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ABSTRACT 
 
CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CONSCIENCE FORMATION AND SYSTEMIC FORMATION (IN NIGERIA) 
 
 
By 
Augustine E. Ebido, O.P. 
May 2014 
 
Dissertation supervised by Gerald Boodoo, PhD 
 This research focuses on the impact of the moral community (or social context) on the 
formation of conscience and its implication for moral responsibility. It is an interdisciplinary approach 
to theological reflection that is particularly attentive to psychological, philosophical, sociological, and 
neurobiological viewpoints showing how these have either distorted or broadened our understanding of 
conscience in its relation to community and social responsibility, or its formation in relationship to our 
moral development. It stresses reciprocity of conduct (for we are “responders”) and the 
complementarities of internal and external sanctions. It insists that the influence of conscience on 
behavior is undermined by a fixation on its cognitive at the detriment of the feeling aspect such that 
retrieving the latter will broaden our appreciation of its deep but subtle influence. While admitting the 
v 
 
richness of African “communalism” as the basis for a healthy formative process, it also sees in it a 
perplexing paradox given the socio-political realities of venal leadership and systemic corruption that 
de-colors the African landscape. Focusing on Nigeria, it identifies “tribalism” as a socio-moral 
“pathology” (an institutionalized self-interest) that not only distorts the traditional process of moral 
formation but has evolved as a core driver of systemic corruption. It claims that globalization enables 
“external powers” to impact local moral orientation. It links “local tribalism” and “international 
tribalism” as “pathologies” based on kinship of disordered self-interest.  It exposes how the latter 
influences local moral disorientation in a way analogous to how the local moral community impacts the 
malformation of individual conscience and thus influencing irresponsibility. Its recommendations 
include: a “glocalized” moral reform aimed at “updating” conscience formation process and 
overcoming tribalism; a paradigm shift in foreign policy agenda towards a new ethic; and a “three-
stage-process” that focuses on deconstructing unhealthy belief systems and building “active” moral 
communities as part of a robust long-term strategy against systemic corruption and deeper socio-moral 
transformation.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The original impetus for this research came from a hunger that seeks to understand the 
deeper reasons underlying poor governance and systemic corruption that has plagued Nigeria 
(and most African nations) since independence. The degree of corruption found in our leadership 
reached insane proportions in Nigeria in both military and civilian regimes such that the question 
is asked, “Where is their conscience?” Coincidentally, this research commenced at a time when 
the world was enveloped in economic recession that threatened the future of many countries and 
families. The underlying reason for this recession was monumental “greed” of certain individuals 
who were supposedly “custodians” of our financial institutions. Some of the bank executives that 
gambled away the future of so many people around the world, not only made money out of the 
crash itself but walked away with salaries and bonuses that were simply ludicrous.
1
 The question 
is again asked “where is their conscience?” Evidently, greed is not a uniquely African problem 
but a global phenomenon. However, given the reality that corruption has arrested the possibility 
of building sustainable social institutions (particularly in Nigeria), this research attempts to seek 
an understanding of the deeper roots of the problem of moral irresponsibility.   
                                               
1 See Sam Polk’s New York Times article “The Love of Money”. He was a young executive who traded on 
derivatives during the recession. His confession gives insight to the culture of greed on Wall Street.  He made $3.6 
million dollars in bonuses and was angry it was not enough! He said, “Not only was I not helping fix any problems 
in the world, but I was profiting from them. During the market crash in 2008, I‘d made tons of money by shorting 
the derivatives of risky companies. As the world crumbled, I profited. I’d seen the crash coming, but instead of 
trying to help the people it would hurt most – people who didn’t have a million dollars in the bank – I made money 
off it.” See (Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: 10th Anniversary Edition 
2012)http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/opinion/sunday/for-the-love-of-money.html?ref=executivepay&_r=0 
Alan Pyke, in an article, “Three infuriating facts about Wall Street CEOs five years after the Crises,” details the 
payout and bonuses of the CEOs that were responsible for the meltdown. See 
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/09/10/2595421/infuriating-facts-subprime-ceos-years-financial-crisis/ Alvin 
Lin, traces the “causes” of the recession in his paper, 
http://www.academia.edu/1615702/The_Global_Financial_Crisis_Causes_Remedies_and_Discourses  
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The question of conscience is very poignant because it is commonly assumed to be the 
doorkeeper of moral rectitude.
2
 Catholic moral tradition has consistently held that conscience is 
the gateway to moral responsibility, “man’s most secret core,” where he hears God’s voice 
“echoing in his depths” and calling him to act uprightly.3  It is that capacity that enables us to 
“recognize the moral quality” of specific acts (either performed in the past, present, or future),4  
and to enable us to make prudent judgment with respect to that quality. Therefore, if our leaders 
consistently make wrong choices, does this imply they do not have a conscience or that they 
have but theirs do not influence their actions? The answer has obvious implication for universal 
application.    
To the first part of the question, some have argued that those who act without the normal 
“pangs of conscience” have psychological problems verging on the psychopathic.5 If greedy 
cooperate CEOs (in the U.S) and venal political leaders (in Nigeria) are proven to have “lost” 
their consciences, then it does seem the problem lays not on the functionality of conscience per 
se but on a deeper psychological malady that impact upon their access to their specific 
consciences. The second part of the question (as to the influence of conscience on human 
                                               
2 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed. Unabridged, s.v. “conscience,” defines it as “the 
inner sense of what is right or wrong in one’s conduct or motives, impelling one towards right action.” The New 
Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) says that “Moral Conscience, present at the heart of the person, enjoins 
him at the appropriate moment to do good and to avoid evil. It also judges particular choices, approving those that 
are good and denouncing those that are evil” (See, CCC, 1777)  
3 Vatican II Documents (Gaudium et Spes, 16). John H. Newman calls it the “messenger,” and “the aboriginal Vicar 
of Christ.” See, “Letter to the Duke of Norfolk,” V, cited in CCC, 1778.   
4 CCC, 1778 
5 See R. D. Hare, Without Conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths among us. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1993), pp.3-7 He argues that psychopaths are essentially distinguished by their “stunning lack of 
conscience.” Hare, Without Conscience, p. 6 
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behavior) is more problematic. There are scholarly views that suggest conscience does or does 
not have real influence on our actions.
6
  
It is this particular question of the ability of conscience to influence our behavior (a 
question of its relevance) that prompts the need to explore the deeper roots of moral 
responsibility. If conscience is not relevant to our behavior, then what is it in our natural 
endowments that enable us to act responsibly? On the other hand, if conscience is that “natural 
endowment” that enables responsible action in us, then why does it seem to be impotent in some 
people? Are there “conditions” that enable its functionality in influencing us to act rightly?  
 Addressing the above questions more holistically is the purpose for this research. We 
agree with the traditional Catholic view that conscience is the capacity in us for moral 
responsibility. It is “an inner inclination”7 to do the good thing and avoid evil. But given that the 
possible “relevance” of conscience has been in decline since the last century due to negative 
scholarly opinions
8
, we intend to begin our quest by re-examining the question of the human 
moral dilemma as the objective of chapter one. This broadens our perspective to forge a link 
                                               
6 David Hume argued that reason is “impotent” for as he says, “Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the 
source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals”.6 The stress is ours. See Treatise on Human 
Nature, London: John Noon, 1739, reprinted in Morality and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics Through 
Classical Sources, edited by Robert C. Solomon and Cancy C. Martin (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 2004, p. 
206-220.  See also Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, Toward a Caring Society: Ideas into Action (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1995), p.77; http://www.questia.com/read/16166263. 
7 Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1992), p. 152 
8 Sigmund Freud is representative of scholars that projected a negative view of conscience. His conclusions claim 
that conscience is merely the neurotic expression of internalized “social angst” or the repressed fear of parental and 
societies’ rules. Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume, argues that “reason is a slave to the passions,” implying 
that if conscience is an intellectual activity, as traditional Catholic theology holds it to be, it has little influence on 
behavior. Thomas Hobbes’ classic argument that selfishness is a necessity of our nature implies that conscience has 
little influence on our choices if it has to do with self-interest. The specific references to these scholars are provided 
in the body of this research.  
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between our broader moral complexity and the specific solutions designed to be found in an 
active conscience.
9
 An “active” conscience in this study refers to a well-formed and informed 
conscience. Traditionally, Catholic tradition holds that the more a “correct” or informed 
conscience prevails, “the more do persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and try to be 
guided by objective moral standards of moral conduct.”10 Therefore chapter two will explore the 
psychological theories of moral development as a prelude to theological views on conscience. 
These are complemented by philosophical and neurobiological viewpoints on the theme. This 
approach provides us a broader perspective on views that have tended to diminish the value of 
conscience or provide useful insights that would help us understand the significance of 
socialization or primary socio-moral context for the quality of conscience and moral formation. 
 In our search for a deeper understanding of the influence of conscience on behavior we 
will try to retrieve its “feeling” aspect as a critical component that is often denied and the 
addition of which would significantly boost its influence. Philosophical and neurobiological 
insights indicate that we are often moved by our appetites. The deeper reasons for our acting are 
often based on how we feel than merely what we think. It is our feelings that imbue our action 
with meaning such that we put our “heart” in it.11  This reality of our nature does not imply 
impunity but that the cognitive and feeling component of conscience work as a composite 
                                               
9 Traditionally, Catholic Moral theology has affirmed that conscience could lead one to an error of judgment unless 
it is properly formed and informed (See CCC nos. 17790-1794). We stress “active” conscience to refer to a well-
formed and informed conscience. Selznick considers the formation of conscience as the “natural process” that that 
opens us up or disposes us properly to “moral concerns”. P. Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, p. 151 
10 See Gaudium et Spes, 16 
11 See Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: 10th Anniversary Edition (Kindle edition: Random House, 2012), 
pp. 4-5. Goleman argues that it is misplaced to call human “homo-sapiens” because science has shown that our 
decisions are often based not merely on cognition but on emotion and often more of the later. Goleman, p. 5   
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process. We experience “wholehearted commitment” when our feelings are involved. And 
conscience is about wholeheartedness, about feeling right about what we did, doing or to do.
12
      
 The specific moral challenges we are confronted with particularly in Nigeria is the socio-
moral condition that gives birth to venal leadership and systemic corruption. Therefore 
ascertaining the deeper roots of this socio-moral disease that has rendered comatose all efforts at 
building effective social institutions will involve examining relevant aspects of traditional 
structures of moral formation and the impact of social conditions on these structures. This will 
not only help us understand the normal processes that shape moral thinking in the local setting, 
but also help us determine the possibility that “consciences” could be functionally active within 
these prevailing conditions.
13
 The objective of chapter three will be to examine the notion of 
community and its relevant social context to underscore its significance for moral formation. We 
shall argue that an ideal conscience can only be formed in an ideal community – not an abstract 
utopian ideal, but a community that has an active moral voice.
14
 This provides the background 
for assessing the impact of specific socio-cultural practices in Nigeria on conscience formation 
and overall moral evolution.  
                                               
12 See, Sidney Callahan, In Good Conscience: Reason and Emotion in Moral Decision Making (New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 95 
13 William C. Spohn argues that “Conscience depends on the moral quality of the group to which we belong. We 
gain our moral bearing from the communities we are born into and deliberately choose, beginning with family and 
extending to peers, other adults, religious and professional communities. We carry their voices in our heads, for 
better or for worse. Recent research indicates that people identify with those values and principles that are supported 
by communities that matter to them. O’Connell writes in his recent work on moral formation that we live up or 
down to the standards of the groups to which we belong.” See W. C. Spohn, “Conscience and Moral Development,” 
in Conscience, edited by Charles E. Curran (New York, Paulist Press, 2004), p.133 
14 Amitai Etzioni argues that “community is a moral voice” and where this is lacking, there is likely not going to be 
a an authentic community. See, The Spirit of the Community: The Reinvention of American Society (New York: 
Touchstone Book, 1994), pp. 32-38  
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 We identify “tribalism” as a primary “socio-moral pathology” that its impact on 
traditional moral formation process in Nigeria has been ignored for too long.
15
 Tribalism is 
described here as the “institutionalization of self-interest” that over time evolves a legacy of 
distrust as the default form of inter-tribal relation that then skews the socialization process in a 
direction detrimental to optimal formation of conscience and morality.
16
In other words, we are 
contending that tribalism is a key element that disrupts traditional moral formation process in 
Nigeria.
17
 We also apply the insights of global analysis in this chapter to show the link between 
“local tribalism” and “international tribalism” as one of “kinship,” since both are forms of 
“institutionalized self-interests.” We will argue that international tribalism impacts moral 
orientation in the local community in a way analogous to how the moral community impacts 
                                               
15 There is a perplexing ambivalence in the fact that Africans in diaspora complain and fight against “racism” abroad 
but tend to justify or rationalize “tribalism” at home. Even more ironic is the fact that most are “good” Christians. 
Jay, J. Carney and others have identified tribalism with racism as they lamented on how “racist ideology” among the 
Hutu “institutionalized discrimination” that gave birth to the Rwandan Genocide.  Most were pious Catholics. See, J. 
J, Carney, “Waters of Baptism, Blood of Baptism?” In African Ecclesial Review, Vol.2, March-June (2008): 12-13. 
We consider tribalism and racism as essentially sharing “kindred spirits” for both are forms of prejudice based on 
disparity of “kinship”. But our characterization does take due cognizance of the inherent value in ethnic solidarity 
prevalent among all human groups.  
16 J.S Mill argues that conscience is an internal sanction of duty whose “binding force” depends on whether one is 
“cultivated in it,” not. In other words, it has no compelling power on those whose consciences are undeveloped. He 
counsels for the cultivation of conscience because of its social utility, it helps to increase happiness in society when 
most people act responsibly in keeping with the demands of law. Internal sanctions complement external sanctions 
(or civil law). See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, edited by George Sher, Hacket Publishing Company, Inc. In Morality 
and the Good Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004, pp. 315-351. See also Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience: The 
Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (Kindle Edition: Guilford Press, 1999) Location, 904 
17 Gordon W. Allport has provided insight in his seminal work on “prejudice” that we explored in understanding the 
roots of this socio-moral disease. He elaborates that prejudice is not merely “thinking ill of others without warrant,” 
or “a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, towards a person or thing prior to, or not based on actual experience.” He 
specifically defines it as “an aversive or hostile attitude towards a person who belongs to a group, simply because he 
belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group.” He then 
asserts from above that “ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may 
be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or towards an individual because he is a 
member of that group.” See Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 25th Anniversary Edition, 1979, pp.7, 9  
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upon individual conscience and behavior. This dialectical relation is based upon the reciprocity 
of conduct at the core of moral irresponsibility.  
 Chapter four focuses on Nigeria socio-political context for particular application of the 
insights we gleaned from the foregoing chapters. It explores the notion of corruption (incidental, 
systematic, or systemic) and identifies the Nigerian socio-political context as a society immersed 
in systemic corruption. We expose the nature of corruption and describe the extensions of 
systemic corruption in Nigeria (from despotic and venal leadership to scam artists in cyber 
cafes). Theories of systemic corruption we explore reveal their strengths (especially of “targeted 
gradualism”)18 and inadequacies.19 We will recommend a more holistic approach that constitutes 
part of a long-term strategy to the problem. 
 The final chapter (chapter five) synthesizes the essential points of our research. Our 
approach is to provide a critical summary of the previous chapters and to apply the essential 
insights of the research in formulating our recommendations and general conclusion.  Part of our 
recommendation is a “glocalized”20 moral reform with a stress on internal content of reform.21 
                                               
18 Susan Rose-Ackerman analysis provides a useful insight for the recommendations we will eventually advocate in 
this research.  See Rose Ackerman, Corruption in Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
19 Phyllis Dininio, “The Risk of Recorruption,” in Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries, edited by Bertram 
I. Spector (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc, 2005), pp. 233-249  
20 Habibul H. Khondker traces the history of this term to an adaptation of Japanese word “dochakuka” that means 
“global local” (the effort to adapt globalized farming methods to local needs). It has since been used by different 
authors to describe the integral relationship between the global and local. For the historical evolution of this term, 
see Habibul H. Khondker, “Glocalization as Globalization: Evolution of a Sociological Concept, in Bangladesh e-
journal of Sociology, 1(2) June, 2004. http://www.bangladeshsociology.org/Habib%20-%20Glocalization.htm. See 
also Victor Roudometof, “Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Glocalization,” in Current Sociology, Vol. 53 
(1): 113-135, http://csi.sagepub.com/content/53/1/113.  William Schweiker uses this term to describe “a condition in 
which the local is globalized and global forces are only grasped in distinctive local situations” See, “Whither Global 
Ethics? Moral Consciousness and Global Cultural Flows,” in Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 42, no. 3 (2007), 
http://www.questia.com/read/1G1-171137337. We use this term here to describe the same idea of interpenetration of 
the global in the local such that powerful nations and multinationals that have significant influence in other nations 
(like Nigeria), where they have interests, can participate in a significant way in a reform agenda through their 
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We will be proposing a unique method (the “three-stage-process”) that is tailored to meet the 
needs of largely uneducated agrarian societies of Nigeria (and perhaps Africa) without being too 
simplistic to the educated class. We hope that this method be part of a robust long-term strategy 
for moral reform in Nigeria (and perhaps Africa) that aims at updating conscience formation and 
raising moral consciousness by building active moral communities, one village at a time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
policies and actions. The inherent danger of any such collaboration between the West and Africa is that of neo-
colonialism. Recognizing this possible danger is important for the partners until trust is built. We cannot for fear of 
the possible risks in life confine ourselves to live a life of isolation.   
21 Part of that internal reform effort is the critical re-evaluation of received values encoded in behavior, practices, 
and symbols such that unhealthy aspects could be expunged and healthy practices retrieved or reinvented.  
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1.0 SEARCHING FOR FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
1.0.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER ONE 
We assume that in order to understand the significance of conscience for the development 
of character, we need to expose some aspects of the human struggle for achieving moral 
responsibility. Therefore, this introductory chapter provides a critical background for 
understanding why we need to revisit the question of conscience and also defines our chosen 
methodology as a “synthetic” model22. Given that we do not intend to force the claim of the 
relevance of conscience for the growth and development of moral character and for building and 
maintenance of good human institutions, hence, we considered that the best way to begin is by 
raising questions regarding the human dilemma with moral responsibility, and to search for the 
roots of moral irresponsibility.  
While this study does not claim that this is a wholly new quest, we are however 
convinced that this question needs to be raised afresh in the light of prevailing historical 
situations. We have witnessed the rate at which corruption in government and cooperate organs 
is impacting both developed and developing nations around the world.  Africa in particular is 
experiencing unparalleled corruption, a monumental failure of leadership, and a disturbing 
passivity of its citizens to hold their leadership accountable. Evidence from experience suggests 
that systemic corruption is perpetuated when the greater part of the citizens deliberately or 
inadvertently participate in it. And systemic corruption and failed leadership often lead to social 
disintegration. Both realities can be effectively forestalled if and only if the ordinary citizens are 
                                               
22 Stephen B. Bevans presented six possible “models of contextual theology” that includes: translation, 
anthropological, praxis, synthetic, transcendental, and countercultural models none of which is inherently superior 
and/or better than the other. See Models of Contextual Theology (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 2004).  
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properly enlightened and empowered to fight for the kind of commonwealth they want and/or 
deserve.  
This chapter provides a foundational framework for understanding what has gone wrong first 
with the human moral structures in general and specifically with the Nigerian socio-moral 
context such that Nigerians often seem incapable of shaping positively the trajectory of their own 
development. We hope to argue that indeed, something has gone wrong with the socio-moral 
foundations of human communities such that incidental or systemic corruption we now 
experience on a large scale globally is but a primary symptom of that fact. We strongly hold to 
the view that unless we underline afresh the reality of human moral dilemma, understanding the 
role that conscience plays as the “doorkeeper” of both “good character” and “good 
citizenship” (and leadership) is a virtual impossibility. Specifically relevant for Nigeria we stress 
that unless we begin a holistic socio-moral re-evaluation, exposing and expunging certain 
unhealthy cultural and socio-moral viewpoints and beliefs that confuse and dis-empower our 
people, and replacing them with more healthy and empowering ones, we may not likely build 
very strong social-political and economically vibrant and enduring institutions in this century 
despite the positive index we now see on the horizon.     
This chapter has two parts. The first part raises the question of the human moral dilemma 
by exploring the notion of responsibility and searching for the roots of moral [ir]responsibility. 
We define the notion of responsibility that is specific for the goals of this research. H. R. Niebuhr 
and Philip Selznick provide us insights in conceptualizing responsibility that stresses reciprocity 
of conduct. This provides us a contrasting framework to examine some views on the African 
notion of moral responsibility. We singled out the concept of “Ubuntu” as a specific African 
concept that approximates the extensions of the meaning we ascribe to moral responsibility in 
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Africa even though it is a region-specific concept. Ironically, there is no homogenous Nigerian 
term for it. This forces one to think of a need to “invent” a homogenous term for responsibility.  
An adequate understanding of moral responsibility implies moral agency. Therefore, we 
shall examine the notion of personhood in its Western and African conceptualizations to 
underline the different emphasis and accentuate its implication for understanding African moral 
orientation. Given that African notion of person is embedded irrevocably with its notion of 
community, we shall examine the nexus between personhood, moral responsibility, and 
community. This will situate our theme for fuller development in subsequent chapters when we 
develop that relationship at a deeper level in relation to conscience. The difficulties arising from 
our research on personhood and moral responsibility leads us to further explore the “roots” of 
moral responsibility. We shall examine the data from neurobiology and moral psychology to 
refresh our mind on the state of the debate regarding the origins of morality and the human 
capacities for overcoming our “genetic” predisposition to irresponsibility. We shall examine the 
role of nature and/or nurture (environment) in overcoming the single moral albatross called 
“selfishness” or in the parlance of neurobiology: our “selfish gene”.   
The second part of the chapter will be on methodology. We shall define our chosen 
methodology (as synthetic theological model) and provide reasons for our choice. Given that this 
is an interdisciplinary approach to theological reflection, we consider this model as having the 
proper extensions to accommodate and dialogue with not just diverse theological and 
philosophical viewpoints that this research will encounter, but also the insights from biological 
and social sciences. Finally, we end this chapter by raising questions about the relevance of a 
methodological shift in emphasis among African scholars from a need to develop the conceptual 
and structural traditions we inherited to one of reconstructing and improving upon that tradition. 
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We consider a paradigm shift from a compact retrieval of complex traditions to one of “critical 
differentiation” as holding the key to African self-understanding and development in this 
century. 
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1.1 Human Moral Dilemma: Defining Moral Responsibility 
 Men who are governed by reason…desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire 
for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, faithful, and honorable.
23
  
 
The man-made tragedies of this century alone evidently mock the sentiments in the beautiful 
quote above. Some of such tragedies include the two world wars, the genocides (the “holocaust” 
being its extreme form) in Germany, Kosovo, Rwanda, Somalia, among others. It should include 
the “kleptocracies” that most despotic leaders practiced (or still practice as a camouflage for 
democracy) and effectively arrest the development of their respective countries. Having 
squandered the resources of their respective countries they jettisoned the development of its 
human potentials. We must now add the recent phenomenon of “suicide bombing” that has 
claimed thousands of lives as well as changed the world dynamics and the way we live. Finally, 
we cannot overlook the prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into an economic meltdown 
with very painful and lasting consequences.  A common trait that runs through these human 
activities is its irrationality.  
It is a troubling paradox that at a possible zenith of human progress,
24
 at least with 
reference to knowledge, we find an increasing irrationality. This irrationality is manifested in 
irresponsible actions  in every tragedy of human history. While it is smug to point accusing 
                                               
23 Benedict Spinoza, Ethics (London: Dent, 1910) reprint of 1677 edition, book 4. Prop.22 cited in P. Selznick, 
Moral Commonwealth, p. 209.  
24 Given the lack of consensus as to what constitutes “development” we prefer to use the term “progress” in its 
ordinary meaning as “an advance” (Oxford dictionary notes its Latin roots: “progressus” See, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/progress?q=progress ) in almost all areas of human knowledge 
- especially as made evident in available scientific and technological data. The claim of an “advance” is still 
debatable because it is relative to differing views as to what constitutes “progress” or a “setback”. This debate is not 
one we intend to pursue here.  
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fingers at notorious individuals like Adolf Hitler, Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia (the ethnic 
cleanser in Serbia), Theoneste Bagosora (the genocide organizer of Rwanda), Osama Bin Laden 
(the spiritual leader of modern day terrorists), and even ponzi schemers
25
  like Bernard L. 
Madoff, yet they all serve to underscore the human predicament of a defective conscience.  
Predictably, these irresponsible acts of human history keep repeating themselves; regrettably, the 
negatives seem to be more repetitive. It is the irresponsible acts of man that threaten not just 
human civilization but life itself on planet earth. It is imperative to self-preservation that we 
begin to reconsider what has gone wrong (or going wrong) with the human project.  
This research is not particularly concerned about single individuals with an uncanny 
capacity for great evil (for we will always have them), but is rather more interested in 
understanding why masses of people can be duped to act against their better judgments – even if 
it be the influence of charismatic monsters like Hitler, Bin Laden, or falling prey to fraudsters 
like Madoff. We believe that it requires a certain degree of irresponsibility if not serious moral 
pathology to be part or a participant in the schemes these people orchestrated. Whether it be a 
confused wo/man participating in “ethnic cleansing,” or “suicide bombing” that destroys 
innocent lives, or an elite partner in a cycle of “systemic corruption” that is crippling a nation (a 
wall street entrepreneur or an actor in a third world government) not only expresses a puzzling 
“irrationality” but seem to point to the flowering of certain seeds of irresponsibility sown at 
given historical moments. Each of these horrendous acts has a story, a life-cycle, or a history.   
                                               
25 Online Investment encyclopedia defines it as “a fraudulent investing scam that promises high rates of return at 
little risk to investors. The scheme generates returns for older investors by acquiring new investors. This scam 
actually yields the promised returns to earlier investors, as long as there are more new investors.”  See more: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ponzischeme.asp#ixzz1ZyRrsJFz   This scheme is only one among many 
other fraudulent activities we now classify as “scams”. These activities form either part or whole of a scammer’s 
work portfolio. It therefore could constitute a “normal” daily activity of a ‘normal’ person.  
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It is our contention that in all situations, great moral evil on a large scale as we have 
experienced so far never succeeds without the cooperation of a willing majority of “normal” 
people or a community of moral agents. It is for this reason that we begin this research with 
investigating afresh the roots of moral [ir]responsibility as a critical background that helps us 
understand its deep links with formation or “deformation” of  conscience and vice versa, in a 
given community of agents.  As Philip Selznick puts it, “to be effective conscience depends on 
an array of psychic competencies, especially the capacity to defer gratification, experience guilt, 
make commitments, and fulfill obligations.”26 We conceive conscience as the doorkeeper of 
responsible actions such that it is inconceivable that we can act responsibly in a consistent 
manner without a living (or active) conscience. It is this intrinsic dialectics between conscience 
and moral responsibility that needs understanding today for a recovery of this critical quality of 
responsible action that not only builds character but also the quality of the human society.  
 H. Richard Niebuhr’s definition of responsibility helps us to effectively differentiate it from 
irresponsibility. He argues: 
The idea or pattern of responsibility, then, may summarily and abstractly be defined as 
the idea of an agent’s action as response to an action upon him in accordance with his 
interpretation of the latter action and with his expectation of response to his response; and 
all of this in a continuing community of agents.
27
 
 
                                               
26 P. Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, p. 151. We shall explore in later chapters the value of “guilt” for moral 
ordering in any society. We shall argue that the effort to purge the human psyche of all sense of “guilt” poses a 
serious problem to proper development of moral consciousness.  
27 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self, p. 65.  
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Evidently this definition departs from the traditional “merit-based” approach (Aristotelian 
model) in defining moral responsibility.
28
 We shall revisit this model latter in this chapter. Four 
elements are involved in Niebuhr’s definition: a) response to previous action b) interpretation c) 
accountability d) social solidarity. It is primarily a “response” to an action done to us. In other 
words, responsibility is a fruit of experience. It is a “response” in the light of the meaning we 
input to a prior action underscoring the significance of interpretation. Interpretation is at the heart 
of responsibility because if one understands that prior action to be positive (loving, kind, helpful, 
and life-giving) it will influence one’s response in a radical way if contrasted with a negative 
interpretation (hurtful, hateful, mean, death dealing). It is therefore a “response” that is “in 
accordance with our interpretation of the question to which answer is given.”29 Niebuhr explains 
that in our effort to act responsibly, we try to answer the question “what shall I do?” by posing a 
prior question, “what is going on?” or “what is being done to me?”30 Niebuhr insists that our 
responsible actions are not just responses to interpreted actions but there ought to be expectation 
of other responses or an “anticipation of answers to our answers”31 which is accountability.  
 Accountability therefore is being able to stay with our actions and accept the 
consequences of such actions. Our response is only but a unit in a chain of responses – a form of 
dialogue in action that forms a whole narrative. It is only proper to then have social solidarity as 
                                               
28 Aristotle provides us with the oldest model of this approach to understanding moral responsibility in his discourse 
on virtues. See Nicomachean Ethics (Book II: 8:20-25; III: 1-12).   
29 R. H. Niebuhr, The Responsible Self, p.63  
30 This constitutes part of Niebuhr’s critique of deontological (Kant) and teleological approaches (Aquinas) to 
morality as they presume the moral agent basically asks questions of ultimate ends and/or ultimate laws. He 
proposes a “relational ethic” of doing what is “fitting” or “appropriate” than what is our “duty” or the “law”.  
31 Niebuhr, Ibid, p. 64.  
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its fourth element. Social solidarity confirms that there is continuity in this dialogical action – a 
response and reciprocal response that forges the bond of relationships holding the society 
together or initiates its disintegration. Social solidarity ensures that this interaction is “among 
beings forming a continuing society.” He argues that personal responsibility implies both a 
“continuity of a self” and that of “community of agents” for this dialogical action of reciprocal 
relation to happen.  
Part of the significance of Niebuhr’s insight for us is in his rejection of the view that 
humans are basically “citizens” who merely “obey laws” (as we find in I. Kant) or those that see 
them as “builders” that seek to achieve certain ends (Aristotle). Niebuhr rather prefers to see a 
human being as a social organism – “living in dialogue and responding to actions upon him.”32 
The insight here is that as social beings we are basically “responders”. Our response is based on 
the meaning we attach to “actions done to us.” The direct implication of this insight is that 
responsibility is rather more caught than taught. It then underscores moral responsibility as a 
quality of the “self” that is radically integral to its concrete community. Individuals and even 
groups are “responders” who tailor their actions based on their “interpretations” of prior actions 
upon them. In chapter three and four we shall explore the implication of this view not only in 
shaping moral responsibility but it does illumine the evolution of irresponsible actions.  
Niebuhr asserts that the self knows itself only in relation to other selves within a concrete 
community. He draws insight from Herbert Mead and Martin Buber to underscore this social 
nature of the self who does not know itself in the “I-It” relation, but rather, only in the “I-thou” 
                                               
32 Eric Mount, Conscience and Responsibility, p. 51.  
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relation that it comes to know itself as known.
33
  It is therefore within the social context that one 
becomes not just moral beings but quintessentially one comes to know oneself as a “self.”   
Another critical element of Niebuhr’s definition above is “accountability.” This does not 
mean mathematical accuracy, but the courage to face the consequences of one’s choices or 
“responses”. This is what it means in common language to have “integrity”.  Integrity then is 
about honesty and consistency that defines the self. However, this does not imply a “mere 
consistency” of either thought or action since these could be possessed by psychopaths, 
sociopaths or the kind of persons we listed above. Integrity (taken here as a core aspect of 
responsibility) denotes a perceptible authenticity that characterizes the whole person’s conduct 
and bearing. In other words, it abhors all forms of deception or duplicity and it helps define the 
self as harmonious, whole and sound.
34
 John Rawls elaborates this concept: 
Here we should note that in times of social doubt and loss of faith in long established values, 
there is a tendency to fall back on the virtues of integrity: truthfulness and sincerity, lucidity and 
commitment, or, as some say, authenticity. If no one knows what is true, at least we can make our 
beliefs our own in our own way and not adopt them as handed to us by others. 
35
 
 
To reiterate, Rawls identifies “truthfulness” “commitment” [consistency] and lucidity” [or 
coherence] as “virtues of integrity.” He however argues that they are “virtues of form” and as 
such not adequate for an understanding of moral uprightness or objectivity except they are joined 
                                               
33 R. H. Niebuhr, ibid. pp. 72-73. He argues, “The fundamental form of human association, it is seen, is 
not that contract society into which men enter as atomic individuals, making partial commitments to each 
other for the sake of gaining limited common ends or of maintaining certain laws; it is rather the face-to-
face community in which unlimited commitments are the rule and in which every aspect of every self’s 
existence is conditioned by membership in the interpersonal group.” Niebuhr, ibid. p.73  
34 See Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, pp. 212-213.  
35 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 455  
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to “appropriate conception of justice…”36 What this means is that integrity is not about content 
but form. Though it represents a definitive mode of thinking, acting, or feeling but it does not 
specify the contents of judgments or choices we make. Selznick argues that “To act with 
integrity is to have values and take them seriously, but the values themselves may be diverse.”37 
However, he adds that form and content cannot be “radically separated” because the former 
impacts the latter. The “content” depends on our concept of the “good”, or as Rawls asserts, our 
concept of justice. In other words, if we have integrity, it does influence the choices we make.  
An important point Selznick made, which is corroborated by evidence, was that in 
conditions of psychological stress, and where the “ego” is insecure, personal integrity is difficult 
to sustain. Though we agree with this claim, but we argue that it is precisely in such situations 
that the authenticity of one’s integrity is proven. Even in a country where bribery and corruption 
is rampant (systemic corruption), upholding integrity will prove an uphill task, but the fact is, 
that in such unscrupulous environments, we do find some people, by their morally responsible 
conduct, exhibit authentic integrity. The moral problematic is how to increase the proportion of 
those who act like that from “few” to “many”. Our first intuition is that “targeted formation” – 
that is, formation directed specifically at inculcating “specific virtues,” (of “integrity”) is critical 
for the moral goals of a given community. We shall reflect on this in the last chapter. The 
                                               
36 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 456 He holds that “tyrants” may display these qualities to a high degree. The 
question might be raised, “if someone like Hitler exhibits sincerity and commitment to what he considers his 
“values,” does he have integrity?” Rawls will say “yes,” if integrity is separated from justice; it is debatable what 
Niebuhr’s answer will be because of the nexus in his thoughts between self, community, context (time or history) 
and God. We however think his final answer will be “no” given the integral relation he finds between responsibility 
and conscience. Without a properly formed conscience, integrity becomes sterile regimentation. The “Islamic 
suicide bombers” have maintained “integrity of purpose in killing Westerners and liquidating their assets, but they 
exhibit a blind or sterile rigidity that often reveals a distortion – integrity without a clear notion of “justice” (or 
“love” or “mercy”).  
37 Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth, p. 213.  
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implication of the foregoing is that, like most virtues, context is important for both the 
formulation and the formation of integrity and without which the notion of moral responsibility 
remains vacuous. 
Therefore, accountability in this definition is a functional synonym of integrity, and 
considered to be a major part of the essence of moral responsibility. Accountability means taking 
one’s values seriously; and to the extent that one is willing to bear the consequences of the 
values we live by consistently, to that extent we are supposedly deemed accountable and 
therefore exhibit integrity of purpose. However, while “consistency” is part of what defines 
“integrity,” it does not mean “every persistent pattern” of either conduct or motivation is a mark 
of integrity.
38
 This underscores the integral relationship between form and content in 
conceptualizing integrity.  
Selznick is of the view that “virtues of integrity cannot guarantee morally right outcomes 
any more than due process of law can guarantee substantive justice.”39 He also holds that 
“virtues of reason” cannot guarantee moral outcomes given that these are qualities that are 
“necessarily detached from content” since it is their role to “assess the content of particular 
choices and patterns of conduct.”40 But he affirms that the degree of “striving for integrity”” 
could enhance the probability of achieving moral uprightness just as the degree of “striving for 
due process” could enhance the probability of justice being done. The key then may be how to 
enhance this “striving” since there seem to be no other guarantees. We argue that due diligence 
                                               
38 Ibid, p. 214 
39 Ibid, p. 214 (The stress is his).  
40 Ibid, p. 214 
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in conscience formation will invariably increase this striving. However, we cannot deny in this 
research the important role of grace in the practice of virtue of any form.
41
   
Philip Selznick further distinguishes between moral and aesthetic integrity to underscore 
the fact that while “consistency” is a character of integrity in general, moral integrity is about 
‘wholeness” of the personality and therefore cannot admit of duplicity. He insists that “it is the 
integrity of self, not of a specific activity, that matters most for moral experience.”42 This view 
highlights “integrity” as having more to do with harmony of the whole personality than mere 
constancy as noted earlier. It is the harmonious relationship between one act and others acts of 
the same self that underscores moral integrity and therefore moral responsibility. An example 
may clarify this: Jones is a grade school football coach. He is talented, hardworking, and very 
                                               
41 Though we do not intend to develop a theology of grace in this work, we feel inclined to stress here that human 
virtues acquired through effort are founded in and supported by God’s grace. We refer to St. Augustine, the Doctor 
of Grace, who argues that in the face of an inner cruel necessity (peccati habendi dura necessitas), an inner 
“existential condition” of a psychological nature, that compels us to choose evil such that we cannot achieve any 
lasting good without God’s grace that prepares, enables, and sustains all our efforts. He therefore holds that grace 
precedes us in everything: “Indeed we also work, but we are only collaborating with God who works, for his mercy 
has gone before us. It has gone before us so that we may be healed, and follow us so that once healed, we may be 
given life; it goes before us so that we may be called, and follows us so that we may be glorified; it goes before us so 
that we many live devoutly, and follows us so that we may always live with God: for without him we can do 
nothing.” De gratia et libero arbitrio, 17: PL 44, 901 cited in The New Catechism of the Catholic Church, (United 
States, Liguori Publications, 1994), p.484; Stephen Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace (see reference below).  Aquinas 
will follow this line of argument to hold that we need supernatural grace or habit to “consistently” do the good (See 
Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 109, a. 1-10). His earlier writings seem to support human capacity for achieving human 
virtues but seem influenced by Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings. Pelagius concedes that Adam’s sin has a 
consequence – physiological, spiritual, and environmental effects. But he argues that these effects are not 
transmitted generatively but by imitation. We “re-enact” what Adam did through our own personal choices, and at 
length we are ensnared in sinful habits and create a society and an environment used to sinful customs and lifestyles. 
Grace for him is external rather than internal. The life of Christ is an exemplary grace – it illumines our own life 
path and empowers us from outside. In other words, human nature has the inner resources it needs to obey God’s 
commands for “he has not commanded the impossible”. A theologian like Stephen Duffy thinks that Pelagius did 
have a doctrine of Original sin except that it was presented differently: our individual sinful acts sediment into sinful 
habits and give rise to sinful social habits, structures, and customs that we today call social sin. For further reading 
on the foregoing, see Stephen J. Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology 
(Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993, pp 75-119 
42 Ibid, p. 214 He argues that while a dedicated artist is diligent to maintain the integrity of his work, he as a person 
may be distracted, confused, and deceptive. This hacks back to honesty as seen above.  
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much loved by his students. He won many awards for “best practices” consistently for three 
years. Then, he was caught molesting a boy, and subsequent investigation shows that this was a 
pattern that goes back many years. Is it possible that Jones has integrity as a coach but not as a 
person? If we follow Selznick’s stance on harmony, he can neither be said to possess integrity 
nor be considered a morally responsible person given the “inconsistency” that disrupts the 
wholeness (or integrity) of his other acts.   
Selznick then makes a shift from conduct to structure in order to de-emphasize “acts” and 
“rules” and to rather emphasize the “effectiveness” of “organizations, of persons, institutions, 
and community”43as depending on its inner integrity.44 To then speak of the “moral integrity” of 
an individual, institution, or community is a value judgment regarding its wholeness and/or 
soundness. Moral integrity is an evaluation that seeks to establish the kind of person, institution, 
or community in question. This point on ‘wholeness” and “soundness” is critical for our 
understanding of moral responsibility because so much has been aggressively defended as 
“good” about African socio-moral structures by well-intentioned authors but until we show how 
these have actually helped Africa be a healthier and wholesome continent, we miss the point. 
Morality is a practical discipline. It either helps one live a better life or else it is redundant. So 
while we affirm the invaluable service African apologist have done in defending African 
                                               
43 Ibid. p.214 
44 We need to add here that “effectiveness” in this instance is preferred to “successfulness” of individual or 
organization because to be an effective member of a community essentially means adding in some way to its overall 
socio-economic, moral and/or spiritual health. The implication is that a company that is involved in fraudulent 
practices may become “successful” but not an “effective” member of society precisely because it destroys it from 
within.   
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institutions and values from its critics, we however think the time for retrospection and critical 
re-evaluation is urgently upon us.
45
  
Selznick however points out that this evaluation is never made solely on the basis of an 
abstraction of an ideal of integrity but always in conjunction with its operative meaning 
determined by “historically situated capacities, constraints, and opportunities.”46  This 
underscores the fact that “standards” have been historically conditioned. He maintains that “the 
standard itself cannot be known apart from a theory of what constitutes wholeness and 
soundness”47 in a given context. We shall return to this point later for there is a distinctive 
nuance as to what constitutes “standards” or the “objectivity” of moral responsibility in the 
African context from that of the Western ethical orientation.  
Historically, the first recorded explicit notion of moral responsibility was that articulated 
by Aristotle in his treatment of virtues.
48
 It involves the criteria for determining when an action is 
to be considered blameworthy and by extension, praiseworthy. According to him, virtue is about 
finding the mean between excess. So, he argues that, the man who deviates little from goodness 
(either more or less) is not blamed except he “widely” deviates from it. But he admits the 
difficulty inherent in establishing what constitutes the mean (in this case, for blameworthiness). 
In his view, this may not be arrived at through reasoning as is anything involving the senses. 
                                               
45 Two Nigerian Nobel laureates in literature, Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka vehemently defend African culture 
but also agree that what needs preserving ought to undergo critical evaluation. See E. E. Uzukwu, God, Spirits, and 
Human Wholeness, p. 56 
46 Ibid.p.215. Emphasis is his.  
47 Ibid  
48 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Op. Cit., Bk. II: 9. III: 1-12. We concede that the Homeric epics carry implicit 
references to this term and this is informed by earlier oral traditions as found in African traditional cultures.  
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Rather, our “perception” should guide us to determine what constitutes “excess” and 
blameworthy or the “mean” and therefore praiseworthy. Aristotle’s position still provides the 
outline of the debate: moral responsibility consists in blame or praise of someone based on a 
certain quality of his/her action (depending on how far it harmonizes or departs from its 
supposed mean). This led him to consider the moral agent as such and the characteristics he 
should possess: reason and/or capacity for deliberation. He then determined that voluntariness is 
the necessary conditions for blameworthiness.  
Aristotle’s argument on moral responsibility needs to be seen in its wider context as a 
response to Plato’s view that moral failure (or irresponsibility) is a function of ignorance and 
needs to be overcome by knowledge (as wisdom) alone.
49
 Aristotle insists on the acquisition of 
                                               
49 Plato and Aristotle explored the reason for moral irresponsibility among humans. While Plato finds the answer in 
ignorance, Aristotle argues for “weakness of the will” with relevant qualifications. Plato identifies knowledge (as 
wisdom) as the highest virtue, and ignorance as the ultimate vice.  According to him, it is “contrary to human 
nature” to choose that which is manifestly evil; and when faced with two evils we rather choose the lesser than the 
greater. He insists that nothing overcomes true knowledge – neither fear, pleasure, pain or any other affections (like 
love) would overcome a person with true knowledge since “wisdom is all the reinforcement he needs” as it is the 
“the most powerful element in human life.” So, even though he speaks of the value of virtue, he does so in the 
context of knowledge as the supreme virtue. He insists that whoever learns to distinguish the good from the bad will 
never be swayed to act contrary to that knowledge. Those who do evil do so as a consequence of ignorance akrasia 
(the very opposite of true knowledge) where evil is chosen disguised as the good. He argues in Protagoras, “To 
remind you of your question, it arose because we two agreed that there was nothing more powerful than knowledge, 
but that wherever it is found it always has the mastery over pleasure, and everything else. You, on the other hand 
maintain that pleasure often masters even the man who knows, asked us to say what this experience is, if it is not 
being mastered by pleasure. If we had answered you straight off that it is ignorance, you would have laughed at us, 
but if you laugh at us now, you will be laughing at yourselves as well, for you have agreed that when people make a 
wrong choice of pleasures and pains – that is, of good and evil – the cause of their mistake is lack of 
knowledge….So that is what being mastered by pleasure really is – ignorance” (Plato, Protagoras, 357, c-e). 
Evidently, this hacks back at the finitude of human knowing. However, anyone who had struggled with choice 
knows that we sometimes make “deliberate” wrong choices. Paradoxically, Plato also holds that the vicious is 
responsible for his acts. He distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary acts. Interestingly, only those who act 
with true knowledge act voluntarily; and all wrong doing is characterized as “involuntary” since the agents lack  true 
knowledge. Those who deliberately make wrong choices do so based on inability to know the true good (ignorance).  
As he puts it, “To ‘act beneath yourself’ is pure ignorance; and to ‘be your own master’ is wisdom.” Aristotle will 
strongly disagree with Plato on this point.  Aristotle on the one hand begins his ethical project by examining the 
object of human desire or “the good for man”. He identifies this ultimate object as eudemonia (happiness). 
According to him, the nature of a being is revealed through its “objective teleos” (the supreme end towards which it 
tends). In his analysis of human nature (a composite of body and soul with their varying functions) identifies 
rationality as what differentiates human beings from other lower forms of being (sentient and vegetative beings). 
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virtue as the answer to moral character. According to him, “virtue is a state of character” that 
disposes one to “choose the mean,” the middle point between excess and defect. It is a habit 
often “acquired through repetition of corresponding acts.”50It is therefore neither a passion nor a 
faculty. Aristotle argues as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                       
Since tending towards the end is essential to the perfection of our nature, he distinguishes between rational and 
irrational parts in the human soul. The irrational consists of the vegetative and appetitive powers of the soul. The 
“rational” is essentially the intellect subdivided into speculative and practical intellect. He holds rationality as an 
essentially character of being human. Therefore, acting in accord with reason indicates one is properly ordered 
towards ends and happiness. However, though he acknowledges the supreme priority of reason over other faculties 
of the soul, he thinks it is rather simplistic to assume that ignorance is wholly responsible for human wrong doing. 
Recognizing the need for internal consistency for moral agency, he insists on human freedom (of choice), man is a 
free agent of his acts. As the moving principle of his own actions, he has the freedom to adapt to virtue or vice – to 
make good or bad choices and to act on them accordingly.  He insists that we are not born virtuous or vicious but 
“have it in our power” to become so through habit. This provides the basis for his insistence on training in virtue 
from childhood as the way to create morally upright persons (good citizens) or else abandon man to his basic 
tendencies.  He identifies “three things in the soul that control action and truth – sensation, reason, desire.” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI chapter 2). While sensation does not “originate action,” reason and desire play an 
integral role in moral action but only reason is concerned with truth. According to him, morality is about choice, and 
“choice is a deliberate desire of something in our own power;” therefore “both reasoning must be true and the desire 
right, if the choice is to be good and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.”( Nicomachean Ethics,  
1139 – 25). It is therefore reason, which seeks the truth that guides desire (appetite) which seeks the good. Aquinas 
would affirm in his commentary that “in order that there be perfection in action it is necessary that none of its 
principles be imperfect”(See, Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, translated by C.P. 
Litzinger, Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993, p. 360).Therefore, for Aristotle, since reason and desire concur in 
“choice,” it (choice) is the originating principle of action (as efficient cause - that is, of movement, as distinct from 
final cause concerned with “something” – the end); and the intellect (practical intellect) and sensitive appetite are 
the principles of choice (Aristotle asserts in De Anima that, “Both of these then are capable of originating local 
movement, mind and appetite: 1. Mind, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from 
mind speculative in the character of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that 
which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is 
the beginning of the action. It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of 
movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that 
thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation. So too when imagination 
originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite.” BK. III, chapter 10, 433a, 17-20.  He claims that the 
speculative intellect does not move anything but concerned with truth (the absolutely true) or falsehood as its object. 
Aquinas explains that the “good” of the speculative intellect is “the absolutely true” and its evil is the “absolutely 
false.” In other words, the “essential function” of every intellect is “to express the true and the false.” But the 
manner of that expression is distinct for the speculative and practical intellect. The practical intellect is not 
concerned with the absolutely true (as does the speculative) but has “conformable truth” (that which conforms to 
right appetite) as its good. (Aquinas, Commentary, p.360). We shall see in Chapter two how this relates to 
conscience. It is important to note that Aristotle concedes that appetite (through its object) and practical intellect 
constitute the source of movement involved in moral action.  
 
27Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, BK II: Chapter I 
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Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main 
owes both its birth and growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and 
time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name ethike is 
one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also 
plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by 
nature can form a habit contrary to its nature…Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to 
nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and 
made perfect by habit…Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like 
activities….It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of 
another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the 
difference.”51  
 
He admits that a virtuous life is difficult (because it causes sorrow and pain) but when attained, 
life becomes pleasant. Moreover, determining what constitutes the mean is “difficult to attain” 
such that determining blameworthiness in particular instances is often not arrived at merely by 
reasoning but by perception.
52
 According to him, virtue is about the mean and it is in our power 
to acquire it. He argues thus: 
The end, then, being what we wish for, the mean what we deliberate about and choose, 
actions concerning means must be according to choice and voluntary. Now the exercise 
of the virtues is concerned with means. Therefore virtue also is in our own power, and so 
too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice 
versa…Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not 
to do them, and this is what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be 
virtuous or vicious.
53
  
 
 The claim that “it is in our power” to live virtuously generates debate but Roman 
Catholic theology disagrees with all philosophy that makes this claim precisely because it insists 
that grace is necessary for a virtuous life. Aristotle, a pagan philosopher, however insists on our 
ability to live virtuously through repetition. But given the experience of a preponderance of bad 
                                               
51 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk II: Chapter I, 15-20, 1103b:20 The emphasis is ours.  
52 Nicomachean Ethics, Book II: Chapter 9.  
53 Ibid, Book III: Chapter 5 (1113b: 5-10) 
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choices and actions, he admits the role of ignorance but qualifies this. He affirms that acts done 
under ignorance or compulsion are involuntary but with further qualifications. “Compulsion” 
indicates the influence of an external principle of action without the moral agent contributing 
anything. He admits an inherent difficulty in categorizing the voluntariety of certain specific acts 
of mixed nature. He differentiates “non-voluntary” from “involuntary” acts done as a result of 
ignorance. A person who acts in ignorance but is not repentant acts “non-voluntarily” while he 
that feels pain and remorse is considered to have acted “involuntarily.” He distinguishes acting 
by “reason of ignorance” and “acting in ignorance.” A drunk, for instance, acts under the 
influence of drunkenness but unknowingly misbehaves (acts in ignorance). But he who is 
ignorant of the particulars – of the circumstances of an action and its objectives or end 
(especially with regard to important points) acts by reason of ignorance and therefore 
involuntarily.
54
  
Aristotle’s notion of voluntary action is “that of which the moving principle is in the 
agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action.”55 Therefore, actions 
proceeding from passion or anger are not considered involuntary because they actually proceed 
from the agent and are his acts. He argues that “wickedness is voluntary” and being careless, 
dishonest, unjust or self-indulgent are therefore voluntary.  
                                               
54 Ibid, Book III: Chapter I. According to him, “every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he 
ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad; but the 
term ‘involuntary’ tend to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage – for it is not mistaken 
purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are 
blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is 
concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts 
involuntarily.” NE 1110b: 25-30.  
55 Ibid. 1111a: 25.  
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Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states 
of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person. Again it is 
irrational to suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man 
who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. But if without being ignorant a man does 
the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. Yet it does not 
follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjust as will be just. For neither does the man 
who is ill become well on those terms…So too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent 
man, it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they are unjust 
and self-indulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for 
them not to be so.
56
 
 
Aristotle evidently makes an important point here. He insists that it is irrational to 
consistently make bad choices and expect a different result. The unjust man (or the corrupt 
person) becomes so by choice – a series of bad choices such that at some point he loses the 
power to reverse the outcome given the force of habit. This latter situation, of being powerless to 
reverse an outcome, does not exonerate him. In like manner he refutes the claim that men choose 
the apparent “good” (what seems best to them) whose appearance is not in their control. He 
rejects this excuse for wrongdoing by affirming that the “end appears to each man in a form in 
accord with his character” and “each person is responsible for the state of his mind” and 
therefore the “appearance” of the good he chooses.57 This conforms to modern aphorism: “we 
become what we think.” And since we can control our thought, we are responsible for the 
content of our thoughts that shape who we become. According to Aristotle, even if we hold that 
the end is fixed by nature, then the only way to consider virtue voluntary is that the good man 
“adopts the means voluntarily” and by implication, the bad man “voluntarily” does not.  
                                               
56 Ibid, Book III: Chapter 5 (1114a:5-20). The stress is ours. This argument is of critical import despite critiques of 
it.  
57 Ibid, Book III: Chapter 5 (1114b).  
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To further clarify this point, Aristotle distinguishes between the continent and incontinent 
on one hand, and the temperate and self-indulgent (intemperate) person, on the other, to 
underscore the nature of choice. The incontinent man acts with “appetite” but not with choice, 
the continent man acts with choice rather than appetite. This perhaps is the distinction in 
Aristotle that serves as a basic critique to David Hume who considers reason as a “slave” to the 
appetite. The continent man, following the dictates of reason, resists acting on his desires that he 
knows are evil, but the incontinent disregards reason, for even though he knows his desires are 
evil he still acts on it due to the influence of passion. The self-indulgent person however is led by 
choice, for he voluntarily decides (judges) that he will always purse present pleasure. This 
distinguishes him from the incontinent man who, though he knows his desires are evil, pursues it 
by force of passion. This is why Aristotle considers self-indulgence as identical with wickedness 
in those instances where someone’s choices affect others. In his view, incontinence is better than 
self-indulgence because while it is possible for the incontinent to repent and change, the self-
indulgent is obstinate and hardly will change.  
Interestingly, regarding the object of willing, Aristotle concedes that the “end,” 
absolutely speaking, is the object of the will. However, this appears to different people in 
different ways as “apparent good”.  For the virtuous, it is what appears truly good that is the 
object of his will, but for the vicious, it is what is pleasing (or pleasurable). He argues:  
The good man perhaps is much different in his capacity to see what is truly good in 
individual matters, being as it were a norm and measure of these things. Many men are 
apparently deceived because of pleasure. What is not good seems good, so they desire as 
good the pleasurable and seek to avoid the painful as evil.”58  
 
                                               
58 Nicomachean Ethics, Book III: Chapter 4 (1113a29-33). The stress is ours.  
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Evidently, with this position, Aristotle seems to come back to Plato’s view that 
ultimately, wrong choices are the consequences of ignorance. There are however important 
insights from his arguments: First is the stress he places on the acquisition of virtue as the answer 
moral character. According to him, this has to be drilled from childhood so that it becomes 
second nature (a habit). Part of our argument in this research is the need to recover or develop 
some healthy forms or models of moral formation in our different moral communities if we are to 
build or rebuild our social institutions.  
Secondly, he recognized the necessity of freedom of choice for moral agency, and that in 
itself presupposes rationality. Thirdly, he insists that the unjust man, the self-indulgent (the 
corrupt) become so by choice and to think that one can consistently make irresponsible choices 
hoping that this will not impact one’s character is a mark of irrationality. Today we acknowledge 
that consistently making irresponsible choices expecting a different result is an apt definition of 
insanity. It is our hope that we take this seriously since they tend to challenge our common 
assumptions. Aristotle’s distinctions between the continent and incontinent, temperate and self-
indulgent remain classical in the discourse on choice, ignorance and weakness of the will.  
We do admit both ignorance and weakness of the will are involved in moral failure which 
is why “targeted formation” will constitute part of the recommendation of this research. 
However, our argument is that without appropriate conscience formation, both of these human 
deficiencies (ignorance of the true good and weakness of the will, a certain proclivity to bad 
choices) become highly activated and lead definitively to irresponsible choices and acts. The 
situation is similar to when one lacks proper or adequate physical exercises; it leaves one prone 
to all kinds of health hazards. When our mind (seat of knowledge) and heart (seat of desires and 
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willing) are not properly exercised through basic and ongoing formation, it leads to a myriad of 
distortions in our choices and results in moral diseases or pathologies.  
Despite the insights gleamed from Aristotle’s views above, there are inherent ambiguity 
in Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of moral responsibility that lends itself to different 
interpretations. Therefore overtime there emerged different viewpoints on the notion.
59
 
Historically, fatalism is a concept that arises out of the oldest effort at comprehending human 
moral responsibility. In the Homeric epic we see “blame” and “praise” used interchangeably 
based on actions of persons. However, some actions are excused on the pretext that factors 
beyond his/her control influenced the action. A classic example is Oedipus’ action that is 
excused on grounds that he was “fated” or predetermined by the “gods” or “stars” to act in such 
manner. Therefore, he is not responsible for his actions. While determinism (fatalism) as an 
argument hinged on influence from “gods” has diminished, its philosophical counterpart 
continues to exert influence. Part of Aristotle’s argument on voluntariness is aimed at refuting 
this trend of thought by establishing freedom of choice as the basic criteria for moral agency.  
A historical overview of the philosophical argument on moral responsibility from 
Aristotle to the current debate provides useful insights. According to Eshleman, two 
interpretative viewpoints (“merit based view” and the “consequentialist view”) compete for 
prominence. The first ascribes blame or praise to an agent’s action “if and only if” he “merits” 
such ascription. The second ascribes blame or praise if and only if it will result in change of 
behavior in the agent. Though it is not clear which view Aristotle actually endorsed, but he did 
                                               
59 For a historical overview of this debate we follow here the insights of Andrew Eshleman, See Standford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Moral Responsibility” by Andrew Eshleman, online edition, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archieves/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/  
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argue against a version of determinism, as already noted. Eshleman presents three versions of 
determinism that Aristotle could not have recognized in his writings (especially, On 
Interpretations): Causal determinism that holds everything as caused by “sufficient antecedent 
conditions” that it could not be otherwise. This includes human actions. It differs from “fatalism” 
as such in that while fatalism does not consider human deliberation and choice as of any 
consequence, causal determinism considers human choice as a necessary link in the realization of 
such determined events.
60
  
Scientific determinism is a variant of the first and identifies the “laws of nature” operating 
in the universe as such as the antecedent condition. Theological determinism lays the burden on 
the “nature and will of God” instead of on stars or gods more prevalent in ancient religions. 
Theological determinism actually did influence the theological discourse we find in Augustine 
and Aquinas (medieval period) as they struggled to understand the origin of evil against the 
implication of God’s providence, his absolute power and especially his foreknowledge. What is 
the significance of human freedom in the light of God’s foreknowledge? Their views on 
predetermination remain controversial theological themes we do not have space to pursue.  
The modern period saw a focus on scientific determinism given the ascendency of natural 
science applying mechanistic models of the universe that tends to explain everything by physical 
laws – including human actions. Opinions were however divided as to the implication of such 
explanation on human freedom, with some arguing that it does not pose any problem to freedom 
and hence moral responsibility. On the broader issue of causal determinism, two major schools 
                                               
60 For further reading on this see, Susan S. Meyer, “Moral Responsibility: Aristotle and After,” in Everson 1998: 
225-227; Terrance Irwin, ed. Classical Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 243-249.  
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emerged over time: the incompatibilist hold that moral responsibility is impossible if causal 
determinism were to be true. The compatibilists hold the opposite view – determinism does not 
threaten moral responsibility. Eshleman thinks that Epicurians and Stoics represent classical 
examples of how these opposing worldviews among the ancients influenced lifestyle choices.61  
He thinks that “how one interprets the concept of moral responsibility strongly influences one’s 
overall account” of the theme.62 Historically, those that accept merit based account lean towards 
incompatibilism and those that accept the consequentialist viewpoint tend towards 
compatibilism.
63
 These two schools continue to gain currency even today. The critical core of 
their position is the assumption that an external theoretical criteria of either efficacy or 
metaphysical freedom (merit) justifies holding the agent responsible.  
P. F. Strawson’s landmark essay “Freedom and resentment” dismisses both viewpoints as 
wrong.  He offered a different perspective on the debate. He argues that both schools miss the 
point when they consider an a priori judgment external to the agent is a sufficient condition for 
establishing or justifying the agent’s moral responsibility. According to him, the attitudes of 
praise and blame are part of a wider range of attitudes we express towards those with whom we 
are immersed in a personal relationship. Our attitudes are “participant reactive attitudes” 
disclosing resentment, indignation, love, care, indifference, goodwill or ill-will.
64
 These reactive 
attitudes are open to change as more facts are known such that one’s situation could “excuse” or 
                                               
61 Andrew Eshleman, “Moral Responsibility,” Op. Cit., pp. 6-7.  
62 Ibid 
63 He includes Epicurus, early Augustine, Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant among incompatibilists; and Stoics, 
Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and J. S. Mill, are among compatibilists. See Eshleman, Ibid. p. 8.   
64 P.F. Strawson, “freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962); 1-25 Reprinted in 
Fischer and Ravizza, 1993, cited in Eschelman, Ibid. p.10.  
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“justify” the agent’s attitude. Therefore judgment could be suspended so long as such condition 
persists. In such a situation, adopting “objective standpoint” that brackets the person out of the 
circle of “participants” in a temporal or permanent manner based on the interpretation of the 
agent’s condition. Children and mentally ill are permanently excluded from the circle of 
participants because they are considered incapable of genuinely participating in a personal 
relation.  
Strawson criticized the two schools above for “over intellectualizing” the notion of moral 
responsibility.
65
 Instead of presuming an external theoretical judgment of efficacy or merit as the 
rational basis that justifies moral responsibility, he reverses that by establishing it on wholly 
internal criteria of feeling. We hold people accountable or responsible based on the relationship 
we share together with them – we “feel” this way as a way of being human. It is embedded in our 
psychological makeup and therefore does not need an external criteria or justification. Even the 
judgment that verifies the condition of the agent depends on principle internal to the practice 
rather than on an external criteria.
66
 Therefore seeking justification for holding someone 
responsible “if determinism is true” becomes a redundant question. His argument is that we are 
wired internally to hold accountable so long as they are participating in a relationship with us.  
The central commonplace that I want to insist on is the very great importance that we attach to the 
attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our 
personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and 
intentions.
67
 
 
                                               
65 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, New York: Routledge, 1974, p.25.  
66 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, New York: Routledge, 1974, p.19  
67 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, ibid., p. 5 
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While there are evident oppositions to Strawson’s argument,68 the import of his insight cannot be 
lost to this research. Actually, his view corroborates Niebuhr’s position on the definition of 
moral responsibility. Niebuhr holds that it is a “response” based on an “interpretation” of action 
done to us implying “accountability” for our “response” and possible only in “solidarity” within 
a community of moral agents. We shall revisit this view on “reactive attitudes” as a critical 
criterion for moral responsibility in other chapters (two to five) when we explain the role of 
“perception” in the development of moral responsibility.  
We noted above that what constitutes the “content” of a morally responsible act is 
determined by both objective standards and its specific historical context in line with the debate 
on what constitutes a moral act. Strawson brackets some agents from being “participants” 
because our “reactive attitudes” are based on the assumption the agent has the capacity to enter 
into genuine relationship with us. This implies acting responsibly presupposes that one has moral 
agency (the capacity for reasoning, deliberation, and freedom of choice).  The only aspect we 
wish to consider in this direction is the assumption that the moral agent is considered an “integral 
self” – a morally competent unit, “a person.” Let us now turn to explore what this term means.   
1.2     Personhood  
The notion of “person” is one that generates debate. What criterion constitutes 
personhood? Of what relevance is this notion? We appreciate the insight of Karol Wojtyla (Pope 
John Paul II) not merely for his contemporariness but for his depth. While maintaining the 
                                               
68 See Andrew Eshleman, “Moral Responsibility,” Op. Cit. p. 13-18. Cites Fischer and Ravizza (among others) to 
have argued that it is possible to critique existing practices from a standpoint outside it which then could justify a 
theoretical criteria one of which might be compatibilism or incompatibilism. We agree that such evaluation is not 
just possible but necessary unless we hold an absolute relativist concept of knowledge and truth.   
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Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysical tradition, he was able to incorporate Scheler’s insight from 
phenomenology in exposing this notion. He adopts the classical definition articulated by 
Boethius and used by Aquinas: persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia [“a person is 
an individual of a rational nature”] but noted its inadequacy. It is presupposed that “persona” 
here stands for a “human being”.  A rational nature subsists in a subject – in a person. The idea 
of “individua substantia” goes back to Aristotle’s hylomorphism that sees the human being as 
composed of matter and form which together constitutes one undivided substance – an 
“individual substance” is in this instance, called a human being. Following Aristotle, Aquinas 
holds that matter is the principle of individuation; and the rational soul [anima rationalis] is the 
animating principle of the whole human organism because it is the “substantial form” of the 
body and by virtue of which a human being is regarded as a “person.” Aquinas elaborates in the 
Prima pars (questions 75-83) treatises on the essence of the soul, its unity and powers.
69
  
Wojtyla argues that “neither the idea of rational nature nor its individualization seems to 
express fully the specific completeness expressed by the concept of person.”70 He holds that the 
rational soul as the principle and source of life and activity of the human person is composed of 
faculties (primarily of intellect and will) through which it executes its operations and by which 
therefore the human person actualizes full potentials. There are other secondary faculties of the 
soul (cognitive and appetitive) that are of a spiritual nature but dependent on matter (the body) 
for their operations and help shape the psychological and moral personality of the human subject. 
                                               
69 See especially T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I. Q. 75, a 5 
70 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, definitive ed., Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, trans. Andrzej Potocki, in Analecta 
Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research 10, ed. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 1977), xiii 
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All faculties of the soul work together in the development of the human person.
71
 He however 
draws insight from Max Scheler who holds a different view of person. According to Scheler,  
The person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences which in itself 
….precedes all essential act-differences (especially the difference between inner and outer perception, inner 
and outer willing, inner and outer feeling, loving and hating, etc.). The being of the person is thereof the 
“foundation” of all essentially different acts.
72
 
 
The implication is that Scheler sees the person neither as a substance nor as a specifically 
rational being but rather as an actor, “a pure-act-center” whereby the “whole person is contained 
in every fully concrete act, and the whole person “varies” in and through every act—without 
being exhausted in his being in any of these acts and without changing like a thing in time….”73 
He therefore rejects the notion of being that is traditionally positioned as necessary for 
safeguarding the identity of the individual person. He views the person as a “unifier of diverse 
acts.” He insists that a being engaged solely in rational activity is not a person. The notion of 
“individual substance” is important, at least in Western Metaphysics, because it is assumed that 
this preserves the notion of “concrete existence” and the philosophical principle: operari sequitor 
esse (for something to act it must first exist).  It is also presumed to preserve the notion of unity 
(or integrity) of “being”.  
Scheler’s insight above helps Wojtyla to view the person as beyond mere rational activity 
but includes actions. While acknowledging the need for objective existence (supositum) of this 
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“individua substantia” he maintains that it is “action that reveals the person”. The individual is 
not just a static quantity like stone or tree (objects of existence) but he is a subject – he knows 
himself as a subject, and knows himself as known. Though this “self-consciousness” of the ego 
is at the center of personhood but its deeper value is precisely because it provides the possibility 
for morality, for performing loving acts. The person is then essentially a spiritual being whose 
essence does not just consist in rationality (thinking) as Aristotle-Boethius-Aquinas holds but 
also involves actions through which he fulfills his personhood. He will eventually posit that 
morality, and more specifically, acts of love alone that “fulfills” the person as it integrates the 
subjective and objective dimensions of his/her existence. 
Wojtyla would however correct Scheler’s rejection of substance as problematic because it 
disregards the “moment of efficacy” when the individual recognizes himself as the source of his 
actions. Here, he argues, is revealed the integral nature of the person as substance, subject, and 
agent.
74
 Wojtyla would eventually critique some modern philosophical views that indulge in 
what he calls a “hypostatization of consciousness” that creates a serious bifurcation between 
body and soul such that “consciousness” is presumed as an independent subject of activity with 
an indirect existence parallel to that of the body. This dualism creates a tendency to identify 
person with mere consciousness.
75
 Wojtyla argues in line with Aquinas, that consciousness and 
self-consciousness do not subsist in themselves but rather subsists in the person as a form of 
“fruit of a rational nature”. In this way a unity of being is preserved along with autonomy such 
that the human person could retain the status of a free agent of his/her acts. Therefore the human 
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person as a “subsistent subject of existence and action”76 is free and responsible for his/her acts. 
While Aquinas concedes with Aristotle that intellect and will are the primary faculties of the 
human soul the possession of which constitutes the essence of personhood, a clarification from 
Wojtyla reads:  
Although thought is the basis of the creativity in which we express ourselves as persons, this 
creativity neither ends nor culminates in thought. That which is most characteristic of a person, 
that in which a person (at least in the natural order) is most fully and properly realized, is 
morality. Morality is not the most strictly connected with thought; thought is merely a condition 
of morality. Directly, however, morality is connected with freedom, and therefore with the will. 
The object of the will is the good. There are a variety of goods we can will. The point is to will a 
true good. Such an act of the will makes us good human beings. To be morally good, we must not 
only will something good, but we must also will it in a good way. If we will it in a bad way, we 
ourselves will become morally bad. Morality, therefore, presupposes knowledge, the truth 
concerning the good, but it is realized by willing, by choice, by decision. In this way, not only 
does our will become good or evil, but our whole person also becomes good or evil. Thanks to 
our will, we are masters of ourselves and of our actions, but because of this the value of these 
actions of our will qualifies our whole person positively or negatively. 
77
 
 
Apart from other possible observations, what we consider pertinent in the above is the shift in 
emphasis from intellect to will as having a certain priority of place in the characterization of 
personhood. Of course the reason for this is that he considers morality as a form of conceptual 
context in which full personhood is realized. His stress on “morality” and/or “action” as 
revealing the person or in defining personhood is significant because it resonates with the 
African view of personhood that is based thoroughly a socio-moral concept of person. Of course 
he does explore as well the relationship between the individual person and the community 
underscoring the need for correlation between the person’s good and the common good. It is 
often the disparity between these two poles that give rise to the evils associated with individuals 
                                               
76 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community: Selected Essays, p. 167  
77 Ibid. p.172 
32 
 
and society. Placing a stress on the will in conceptualizing morality will be considered further in 
this chapter but we need to affirm that scholarly views especially from social sciences suggest a 
consensus that capacities for cognition and affectivity distinguish personalities that are 
personally and socially responsible.
78
 Before examining this latter aspect, let us make a brief 
review of some other perspectives on personhood.  
Philip Selznick asserts that etymologically, the notion of “person” implies “particularity, 
coherence, and responsibility.”79 Its Latin and Greek roots (persona, prosopon) refer to masks 
used by actors and the role they play. It is expected that they play well these roles. Personhood is 
often defined by one’s place or the role one plays in society, and to effectively play those roles is 
a critical criterion for defining social responsibility.
80
 He argues that historically, Anglo-
American law thrived on what he calls the “law of persons”, where everyone has his place in 
society (as “slave, serf, master, servant, ward, infant, husband, wife, cleric, king”), and the 
privileges of rank and positions are recognized by law. The parameters of “kinship, locality, 
religion and social rank” determine social relationships as well as provide avenue for “moral 
grace and practical virtue”.81  
However, in mid-19
th
 century this “law of persons” gave way to the “law of progress” in 
a paradigm shift from status to contract. Selznick argues that the result of this shift was a 
reduction of persons to objects – as “individual units of investment, labor, or consumption. Their 
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80 Ibid, p.217 
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special identities are lost in the egalitarian, free-market imagery of “economic man.” The group 
becomes an aggregate or, at best, a composite of freely chosen individual arrangements.”82 This 
orchestrated the rise of individualism and its subsequent advantages (freedom, equality, self-
government, self-affirmation, opportunity to define rights and determine one’s place in the strata 
of society) to say nothing of its negative consequences most of which we are still grappling with 
today. He warns that the lessons we should draw from the ills of individualism today is that for 
us to craft a more adequate understanding of personhood, we should give “full weight to self-
affirming participation in a moral order.”  
Respect for individuals as persons requires that we “regard and act towards [them] in their 
concrete specificity, that we take full account of their specific aims and purposes and of their own 
definition of their [social] situations.” In other words, the person as an object of moral concern 
can never be an abstraction, never be wholly subordinated to social needs never be dissolved into 
a group or process.
83
  
 
We note carefully his caveat, especially the last line on dissolving the person “into a group or 
process.” This will be given consideration later when we consider the African view of person. 
Selznick’s argument is that a person possesses a moral unity that is a counterweight to the 
demands of the common good. There are certain things a person (as a moral unit) may never give 
up for the sake of the common good – what Bernard Williams calls “the ground project” which is 
a set of commitments that together constitute a moral identity and source of meaning for living at 
all.
84
 This personal identity that has a moral foundation constitutes in itself a source of conflict 
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between individuals and others (families and friends) and society. This is an expression of the 
reality of autonomy that characterizes individuals as “persons” and therefore moral agents. It also 
determines their uniqueness in a community of moral agents. A community remains a gathering 
of individual persons united in will for a common purpose and should not be conceived as a mere 
collectivity.  As “personhood” recovers the individual from the danger of being reduced to an 
object or lost in a collectivity, so also is an adequate notion of personhood threatened by an 
exaggerated “individualism” that pretends  to an absolute autonomy without reference to a 
community. We shall return to this as we consider personhood and responsibility.  
Anthropological accounts of personhood show a disparity of views between the terms, 
person, self, and individual.
85
 Gracia Harris argues that “person refers to human beings who have 
agency; self to human beings as centers of experience; and individual to living human entities.”86 
Nancy Rosenberger, contra western of view of ‘autonomous’ individual, presents Japanese sense 
of self as an “interactive process that is molded through social relationships.” In this instance, the 
“self” absorbs both the concept of “person and individual” allowing at the same time for 
ambiguities and seeming contradictions. 
87
 A. L. Apstein argues that maintaining a distinction 
between person, self, and individual is difficult because among the Tolai of Papua New Guinea, 
a communal criterion is needed for “achieving personhood”.88 We shall see later that this holds 
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true for most Africans as well – personhood is “achieved” through a socio-cultural process than 
an ontologically necessary quality that everyone possesses. Geoffrey Kirkpatrick defines persons 
as “points of intersection between the subjective and the social…constructs deemed capable of 
experience, will, action, identity.”89 Brian Morris sees the person as “embodied, conscious, and a 
social being with language and moral agency.”90 The tendency here is either to distinguish the 
“individual” from the “self” or “person,” or to subsume one under the other. There is also a 
tendency among scholars from other regions to critique the Western approach that stresses 
individualism in conceptualizing personhood as far from being normative.  
Literary evidence shows that Asian and African views agree to the degree they both see 
personhood emerging out of a determinate social process and hence tend to favor holism rather 
than individualism.
91
 In India, for instance, Marriot speaks of “substance code complex” where 
“code” stands for moral conduct and “substance” stands for “body”. They do not form a duality 
but a unity. He says, “Codes are embodied in persons and substance flow between them.” 
However, “persons do not stand for “indivisible units” (individuals), but rather “dividuals” 
because they are always divisible as “substance codes.”92 Roy Wagner’s view of the Melanesian 
“big man” as a “fractal person,” understood not as “a unit standing in relation to an aggregate,” 
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or vice versa, but “always an entity with relationship integrally implied”.93 Strathern and Stewart 
show how “alignment” with others is an “active shaping” principle for achieving personhood in 
that there is a constant openness to relationship. Hence among the Papua New Guinea, 
relationship underscores the concept of “norman”. It can mean personality, mind, intention, will, 
agency, social conscience, or desire. It’s meaning shifts with context. But children are not born 
with “norman”, rather it develops in humans as they begin to form concepts and understand 
language. This means a progressive differentiation over time as one interacts with others. The 
ideal for developing a correctly differentiated norman is in maintaining “proper relationships.”94 
That the foregoing shares some with African view of personhood which we now examine below.  
1.3. African View of Personhood  
African life revolves around the primary community. In most of Africa, it is the 
community that gives meaning to individual life. In places where this priority is entrenched, it is 
inconceivable how the individual can exist outside the community. This implies a view of 
“person” that is intrinsically connected to the notion of community. I.A Menkiti helps us 
encapsulate this African view of personhood: 
Whereas the Western view of man abstract this or that feature of the lone individual and proceed 
to make it the defining or essential characteristic which entities aspiring to the description ‘man’ 
must have, the African view of man denies that persons can be defined by focusing on this or that 
physical or psychological characteristic of the lone individual. Rather, man is defined by 
reference to the environing community. As John Mbiti notes, the African view of the person can 
be summed up in this statement: ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am.
95
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J.S, Mbiti is credited with being the first to articulate that one liner: “I am because we are, and 
since we are, therefore I am,”96 an insight based on a reversal of Descartes’’ ‘cogito ego sum’ 
implying a significant paradigmatic shift in the African view of person compared to that of the 
West. Menkiti’s view above that elucidates J.S. Mbiti’s original insight condenses the essential 
element of the relationship between the individual and the community. P. Ikuenobe researched 
extensively on this and posits that “the relationship between an individual and the community 
and the responsibility that is dictated by this relationship indicate the foundation for moral 
reasoning, moral principles, and moral education in African cultures.”97 While the distinction he 
makes between metaphysical/ontological account of personhood and the moral/normative 
remains ambiguous, it is noteworthy that he considers the moral concept of person (African 
model) as presupposing the metaphysical model (Western model). The moral or “normative 
model” is based on social recognition.  
According to Ikunobe, personhood is conferred by the community based on experience of 
the individual’s ability to fulfill certain standards of behavior critical to the wellbeing of the 
community. While the ontological model tends to define the nature and/or describe the make-up 
of an object (of animal species but within the genus ‘human’) as composing of faculties of mind, 
body, and soul, the African view of person, presupposing the foregoing, confers personhood not 
on every human being but on those who meet certain socio-moral criteria set forth by the 
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community. Hence while a necessary relationship does exist between the two models, he argues 
that only the normative model is relevant to the form of communalism unique to African culture.  
This view has been criticized by other Africans who argue that personhood is neither “acquired” 
nor “achieved” through socialization, but a property of any human being.98 Kwame Gyekye 
however admits that it is still a valid account because it “adumbrates moral conception of 
personhood” relevant to understanding the “communitarian framework” practiced in Africa.99 K. 
Gyekye actually presents a view of personhood among the Akan of Ghana that share lots of 
similarities with the Western view.
100
 There are therefore divergent opinions as to which view 
best describes the concept of person among the different ethnicities in Africa, including Nigeria.  
For example, Elochukwu E. Uzukwu holds an African notion of personhood that 
arguably incorporates the individual, the community, and divinity (or deity) underscoring a 
complex relationship. He not only insists that “relationality” (as “duality or multiplicity”) is the 
foundational “norm of being in the world,”101 but that it represents the interpretive lens through 
which to view the African mind, its concepts, and its institutions. He argues that the African 
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notion of person must take into account the pre-existing spiritual element of the individual, what 
he calls “personal spirit” (Chi of the Igbo, Ori of the Yoruba, Kra or Okra of the Asante, Se of 
Adja-Fon, Aklama or Kla of the Ewe peoples respectively).
102
 Uzukwu holds that among the 
Igbos the “personal spirit” (or Chi) has a dynamic relationship to “individual destiny, and to the 
‘returning’ dead, and to God himself.”103 In his view, this personal spirit, determines the course 
of one’s path in life (among the Fon), personal wellbeing, and even personal character (among 
the Ewe).
104
  It would be helpful to quote him at some length: 
The above fundamental spiritual linkage from pre-existence illustrates a key molding block for 
apprehending the human person in West Africa. The Spirit dimension of the person linking the 
individual from pre-existence into life in this world is strategic to the notion of person. The spirit 
carries or reflects individual destiny providentially assigned by God. It constitutes the 
acknowledged and unacknowledged link with God in the evolving destiny of the individual or in 
questions asked about fortunes and misfortunes by the individual and community. One should not 
underestimate the cosmological and anthropological position of this structural determinant of 
destiny, embedded spirit, the original gift and guardian from God that humanizes the person.
105
  
    
Uzukwu’s insistence on the centrality of “duality” (or “multiplicity”) as an interpretive paradigm 
is squarely in line with Chinua Achebe’s view that the physical world has its “double and 
counterpart” or mirror image in the world of spirits.106 Achebe affirms that “every person has a 
personal chi who created him…a person’s fortunes in life are controlled more or less completely 
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by his chi.”107 He claims that for the Igbos, one’s gifts and talents, and even character are all 
“received” before one comes to birth. His “chi” bargains for him at the time.108 It is noteworthy 
that “chi” is not just a personal deity, but actually the “unique” creator of an equally unique 
individual!  Achebe points out that such radical individuality among the Igbo finds a 
counterbalance (its “double”) only in another “potent force – the will of his community;”109 for 
according to him, no person is above the will of his community. Igbo people capture this idea 
with a proverb: isụọrọ ọha nri, ọha erichaa ya, mana ọha sụọrọ gi nri, ịgaghị erichaliya (if you, 
as an individual, cook for the community, the community will finish it, but if the community 
cooks for you, you cannot finish it). In other words, as Achebe explains, “No man however great 
can win a judgment against all the people” [the community].110     
Apart from the above, Uzukwu also identifies eight other dimensions relevant to the West 
African notion of person: According to him, among the Bambara of Mali and Asante of Ghana 
there are eight and seven principles respectively that converge to make up a person: mogya 
(blood); okra (guardian spirit); sunsum (individualizing principle in a person, is spiritual and pre-
existent); honhon (person’s shadow); sasa (an ethical component or conscience); ntoro (spiritual 
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component inherited from father but discarded after puberty as one “reaches socially defined 
maturity” and gains personal ntoro); and saman (the form one takes after death).111Is there a 
rational basis for the above claim? Uzukwu answers in the affirmative. He argues that a “body” 
(the visible aspect), “breath” (not sensible breath but an equivalent of pneuma or spiritus), and 
“shadow” (as soul or anima/psyche) distinction provides some clarity in conceptualizing a person 
in West Africa.
112
 In this regard, he probably agrees with Gyekye who also distinguishes Okra 
(soul), honam (body), and sunsum (spirit) in conceptualizing person among the Akan.  
It is then possible to argue that Uzukwu is as close to the Western model (the ontological 
model) of personhood as Gyekye whose Akan view of personhood stresses the ontological 
individuality of the person and for that reason places Uzukwu further away from Mentiki’s 
claims which Gyekye critiques as “radical communitarianism” that attempts to domesticate the 
individual.
113
 The same argument holds true for the Igbo who are known for their characteristic 
individualism to such a degree that they have no serious allegiance to kings (Igbo ama Eze) as 
we find in other tribes in Nigeria like the Yoruba or Hausa. However, as we see from Achebe’s 
view above, this individualism is moderated by a higher force – “the will of the community”. It 
is our opinion then that there is a necessary tension (hopefully a healthy one) among the Igbo for 
both individualism and community.  Gyekye shares this view in articulating Akan view of 
person.
114
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In his critique of Menkiti, he has this to say: 
A consideration of other aspects of human nature would certainly be appropriate: a person is by 
nature a social (communal) being, yes; but he is by nature other things as well (i.e. he possesses 
other essential attributes). Failure to recognize this may result in pushing the significance and 
implications of a person’s communal nature beyond their limits, an act that would in turn result in 
investing the community with an all-engulfing moral authority to determine all things about the 
life of the individual person. One might thus easily succumb to the temptation of exaggerating the 
normative status and power of the cultural community in relation to those of the person, and thus 
obfuscating our understanding [of] the real nature of the person. It seems to me that Menkiti 
succumbed to this temptation.
115
 
We agree completely with Gyekye’s point of view above that Menkiti’s view upon which the 
normative model of personhood is based is in need of evaluation. However, given that this view 
is held by many, it is important to keep this in view as their perception of the reality of African 
experience. There is yet no need for absolute positions, at least not yet. It is possible that Menkiti 
expresses correctly a reality for some African cultures, and Gyekye is doing same for another. 
We do not think there is a homogenous view of personhood that would adequately describe the 
experience of all Africans at all times in all cultures. However, if Menkiti is describing the Igbo 
view of personhood, Uzukwu and Achebe’s will disagree given the”radical individualism” of the 
Igbo person that they pointed out above and to which this writer confirms to be true.  
The foregoing therefore underscores the complexity of the African phenomena. Is it 
possible to make a universal claim that is relevant for most African peoples, even if not in 
absolute terms? We cannot answer in the affirmative until perhaps a critical mass of systematized 
analysis reveal the commonalities in what presently seem either divergent or incompatible 
positions.  There is an obvious difficulty in explaining the rationality of a dualistic worldview to 
one not socialized in it. The idea of a “spirit-double” is a problematic for self-identity to a 
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western mind, but perhaps adopting in its place the concept of “guardian angel”116 might reveal 
the concept as a deeper ontological reality that different cultures prefer to interpret differently. At 
this pioneering stage in articulating this reality in Africa, it might sound too complex and 
ridiculous but definitely not meaningless. Therefore, the age-old difficulty in the West with the 
philosophical question of body-soul or mind-matter dualism will invariably replay itself in Africa 
as authors like Achebe or Uzukwu grapple with describing a phenomenon that reveals itself in a 
dualistic garb.
117
 If you are an Igbo or Akan person, you will know intuitively that some of these 
authors (Achebe, Uzukwu, Gyekye, and Menkiti) are firstly describing a phenomenon and only 
secondarily reflecting on it. If the description aspect is wrong, you will know intuitively that 
their conclusions will be equally wrong. Hence, the inherent ambiguity in a dualistic view of 
personal identity is one that will continue to generate debate for a long time in Africa especially 
as more of the scholars are socialized in a different cultural setting other than Africa.  
We could also argue that it is self-contradictory to claim and deny the same thing at once. 
It is in this respect that holding “chi” as both a personal double that implies “creature” (but 
existing in another realm) and unique creator, implying immortality, seem to be self-
contradictory. But again, Western Christian idea of creation in genesis is hinged on the idea of 
imago Dei which gives a religious interpretation to an ontological reality identified by an earlier 
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Philosophical Perspectives, Op. Cit, pp. 243, 247, 253-4. In the end, it does sound like a native grown libertarianism 
practiced long before the words were coined.  
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pagan culture as “soul” and/or “spirit” in the constitution of any human being.  African 
philosophy is now confronted with interpreting the same aboriginal or primal ontological reality 
on their terms.
118
    
For this research however, the role of “Chi” (and its equivalents in other African cultures 
that share the same view) as giver of “character” constitutes a major problematic for our 
discourse if not clarified. The primary moral question here is whether “Chi” is responsible for 
how people behave? If yes, then there will be no need for us to continue with this research. Does 
Achebe’s explanation clarify this point? In his explanation on having a “bad Chi” he argues:  
We must remember, however, when we hear that a man has a bad chi that we are talking about 
his fortune rather than his character. A man of impeccable character may yet have a bad chi so 
that nothing he puts his hand to will work out right. Chi is therefore more concerned with success 
or failure than with righteousness and wickedness.
119
 
Christopher S. Nwodo expounds furthers that “chi” as “divine providence” and giver of gifts, is 
viewed as “fundamentally good and just.”120  According to Nwodo, Chi “demands” uprightness, 
moral integrity, humility, and other virtues from its ward. As such it is often represented in 
folklore as an embodiment of “courage, resilience, hard work, and prudence.”121 It is on this 
account that Nwodo concludes that “Chi in Igbo cosmology performs the function of destiny.”122  
 Nwodo argues on the same page that Chi is an “enforcer” of the contractual agreement 
the proto- individual signed into before being created. Hence, life situations are explained as 
                                               
118 Christopher S. Nwodo used “primordial exposure to Being” in his analysis of Heidegger’s use of it to explain 
people’s initial encounter with reality. See Nwodo, Philosophical Perspectives, p. 240   
119 Chinua Achebe, “Chi In Igbo Cosmology,” p. 97 
120 Nwodo, Philosophical Perspectives, p. 259 
121 Nwodo, Philosophical Perspectives, P. 260 
122 Nwodo, Ibid. p. 267 
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either fruits or consequences of that agreement or in the case of hardship as punishment for 
derailing from it. In this regard, we wonder if it is not coherent to suggest that “chi” could 
actually be a cultural metaphor (or myth) evolved for interpreting or making sense of conflicting 
life puzzles or difficult life situations often lumped together in the West under the category of 
“fate”? If this is the case, the different versions of determinism considered in this chapter do 
show it remains an ongoing philosophical problem even in the West. However, it still does not 
explain the original claim that “chi is giver of character” except this is understood in terms of 
being an “enforcer” (like an internal source of moral sanctions) in which case, it operates like 
conscience. Could it then be that “chi” is actually individual conscience in a deified form? 
Perhaps this is worth exploring in another project!    
The foregoing reinforces the view that there is no absolute consensus on the idea of 
personhood in Africa. But there is sufficient evidence for both the ontological and normative 
models which may actually coalesce into one objective model overtime as the ambiguities are 
gradually clarified. However, the normative view of personhood, baring the critique noted above, 
remain the stronger or older view in African scholarship on this topic. It insists that one is 
recognized as a person if and only if he/she meets the socio-moral standards of the moral 
community.
123
 If this holds true, does this imply that before this, one is a “non-person?” It is 
implied. Some statements among the Igbo that suggest this non-person status are: onyé-éfuléfu (a 
                                               
123 There are obvious nuances as to how each ethnic group in Africa conceptualizes “person” in its specifics. For 
example, Segun Gbadegesin provides a detailed analysis on the concept of person among the Yoruba of Nigeria that 
identifies “eniyan” as the term for “person” but having other material and spiritual attributes: ara, okan, emi, and 
ori. He evaluates the similarities and differences between Yoruba (Nigeria) concept of person with that of Akan 
(Ghana) conceptual scheme. Despite the differences, there is a discernible pattern of conceptualizing personhood 
with socio-moral bias. See S. Gbadegesin, African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary 
African Realities (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), pp. 27-47.  
46 
 
“useless individual”) or Ọbụ madụ? (“Is he/she a human being?”). These are used as forms of 
sarcasm – words used to denigrate whoever it refers to – and often they are reserved for social 
deviants and people of low morals or achievement: loafers, trouble makers, womanizers (or the 
sexually promiscuous), and for those who have a habit of stealing. Stealing is a very serious 
social vice among the Igbos such that in some communities known thieves were made to 
“vanish” (ifuo) from the community.  
It is debatable whether the above characterizations are sufficient evidence of “non-
person” status among the Igbos. It is far from convincing, and would therefore need further 
study.  However, there is a strong claim among African scholars
124
 like Menkiti that personhood 
is a form of social status conferred on “good character” rather than a quality one possesses 
necessarily by virtue of being human. Menkiti insists that this concept of “person” is organismic 
and developmental. It means that for an African, a person is a social organism that evolves to 
‘selfhood’ through a process of social integration.125 It is then inconceivable, according to this 
view, to define or understand a person outside the nexus of community.   
The further implication of the normative model of personhood is that morality is also 
socially defined. Morally good actions are those that promote the good of the community. 
Morality focuses on “duty, responsibility, and obligations”126 one owe the community as criteria 
                                               
124
 Gyekye in his critique against Menkiti’s position provides a plethora of views of African scholars who share the 
same views with Menkiti. He argues, inter alia, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkuruma, Leopold Senghor, 
among others all fought for independence for their countries and sees in Socialism a deep link to African community 
experience. Therefore, they propounded views of African communalism that would support giving priority to the 
community rather than the individual. See, Kwame Gyekye, “Person and Community in African Thought,” in 
Person and Communiry: Ghanian Philosophical Studies, I (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, 1992), P. 101-122  
125 Menkiti, “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought,” Ibid. p. 172.  
126 Ikuenobe, ibid  
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for the community to fulfill its obligation to the individual. This African view implies priority is 
given to the community over the individual, taking note of objections to this view above. 
A critical question regarding individual identity and the possibility of moral freedom has been 
raised given the close relationship between individuals and community in Africa. Bujo and 
Mekiti, among others, affirm such identity and freedom. They argue that Africans have unique 
and elaborate rituals of naming that are traditional modes of differentiation and identity 
formation embedded in custom and socialization process. This position has both oppositions and 
support depending on where you look for answers in most traditional societies other than Africa 
where similar views subsist.
127
  The individual and community are mutually complementary. 
However, the individual cannot exist without the community; rather, it is the community that 
makes the individual’s self-realization possible. The individual can be sacrificed for the 
community but not vice versa even if one upholds mutuality of relation between the two as we 
see in Gyekye and Uzukwu above. An individual cannot achieve an ethical ideal outside of the 
community as a “personal achievement” like you might have in western modes of thinking. The 
individual and community are so deeply related even though they maintain their distinct 
identities.  This will be further explored in chapters 3-5. 
Selznick’s caveat that we avoid subsuming the individual in either a collectivity or 
process warrants attention. We will address that in the context that African view of personhood 
                                               
127
 Scholars have held views that suggest individuality is not about “individual” but a “collective 
individuality”. Here it is argued that there is no place for individuals being specifically individuated 
because all are open to the other for realization. See Robert Foster, (ed.) Nation Making: Emergent 
Identities in Post-Colonial Melanesia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Thomas Mashio, 
To Remember the Faces of the Dead: Plenitude of Memory in Southwestern New Britain. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1994.  
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has raised: the relationship between personhood and moral responsibility within a community of 
agents. In other words, what does it mean to be a socially responsible person?  It is reasonable to 
deduce from the foregoing that “personhood” confers self-identity to an individual in that sense 
in which a specific culture (rather than geographical location) confers identity to a given 
community.  
The notion of personhood we uphold in this research is one that seeks homogeneity of 
self. It implies a basic harmony exists between the powers of the soul (of cognition, willing, and 
desires) and of one’s subjective experiences that involve the use of these powers. It is this basic 
harmonious ordering that is essential in distinguishing a person as an autonomous whole from 
another in much the same way we distinguish any being (as an existing unit) from another. It is 
the basis for holding individuals responsible for their actions. Someone suffering from a bipolar 
disorder could often escape culpability for his/her actions. A splintered self has no locus of 
identity as is captured in psychiatry when speaking of “split personality” as a disorder within the 
self as such.  The “integrity” of actions emanating from the self helps determine how responsible 
this “self” is; and from an African perspective, determine if he is indeed a “person” or simply a 
self still in search of an identity – in search of personhood. We therefore cannot uphold 
“inconsistency” as a normal parameter for personhood because it would help only to distort 
rather than determine identity.  
However, it is important to note that it is not established that a dualistic conception of 
personhood as we find in Achebe and Uzukwu, among others, has anything to do with, or fulfills 
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in anyway the criteria for multiple personality disorder.
128
 The difference is that a dualistic 
conceptualization of personhood, as seen above, adopts a different frame of reference to 
characterize a person. Its duality is a method or a way of seeing the world and therefore equally 
concerned about wholeness or a way of ensuring a more holistic vision of reality. Therefore it has 
its own criteria for identifying a “divided self” which is merely a language that captures the 
reality of a thoroughly unhealthy personality.  
We are then obviously cautious with views like Erving Goffman’s that conceives the self 
as a plurality determined by the social conditions exerting influence on the individual at the 
time.
129
 He conceives the self as elusive, ever taking the face of shifting interests and interactions 
in relation with other selves. The problem with this notion of self/personhood is that it not only 
twats any attempt to articulate the notion of moral responsibility and/or personal integrity but 
also prevents a proper appreciation of human freedom given the external mechanisms of social 
controls that exerts enormous influence on the individual to which he responds by constant face-
                                               
128 Multiple personality disorder is a “very rare psychological disorder in which a person has two or more [from 3-13 
or more] distinct personalities, each with its own thoughts, feelings, and patterns of behavior. The personalities often 
are direct opposites and dominate at different times, with abrupt transitions triggered by distressful events or 
memories. Each may be entirely unaware of the other but aware of unexplained gaps in remembered time. In 
Psychiatry, the condition is known as dissociative identity disorder. The term “split personality,” denoting 
“Schizophrenia” refers to an unrelated disorder in which the split (separation) is between thought and feeling.” See, 
The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. (Columbia University Press, 2013), s.v. "Multiple Personality," 
http://www.questia.com/read/1E1-multipers.  And further, “schizophrenia (skĬt´səfrē´nēə), group of severe mental 
disorders characterized by reality distortions resulting in unusual thought patterns and behaviors. Because there is 
often little or no logical relationship between the thoughts and feelings of a person with schizophrenia, the disorder 
has often been called 'split personality.' However, the condition should not be confused with multiple personality, a 
disorder in which the individual has two or more distinct personalities that dominate at different times.” Culled from 
The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. (Columbia University Press, 2013), s.v. 'Schizophrenia,' 
http://www.questia.com/read/1E1-schizoph. (Encyclopedia 2013) 
129 Erving Goffman, Assylums (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), cited by Philip Selznick, ibid, p 221. He uses the 
metaphor of “drama” to explain how individuals are ever maneuvering to save face in the light of prevailing social 
situations such that there is a plurality of selves, episodic and ever shifting. The face we wear at a given time 
depends on the mechanisms of social control and personal influences existing at the time.  
50 
 
saving manipulations or defensive mechanisms. While this view might be descriptive of a part of 
reality or human sociality where people constantly try to “be in control” of some aspect of the 
forces of social arrangement and make sense of their lives, however, it is important to underscore 
the fact that it is precisely how we do this that we reveal our moral worth: whether we have 
moral integrity or not and thereby determine how socially responsible we are. It is not 
conceptually coherent to speak of social responsibility without a sense of an acting self as an 
integral moral unit. Let us now examine further the relationship between personhood and moral 
and/or social responsibility.  
1.4 Personhood: Morality and Social Responsibility 
In this segment, our concern is to establish what it means to be a morally and socially 
responsible person. From the foregoing we see that moral responsibility cannot be properly 
conceived except in relation to other moral agents. In other words, moral responsibility is 
meaningful only when we speak of our relation to other “persons” within a community of agents. 
Common sense informs us that being morally responsible is a critical criterion for participating 
in the life and development of any human community. It is presumed to be the very soul of 
developing a social self. How we come to develop the capacity and/or awareness that we have a 
responsibility to others in the community will be explored in the next segment. These “others” 
with whom we live in community are the very reasons we develop and cultivate life-long “other-
regarding-attitudes” for peaceful co-existence. So the need for community is at the heart of moral 
responsibility. We are expected or socialized to cultivate “other-regarding-attitudes” for only in 
so doing are we arguably able to live relatively meaningful and self-fulfilling lives. In other 
words, it is in the context of cultivating “other-regarding attitudes” we are able to cultivate 
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appropriately (by putting in check) “self-regarding attitudes.” A corollary position is that we are 
able to cognitively come to true consciousness of self in the “presence” of another. It is only in 
the presence of another that we evoke the capacity to be our best or worst selves. The need for 
moral responsibility is evoked not properly in relation to other animals but precisely in the 
presence of other selves (those like us). It is this reason that explains the disproportion in moral 
responsibility once “being like us” is questioned in the relationship. We shall return to this.  
Martin Buber’s insight, following Mead, is that the “self” becomes conscious of itself 
only in relation to the “Other” and defines the “I” and “thou” relationship as integral to the 
development of selfhood.
130
  Paul Ricoeur made a more extensive study in the phenomenology 
of self, drawing insights from Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger and I. Levinas, came to the same 
conclusions except that he insists that actions of the self are primarily directed at some good. The 
ultimate aim is to participate in “good life’ with and for others in just institutions.”131 He 
therefore conceives ethics as prior to morals (norms), adopting the insight of Immanuel Levinas. 
But unlike Levinas he makes it clear that the notion of “other” goes beyond the mere face-to-face 
personal encounters or relationship to encompass institutions – a community of beings.132 This 
                                               
130 The I and Thou relationship is considered by some to have ushered in “a Copernican revolution in theology…” 
but also criticized for reductionism – compressing basic human relationships to merely two: I-thou and I-it. For 
these see Bloch, 1983, p.42; Walter Kaufmann, 1983, pp.28-33 cited by Michael Zank in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, “Martin Buber,” Online edition, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entried/buber 
131 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans by Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 
189, 262.  
132 Hannah Arendt’s concept of power helps Ricoeur argue that this primacy of relationship aimed at the good life 
(ethics) over constraints of juridical and political systems is stressed when we “mark the gap separating power in 
common and domination.” See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, Ibid. p. 194. Furthermore, Hannah Arendt asserts 
that “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an 
individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.” See H. Arendt, 
Crisis of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), P. 143.  
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implies that socio-moral responsibility is determined by institutional relationships - relationships 
within a community. Immanuel Levinas himself argues in his “metaphysics of desire” that the 
moral law is specifically “revealed” in the “face of the other,”133 that is, the concrete person 
before you. He argues: 
To begin with the face as a source from which all meaning appears, the face in its absolute 
nudity…is to affirm that being is enacted in the relation between men that Desire rather than need 
commands acts. Desire, an aspiration that does not proceed from a lack—metaphysics—is the 
desire of a person.134 
While the view above is about the foundations of morals, it does imply that the moral law 
obliging one to responsibility is inconceivable except in relation to other persons. In the 
aboriginal encounter with other persons, the natural instinct to “murder” has a counter weight in 
the plea “on the face of the other” for love. This is perhaps the original root of the moral sense to 
“be responsible” we shall examine in the next segment of this chapter. Suffice it to affirm at the 
moment that this view is even more acutely accentuated in African view of morality.  
We have seen earlier how the African concept of person is meaningless outside the 
community; but the foregoing also indicates that this is not uniquely an African phenomenon. 
However, in Africa, relationships are central in understanding morality in all its dimensions. 
John Mbiti’s assertion that “I am because we are…” (noted above) is further elucidated by I.A 
Menkiti: “The We is not an additive ‘we’ but a thoroughly fussed collective ‘we’”135 Therefore 
the imperative to social responsibility to an African mind is not merely because it is “expected” 
                                               
133 Immanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 
p. 299.  
134 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.299 
135 I.A. Menkiti, “Person and Community in African Thought,” p. 166 
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of him/her but rather, because “it is him or her.”136 This implies that the African view of social 
responsibility is integral to selfhood. L. Magesa, among others, argues likewise that “building 
social relationships” that promote life is the imperative of African religion and the core of moral 
responsibility.
137
 We have already indicated that the notion of moral and/or social responsibility 
is identical, that is, not strictly differentiated. K. A. Opoku even punctuates this point by saying: 
“Life is when you are together, alone you are an animal.”138 It is in relation with others that the 
need to live responsibly arises; otherwise, we are prone to live out our most basic instincts like 
animals. It is then plausible to maintain that the concept of moral and social responsibility are 
more fused than delineated to an African mind than you might find in the West. Let us now 
consider an overview 
A normative concept that nearly approximates moral responsibility among the Bantu 
speaking regions of Africa is “Ubuntu” (more specifically so among the Xhosa). Ubuntu is an 
approximation because it is difficult to render an exact English equivalent of it and its variations; 
hence there are different renderings of it among the different Bantu dialects and among 
scholars.
139
 Thaddeus Metz who develops a more lucid theory of this concept says that 
                                               
136 H. Verhoef and C. Michel, “Studying Morality within the African Context: A Model of Moral Analysis and 
Construction,” in Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 26 (4):1997, p. 396.  
137 Laurent Magesa, African Religion: The Moral Tradition of Abundant Life (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis books, 
1997). 
138 He cites P. Bock, “Exploring African Morality,” Cross Currents, XXVIII:4 (Winter, 1978-9), p.483.  
139 We acknowledge the variations of this concept as identified by Richard Tambulasi and Happy Kayuni who noted: 
“Like many doctrines that characterize a way of living of communities with small but crucial cultural variations, 
ubuntu is a difficult concept to pin down as different communities attach different meanings to the concept 
emphasizing the strengths of some aspects they regard fundamental. Moreover, ubuntu is referred to differently in 
different African Bantu languages. For instance, it is umunthu in Chewa, umundu in Yawo, bunhu in Tsonga, unhu 
in Shona, botho in Sotho or Tswana, umuntu in Zulu, vhutu in Venda, and ubuntu in Xhosa and Ndebele. In 
addition, being an African concept and a basis for African cultural abstract feeling, attempts to create concrete 
definitions of the term prove futile. At the bottom level however, ubuntu is the underlying foundation of African 
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“roughly, it means humanness, and it often figures into the maxim that “a person is a person 
through other persons.” This implies that one’s metaphysical and social identity “depends on the 
community.”140 Desmond Tutu provides us further insight to understanding this term as integral 
to the relationship between personhood, moral responsibility, and community:  
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey, so-and-so has 
Ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and 
compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably 
bound up in yours.
141
 
The concept of Ubuntu is difficult for a Westerner to understand but very much at home 
with any African. Michael Battle concedes this much in the title he dedicates to this African 
concept: 
Ubuntu is an African concept of personhood in which the identity of the self is understood to be 
formed interdependently through community. This is a difficult world-view for many Westerners 
who tend to understand self as over and against others— or as in competition with others. In a 
Western worldview, interdependence may be easily confused with codependence, a pathological 
condition in which people share a dependence on something that is not life-giving, such as 
alcohol or drugs. Ubuntu, however, is about symbiotic and cooperative relationships— neither the 
                                                                                                                                                       
communities’ culture. It is a way of life that characterizes the communal nature of African communities as it “brings 
to the fore images of supportiveness, cooperation and communism” (Koster 1996: 111). Nussbaum (2003: 2) 
conceptualizes it as the “capacity in African culture to express companion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and 
humanity in the interest of building and maintaining community with justice and mutual caring”. ”See, “Can African 
Feet Divorce Western Shoes? The Case of ‘Ubuntu’ and Democratic Good Governance in Malawi, in Nordic 
Journal of African Studies 14(2): 147-151 (2005), p. 148; See also Michael Battle who adds, “The word Ubuntu 
comes from a linguistic group of Sub-Saharan languages known as Bantu. Both words Ubuntu and Bantu can be 
recognized by the common root of -ntu (human). The prefix ba- denotes the plural form for humanity. In short, 
"Ubuntu" means personhood. A further etymological foundation for -ntu can be translated as being, that is, human 
being. In the spirituality common to Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a direct relationship between human being and 
God's being. Ubuntu, therefore, also includes a theological understanding in which all beings are known through the 
category of personhood. Michael Battle, Ubuntu: I in You and You in Me (Kindle Locations 62-64), Seabury Books, 
Kindle Edition.  
140 Thaddeus Metz, “Toward an African Moral Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.15 (3):2007, p. 323.  
141 Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 31.  
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parasitic and destructive relationships of codependence nor the draining and alienating 
relationships of competition.
142
 
Space does not allow us explore further the different dimensions of African view of either 
hospitality or solidarity (friendship) that could reveal the linkages with and enrich at a deeper 
level an understanding of this concept.
143
 However, we prefer to argue from the foregoing 
explanation that Ubuntu is a term that encapsulates the different qualities that is essential to 
being considered a “responsible person”. It means that when someone is said to have Ubuntu, it 
means he/she is morally responsible. To an African mind, moral responsibility is about building 
positive and enduring relationships with others. It implies being genuinely concerned about what 
is happening in the other person’s life. It is about empathy, care, hospitality, benevolence, love. 
At the heart of all these is “relationship” – the good relationship we share with others. It 
therefore affirms our positions that “relationship” is at the heart of all moral conceptualizations 
among Africans. The goal of morality is to maintain the harmony of the network of relationships 
at all costs. And this relationship transcends person-to-person and community to include all 
creation (ancestors, spirits, the cosmos).   
While Ubuntu is a concept undergoing development, it does help in some way to 
conceptualize a specifically African notion of what “moral responsibility” implies to an African 
mind. It allows us to see moral responsibility as meaningful only in the context of relationships 
with others within the concrete moral community. Though T. Metz’s analysis explains how this 
concept approximates different Western themes of right and wrong conduct but we leave this 
                                               
142 Michael Battle, Ubuntu: I in You and You in Me (New York: Seabury Books, 2009) Kindle Edition, Locations 
53-55 
143 See Gregory I. Olikenyi, African Hospitality: A Model for the Communication of the Gospel in the African 
Cultural Context (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 2001), pp. 102-133.  
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aspect for another chapter.  Suffice to say here though that this African notion of moral 
responsibility as we interpreted above fits neatly into Strawson’s “fellow feeling” argument and 
Niebuhr’s idea of moral responsibility that presupposes the idea of a moral community. We do 
recognize the distinctions properly made between community and society.
144
 We shall explore 
this further in Chapter three when we develop fully the idea of community. At the moment, let us 
review the current debate on the origins of moral responsibility.  
1.5     Nature or Nurture: The Origins of Moral Responsibility 
In the light of our explication of the notion of moral responsibility, is it safe to assert that 
we cannot possibly expect responsible action from individuals in a moral community where 
others (especially its leaders) act irresponsibly towards them “consistently”?145 Rick Nauert 
recently posed the question: “Are some corporate CEOs, lawyers, politicians and scientists 
psychopaths? And his response is “yes” if we widen our understanding of psychopaths to include 
very intelligent and often charismatic personalities that “display a chronic inability to feel guilt, 
remorse or anxiety about any of their actions.”146 We know the rage such coldness in the face 
                                               
144 See Wojtyla, Op. Cit. pp. 239; Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, trans. Charles P. Loomis (1887 
reprint, New York: Dever Publications, inc., 2002), pp. 33-102. Toonies presents here what has become a classical 
distinction between “Gemeinschaft” (community) and “Gesellschaft” (society). He asserts that “Gemeinschaft” 
connotes not just a certain kinship or intimacy but perhaps even more important is the “moral unity” that sustains 
and upholds such intimacy and a sense of rootedness or kinship they share in common. It is this moral unity that we 
claim to be at the heart of the commitment that they express through mutual solidarity despite all factors that 
threaten to separate them. It is this internal cohesion (moral unity) that explains why social practices, beliefs, and 
institutions are considered as intrinsically good and valued for themselves.    
145 The possible explanation is that we have become deluded by an excessive focus on the view of humans as 
“citizens” who obey laws or as “builders” who seek for ends. Hence we believe that the social contract holds so long 
as we “enforce” laws and provide limited services that constitute human “ends”. The unfortunate truth however is 
that we cannot legislate our way to moral responsibility. It needs deliberation rather than coercion for it to be 
authentic.   
146 Rick Nauert wrote an article published in Psych Central. See “A better definition of Psychopath,” Retrieved on 
December 5, 2011, from http://psychcentral.com/news/2006/07/03/improving-the-definition-of-
%e2%80%98psychopath%e2%80%99/64.html 
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of a horrible act evokes in the beholders.  If “chronic inability to feel guilt or remorse” regarding 
one’s actions is what distinguishes psychopaths from normal people, it might be justified to label 
most of our leaders who exhibit these attitudes psychopaths. But how does labeling help us to 
deal with the dilemma of moral irresponsibility? Obviously finding the roots of psychopathy 
would form a critical core of the solution based on the assumption that those who “display 
chronic inability to feel guilt and remorse” are more prone to act irresponsibly. This agrees with 
our understanding of moral responsibility thus far as having more to do with “kin feelings” than 
thinking as such.  
Following up on Nauerts claim, we found out that the science of psychology have 
clinically classified “psychopaths” as basically “maladjustments” in the developmental process 
that result in “impairment” of the cognitive apparatus within the individual.147 Does this answer 
the puzzle? Not in the least because irresponsible behaviors traceable to psychopaths are 
infinitesimally small when compared to the whole.  Moreover, the same psychology admits that 
the “origins of psychopathy are still unknown.” 148 However, they admit that this impairment is 
traceable physiologically to specific neurotransmitter systems in the brain but cannot claim their 
origin is either genetic or environmental.
149
  Neuroscientists have also claimed that “acquired 
lesions in the prefrontal cortex” could explain amoral behavior and critics point to the degree as 
                                               
147 Bert Musschenga, “Moral Violations and the Ordinary Moral Person,” in The Development and Structure of 
Conscience, Willem Koops, et al, eds. (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), p. 36.  
148 Ibid. Robert Hare provides an extensive psychological characterization of psychopaths but with critical stress on 
emotional impairment. See R. D. Hare, Without Conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths among us. 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993); J. Blair, D. Mitchell, & K. Blair, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain 
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149 J. Blair, D. Mitchell, & K. Blair, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 13ff.   
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depending on when it occurred.
150
 While abnormal growth could explain amoral behavior in 
clinical patients it still does not explain amoral or immoral tendencies in well-formed persons 
(people without “acquired lesions in the prefrontal cortex”).  What they tried to explain though is 
the phenomenon of “insufficient self-control” or “self-regulation.” This is evidently a new 
attempt to answer the age old question of moral irresponsibility: the recourse to the “weakness of 
the will” argument that we saw in Aristotle above.  
Despite the foregoing shortcomings, we think psychopaths afford us some clue in 
understanding moral irresponsibility. That “clue” is reposed in the symptoms: “a chronic 
inability to feel guilt or remorse.” R. D Hare puts it even more directly when he asserts that 
“Their hallmark is a stunning lack of conscience”.151   According to him, the psychopath profile 
is the “image of a self-centered, callous, and remorseless person profoundly lacking in empathy 
and the ability to form warm emotional relationships with others, a person who functions without 
the restraints of conscience.”152 You may have guessed rightly that the reason we are exploring 
this route is precisely its connection with the notion of conscience. We are of the view that 
though we do not yet know the causes of psychopathy, it is reasonable to assume that 
diminishing the evident symptoms associated with it should result in more responsible behavior 
or at least diminish the degree of irresponsibility. Our greater concern however is not the 
treatment of psychopaths but rather in a related question: Would symptoms associated with 
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psychopaths if found in less degree in “normal people” explain the degree to which such persons 
tend towards irresponsibility?  
Strawson and Niebuhr would exclude psychopath from moral responsibility given that 
they lack the capacity to share fellow “feelings” of sympathy critical to social relationships that 
define responsibility. We need to explain how these “feelings” are related to conscience in the 
next chapter but it helps to note that some neuroscientists define psychopathic behavior in 
relation to its lack of reference to conscience. It is reasonable to hold therefore that when we “act 
without the restraints of conscience,” then the more irresponsible we would be expected to be.    
Kelly McAleer recently published the story of a neuroscientist (James Fallon) who discovered 
there is a visible difference in the scan imaging of psychopaths and non-psychopaths. He 
(Fallon) decided to scan his own brain and discovered his brain scan is identical to that of a 
psychopath. Further analysis of blood samples: MAO-A gene (monoamine oxidase A ) 
controversially dubbed “warrior gene” due to its association with violent behavior. To his 
dismay, while his family members all have the low variant, his matches that of a born killer. But 
knowing that he is not a killer, his conclusion was that environmental factors (the fact that he had 
loving instead of an abusive childhood) ensured that the genetic predisposition to becoming a 
psychopath was “not activated”153in him. This is an important point in understanding the relation 
of nature and nurture in shaping behavior and who we become.
154
 Critical here is the experience 
of empathy, love, and care in his childhood that helped him develop similar emotions that 
                                               
153 Kelly McAleers, “The Effect of Nature and Nurture on Psychopathy: The of Case of James Fallon, PsychCentral. 
Retrieved on December 5, 2011, http://blogs.pschcentral.com/forensic-focus/2010/07/the-effect-of-nature-nurture-
on-psychopathy-the-case-of-james-fallon/ 
154 Howard H. Kendler has forcefully argued in this direction in Amoral Thoughts About Morality: The Intersection 
of Science, Psychology, and Ethics (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 2008), pp. 61-68  
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checkmates the abnormal gene responsible for very violent behavior. Here “empathy” is an 
essential quality – providing trust for significant others involved in childhood relationships.   
 Perhaps the most recent significant development on the relationship between 
neuroscience and behavior is that of Paul J. Zak of the Center for Neuro-economics Studies. He 
claims to have identified “Oxytocin” as the “trust code” in the human DNA. He argues from the 
result of series of experiments that this hormone boosts trustworthiness, resulting in an increase 
in acts of generosity and empathy. He claims that those who have spikes in oxytocin without 
corresponding reaction (of trust and empathy) “suggest pathology” and or brain damage.155 It is 
not our intention to argue against hard facts especially if it is proven with sustained evidence. So, 
supposing that Zak has struck on something substantive, what could be its possible implication 
for moral theory? What is the possible implication of a correlation between a specific hormone to 
a basic human sentiment like trust, empathy, or benevolence that we hitherto consider as the 
substratum of morally responsible acts? If it is possible to use artificial hormone to induce 
morally responsible acts, how does this impact moral theory and specifically our notion of 
conscience as the doorkeeper of morally responsible acts? To address these questions, we need to 
explore further the debate on the origins of morality especially that aspect of it regarding our 
genetic predisposition to selfishness which remains the moral albatross to moral responsibility.  
1.6  The “Selfish Gene” and Altruism beyond Kin and Reciprocation 
 Altruism beyond kin and reciprocation has often been affirmed as a distinguishing 
characteristic of human behavior traceable to earliest beginnings of the human project.  
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While “altruism” is a characteristic behavior of many biological organisms, it has never been 
established to go beyond kin and reciprocation as we find commonly among humans. To 
understand the argument we need to listen to evolution scientists. Evolutionary scientists 
especially in fields of neurobiology and evolutionary psychology insist that there is a “biological 
basis for all social behavior,”156 and they have located this is what they call the “selfish 
genes”.157 According to this view, selfishness is encoded in the genes of all biological organisms 
– including humans. They argue that selfishness is the “engine of evolution” because organisms 
that survive are essentially those whose genetic makeup best promotes the interest of that 
specific organism or group by its capacity to adapt to changing conditions thereby ensuring its 
survival and the replication of its kind. Socio-biologists like Richard Dawkins and E.O. Wilson, 
among others, maintain that altruism is a common phenomenon among animals and insects. Bees 
and birds have been recorded to commit suicide in a bid to protect their kind. Dawkins argue that 
altruistic behavior is a critical component of preservation in natural selection and hence is seen to 
evolve even in a very selfish world. He asserts:  
Humans and Baboons evolved by natural selection…Anything that has evolved by natural 
selection should be selfish. Therefore, we must expect that when we go and look at the behavior 
of baboons, humans, and all other living creatures, we find it to be selfish.
158
 
 
If selfishness and altruism are innate qualities in us, how we interpret their interaction makes a 
world of difference either setting us apart from the rest of biological life or destroying that 
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Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss, eds. (Cambridge: William B. Erdmann Company, 2004), P.288.  
157 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 1, 44-45, 182. 
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distinctiveness.  Charles Darwin, the father of modern scientific evolution held four essential 
positions on the development of morality that remain foundational: He claimed, inter alia, that 
human morality evolved from: 1. Group selection, 2. Maintains that a yawning gap exists 
between human and animal moral systems. 3. The social instinct is primeval and basically the 
same in all modern humans. 4. The instinct for sympathy is the basis for moral development and 
the spread of improved social institutions.
159
 In an effort to identify the most significant criteria 
for distinguishing humans and animals, he writes:  
We have seen in the last two chapters that man bears in his bodily structure clear traces of his 
decent from lower form; but it may be urged that, as man differs greatly in his mental power from 
all other animals, there must be some error in this conclusion. No doubt the difference in this 
respect is enormous…The difference would, no doubt, still remain immense, even if one of the 
higher apes had been improved and civilized as much as a dog has been in comparison with its 
parent form, the wolf or jackal…The moral sense perhaps affords the best highest distinction 
between man and lower animals.
160
 
 
While Darwin acknowledges an “enormous gap” existing between human and his closest 
cousins, some modern evolution scholars tend to discount this gap, preferring to fill them instead 
with spurious arguments. Chris Beard, a senior Paleontologist at Carnegie Museum made a 
recent breakthrough discovery of ancient fossils but was humble enough to admit that, “Every 
time a Paleontologist finds a fossil that fills an evolutionary gap, two more gaps of smaller 
magnitude are created that also need to be filled.”161 The greater problem is not the facts 
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evolution scientists are dealing with but rather the conclusions they arrive at. Often such 
conclusions go beyond what the data says, resulting in a leap from a wholly descriptive 
explanation of “how” they think morality evolved to asserting “why” it exists.162 So far they have 
not provided data evidence that clarifies the evolutionary gap but some would prefer to relegate 
morality and religion as “cultural delusions” lacking objectivity of truth.163  
 
Loren Haarsma has argued that instead of philosophers and theologians trying to refute 
the often “conflicting”164 claims of evolution scientists that are ahead of empirical data they work 
with, it is better to identify the locus of the problem. According to her, “the problem does not lie 
with the scientific claim but “in the philosophical, that if our moral and religious sentiment 
evolved, then moral and religious beliefs cannot have objective status or truth content.”165 She 
holds firstly, that if the claims of evolution scientists are exorcised of certain “philosophical 
additions,” it will not be difficult reconciling them with Christian perspectives on morality. 
Secondly, she insists on leaving a space for divine personal revelation at some point in the 
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evolution of human morality.
166
 She summarizes for us four competing scientific hypothesis why 
humans exhibit “extended altruism” (altruism beyond kin and reciprocation) which we condense:  
First hypothesis sees extended altruism as “non-adaptive side effect of other adaptive 
traits.” As intelligent beings, we envisage possible outcomes of our actions, and hence we select 
or prefer certain actions to others based on our judgment of beneficial outcomes. We are self-
conscious and aware of the self-consciousness of others. While these qualities might be adaptive, 
its combination gives rise to “extended altruism and morality as a side effect.”167 Second 
hypothesis holds that morality and altruism beyond kin and reciprocation are culturally inherited 
traits. While genes predispose us to morality but only limited to kin, culture teaches us to act that 
way and we experience groups that promote altruism and morality outcompete others that do not. 
Third hypotheses see altruism and morality as both adaptive and gene based. Altruism and 
morally right behavior have long term benefits such as improved social status and respect. 
Moreover, those who hold this view also argue that it is a requirement for group membership 
since groups abhor someone who is consistently selfish. The fourth hypothesis holds that 
“altruism and morality are adaptive at group level.” The argument here is that though altruistic 
persons are less advantaged than the selfish ones in the same group, nevertheless, the benefits to 
the members of the group “outweigh the costs imposed by the few selfish members” in the 
group. The altruistic individuals for example have less offspring precisely because they take care 
of the others. So it concludes, “Altruism is group selected if there is a large amount of group-
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group competition and if there is occasional mixing of group membership especially if altruists 
can cluster when forming a group.”168 
What is common to these claims was that morality and altruism evolved, the specific 
difference being as to whether it evolved genetically or culturally (or a mix of both). Evidently, 
there is little agreement here as to how to explain the paradox of altruism beyond kin and 
reciprocation in the light of the claim we have selfishness encoded in our genes. Radical social 
Darwinists like E. O Wilson will nonetheless argue that “philosophers and biologicized” should 
hands off ethics. According to him, human behavior is a “circuitous technique” for preserving 
the human genetic material. Therefore, morality has no other “demonstrable ultimate 
function.”169 Michael Ruse concludes with Wilson that “ethics is an illusion fobbed off on us by 
our genes to get us to cooperate.”170 Michael Ghiselin puts it even more blatantly:  
No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society, once sentimentalism has been laid 
aside. What passes as cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and 
exploitation…Given a full chance to act in his own interest, nothing but expediency will restrain 
[a person] from brutalizing, from maiming, from murdering – his brother, his mate, his parents, or 
his child. Scratch an “altruist” and watch a “hypocrite” bleed.
171
 
 
There is little incentive for pursuing this line of argument here because it often leads to a 
conceptual cur de sac. Evolution scientists need to be more humble in their claims. Steve Rose is 
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a Neuroscientist that accepted the limitations inherent in the data and inadequacy of science in 
answering these questions. He says: 
What, if any, are the limits of our possible knowledge? Are there some things we cannot in 
principle know?....I realize that…natural scientist’s understanding is bound to be inadequate, 
‘Solving’ brain and mind in the lab isn’t same as doing so in our daily life. In the lab we can still 
all aspire to objectivity, examining the workings of other brains – or even imaging our own – yet 
we go home in the evening to our subjective, autobiographical world, and aspire to make personal 
sense of our lives and loves. Neuroscientist must learn to live with this contradiction. Biological 
psychiatrists who may be convinced in their day-to-day practice that affective disorders are the 
results of disturbed serotonin metabolism will still discover existential despair beyond the 
“merely chemical” if they sink into depression. Neurophysiologists who can plot in exquisite 
detail the passage of nervous impulses from motor cortex to the muscles of the arm feel certain 
none the less that they exert ‘free will’ if they ‘choose’ lo lift their arm above their head. Even 
those most committed to a belief in the power of the genes somehow assume that they have the 
personal power to transcend genetic potency and destiny. When Steven Pinker so notoriously put 
it, ‘if my genes don’t like what I do, they can go and jump in the lake.’ Or less demotically, when 
Richard Dawkins concluded his influential book The Selfish Gene by insisting that ‘only we can 
rebel against the tyranny of our selfish replicators’, they merely gave naïve vent to the rich 
inconsistency we all experience between our ‘scientific’ convictions and our own lived lives.
172
 
 
Steve Rose provides us in the above lines refreshing viewpoints from his field of neurobiology 
that helps shed light on some of the wild claims of his peers. It affirms there is a limitation not 
just of human knowledge in general but specifically as to what claims science can make. It 
admits there is a gap between the “objectivity” of lab work and the “subjective” dimension of 
lived experience; the same gap exists between the “chemical nature” of depression and the 
“experience” of the depression itself; between “nervous impulses” in our brain and the reality of 
human freedom. He affirms, using even the most radical of the claimants (Dawkins), that there is 
a gap between “scientific” data and the deeper realities of our lives. In other words, even if there 
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is sufficient scientific data that we are determined to behave in a certain manner does not imply 
necessarily we will do so in absolute terms. That makes a world of difference.  
 Does it mean we should disregard the argument on selfish genes? It is not in our interest 
to do so. There is abundant evidence from lived experience that we seem to have a natural 
tendency towards selfishness than altruistic behavior. From a purely philosophical viewpoint, 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) made that argument forcefully almost four centuries ago. 
According to him, human beings are equal by nature; they have equal ability to aspire for goals. 
This gives rise to “equality of hope” with regard to ends that constitutes the basis for conflict in 
society. 
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if 
any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become 
enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes 
their delectation only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to 
pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man’s single power: if one plant, 
sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with 
forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life, 
or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.
173
 
 
The foregoing is man “in the state of nature” ruled by native drives of self-interest such that 
competition is inevitable. Competition as a function of the desire to procure what one needs or 
wants, and its preservation from others who might want the same, gives rise to fear and war – the 
“war of all against all.”  
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The refutation of Hobbes’ model of “psychological egoism” (as it has come to be known) 
is still relevant to the argument evolution scientists raise today.
174
 The view that all human action 
is motivated by self-interest, no matter how altruistic they may seem, attacks not just the very 
foundations of morality but of our humanity as well.  Brody offers us three major counter 
arguments by opponents of this view like H. A. Pritchard and Francis Hutcheson.
175
 First is the 
claim that our own moral “feelings”176 confirm to us that we often perform moral acts for other 
reasons apart from self-interest, like acting for the sake of duty or to do the right thing. Second, 
we see in the actions of others that they have nothing to gain from a particular moral action (an 
extension of the first claim). This is presented by Pritchard in these words:  
We obviously are referring to a fact when we speak of someone as possessing a sense of duty 
and, again, a strong sense of duty. And if we consider what we are thinking of in these individuals 
whom we think of as possessing it, we find that we cannot exclude from it a desire to do what is a 
duty, as such, for its own sake, or, more simply, a desire to do what is right, then admit the 
existence of a desire to do what is right, then there is no longer any reason for maintaining as a 
general thesis that in any case in which a man knows some action to be right, he must, if he is to 
be led to do it, be convinced that he will gain by doing it. For we shall be able to maintain that his 
desire to do what is right, if strong enough, will lead him to do the action in question in spite of 
any aversion from doing it which he may feel on account of its disadvantages.
177
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Thirdly, he notes that we praise people for their good actions, especially of note is self-
sacrificing actions. For instance, we praise an anonymous charitable donor more than we do the 
philanthropist who donates to a public school for the sake of public acclaim he gets. It implies 
that if all we do were based on self-interest, neither will there be such a distinction, nor would we 
be praising any virtuous actions. The implication of the above three arguments is that we act for 
motives other than self-interest.  Pritchard and Hutcheson agree on the necessity of training 
children to develop a “desire to do the right thing” or the “concern for the well-being of others” 
respectively. 
178
 Both however acknowledge that the claim to act altruistically have been often 
proved to have acted from a covert self-interest. They therefore hold that self-interest and 
benevolence may “jointly excite a man to the same action, and then they are to be considered as 
two forces impelling the same body to motion.”179 In other words, they are making a case for 
benevolence as co-existing with self-interest at a ratio that is indeterminate. If we determine the 
degree of self-interest involved we will then deduce from the remainder a motive of pure 
benevolence.  
Brody also identifies three major arguments in favor of psychological egoism. The first is 
already noted above: experience shows that often those who seem to act from altruistic motives 
reveal ulterior motives of self-interest. Secondly, the claim that one acts from benevolence or 
sense of duty only confirms the motive of self-interest because the deeper motive would be the 
“pleasure” of making others happy or the “pleasure” accruing to them from a sense of being 
considered virtuous. It is this “pleasure” that is the real motive. Thirdly, all our actions have as 
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their ends the satisfaction of some desire, and therefore constitute a motive of self-interest.
180
 
Brody refuted the three arguments.  
He rejects the first claim on the ground that though it raises doubts about people’s 
motives but does not provide sufficient reason to generalize that all actions are motivated from 
self-interest. Our experience shows that people act from other motive apart from self-interest. 
The second he considers more substantial but supposing its claims were true, “we will still have 
a reason for acting morally.” Hutcheson already argues against this claim by pointing out the 
“pleasure” we get from acting altruistically (making others happy) is an unanticipated reward. In 
other words, it is not the goal aimed at while acting (or the end in view). Instead of intending this 
“pleasure” at the end of the act (which is not even guaranteed), we rather experience the “pain of 
compassion” such that even the removal of this pain does not “terminate our desire”. If it were 
so, “we would run away, shut our eyes, or divert our thoughts from the miserable object as the 
readiest way to remove our pain.”181 He insists that our experience shows that we have a native 
instinct directed to the love and care of others.  
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Finally, Brody considers the third argument as resulting from a “common confusion”182 
that identifies all personal desires for acting with satisfying personal interests. Supposing I have 
a desire to help a poor lady heat her home during winter, the satisfaction of this desire is not to 
be identified with satisfying “self-interest” since there is no personal advantage.  We might add, 
often satisfying a desire of this sort actually hurts us, or comes at a personal cost (a disadvantage) 
which we would have readily avoided if not for an internal sense of obligation to do the right 
thing, or the sense of compassion urging us to care, to show love despite the costs.
183
  
David Hume is one modern philosopher (among others)
184
 that made an extensive 
critique of psychological egoism (cites Epicurus, Atticus, Horace, Hobbes and Locke as sharing 
this view) as misrepresenting the facts of human experience. He considers this principle as 
arising from a “depraved disposition” and has a tendency to encourage similar depravity. It is the 
principle that claims “all benevolence is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce, 
fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence; ”185all as efforts in self-interest disguised as 
“benevolence” - a trap aimed at exposing others to our manipulations. He asserts that this form 
of philosophy is more a satire than a “true delineation or description of human nature” and 
cannot be accommodated in any serious reasoning.  
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Superficial reasoners, indeed, observing many false pretenses among mankind, and feeling 
perhaps, no very strong restraint in their own disposition, might draw a general and a hasty 
conclusion that all is equally corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed 
from all other species of existence, admit of no degrees of good or bad, but are, in every instance, 
the same creatures under different disguises and appearances.
186
 
 
Is it not disturbing that what Hume criticized centuries ago has actually taken center stage 
within critical “sciences” of human behavior today? I am certain they are not all “cynics.” It has 
become a common view in some circles that our motives are “an amalgam” of both our own 
interests and our interests in others.
187
 Perhaps if these could borrow insight from Steve Rose, 
they will take a deep breath before making an absolute claim on a theme they hardly understand 
except, of course, making “irrational leaps” is part of the package in our DNA as Dan Ariely has 
forcefully argued recently as a “scientific theory” that we are “predictably irrational.”188  
If “irrationality” is part of our DNA, then the story gets a bit more complex than what 
evolution scientists would admit. Michael J. Chapman actually argued in that direction rather 
indirectly some years earlier. He identified “passions” as the culprit for irrational behaviors 
which fortunately is not the preserve of humans. Our nearest cousins, the chimps, have recorded 
evidence of being “slaves to their passions” such that “rape, murder, and war” were part of their 
society. He included the “Seven Deadly sins” as part of the repertoire of observable behaviors 
                                               
186 David Hume, Inquiry into Human Understanding, Op. Cit., p.253. He traces this to a misguided love of 
philosophical “simplicity.” He cites examples of animals that are kind to their own and our species and wonders if 
we will admit a disinterested benevolence among them? He adds to this tenderness of a mother to her offspring that 
slaves over a sick child and dies of grief at his/her death. He queries about the meaning of “gratitude” as we attend 
to the welfare of a friend even at a cost – like taking care of a poor friend’s family after his death. How could this be 
motivated by self-interest?  
187 Robert C. Solomon, and Clancy W. Martin, Op. Cit., p. 257. 
188  Dan Arley, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions (Harper Collins ebooks, 1998) 
73 
 
among chimps. They crave “sweets” as we do, leaving millions critically unhealthy due to 
irrational choices they consistently make, and knowingly so. His argument however is that the 
theory of “evolutionary trap” may explain the origin of evil and sin. He explains that “instinct” 
could “sometimes drive animals into self-destructive behaviors”.189 He cites an example with 
leatherback turtles ( Dermochelys coriacea) that evolved a food preference for jelly fish but now 
eat transparent plastic bags floating on the ocean that end up blocking their digestive tracts.
190
 He 
then argues that the “seven deadly sins” found in Catholic tradition may well be our own 
“evolutionary traps” the understanding of which could provide insight as to the remedy. His 
analyses of these vices show credible outlines of how these tendencies possibly evolved.  
For instance, he argues that we did not evolve thrift since our environmental cues 
consisting of “weather conditions, game availability, and constant predator threat”191 during the 
hunting stage of our development did not provide us the opportunity for long-term planning. 
Hence, we have “evolved greed for material objects surpassing that of any other animal”.192He 
observes however that it is “getting not having that we seem to crave.”193 It is the “irrationality” 
that results from this craving that corporate businesses are exploiting in their offers from credit 
card to automobile, to the last commodity on offer in the market today. It is possibly the same 
“irrationality” behind our cravings that resulted in the prime mortgage crises and the success of 
                                               
189 Michael J. Chapman, “Hominid Failing: An Evolutionary Basis for Sin in Individuals and Corporations,” in 
Evolution in Ethics: Human Morality in Biological and Religious Perspectives, Op. Cit. p.103.  
190 Ibid  
191 Ibid p. 104  
192 Ibid. p. 104 
193 Ibid pp. 104-105 
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Madoff ponzi rip-off.  He actually applied this in explaining corporate excess. He cites Ritzer’s, 
The McDonaldization Thesis, as an example of how “hyperrational systems” led to “irrational 
consequences.”194 The McDonald franchise is organized as a hyperrational system that works 
because it is tightly scripted to the point that everyone “apes” what the system wants. The 
consequences are not just material gains but levels of irrational behaviors from employee to 
customers (consumers). This script has become blueprint for most businesses and it has crept 
into the academia as well. He then asserts: “the much touted DNA revolution is the product of 
McDonalized biology.”195 It has become so closely scripted and much of the work is done by 
robots that produce “made-to-order enzymes.”196 He admits that though genes connected to 
obesity, homosexuality, and alcoholism (among others), have been identified, only “radical 
reductionists” of the stripes of Richard Dawkins  and/or E. O. Wilson explain these tendencies 
solely in terms of genes. But even Dawkins admits that memes (ideas developed within a culture) 
could enable us “rebel against the selfish replicators,”197but failed to draw from this 
corresponding logical conclusions except the claim that genes has no teleos apart from 
replication. This in itself is metaphysical reduction that is not supported by strict scientific proof. 
Craig A. Boyd argues for a measure of correlation between the findings of evolutionary 
psychology and natural law but warns of its limitations.
198
He agrees there is sufficient evidence 
                                               
194 Ibid  
195 Ibid. p. 109 
196 Ibid. p. 109 
197 He cites celibacy as an instance of how miming is used to overcome biological necessity showing the force of 
group norms in attaining this. See Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, pp. 180-215.  
198 Craig A. Boyd, “Thomistic Natural Law and the Limits of Evolutionary Psychology,” in Evolution and Ethics, 
Op. Cit., pp. 221-235.  
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to argue that moral norms like one prohibiting murder could have evolved from either kin 
selection or reciprocal altruism (both of which is found among hymenoptera like bees, ants, 
wasps; chimpanzee, and vampire bats)
199
 that have corroborative evidence in research done 
among humans. In such a case, it could be argued that natural prohibition on murder is reason’s 
ability to see the “necessary relationship between the principle of non-malfeasance and social 
cohesion.”200 He however criticized evolutionary scientists for over generalizing their claims. 
Celibacy and Martyrdom has shown persistence that defies their basic claim. That Dawkins 
introduced the “meme” theory to explain away this human capacity to “rebel” against the genes 
presents an even more ridiculous position: how is it that biology evolves contradictory 
processes? If “meme” and “gene” are both inherited (the propagation process is the only 
difference), then biology seems to defeat itself.  
Moreover, socio-biologists are yet to prove how humans adjudicate among competing 
impulses. When the Martyrs were faced with recanting their faith or face death, what impulse 
was behind their choice to be killed?
201
 We might then add, what impulses were behind the 
choice for present day suicide bombers to set themselves ablaze? Surely their choices do not 
seem to follow the self-preserving necessity claims of evolutionary psychology.  
                                               
199 William Hamilton’s experiments confirm that female bees could have higher “co-efficient of relatedness” 
towards their sisters than their own daughters. See Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, I and II. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology, 7:1-52 cited by C. A. Boyd, p.230; See also G. S. Wilkinson, “Reciprocal food sharing in 
vampire bats,” Nature, (1984) 308:181-184; Franz de Waal, “The Chimpanzee’s service economy: Food for 
Grooming,” Evolution and Human Behavior, 1997: 18:375-86.  
200 Boyd, Ibid  
201 Boyd, Ibid, p. 232 
76 
 
Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology would therefore need philosophy and 
ultimately, theology to clarify these seeming puzzles. They constitute part of core behaviors, 
along with altruism beyond kin and reciprocation that sets human behavior apart from that of 
ants, bees, vampire bats, and their nearest cousins, the chimps. Thomas Aquinas did exactly that 
when he asserts that “there is in every human a natural inclination to act according to reason; and 
this is to act according to virtue.”202 Therefore, Aquinas holds Martyrdom to be a “rational good” 
deriving from the need to preserve one’s integrity even at the cost of losing biological life.203 But 
this rational good is not just any good but the “truth regarding one’s duty to God.” This is the 
impulse that overrides all other impulses – including self-preservation.  
It is a fact that human beings have consistently shown they can forego biological life to 
fulfill what they consider an obligation imposed from within them, this not only puts a dent on 
the claim that selfishness is a necessity of nature but also brings us to a critical question this 
research hopes to explore: What “inclinations” is there in us that best mirrors the nature and 
nurture arguments? Is it not the human conscience? Is it not conscience that makes it possible for 
the human organism to transcend the seeming necessity of the selfish gene? When this becomes 
either dysfunctional or inactive, humans return to their native instincts and behave like the 
animals they are. In the next chapter we shall explore how conscience serves as the confluence 
                                               
202 Thomas Aquinas, Ia IIae. Q. 94.a3 Boyd argues that all acts of virtue fall under the natural law as they are 
prescriptions of reason.  
203 See Boyd, Ibid. p. 234 
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of nature and nurture providing the alternative theological explanation of how “gene” and 
“meme” come together in the development of our moral intuitions.204   
While there is evidence that suggests humans evolved some norms culturally as either kin 
selection or altruism like other biological organisms, however, there is no hard evidence that 
explains the “evolution” of altruism beyond kin and reciprocation among humans. The claim that 
we are “predictably irrational” suggest an effort to “scientifically prove” what theology has 
known for millennia – that human inclinations go wild (become disordered) and disappoint us 
unless they are formed to that extent they come under the dictate of reason. Such formation is 
only possible through formation of conscience. Therefore, recent developments that find a 
correlation between our brain chemical impulses and trust or empathy would be very misleading 
if we conceive of a “chemical boost” to moral responsibility devoid of all internal mechanisms.    
1.7   Methodological Considerations 
The methodological model we intend to follow in this is the synthetic theological 
approach. Stephen B. Bevans provides us useful description of this model.
205
 It is essentially a 
dialogical model. It is a model that is open to conversation with other views and currents of 
opinions across the spectrum of theological endeavor. The significant addition we have made is 
                                               
204 Philosophers and some theologians have engaged social scientists on the debate about the origins of moral 
intuition for the better half of the last century. That debate will get more poignant as new discoveries are made in 
relation to DNA and behavior. Perhaps this will provide possible reasons for a paradigm shift and a new emphasis.  
Our intention for revisiting this debate at all is hinged on the assumption that new data will possibly impact our 
understanding of morality. From the foregoing, it does not indicate this will happen any soon. However, if data from 
neural science provides us with serious evidence about biological roots of empathy/trust/ and benevolence, it should 
inspire debate as to how this could be applicable to human development. Furthermore, the claim that poor countries 
are “low trust” societies or that “high trust” societies prosper should inspire debate in the developing world like 
Africa where mutual distrust still constitutes a primary hindrance to any meaningful development. 
205 Steven B. Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, Loc. Cit. pp.89-102 
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to widen that openness to be more inclusive to voices and views from other disciplines. We are 
living at a time of an unprecedented overload of information. There are countless disciplines that 
have emerged to manage emerging fields of information. The rate at which new information is 
generated has become unbelievably fast that we are in danger of losing a sense of what it means 
to know something. Sharing information is not only a way to bring to our awareness to what is 
available already as an idea, but it is also a time proven method to capture in time and space 
significant ideas that are bound to be lost or submerged in a mass of data inevitable in an age of 
information overload.  We precisely chose the synthetic model as providing us the best possible 
platform to listen to relevant data that could help us arrive at a broader understanding of our 
problematic and it provides a wider spectrum of possible solutions. The fields of social sciences 
have churned out unbelievable mass of data that will keep theological reflection active for a long 
time. This research pays attention to that mass of data because it considers its findings and 
conclusions of amazing import for theological reflection. 
We adopt in this research Steve B. Bevans’ idea of “model” which he conceives as “a 
conceptual construction” or theoretical views formulated from concrete realities. They are 
therefore neither “realities” as such nor mirror images of realities. However, they are “ideal 
types” and for that reason ought to be “taken seriously but not literarily”206 given that they help 
disclose the complex reality they tend to explicate, they help us to understand them. Given the 
complexity of the reality of human nature and experience that this project aims to understand, we 
consider it an imperative to employ a model that would not limit our options. It is with this 
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consideration in mind that we chose the synthetic model over perhaps the merely anthropological 
or praxis models respectively precisely because of their limitations. 
This choice does not imply our model is perfect. All models are ultimately inadequate. 
Bevans calls the synthetic model “the middle-of-the-road model.” It tries to synthesize the values 
inherent in other approaches to contextual theology. It values the insights in the anthropological, 
transcendental, praxis, translation, and countercultural models. Its uniqueness then lies in its 
effort to be as inclusive as possible. It listen not only to the insights of different schools of 
theology, but also opens itself to integrate the insights from relevant disciplines in other sciences 
(particularly the sciences of human behavior and the new discipline of moral psychology) 
adopting its findings as useful data for theological reflection. It is our aim that this wider 
inclusivity opens our research to a wider context and a wider conceptual understanding of our 
theme. However, this also opens us up to a wider critique. This inclusivity does not necessarily 
imply a compromise position is our aim but rather we envisage a creative dialogue across the 
different disciplines currently involved in understanding human behavior. The procedure for this 
model follows the description Bevans suggests:  
The procedure of the synthetic model, one realizes, is very complex. However, the procedure is 
much more like producing a work of art than following a rigid set of directions. One needs to 
juggle several things at one time, but is not a matter of just keeping everything moving smoothly. 
One needs, rather, to place emphasis on message at one point, while at another point one needs to 
emphasize cultural identity. At one point traditional practices need to be cultivated. Perhaps at 
another set of circumstances, they need to be resisted.
207
 
 
The advantage of this model is its capacity to promote the broadest “cross pollination” of ideas 
and cultural practices. It will seek to analyze both ideas and cultural practices spanning a wide 
                                               
207 Bevans, Ibid. p. 92 
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spectrum of disciplines but always with attention to seek how these ideas and/or practices inform 
or could be shaped by Christian tradition and practices. Specifically, our analysis will seek from 
these cross disciplinary perspectives insights that could help us understand moral behavior in 
relation to conscience.  We shall seek through this model a deeper understanding as to how 
conscience is significant for moral behavior and underscore the need for its retrieval.  
A general critique of synthetic model is already noted above, the argument that it is a 
compromise view. Bevans refutes this argument as hinged on a correspondence theory of truth 
that sees the world in black and white instead of a kaleidoscope of colors. He cites David  
Tracy’s “dialogical imagination” as appropriate metaphor to explain the postmodern worldview 
that compels us to enter into conversation with other points of view – especially when they differ 
from our own. The reason is that truth is not “out there” in static repose but discovered in 
relation and dialogue with others. He therefore counsels that we should cultivate a mental 
attitude that sees truth discovery as a dialogical process rather than a static quality. 
208
 In this 
dialogue with others, our true self and cultural identity will gradually be delineated. Therefore, 
instead of the model being a compromise of truth, it is an ongoing enquiry into fuller truth.  
It is for this reason of a dialogical approach to truth discovery that we need to add here 
the insight of a Nigerian author on method in relation to African context and reality. We noted 
earlier that Elochukwu. E. Uzukwu, in his recent book, God, Spirit, and Human Wholeness, 
identifies “relationality” (either as “duality” or “multiplicity”) as constituting the primary 
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conceptual paradigm or approach for understanding African realities or their idea of “being in the 
world.”209 With reference to methodology he asserts, inter alia, as follows:  
[M]y methodological assumption is rooted in the structure of the West African approach 
to reality. This approach is fundamentally plural or multiple and therefore relational. 
What is not multiple does not exist. Ideas of twin-ness, duality, relatedness, and 
ambivalence dominate West African religion and anthropology. The grounding of these 
ideas is ontological – a contextual insight into being and reality. From Nigeria to Mali, it 
is the same story. Similar perceptions are found in Cameroon, Congo, and other central 
African countries. I will illustrate from the Igbo world and system of thought the 
relevance of duality, flexibility and relationality. The wisdom saying ife kwulu ife 
akwudebe ya (something stands and something else stands beside it) consecrates 
relationality and maintains a clear distance from absolutism.
210
  
 
Uzukwu admits his view on “relationality” is indebted to the insights of Chinua Achebe (an 
outstanding Nigerian author) on the issue and would argue that “relational tension mediates 
being-in-the-world”211 and would constitute the proper departure for any fruitful conversation 
particularly in the African context. It is important to note that Uzukwu’s view on relationality is 
totality in sync with our choice of the synthetic model. He further argues that “flexibility as a 
methodological starting point would enable the African theologians to adopt ‘a second 
viewpoint’” which is an openness necessary for inter-disciplinary conversation in the search of 
truth that the synthetic model espouses. It is not surprising then that he welcomes inter-
disciplinarity as the right approach for unveiling the truth of the African reality – even though his 
focus on inter-disciplinarity is the humanist views of African literature.  
                                               
209 Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, God, Spirit, and Human Wholeness (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2004), pp. 
5, 6  
210 Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, ibid. p. 5 
211 Uzukwu, ibid. p. 6  
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He therefore critiques the use of Western categories in exposing African realities.
212
 
While we admit there is merit in his critique but we do not think it is easy at this point to push 
too hard on this front precisely because there is not enough African literature or resources “when 
you need them” to do a whole lot in some fields like theology. This is perhaps why he used 
Origen to “fully’ expose and “complement” his model.213 In the light of this reality, it is our hope 
in this present study to borrow the seeds of insight from both African and Western authors. There 
is beauty in complementarity. Moreover, if there is abhorrence for all forms of “absolutism” in 
Igbo and/or African thought system, then the more reason it should not be a “selective” vision of 
what it implies.  If one is trying to lay the foundation of criticality for African scholarship by 
insisting on “having a second look at everything” then putting absolute boundaries defeats the 
very idea one is protecting. “Flexibility”, “plurality”, a “second look at everything” are 
indications of a degree of openness to whatever is out there to be discovered as real and true. 
This viewpoint on methodology is in this sense squarely in sync with our chosen approach – the 
synthetic model.  
Given the broad spectrum our research covers, we do admit certain limitations this 
imposes. This research does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of the ancillary themes 
we have accommodated (we particularly note that space does not allow an exhaustive 
discussions on evolution of morals, theories of community, and systemic corruption). Our 
analysis of conscience will focus on processes rather than on formulation of norms. As a result, 
                                               
212 See Uzukwu, ibid, p. 31 While he admits plurality or relationality “insists that no one view of poverty covers all 
its dimensions” (p. 33), he goes on to argue that a broader view is needed by African theologians to understand 
depth and breadth of how their history (of colonialism and neo-colonialism) had shaped and continue to disfigure 
African psyche such that it impacts everything (paraphrase of p.33).  
213 See Uzukwu, God, Spirit, and Human Wholeness, pp. 151-162 
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our approach to the theme does not give sufficient attention to the relationship of conscience to 
objective norms or law. Finally, given that we are interested more in how socio-moral processes 
in the formation of conscience impact character we do not have sufficient space to explore either 
the old debate on what constitutes the “common good” or of human “freedom”.  
1.8. From Compactness to Differentiation:  Is Critical Re-evaluation of 
Moral Formation Process and Traditions in Africa a Necessity?  
 
The excursus above in philosophical, theological, and scientific fields is definitely limited 
in content and extension given our scope. But it situates our discourse squarely within the 
tradition of a universal problematic that hardly has ultimate answers. Even though it defies 
ultimate answers, it does not imply we should abandon seeking for possible answers. An 
essential part of seeking solution to human problems is the ability to provide a coherent 
description of the problem itself. To do this, one needs proper distinctions. This research insists 
on the urgent need for a transition from a rigid compactness to a more differentiated evaluation 
of all African institutional and social-cultural structures and practices. It is only recently that 
scholars are beginning to leave behind the stale argument of whether there is an African 
philosophy or theology or not and proceed to actually philosophize and theologize from the 
African viewpoint. This is laudable. However, we think the next step is to either continue the 
current descriptive analysis of African traditions and socio-cultural structures or leapfrog the 
process and begin a critical reassessment of these traditional structures that we describe to either 
reveal their value or disvalue for holistic social transformation and to advance knowledge.
214
 
                                               
214 Some African scholars are already beginning to do this. For instance, Segun Gbedegesan in his analysis of 
Yoruba traditional religion was able to uphold the value of that tradition but critiques it at the same time. For 
instance, he questions the veracity of holding “Olodumare,” the “creator God” as omniscient when he had to visit an 
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 The reasons for suggesting this approach are varied. Firstly, we cannot possibly deny the 
value of critical evaluation of every human endeavor for it holds the key to a deeper 
understanding of every complex phenomenon. African traditions are archetypically complex 
phenomena. It is therefore imperative it needs critical re-evaluation by those who best understand 
it rather than allow those who do not comprehend its extensions to do so for us. Secondly, we 
find the tendency to present African beliefs and traditions in ways that suggest them to be 
current mainline practices as misleading. There is need for deeper analysis (and perhaps 
involving statistical data) as to the extent traditional beliefs and practices are currently upheld by 
majority of Africans or else reveal its marginal influence in their lived experience.  
Thirdly, we cannot deny there are certain traditional beliefs and practices that are 
evidently unhealthy and in need of revision. We think the time for apologetics is without doubt 
historically relevant but need be superseded by internal critical analytics. Serious scholarly work 
is about facing the truth for what it is worth. Historically, some “sacred traditions” have actually 
been expunged in the past (like killing of twins and human sacrifices). Those are the obvious 
ones. Critical analysis will reveal more unhealthy practices. Obviously, there is need to develop 
some criteria to determine what “traditions” and “practices” are unhealthy for African 
development and wholesome living. This is the work for African scholars.
215
  
Fourthly, we cannot deny there is an urgent need to “exorcise” most of the “spirits” from 
African minds and communities if a healthier lifestyle must prevail. The reason is obvious: there 
                                                                                                                                                       
“ifa priest” at some time to “divine” for him whether he is immortal. It was the Ifa priest’s confirmation that 
eventually made him feel he is both immortal, all powerful, all knowing, among others. See S. Gbedegesan, African 
Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities, 1991, p. 32-38.  
215 We deeply appreciate the depth of critique of the African religious landscape by F. Eboussi Boulaga in 
Christianity without Fetishes, 1984, pp. 57-83;  
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is hard evidence in many African communities that the “bad spirits” have a stranglehold on the 
lives of people that is a source of anxiety and constant fear.
216
 We cannot deny the fact that 
“witchcraft” remains a serious problem for the African psyche. We are of the view that a psycho-
philosophical and theological reconstruction of African worldview is what is urgently needed far 
more than upholding the “values” inherent in our love of “spirits!”217 This does not imply a call 
for thrashing our sacred traditions and values but to reconstruct them to meet present needs. 
Fifthly, historical evidence shows that every human society at some time was 
“embedded” in traditional religions and practices of their fathers (the “Cretes,” “Slavs,” and 
“Barbarians”). They gradually evolved a new paradigms or “worldview” and new “traditions” 
that can respond favorably to their present historical realities. The key word is “critical 
adaptation.” We think Africa no longer needs to receive uncritically the traditions of the “elders” 
but evaluate them in the light prevailing circumstances and needs. When we receive “traditions” 
uncritically, we are bound to repeat its mistakes. For instance, it is arguable that our current 
orientation to education is yet to meet the criteria of what serves African needs. Our system of 
education is merely a rehearsal of western education that needs to be critically revised to address 
the “educational needs” of our realities in Africa.  
                                               
216 See J. Obi Oguejiofor, The Influence of Igbo Traditional Religion on the Socio-political Character of the Igbo 
(Nsukka: Falladu Publishing Company, 1996) p. 85; Misty L. Bastian, “Vulture men, Campus cults and teenaged 
witches: modern magic in Nigeria popular media,” in Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, 
Witchcraft and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa, Henrietta L. Moore and Todd Sanders eds. pp. 87-90; Peter 
Ceshiere, calls “witchcraft” an “obsession” among Africans that “haunts the elite as well as the rest of the 
population. See The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa, p. 1.  
217 Elochukwu E. Uzukwu in his recent book, God, Spirits, and Human Wholeness, 2012 is in our estimation a 
laudable reconstruction effort that opens a new window to a deeper understanding of our love of the spirits. 
However, it raises further questions on discernment of spirits. If “multiplicity” and “duality” are essential paradigms 
for understanding African relationships – including relationships with divinities, it is for that reason pertinent to 
question everything (or “look at everything twice”) including the true origins of the “spirits” we pay reverence to. 
See Uzukwu, God. Spirits, and Human Wholeness, p. 21 
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Therefore, we are convinced there is an urgent need for African scholars (“leaders of 
thought” ) to concentrate more on a critical retrieval and a deliberate effort towards conceptual 
differentiation of African traditions and practices that we consider as key to a deeper self-
understanding and critical to a deeper comprehension and elucidation of the larger problems 
confronting African communities and nations. We do hope that the present research makes a 
humble contribution to that effort in the area of foundational moral structures. If a critical re-
appraisal of this effort proves it to be inadequate, then we would have succeeded beyond 
measure.  
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Chapter Two: Psychological and Theological Views of Conscience 
2.0   Introduction to Chapter Two 
This Chapter examines the notion and nature of conscience from both its psychological 
and theological perspectives. The last chapter reveals an ongoing debate regarding the evolution 
of morality and the reality of psychological theories of moral development have been a source of 
significant insight to our understanding of moral evolution and the formation of conscience. 
Therefore, in Part One, we will explore the views of representative moral development theorists: 
Freud, Adler, Erikson, Piaget, and Kohlberg. Their insights will provide a useful background for 
our reflection at every stage of this research. Moreover, though theological views of conscience 
serve as both a critique and complement of the psychological views examined here, at the same 
time it provides a background of critical assessment of theological suppositions of authors we 
reviewed herein.  
Given the vast literature on this topic we limited our research specifically to the 
theological commentaries of these representative authors on conscience: Vatican II Fathers, 
Aquinas (used as main source for traditional view), Hoose, Hogan, Grisez and Shawn, Curran, 
Gula, Spohn, and Conn (represent a mix of contemporary theological positions). These authors 
provide us with an overview of insight of both the traditional and contemporary theological 
views on conscience – its notion, nature, and development. We noted at the beginning that our 
research stresses process rather than content because we aim at underscoring the value of moral 
formation as a “relational process.”  This emphasis not only informs our interest in psychological 
theories of development but also the content of our theological reflection.  So, instead of 
furthering here the debate on moral “objectivity” or the “authority” of the decisions of 
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conscience, our stress is shifted to certain “neglected aspects” of what constitutes for us the real 
“power” of conscience in “influencing” behavior.  We think that by highlighting these “neglected 
aspects” we not only retrieve a more holistic understanding of the notion of conscience but also 
underscore its power for influencing human behavior.  
Therefore, we will examine in this chapter the role of feelings in human behavior and its 
relationship to conscience. We will argue that feelings or emotions are not only the 
unacknowledged primary drivers of human behavior but that they are at the core of conscience. 
We argue that the emphasis on a cognitive definition of conscience has only helped to rob it of 
its power to influence behavior. Retrieving the sentient dimension of conscience restores its 
strength and power to influence behavior in deeper ways than we admit or realize – beyond mere 
decisions related to individual acts to encompass our deepest life orientation, informs the 
principles we live by, shapes our character, and is at the heart of the persons we are or who we 
become. It is only from this perspective of the significance of conscience for our being or 
becoming that paying more serious attention to its formation becomes an imperative.   
We therefore examine in this section the relationship of feelings to conscience and 
behavior, the role of guilt and shame to conscience, and the significance of perception of moral 
atmosphere to conscience formation. Finally we examine whether there is a unique notion of 
conscience in Africa. Our critical synthesis tries to bring out the salient points that link this 
chapter to our goals and to the other segments of this research.    
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2.0.1 CONSCIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1  SIGMUND FREUD (1856-1939) 
Freud provides us a rather controversial study on the psychology of moral development 
with specific emphasis on the significance of early childhood development that this research 
considers significant in having a basic grasp of not only the human psyche but also a popular 
understanding of the psychological notion of conscience. We will provide a synthesis of his 
position and complement that with an analysis of other representative psychological views of 
moral development.  
Freud postulates three psychic operations of the adult personality (the id, ego, and 
superego) that has become classic in understanding the human psychical structure. Given that 
these have significant implication for any psychological understanding of the notion and 
formation of conscience today, they will constitute our emphasis in Freud. These operatives 
develop within the first two decades of life and their interactions determine human behavior 
when confronted with moral situations. They do not arise at the same time (except the id that is 
present at birth) but developed overtime through the stages of childhood development. We shall 
describe these operatives and how it relates to conscience.  
In his book, The Ego and the Id, Freud develops the notion of these psychical operatives 
only after his theory of consciousness. He divides the human psyche into the “conscious” and the 
“unconscious”. While the former is evident from direct experience, the latter is deduced from his 
“theory of repression” that he considers as “the prototype of the unconscious.”218 There are 
                                               
218 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans by Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1927), p. 12 
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certain ideas that we have present in consciousness, but only temporarily. These ideas are 
latently present in the unconscious and could be recalled with some effort. This describes the 
first level of the unconscious: the preconscious. There are other ideas in the unconscious that are 
not accessible to us but occasionally reveal their presence through dreams or hypnosis. These are 
“repressed” ideas embedded deep in the prototypical unconscious. Psychoanalysis is then a 
process aimed at interpreting the symbolic expression of the unconscious (present in dreams or 
other expressions) and to help resolve the repressed conflicts they represent in the person’s past.  
In the final analysis, Freud divides the psyche into the conscious, preconscious and 
unconscious. In the unconscious is reposed the motive force of most actions. This motive force 
(or energy) is a derivative of unconscious instincts relating to life and death both of which are in 
constant tension – as they compete for dominance. Eros is the life instinct that finds expression 
in constructive and creative acts like caring, self-sacrifice, altruism, and love.  Thanatos is the 
death instinct that expresses itself in all forms of destructive acts, hate, and aggression.  Freud 
called the life energy libido; there is no name for the death energy even though it wins over the 
life instinct in the end.
219
  
The Id is a primordial “instinct” of a sexual nature (wholly unconscious). It “contains 
everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution – above 
all, the instincts.” 220It represents what the individual would love to do were there no restrictions 
                                               
219 R. Murray Thomas, Moral Development Theories – Secular and Religious: A Comparative Study (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 95. Freud stressed the critical role of the sexual instinct in his earlier writings, but after 
the War (WWI) the aggressive and death instincts were also critical. In all, internal psychic forces (as basic 
instincts) seem to determine human behavior.  
220 Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (London: Hogarth, 1973), p. 2 cited by R. M. Thomas, Moral 
Development Theories, Ibid. P. 95.  
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to his/her freedom.
221
  The libidinal energy in the id “pressures” for expression. According to 
Freud, its origin is traceable to the infantile experiences of these libidinal pressures as “pain” and 
its release as “pleasure”. Hence, the id is conceived as a pleasure principle – seeks for pleasure 
and avoidance of pain at all costs. The infant is a bundle of instincts: seeks comfort (need for 
food, drink, discharging wastes, affection) and avoidance of pain (not fulfilling the above needs 
at any time). It therefore cries to get these needs met. The senses (taste, touch, smell, sight, or 
hearing) actively record whatever helps or thwarts the fulfilling of these needs so as to seek their 
repeat and vice versa. Evidently, this process is at this stage amoral. The id is essentially selfish, 
but it has no knowledge of right and wrong. It will have to learn control of its appetites through 
another mechanism of control: the ego and superego based on environmental cues.  
Freud’s Illustration: Ego and the ID222 
 
                                               
221 John Martin Rich and Joseph L. DeVitis, Theories of Moral Development (Springfield, Illinois, Charles C 
Thomas, 1985), p. 18 
222 Sigmund Freud, Ego and Id (London: Hogarth Press, 1927) p. 29. Pcpt-Cs is perceptible consciousness.  
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The Ego, according to Freud, is that “part of the id” that evolved out of the infant’s relationship 
with the external world. Unlike the unconscious id, the ego is conscious, though not wholly so. It 
is a “modification” of the id, as the super-ego is also a “modification” of the ego. He says:  
 It is easy to see that the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence 
of the external world acting through the Pcpt-Cs: in a sense it is an extension of the surface-
differentiation. Moreover, the ego has the task of bringing the influence of the external world to 
bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavors to substitute the reality-principle for the 
pleasure- principle which reigns supreme in the id. In the ego perception plays the part which in 
the id devolves upon instinct. The ego represents what we call reason and sanity, in contrast to 
the id which contains the passions. All this falls into line with popular distinctions which we are 
all familiar with; at the same time, however, it is only to be regarded as holding good in an 
average or 'ideal' case.
223
 
The ego, as a “reality-principle,” puts a check on the native instincts (desires) of the id, the 
“pleasure-principle” noting his caveat that it happens only in ‘ideal cases’. It “negotiates between 
id’s demands and requirements of the physical and social environments,” ever seeking a 
compromise or a realistic approach to such demands in the light of societal demands and other 
contingent conditions. It is the role of the ego to interpret (as a “secondary process”) the 
instinctual images (“primary process”) of the id into implementable actions. As a result, it 
affords the child its primary sense of what is acceptable behavior and a basic sense of penalties 
for infringing on these.
224
 The child gradually learns overtime how to adjust its needs to societal 
demands, responding to moral situations in the more acceptable ways while at the same time 
juggling to fulfill the desires of the id.  If the ego develops to be strong and mature, it will 
respond appropriately, being more forthright and sincere than a weaker one. A weaker ego 
adopts “defense mechanism” or “ego adjustment mechanisms” as a substitute measure to cover 
up its inadequacies. Some of these mechanisms are: repression, projection, regression, 
                                               
223 Sigmund Freud, Ego and the Id, Trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1927), p. 30. The stress is ours.  
224 See R. Murray Thomas, Moral Development Theories, Ibid. p. 96.  
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rationalization, escape, Denial, compensation, and sublimation. The last two however are 
considered to be positive.
225
  
Repression is a non-conscious process whereby the ego suppresses uncomfortable 
material by pushing it away from the conscious part of the psyche to the unconscious. This 
implies that the ego can operate at both the conscious and unconscious levels. Projection is when 
the ego attributes to others the demands of the id that it finds discomforting in itself. Regression 
is when the ego takes recourse to a more primitive mode of dealing with moral difficulties (for 
instance, a husband caught by his wife in an act of infidelity bursts into anger tantrums). 
Rationalization is when the ego displaces an unacceptable behavior with one that is socially 
acceptable. Escape is an attempt by the ego to vacate the location (physical or psychological) 
that is the source of pain.
226
 Denial is when the ego shields itself from an uncomfortable 
experience by a “denial of external reality” (verleugnung).227  Compensation is the ego’s attempt 
to substitute success in another area of life in order to balance-out the area of weakness.  
Sublimation is the ego’s effort to substitute a less virtuous approach to fulfilling the instinctual 
drives with a more virtuous one – a better or higher approach that is more culturally and socially 
                                               
225 George E. Vaillant argues that “for Freud, the defenses of denial, distortion, and projection were defenses of 
psychosis. At the opposite end of the continuum, sublimation, altruism, humor, and suppression were the defenses of 
maturity. Between these two groups of defense mechanisms were splitting, hypochonriasis, turning against the self, 
phantasy, dissociation, repression, isolation, undoing, displacement, and reaction formation – defenses that Freud 
believed to be the hallmark of neurosis.” See, Ego Mechanisms of Defense: A Guide to clinicians and Researchers 
(Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 1992), p.9  
226 See also R. Murray Thomas, Moral Development Theories, ibid. pp. 97-8 
227 See George E. Vaillant, Ego Mechanisms of Defense, ibid. p. 10.  
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acceptable.  It implies that all altruistic acts are essentially “sublimations” of certain instinctual 
drives.
228
  
 The   Superego is a “special psychical agency” that regulates the selfish demands of the 
id to conform with socially acceptable standards of behavior.  As noted above, it is a 
“modification” of the ego, or as Freud would say, it is “a special function within the ego, to 
represent the demand for restriction and rejection, i.e. the super-ego – either that it does its work 
on its own account or else that the ego does it in obedience to its orders.”229 For Freud, the 
superego is the psychical apparatus for ensuring the individual adapts to moral standards, 
customs and ethos of the people with whom he/she lives. It is synonymous with (or includes) 
“conscience” because it regulates right and wrong behavior by encouragement or punishment of 
respective behaviors. The superego is the last to evolve among the three psychical apparatus – it 
develops as the child observes and learns to adapt to what is acceptable or unacceptable 
behaviors. Freud holds that the neonate comes into the world amoral, as a moral tabula rasa 
(with no knowledge or right or wrong) and whatever moral knowledge it possess comes from 
interaction with the outside world starting from parents, caregivers,  peers, teachers, religious 
leaders, counselors, media, among others.
230
  However, note that thought these representatives of 
“external sanctions” overtime will transform into “internal sanctions” that speaks in its own 
voice or authority. Perhaps this, along with the negativity associated with its role, explains why 
Freud sees conscience as essentially neurotic. His view of conscience is that it evolved as part of 
                                               
228 For the foregoing see R. Murray Thomas, Moral Development Theories, Ibid. p. 98  
229 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, translated by W.J. H. Sprott (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1938), p. 98  
230 R. M. Thomas, Ibid. p. 99 
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the superego, even as he distinguishes conscience and ego ideal. R.M. Thomas puts it more 
succinctly thus:  
Freud portrayed the ego as having two facets, the conscience and the ego ideal. The conscience 
represents the “should nots” of society, the things for which the child will be punished. The ego 
ideal represents the “shoulds,” the positive moral values the child has been taught. Whereas very 
young children must be punished for transgressions and rewarded for good behavior by their 
parents and guardians, older children and adolescents often do not need outside sanctions. For 
breaching the values they have now accepted as their own, their conscience metes out punishment 
in the form of distressing emotions. For abiding by their moral values, their ego ideal rewards 
them with approval and praise.
231
  
 
We shall see in the next section that there is indeed a certain correlation in Freud’s view of 
conscience with theological development of the concept. As R. M. Thomas would argue, in 
Freud’s view, moral behavior of older children and adults is a function of how the ego 
“negotiates a settlement among three sources of conflicting demand”: the id, the environment, 
and the superego.
232
 The difficulty is establishing the role of conscience in this dynamic process. 
Since our interest in Freud is his view of the evolution and role of conscience in human behavior, 
let us explore more of his views on conscience.   
 We have already seen above that conscience is, or is part of, the superego. In Totem and 
Taboo he presents what he calls “taboo conscience” as the oldest form of this phenomenon.  
Conscience is the inner perception of objections to definite wish impulses that exist in us; but the 
emphasis is put upon the fact that this rejection does not have to depend on anything else, that it is 
sure of itself. This becomes even plainer in the case of guilty of conscience, where we become 
aware of the inner condemnation of such acts which realized some of our definite 
wishes….Whoever has a conscience must feel in himself the justification of the condemnation, 
and the reproach for the accomplished action. But this same character is evinced by the attitude of 
                                               
231 R. M. Thomas, Ibid. p. 99.  
232 Ibid  
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savages towards taboo. Taboo is a command of conscience, the violation of which causes a 
terrible sense of guilt which is as self-evident as its origin is unknown.
233
 
Freud basically reduced conscience to a “social anxiety” or what he calls “soziale Angst” (fear of 
society)
234
 resulting from a conflict between the “pleasure principle” and the “reality principle” 
in relation to the demands of its social environment. Given that the ego response to this conflict 
is repression, it is predictable what the conclusion would be: acts based on conscience cannot but 
be a neurotic manifestation of repressed social angst.  In Civilization and Its Discontents, he 
elaborates on this angst. First is the “renunciation due to the dread of the loss of love” that would 
result if one were to act in a way other than what society demands. Second is the “the erection of 
the internal authority, and instinctual renunciation due to dread of it – this is the dread of 
conscience.”  Third is the sense of guilt that follows should one actually act otherwise than 
expected – an internalized expectation of or need for punishment, what Frederick Nietzsche 
called a “need for self-flagellation.”235 In the end, conscience is nothing but an internalization of 
hostile parental and social mechanisms of control that the mature would or should outgrow.  
 Freud’s contribution to the development of the formation of conscience is above all, and 
apart from the foregoing, a characterization of conscience as a “neurotic” manifestation of social 
angst. Coming at a time of deep social sympathy for scientific approach to human knowledge, 
his conclusions backed by scientific observations was able to influence a generational change 
towards the notion of conscience more than we are ready to admit. It is this negative connotation 
associated with the concept of conscience after Freud that remains its albatross. Perhaps an even 
                                               
233 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, translated and edited by A.A. Brill, 
(New York: The Modern Library, 1938), pp. 859-60.  Freud makes reference to the Greek Oedipus Myth here.  
234 See Sigmund Freud, Repression in General Selections, Rickman Edition (London: Hogarth Press, 1915), p. 109.  
235 Frederick Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, pp. 87, 92-3  
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deeper consequence is perhaps his conclusions evident in his critique of Kant views of 
conscience summarized as:    
God has been guilty of an uneven and careless of piece of work [referring to conscience], for a 
great many men have only a limited share of it or scarcely enough to be worth mentioning… it is 
very remarkable experience to observe morality, which was once ostensibly conferred on us by 
God and planted deep in our hearts, functioning as a periodical phenomenon. For after a certain 
number of months the whole moral fuss is at an end, the critical voice of the super-ego is silent, 
the ego is re-instated, and enjoys once more all the rights of man until another attack.236   
 
The implication is that Freud sees conscience as not only ethically impotent (does not 
influence behavior) but a “neurotic” contraption of the human psyche in need of healing.237 At 
best, conscience is but an evolved mechanism for observing social regulations without which 
social ordering is jeopardized along with the individual. In this sense, adhering to the voice of 
conscience is then an “enlightened self-interest.”238  
While we do not see anything wrong with admitting this latter view, but it is refuting his 
critical contributions to the disruption of the notion of conscience that reconstructive research on 
this theme should focus on. In that regard we need to point out that there is no reason arising 
from his analysis that would not admit the distinction that he makes between conscience and 
ego-ideal to be revised whereby the ego-ideal becomes the positive aspect of conscience. Hence, 
                                               
236 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, translated by W. J. Sprott (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1938), p. 88 Emphasis is ours.  
237 Freud’s view of moral development is cast against the background of fear or “anxiety,” the result of “Oedipal 
complex” (for boys) and “Electra complex” (for girls). However, while the boys have “castration anxiety” and 
therefore strong super-ego development, girls (and subsequently women) have a weaker superego development 
since they already are somewhat ‘castrated” and have “penis envy” as an anxiety to deal with. As a consequence, 
ideally, men should have stronger moral sense than women. Of course there are many objections to this argument 
(See Carol Giligan as an example), and there is hardly any evidence from experience that justifies this wide claim.     
238 John M. Rich and J. L. DeVitis, Theories of Moral Development, Op Cit., p. 19 
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instead of conceiving the ego as constituted by conscience and ego ideal (where conscience is 
identified with superego), the identification of the two in the one reality of conscience frees his 
thesis from its ambiguity but allows conscience to be retrieved and rehabilitated. It is precisely 
the neglect of the positive aspect of conscience (its self-transcending role) enabled by this forced 
distinction, that paves the way for its trashing as a neurotic appendage.  Our synthesis at the end 
of this chapter may attempt a submission on this. Let us at this point present an overview of 
some other significant psychological viewpoints, after Freud that could throw some light on the 
notion of conscience and its development.   
2.1.2 Alfred Adler (1870-1937), was Freud’s student who parted ways with his master 
based on an intellectual disagreement on the foundations and goals of psychoanalysis. Adler 
views Freud’s approach as too fixated on sexuality and deterministic to the extent that it reduces 
all human behavior to intra-psychic and biological drives. He instead founded a school of 
“individual psychology” to emphasize individual uniqueness and the influence of social 
dynamics and relationships.  
 Adler argues that the goal of life is the development of “social interest” as a 
“compensation for all the natural weaknesses of individual human beings.” 239 Social interest is a 
quality that serves as the index of maturity in both personal and cultural entities. In other words, 
the degree of social interest present in an individual or culture is the determinant of is maturity or 
development. He argues that each person comes into the world in a state of deficiency or 
“inferiority” and goes through life striving towards “superiority” in an attempt to overcome or 
“compensate” for the lack. The proper trajectory of that striving is towards the development of 
                                               
239 Alfred Adler, Problems of Neurosis (London: Kegan Paul, 1929), p. 31 
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social interest; this implies a less striving for personal interests and a shift towards building of 
the community.
240
 His notion of "Gemeinschaftsgefühl" (community feeling) captures his idea 
that the process of personality development should be (teleological) directed towards 
“completeness” or “wholeness” (holism). This wholeness involves the individual consciously 
choosing to act for the interest of the larger whole – the community. However, if the individual 
overcompensates in an effort to adhere to community and environmental cues, he/she develops 
inferiority complex that leads to a pathological striving for power, aggressive behavior, among 
other ills.   
 Though Adler’s analysis is criticized for “lack of rigor, depth, and precision,”241 
nevertheless, we do consider his analysis illumines an important aspect of basic socio-moral 
process of development that Freud’s analysis tends to overlook. Though he presents us with no 
systematized process regarding development of conscience, he does provide us insight as to what 
its role and content should be: its role could be assumed as spurring the process of self-
transcendence as the individual matures from a fixation on self-interest towards the interest of 
the community. Acquiring a sense of “community feeling” (an interest for the good of the 
community) is the ultimate criteria for social ordering and development not just for the 
community, but for the individual as well. This is the critical role of conscience.   
                                               
240 See Adler, Co-operation between the Sexes: Writings on Women and Men, Love and Marriage, and Sexuality, 
Ansbacher, Heinz L. and Rowena R., Eds. (New York: Norton, 1978) pp. 49, 147-148, 168-169; See also Rudolf 
Derikurs, Social Equality: The Challenge of Today (Chicago: Regnery, 1971), p. viii. 
241 John Martin Rich and Joseph L. DeVitis, Theories of Moral Development, Op. Cit., p. 32; See also, Russell 
Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology from Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon, 1976). But 
Jon Carlson and Michael P. Maniacci (eds.) have argued to the contrary in Adler Revisited (New York: Roultledge, 
2012).  
100 
 
2.1.3.   Erik H. Erikson (1902-1994): Erickson applies broader resources of 
interdisciplinary research involving anthropology, religion, cross-cultural studies, and 
psychology to deepen our understanding of the process of moral development. As a 
consequence, he leaves us with a broader and more inclusive vision of the influences and the 
trajectory of human moral development than Freud or Adler. Essentially, he modifies Freud’s 
eight stage theory of psychosexual development to capture the deeper influence of the larger 
society (not just the family as we find in Freud). His “life cycle” (in eight stages) condenses eight 
primary “stages” of development that may overlap; but it is expected that problems arising from 
each stage need proper resolution for a healthy growth and moral development. It is not possible 
to accommodate the full breadth of his analysis for lack of space. We will concentrate on aspects 
that impacts conscience formation.  
 Erikson’s “life cycle” consists of these eight polarities: 1. Trust vs. mistrust; 2. Autonomy 
vs. shame; 3. Initiative vs. guilt; 4. Industry vs. inferiority; 5. Identity vs. role diffusion; 6. 
Intimacy vs. isolation; 7. Generativity vs. stagnation; 8. Ego integrity vs. despair. The first 
polarity is the psychosocial crisis the neonate undergoes as it tries to balance basic trust against 
mistrust which, if properly resolved, provides the child with the critical virtue of hope in life that 
is the cornerstone of a healthy person. He holds that this develops in the child, in the first year of 
life, primarily through the quality of care it receives from the mother. He sees this basic trust as 
consisting in an “essential trustfulness of others as well as a fundamental sense of one’s own 
trustworthiness.”242 He warns that a pure trust is naïve and inappropriate. This trust arises as a 
counterweight to mistrust. It is in the struggle to overcome a sense of “nostalgia” for the womb, 
                                               
242 Erick Erickson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 96.  
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“of having been divided” and of “having being abandoned” that this trust emerges accompanied 
by an inner orientation that would reassure one that all is well throughout the struggles and 
uncertainties of life.
243
  This inner orientation that comes with trust is the ground for hope so 
vital through life.  It is obvious that the significance of self-esteem is no longer in dispute today. 
It is now common knowledge that if the child does not feel “all right” with self, nothing will be 
alright in life. We add here that if basic mistrust is the child’s inner orientation, it will be difficult 
for that child as an adult to trust others precisely because its capacity for self-transcendence 
experienced a primary hiatus. We shall indicate later how this connects to conscience. If 
Erickson is right, it is possible to imply that in the first year of life, a child has the opportunity to 
be equipped, through nurture, with this critical tool for developing both a healthy sense of self 
and of others that is so crucial for community development.  
 The significance of the second stage (corresponds to Freud’s anal stage) is in helping the 
child develop an autonomous will. This emerges as the child struggles with balancing “letting 
go” and “holding on” that characterizes early toilet training. Like the first stage, balance is what 
is essential. While a fixation on “holding on” can lead to a pathological orientation (“to have and 
to hold”) that is ultimately destructive; “letting go” could as well “turn into inimical letting loose 
of destructive forces, or it can become a ‘to let pass’ or ‘to let be.’”244 It is during this stage the 
child learns to first distinguish between an “I” and a “you”; “yours” and “mine”; identifies 
categories of “good” and “bad”; “right” and “wrong”.245 Note that though Erikson identifies the 
                                               
243 Erick Erickson, Childhood and Society, 2nd Edition (New York: Norton, 1963), p. 249; See also Richard Evans 
and Erik Erikson, Dialogue with Erikson (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 15ff.  Mistrust is also important.  
244 Erick Erickson, Identity, Ibid. p. 109 
245 Erik Erikson, “Life Cycle,” Op. Cit. p. 288 
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development of a sense of autonomy with “right” and “wrong”, he does not directly link it with 
formation of conscience. However, keeping in mind the integral nature of the life cycle he 
analyzes explains it.  
He presents the third stage (Initiative vs. guilt) as the time when conscience formation is 
“firmly established” with the development of a “sense of guilt” as the child begins to hear an 
“inner voice” that puts brakes on his/her exuberant sense of freedom and resultant excesses of 
initiative.  So conscience is the “governor of initiative” that emerges as a result of a split in the 
self in its struggle to balance infantile self-indulgence and social mechanisms of control calling 
him to “self-observation, self-guidance, and self-punishment.”246 He holds this “inner voice” as 
the “ontogenetic cornerstone of morality,” but one that needs careful development for it has a 
high tendency to become deformed or “maimed” in the child by excessive obedience or “deep 
resentment” should the parent fail to live up to the values he/she  has made the child internalize.   
 The fourth stage (industry vs. inferiority) affords the child the opportunity to learn how 
to be industrious by careful use of tools. The child learns from older kids both at home and at 
school. This marks the stage of social responsibility as the child learns to complete a task 
unhindered by feelings of inferiority (resulting from mistakes made). This “competence” is the 
basis for social cooperation. The fifth stage (identity vs. role diffusion) is the last stage before 
young adulthood, a stage marked by rapid physiological changes. Here the adolescent undergoes 
identity crisis in an effort to understand the self in the light of the past and future. It is a psycho-
social struggle to find and/or integrate oneself within the new context - the larger segment of 
society.  The sense of ego identity here is a certain “confidence” that one is the same self as 
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witnessed in the past stages of development and is taken to be the same by others. This search for 
identity is characterized by an “ideological experimentation” as he/she seeks for an “inner 
coherence” via some form of durable values. The core virtue of this period is fidelity – the 
capacity to fulfill promises made to one’s friends despite the inadequacies found in value 
systems of one’s society.247   
The other three stages (6-8) are adult developments. Therefore, they consolidate the gains 
of previous stages. He conceives “intimacy” as a certain form of “shared identity” - the capacity 
to integrate in oneself one of the paradoxes of life where one experiences “finding oneself as one 
loses oneself, in another.”248 It is the “transformation” of the love one had received (during 
childhood) into that which one gives. It is the evolution of self-transcendence as the individual 
redefines “self-identity” to include others. The distortion of this stage is “isolation” that could 
find expression in form of evolving a “joint selfishness in the services of some territoriality”249 
such that one is willing to “repudiate, isolate, and if necessary, destroy those forces and people 
whose essence seems dangerous to one’s own.”250This corruption of love has lasting 
implications.  
At the seventh stage, the young adult already has a growing sense of maturity and 
responsibility. One is dependable for a host of generative initiatives: “children, products, ideas, 
and works of art.” Though emphasis here is placed on providing and guiding one’s progeny, 
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Erikson notes motherless women can fulfill their generative potentials by taking care of other 
women’s children.251 The virtue that this stage fosters is “care”. He says, “I use ‘care’ in a sense 
which includes ‘to care to do’ something, to ‘care for’ somebody or something, to ‘take care of’ 
that which needs protection and attention, and ‘to take care not to’ do something destructive.”252 
The dystonic component of generativity is stagnation, self-absorption, and self-indulgence. 
Finally, the eighth stage affords one the opportunity to evolve integrity or else despair. It is the 
capacity to accept oneself and life’s experiences with dignity or else become bitter, cynical, or 
resentful. The virtue inherent in this stage is wisdom.  
Erikson identifies three distinct levels of ethical development: “moral learning” (of 
childhood), “ideological experimentation” (during adolescence), and “ethical consolidation” (of 
adulthood).
253
 He therefore distinguishes between “morals” and “ethics” by identifying “moral 
learning” with “adolescent experimentation” as infantile – a moral sense that is the result of fear 
or threat; and considers “ethics” as the “task of adults” since they are products of reflection 
rather than a largely unconscious fear emanating from the superego.  He says:  
I would propose that we consider moral rules of conduct to be based on a fear of threats to be 
forestalled. These may be outer threats of abandonment, punishment, and public exposure, or a 
threatening inner sense of guilt, of shame, or isolation. In either case, the rationale for obeying a 
rule may not be too clear; it is the threat that counts. In contrast, I would consider ethical rules to 
be based on ideals to be striven for with a high degree of rational assent and with a ready consent 
to formulated good, a definition of perfection, and some promise of self-realization.
254
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Erikson however considers each stage of moral development as critical to what the other 
becomes. In other words, he has an integral view of moral and/or ethical development. 
Conscience formation therefore begins at the very first stage in the process but only finds full 
expression in the third stage with the formation of the sense of guilt. It comes to maturity not in 
the adolescent formation but in the adult stage with the realization of ethical orientation where 
the individual performs ethical acts not based on threats (or a sense of inner guilt) but of ideals. 
One way to interpret this is to make sharp bifurcation between morals and ethics – morals linking 
conscience formation and ethics to ego ideal. Another is to see moral and conscience 
development as integral to ethical development. Therefore, a child maladapted in any stage of the 
process will fail to develop the necessary strengths and/or “virtues” proper to that stage thereby 
effectively disrupting or distorting the proper formation of conscience and ultimately arresting 
his/her proper ethical development. We consider this latter view as closer to experience.  
An integral view of moral formation inclusive of conscience formation allows a retrieval 
of conscience with its positive aspects than identifying its presence or formation solely from the 
capacity to feel guilt. Such positive aspects as we find in the moral formation of the child (as we 
find in Erikson’s polarities) are often neglected in their bearings on conscience formation 
precisely because we have overtime gotten used to identifying conscience solely with guilt. But 
this guilt is only one aspect of its functionality. The other is self-transcendence the development 
of which we already see in its nascent form in the first stage (trust/mistrust) as the child decodes 
the loving relationship its shares with its mother.  Before our final synthesis, let us examine two 
more classical representative psycho-moral theorists: Piaget and Kohlberg who are both 
cognitive structuralists that share this integral view.   
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2.1.4  Jean Piaget (1896-1980) is another psycho-moral development theorist that provides us 
insight about human moral evolution. Like Freud and Erikson, he considers childhood 
development as key to understanding how we develop morals. He holds that cognitive and moral 
developments proceed together. He provides us with four principal stages of cognitive 
development: 1. Sensorimotor period (0-2) is characterized by basic reflex actions that 
progresses to basic mental representation and manipulation of objects (identifies six sub-stages). 
2. Preoperational period (2-7) the child primarily concerned with self and depends on perception 
of objects than logic (abstraction) in solving problems but would gradually progress to more 
intuitive thinking (from age 5-7). 3. Concrete operations period (7-11) the child performs logical 
mental “operations” but on perceptible or imagined “concrete objects”. 4. Formal Operations 
period (11-15) is when the child has a fully functional mind capable of abstract thinking and no 
longer limited to objects, sights and sounds. Experience over the years would continue to fill the 
gaps in mental conceptualizations to enable the individual develop greater capacity for even 
more complex ideas.   
 We have noted above that Piaget holds that cognitive and moral developments proceed 
together. To understand the nature of this integral development one needs to grasp how he 
conceives the mental architecture. He views this as having three parts: “cognitive structures, 
schemes, and operating mechanisms.”255 Cognitive structures are the templates or “perceptual 
capacities” for interpreting the world. They change from one stage to another in predictable 
patterns for all children. Schemes are mechanisms of adaptation that people evolve in response to 
their changing situations. The reason for thought and action is to enable this adaptation to its 
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optimal value. The “grasping” movements of the child, the concept of “addition,” and “abiding 
by the rules” are different forms of schemes the child develops at different stages of its 
development.
256
 Operating mechanisms are more primary categories from which schemes 
emerged. Piaget identifies assimilation and accommodation as the primary mechanisms that are 
functional throughout life. Assimilation is a process of interpreting a new experience in the light 
of a scheme (an existing mental pattern) thereby modifying that new experience to suit his 
mental mode. When the experience does not match an existing scheme, an existing scheme is 
altered or a new one created. This is “accommodation”.257 The whole of life is one of either 
assimilation or accommodation at one time or the other.  
 In the light of the above, Piaget conceives moral development as integral to cognitive 
development because it involves the application of mental process to bear on moral matters. In 
his view morality develops from feelings of respect for authority figures (adults) that made rules, 
and sympathy for peers that is at the root of all collaboration. Therefore, moral development has 
a basic social locus, evolving from a heteronymous to an autonomous standpoint. He explains:  
We found that the purely individual elements of morality could be traced either to the feeling of 
respect felt by the younger for the older children, which explained the genesis of conscience and 
duty, or to the feelings of sympathy felt by the child for those around him, which made 
cooperation possible. Instinctive tendencies, together with others more or less directly connected 
with them, are thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the formation of morality. 
Morality presupposes the existence of rules which transcend the individual, and these rules could 
only develop through contact with other people. Thus the fundamental conceptions of childish 
morality consist of those imposed by the adult and of those born of collaboration between 
children themselves. In both cases, that is to say, whether the child's moral judgments are 
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heteronymous or autonomous, accepted under pressure or worked out in freedom, this morality is 
social, and on this point Durkheim is unquestionably right.
258
 
 
Piaget is affirming here with Durkheim the social nature of morality which we already saw in 
Adler and Erikson above. However, unlike Durkheim, he admits that youths move beyond 
heteronymous morality based on constraints or fear (respect for authority figures) as they learn to 
tap into innate potentialities of “mutual respect” for peers and therefore develop an autonomous 
morality based on social sympathy. This happens as soon as the adolescent is able to overcome 
egocentrism. So he considers “decentering” (self-transcendence) at the roots of all morality.259 
As expected, Piaget’s claims have been challenged extensively.260 The essence of the 
critique to Piaget’s claims is that he oversimplified the complex phenomenon of moral 
reasoning.
261
 Apart from the foregoing, three relevant points for this research are: firstly his view 
that conscience originates from “feelings” of respect (or even the latter social sympathy). It is 
important to keep this in mind given that Piaget is considered essentially as a cognitive model 
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109 
 
theorist. Much of the critique of Piaget’s model focuses on his claim that there exists an innate 
“cognitive structures” that are invariant and culturally universal. The stress is on “cognition” at 
the detriment of “feeling” (affect). This research considers “feeling” as a critical component of 
conscience and in fact at the roots of the moral sense. It is a documented fact that the absence of 
this “feeling” component that distinguishes the psychopath from normal people (see chapter 
One). Instead of the cognitive aspect, it is the “feeling” aspect that makes them conscienceless. 
Therefore, a retrieval of the notion of conscience needs to sufficiently integrate this aspect.  
Secondly, without detriment to the foregoing, that he integrates cognitive and moral 
development is significant for the notion of conscience we admit, as we noted above. Thirdly, the 
fact that he considers instinctive childish tendencies as necessary but insufficient for the 
formation of morality is a significant critique of Freud in particular and opens up the possibility 
to argue that conscience rather than being conceived as a static quality evolves in its formation as 
the child matures from a morality of constraint to one of autonomy. Conscience does not only 
look backwards (at punishments) but also gazes at the future possibilities – the ideal self in an 
ideal community. It is the combination of the two that enable it to make present judgments. 
Therefore, without the positive aspect in the development of conscience, it becomes at best an 
effort in reductionism. Perhaps Freud’s insufficient attention to the significant role of the larger 
social environment beyond the family as pivotal to the development of the cognitive and moral 
apparatus of the growing child and adolescent played a part in his conclusions. Questions that 
Piaget’s theory raises for us are: What are the roots and role of “moral feelings?” Are logical 
abilities more influential than experiential ones for moral growth? How significant is 
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“perception” (peer perception or otherwise) in influencing moral behavior? Lawrence Kohlberg 
who develops further Piaget’s model might provide some insight to some of these questions.   
2.1.5  Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987): Kohlberg, who claims that his theory is both 
psychological and philosophical, holds that moral development passes through invariant stages 
that have universal cultural application. His major influences are Dewey and Piaget. He 
postulates that six developmental stages that yield three moral levels of developments: pre-
conventional, Conventional, and post-conventional levels (with two succeeding stages 
proportionate to one moral stage respectively). At the pre-conventional level (stages 1 and 2), 
rules are obeyed merely to avoid punishment and conformity is directly related to rewards. The 
conventional level (stages 3 and 4) the agent conforms to social rules (as a duty he owes the 
group) in order to gain approval of the “in group” and therefore right behavior is elicited based 
on the agent’s perception (of approval or disapproval) of his/her social group (see “perception of 
moral atmosphere” later in this chapter). The post-conventional level (states 5 and 6) is 
characterized by autonomy for the agent evolves a subjective principle of value for moral 
choices. Duties are therefore conceived no longer on the basis of approval but as obligations that 
are mutually binding based on equality of rights. He argues that stage six of the post-
conventional level involves the application of principles of conscience that are invariable and 
universal. These principles are rather more abstracted (like the “Golden rule” or the “categorical 
imperative” of Kant) than concrete (like the Ten commandments).262In his view, moral maturity 
is the capacity to make moral judgments based on one’s own convictions (principles).  
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Kohlberg holds that childhood moral development is within the pre-conventional level 
and majority of adults remain all their lives in stages 3 and 4 of the conventional level. He 
contends that only a few percentage of adults (20-25 percent) reach the post-conventional level 
of moral reasoning and even less arrive at stage 6 (5-10 percent).
263
 Evidently, Kohlberg affirms 
with Piaget that children tend to conform to rules based on punishments and rewards (good or 
bad outcomes). According to him: 
Piaget is correct in assuming a culturally universal age development of a sense of justice, 
involving progressive concern for the needs and feelings of others and elaborated conceptions of 
reciprocity and equality. As this sense of justice develops, however, it reinforces respect for 
authority and for the rules of adult society; it also reinforces more informal peer norms, since 
adult institutions have underpinnings of reciprocity, equality of treatment, service to human 
needs, etc. 
264
 
 
He however rejects Piaget’s assumption that there is a universally applicable shift from an ethic 
of constraint (based on fear and respect for adult authority) to one of peer loyalty; a shift from a 
sense of justice based on conformity to one of democratic equality. He thinks there is no relevant 
data to justify this position.
265
  
 Kohlberg argues that these cognitive stages and the moral levels integral to them succeed 
each other and therefore cannot be skipped over. While it often happens that an adult cognitive 
and moral developments are arrested in stage 4 without going to stages 5-6, no one arrives at the 
latter stages without going through the earlier one (1-2, 3-4). These stages proceed in an 
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“invariant developmental sequence.” Accordingly, moral development, which progresses in 
tandem with cognitive maturation, essentially involves providing the rationale for moral choices. 
For example, at Stage 1, the reason in conscience for right behavior is to “avoid punishment,” 
while for someone in stage 6 it is to avoid “self-condemnation.” Therefore, from stages 1 
through 6, there is a progressive maturation, differentiation, and integration of higher and more 
universalized values for moral decisions.   While there is value confusion at lowest levels of 
development, the highest levels are marked by greater value differentiation not only in terms of 
social rules but also characterized by a more delineated principles of choice that appeal to 
“logical universality and consistency.” 266  
He considers these progressions as not merely cognitive but that they have a moral aspect 
as well – and they constitute his theory of conscience development. He however does not lump 
cognitive and moral development together. In other words, he considers cognitive maturity as a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral maturity.
267
 This implies that while someone in 
stage four might be cognitively mature but may not be able to attain high levels of principled 
decisions of conscience of post conventional level of moral development. Conversely, someone 
in stage 6 cannot get there without an equivalent cognitive maturity.  In this way he is able to 
avoid the critique that persons of high cognitive ability are found to be deficient in high moral 
principle. He ultimately considers “judgments of principle” as moral judgments that are based on 
an impartial (impersonal or objective) universal concept of justice. While stage 5 is an 
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orientation to internal decisions of conscience (with regard to justice and fairness) it admits some 
elements of vagueness and ambiguity as to its universality, but stage six is unambiguous, 
logically comprehensive, universal and consistent.  
The immediate concern for our research with Kohlberg’s theory of moral development is 
the inherent difficulty in differentiating the role of conscience in influencing moral behavior. It 
would have made a significant difference if this is easily attainable given that his theory is more 
readily applicable to adults than the other theories of development reviewed here. If cognitive 
maturity does not necessarily lead to principled decisions of conscience, what other helps are 
needed? His answer here is lame: “experience of sustained responsibility for the welfare of 
others and the experience of irreversible choice....”268 Obviously, “experience” is neither a 
tangible quantity nor a predictable quality even if it is measurable. And for our purposes, his 
answer suggests circularity given that “sustained responsibility for the welfare of others” is what 
we are trying to understand how conscience influences that possibility.  
However, he does help us confirm that moral development consists in a progressive 
weaning of interests from the self towards the larger whole. It is obvious from his theory that a 
more developed conscience leads one to act more responsibly by making more principled 
decisions that is attentive to justice and fairness in its widest conceptualizations even if these run 
the risk of abuses (like zealotry, fundamentalism) as Kenneth Keiston has rightly observed.
269
 
Moreover, though a developed cognitive ability does not necessarily imply moral maturity, but it 
                                               
268 Lawrence Kohlberg, “Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited” in P. B. Baltes and K. 
Warner Schaie (eds.), Life-Span Developmental Psychology: Personality and Socialization (New York: Academic 
Press, 1973), p. 195  
269 Kenneth Keniston, “Moral Development, Youthful Activism, and Modern Society,” The Critic, September-
October (1969):22-23 
114 
 
is even worse to arrest or delete the possibility of such moral progression. Is it not valid then to 
argue that efforts to arrest or destroy the formation of conscience translate, by Kohlberg’s 
scheme, to emasculating moral development in all its forms?  
More importantly, Kohlberg’s theory is essentially focused on cognitive ability such that 
the dimensions of emotion, “moral sensitivity to interpersonal and social complexities, intuitive 
judgments, moral dispositions, and character as the basis of action” are all ignored.270 William 
Spohn considers the cognitive developmental theories (of Piaget and Kohlberg) were based on 
“flawed empirical and philosophical assumptions.”271 Other empirical evidence indicates that 
children act sometimes from motive other than punishment or rewards; infants reveal 
“rudimentary empathy,” while two year olds are aware of rules.272 Moreover, research shows 
mixed responses: children mix responses from 2 and 3, and adults mix 3 and 4 refuting the “hard 
stages” Kohlberg claims. He also notes a philosophical difficulty inherent in universalizing 
particular moral encounters. Gilligan’s hypothesis of distinctive gender differences in moral 
reasoning (justice/care dyad) is not true to fact.
273
 We shall now proceed to a more general 
critique of the psychological theories of moral developmental that pays attention only to those 
aspects that we have not touched in our individual critiques of each model above.  
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2.1.6.  A General Critique of Psychological Theories of Moral Development 
We have examined above the most prominent of moral development theorists and offered some 
critique along with our analysis. This section attempts a more generalized critique aimed at 
highlighting some important aspects of these theories and to underscore critical insights of other 
theories of development that cannot be accommodated here due to space. A good way to start is 
using other theories of development as critical tools. Social learning theorists who are more 
interested in the process than in content of moral development insist that precepts and values are 
relative to each given culture based on a “pragmatic sense” of the importance (over time) of such 
values or precepts. Therefore, they consider the universalizing of values and the claim of “hard 
stages” as overstating the facts. Arthur W. Chickering defines “values” as “standards by which 
behavior is evaluated.”274 Social learning theorists argue that each community determines what 
constitutes “values” for them based on their relative merit or other utilitarian considerations. 
Moral values are either individual or shared. When shared, they are codified into law or remain 
informal as customs and traditions.  This insight is critical for an appreciation of the uniqueness 
of African ethical orientation we shall be encountering throughout this study.  
Albert Bandura, a prominent social learning theorist, criticizes cognitive structuralists (as 
we find in Piaget and Kohlberg models above) for ignoring the discrepancy that exists between 
high moral reasoning and actual behavior.
275
 His critical assessment of psychoanalytic approach 
argues that “it is more like a belief conversion than a self-discovery process”  since “each 
                                               
274 Arthur W. Chickering, Education and Identity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), p. 123 
275 See J. H. Kupfersmid and D. M. Wonderly, “Moral Maturity and Behavior: Failure to find a Link,” in Journal of 
Youth and Adolescence, 9, 249-262.  
116 
 
psychodynamic approach has its favorite set of inner causes and its own preferred brand of 
insight” that are “readily confirmed in self-validating interviews by offering suggestive 
interpretations” and selective reinforcements of clients observations to align with chosen 
beliefs.
276
 While this critique questions all the claims of the development theories above it also 
leaves room for doubt even for social learning theories themselves but only so long as they 
employ interviews as technique. Bandura argues further:  
In the social learning view, people are neither driven by inner forces nor buffeted by 
environmental stimuli. Rather, psychological functioning is explained in terms of a continuous 
reciprocal interaction of personal and environmental determinants. Within this approach, 
symbolic, vicarious, and self-regulatory processes assume a prominent role. Psychological 
theories have traditionally assumed that learning can occur only by performing responses and 
experience their effects. In actuality, virtually all learning phenomena resulting from direct 
experience occur on a vicarious basis by observing other people’s behavior and its 
consequences for them. The capacity to learn by observation enables people to acquire large, 
integrated patterns of behavior without having to form them gradually by tedious trial and 
error.
277
  
We prefer a middle position that admits the influence of internal and external factors (or 
forces) in behavior. The above critique however highlights an aspect - the “vicarious” nature of 
learning behavior (we learn “how to behave” from observing others). This insight helps our 
research for it underscores the effect of people’s action (or inaction) on other people’s moral 
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development and behavior. It also allows us to appreciate more the role of “consequences” as 
moral “reinforcement” (an “effective means of regulating behavior that has been earned).”278Jane 
Loevinger would further argue that “externally applied consequences create the contents of 
conscience.”279 Social learning theorists adopt a “cognitive interactionist perspective” in 
assessing moral phenomena. Therefore they could argue that “moral thought and affective self-
reactions, moral conduct, and environmental factors all operate as interacting determinants that 
influence each other bidirectionally.”280This implies that social learning theory recognizes the 
significance of “affect” or emotions on behavior to a degree we do not find in the psychological 
models reviewed above.    
 Perhaps one of Freud’s greatest achievements is helping us to appreciate the depth and 
power of the unconscious mind in motivating behavior. Part of the critical component of the 
unconscious is memory (short and long term). R. M. Thomas includes these as part of memory: 
“needs/drives and goals, facts and concepts, causal relations, moral values, mental processes, and 
the moral self.”281Though we affirm that conscience is a capacity and/or a process rather than a 
faculty, yet we equally affirm that like “drives,” its influence on behavior is not limited merely to 
the conscious moral choices but to deeper unconscious motives that shape the contours of our 
life stance. Our conscience shapes who we are or who we become in deeper ways than the 
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surface decisions of everyday life. These surface decisions are like trails that reveal only partly 
the phenomenon it represents.  
 We have noted that theologically conscience reproves and approves. The distinctions 
Freud creates between conscience and ego-ideal can be considered as two aspects of the same 
reality of conscience. In this way, theology corrects and complements psychological pre-
suppositions. It also could help reconstruct Freud’s wholly negative view of conscience such that 
instead of reading the social angst (that gives rise to conscience) as “repression” inverts to 
“elevation” because it is a symbolic moment in the growth of the individual. This “symbolic 
moment” is experienced in “growth” at all levels: physiologically (especially the effort towards 
bipedalism is significant for the concept of elevation), cognitively, emotionally, morally, and 
eventually, spiritually.  The real “repression” would be a reverse situation whereby the id is 
given a free-reign such that the potentialities for social relationships and particularly the capacity 
for selflessness (or altruism) and empathy become stifled. Experimental data shows that 
narcissism has links to overindulging children, and Robert Shaw, among others, has noted the 
grave dangers of such overindulgence. Such children think “the world is there as his satisfaction 
system that keeps doing whatever they want.”282 This is actually the fundamental critique of 
Adler to Freud. His individual Psychology is an expression of this concern about pampering 
children to the point it threatens the development of proper “social interests”.  
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 Erikson considers all moral conduct based on fear, guilt, shame, punishment, as infantile. 
This position is left to an open debate and African Ethics falls within this circumscription. We 
particularly note the integrality of the stages of moral formation as represented in Erikson – each 
stage melds into the other. Conscience formation begins in early stages but find fuller expression 
at higher stages (3) and ultimate maturity later in life (when wisdom and integrity becomes 
priority). Part of his insight for us is the need to develop trust (and intimacy) or mistrust (and 
isolation). If trust and intimacy, one finds self by losing oneself in others. If otherwise, “joint 
selfishness in the service of some territoriality” becomes a dangerous pastime. This is a serious 
caveat that this research will consider in the next chapters because we consider its import has 
universal application. Since we cannot possibly exhaust the critique of these models let us now 
turn to theological understanding of conscience.  
2.2.0 PART TWO: THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF CONSCIENCE 
Our overview and critique of representative theories of moral development in the last 
segment leads us to now consider the theological understanding of the notion of conscience with 
particular emphasis on the Catholic moral tradition. Space will not allow us an historical 
overview of the development of this concept (for this see footnote), 
283
 but we will attempt in the 
following segment to examine some representative authors on this theme with a particular 
emphasis on Thomas Aquinas whose conceptualization remains central to the Church’s 
understanding of the concept.  
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To be able to provide a wider perspective on the subject, we shall incorporate a cross 
section of views on conscience from contemporary theologians, both traditionalist and 
revisionists. We shall first give a general overview of the problematic surrounding the nature of 
Conscience as found in the Church’s most recent documents and proceed to examine how 
Aquinas in particular views Conscience. Other significant perspectives will be accommodated to 
help underscore the difficulty inherent in certain aspects that impinge on our theme. Given that 
our interest in conscience is only functional – to help us examine its influence on human 
behavior, we shall therefore incorporate themes that fulfill this goal. In this regard, the relation of 
conscience to “feelings,” to “shame” and “guilt” and to the “perception of moral atmosphere” 
will be explored. Finally, we will present an overview of African thoughts on Conscience that 
links us to the next chapter on the role of the moral community in conscience formation.  
2.2.1 An Overview of Catholic Traditional View of Conscience 
A good place to seek for current hierarchical traditional Catholic understanding of 
conscience is Vatican II document (Gaudium et Spes)
284
 and proceed to its hermeneutical 
application in New Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) and Veritatis Splendor
285
 which are 
two most recent relevant documents for understanding conscience that John Paul II left in the 
annals of Catholic moral tradition. The council fathers dedicated the first chapter of Gaudium et 
Spes to the examination of “The Dignity of the Human Person.” This involved seeking for an 
understanding of the “essential nature” of man in whom this “dignity” reposes. In article 12 the 
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fathers identified this dignity of man in his being “created to God’s image” which finds 
expression in his intellectual nature and finds its perfection in “wisdom” that draws him to seek 
and love “the truth and the good.”286 Then in article 16 the document dwells on the “Dignity of 
Moral Conscience.” It asserts: 
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but 
which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and avoid 
evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a 
law inscribed by God. His dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he will be judged. 
There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths.
287
 
 
Even though the Council fathers did not articulate for us a clear definition of conscience, 
they however provided us with the essential ingredients of a descriptive understanding of it as 
well as leaving traces of the inherently difficult relationship it has with “objective moral 
standards” (or law). The ambiguity emerging from the above functional description is that it 
leaves one wondering how conscience and law are distinguished. If conscience is the “voice” of 
objective divine law speaking in man’s depths, then how do we distinguish the “objectivity” of 
this law from the “subjectivity” of conscience that adheres to it? What is the warrant for the 
“objectivity” of this law since it is only as evident as it appears “subjectively” to the moral 
agent? This is the perennial moral problem associated with conscience. This complexity is 
evidently the function of human freedom. And the council fathers rightly affirmed that “it’s only 
in freedom that man can turn himself to what is good.”288 Hence, to affirm human freedom is to 
affirm that a clear logical distinction exists between the objective moral law and both the 
                                               
286 Gaudium et Spes, 12, 14.  
287 Gaudium et Spes, 16. 
288 Gaudium et Spes, 17. 
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subjective “awareness” of that law and the equally subjective “response” to it. These latter two 
are not to be identified. But which of them is conscience? Is it possible to affirm that both 
subjective “awareness” and “response” are integral parts of conscience? Whatever the answer 
should be it is at least implied that the dignity of conscience consists in being the “voice” that 
“echoes” in the human heart – the deepest guide to human moral life. And human dignity 
consists essentially in following it.  
 The Council fathers revealed another aspect of the problem. In Dignitatis Humanae, a 
document dedicated to religious freedom, they affirmed both the authority of conscience and the 
divine law as the ultimate moral norm:  
[T]he highest norm of human life is the divine law itself – eternal, objective and 
universal, by which God orders, directs and governs the whole world and the ways of the 
human community according to a plan conceived in his wisdom and love….It is through 
his conscience that man sees and recognizes the demands of the divine law. He is bound 
to follow this conscience faithfully in all his activity so that he may come to God, who is 
his last end. Therefore he must not be forced to act contrary to his conscience. Nor must 
he be prevented from acting according to his conscience, especially in religious 
matters.
289
 
 
The question this seems to raise, as we shall see in later arguments, is whether by affirming 
together the absolute authority of the divine law (as the objective moral norm) and the absolute 
authority of conscience (as the subjective moral norm) the council has contradicted itself? There 
will not be any reason to pursue this question if not that a difficulty already exists in 
distinguishing conscience from law. What compounds the problem further is the fact that though 
this objective “divine law” is essentially interiorly grasped, it also has an exterior manifestation 
                                               
289 Dignitatis Humanae, 3, in Vatican II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, ed., Austin Flannery 
(Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1987), pp. 801-802. 
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in the contents of Revelation and the interpretative teachings of the Church Magistrium. The 
Catechism presents us with a clearer view: 
Conscience is a judgment of reason whereby the human person recognizes the moral quality of a 
concrete act that he is going to perform, is in the process of performing, or has already completed. 
In all he says and does, man is obliged to follow faithfully what he knows to be just and right. It 
is by the judgment of conscience that man perceives and recognizes the prescriptions of the 
divine law.
290
 
 
Here we have a descriptive definition of what conscience is through the role it plays. By stating 
that conscience is a “judgment of reason,” the Catechism made an advance over the Vatican II 
documents. By this singular claim, it has differentiated conscience from law, for judgment 
follows law, and is about law.  
Given our analysis of psychological perspectives on moral development above, it is 
pertinent to ask how conscience mediates or grasps this law. Freud informs us that it is the voice 
of the superego (internalized parental authority). So, is it a repressed parental inhibitions or a 
personal law? If it is not, then who made this law? This gets a bit complicated when the 
Catechism itself quotes John Newman who affirmed that “conscience is a law of the mind.”291 
Even though Newman did clarify some of the ambiguity in his claim by affirming further that “it 
is a messenger of him, who both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches 
and rules us by his representatives,” yet there remains an openness to “radically personalize” this 
law as differentiated from its cognitive subjectivity (being “known” by the individual person). 
Hence the Catechism’s clarification that conscience is a “witness to the authority of truth in 
                                               
290 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 1778 (Missouri: Ligouri Publications, 1994), p. 438. 
291 John Newman, “Letter to the Duke of Norfolk,” V, in Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching 
II (London: Longmans Green, 1885), p.248.  
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reference to the Supreme Good”292 or Newman’s idea of divine “messenger” becomes useful in 
showing that the dignity of conscience does not consist so much in being a law unto itself as in 
being a “witness” to the divine law. However, given the subjective nature of this knowledge of 
the divine law, another problem emerges: Who determines what this law is? Here we return full 
circle to the moral dilemma of conscience and law, the subjective knowledge of law and its 
objective component (shared externally with others). We must note again that our interest in this 
research is not so much finding answers to the questions of the “content” of conscience as to the 
sources of its inhibitions in influencing our actions. But to underscore the problematic relating to 
understanding its nature it does help to explore further the theme of conscience and law.  
In Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II dedicated many pages to explaining the relationship 
between conscience and law. He affirms, inter alia, the following:   
The moral law [that conscience mediates] has its origin in God and always finds its 
source in him: at the same time, by virtue of natural reason, which derives from divine 
wisdom, it is a properly human law.
293
 
 
The introduction of “natural reason” and “human law” takes us further into the debate but should 
not hinder our quest for the core issue: to clarify the relationship between the subjective and 
objective components of law that conscience mediates. Suffice it to say for now that 
“conscience” is a function of practical reason in the human intellect. As it is, the assertion above 
compounds the tension between divine law and the autonomy of reason and/or conscience. In a 
further effort to douse this tension, he elaborates:  
                                               
292 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no., 1777.  
293 John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, art. 40 (Vatican: Lebraria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), p. 63, or 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-
splendor_en.html 
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The rightful autonomy of the practical reason means that man possesses in himself his own law, 
received from the Creator. Nevertheless, the autonomy of reason cannot mean that reason itself 
creates values and moral norms.
294
  
 
The affirmation and denial of the autonomy of reason in the above text only underscores the 
complexity of explicating this relationship between the objective law and subjective human 
reason that possesses it. The document hinged the inability of an autonomous reason to create its 
own law on the fact that it is a custodian of eternal divine law. It became necessary then to 
identify this “objective, eternal, and universal law” with “natural law” as the “human expression” 
of it.
295
 Aquinas provided the most lucid articulation of this idea and the Church adopted it. We 
shall be examining his view on conscience in greater detail later. But note here what he says:  
Among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in the most excellent way, 
insofar as it partakes of a share of providence, being provident both for itself and for others. Thus 
it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This participation of the eternal law in the 
rational creature is called natural law.
296
 
 
So, natural law is the human “participation” in the eternal law that God “engraved” in the very 
nature of humanity such that it is “properly a human law.” That human reason knows this law is 
evident in the testimony of conscience. As Veritatis Splendor affirms, “it is none other human 
reason itself which commands us to do good and counsels us not to sin.”297  
Perhaps it could be argued that this identification of the “objective” eternal law with 
natural law that then finds expression through human reason both resolves and compounds the 
problem. It resolves the problem by establishing the basis for the autonomy of reason and/or 
                                               
294 Veritatis Splendor, 40.  
295 Veritatis Splendor, 43.  
296 Thomas Aquinas, S. T. I-II, q. 91, a. 2.  
297 Veritatis Splendor, 43. 
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conscience. Paradoxically, the establishment of the autonomy of reason compounds the problem 
because it now becomes more difficult to bring reason to renounce this autonomy, nor should it! 
Though the idea of “participation” is useful in clarifying the manner of relationship between the 
eternal reason and human reason (or the eternal law and human law), it nonetheless fails to solve 
the problem. It is possible that each person could follow personal whims and still lay claim to 
“participating” in the divine law precisely because there is no way to verify the truth of natural 
law, not in terms of first practical principles that are self-evident, but secondary principles 
deduced from it in concrete situations. This remains the source of moral dilemma that will 
continue to make issues of conscience one of persistent debate. This research does not aim to end 
the debate because the tension it creates acts as a check on the two poles of the divide.   
The question of “why” and “how” man is capable of obeying another law other than the 
eternal law supposedly “engraved” in his nature is not an issue this research would address.298 
Suffice it to say that it has all to do with human freedom which is nothing but the ground or 
possibility for all disobedience and sinfulness. The affirmation of human freedom implies that 
there ought to be a mechanism for ordering human reason to obey rather than disobey the natural 
law it recognizes in himself. This becomes the traditional role ascribed to conscience. It is the 
“voice” of God calling man to obedience to the eternal law. To be able to convince man not so 
much as to “abandon” his own “reason” (for human reason is basically ordered to the truth), as to 
be aware that he is not a law unto himself but is accountable to another authority. It seeks to 
                                               
298 We want to note here in passing that the findings of evolution scientists have compounded the whole question of 
natural law – that is if we are to affirm that man evolved from lower forms. If natural law is ‘engraved” in the very 
nature of humanity, and man evolved obeying bio-physical laws, how do we distinguish the ‘natural law” from other 
innate tendencies that man is inclined to obey? In such a situation, it will no longer suffice to call this merely the 
“law of sin” given that it could be merely a reflection of man’s basic orientation to obey  (if not identify with) 
biophysical laws just as all other lower forms from where he evolved.    
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affirm that the authority of human law depends solely on its alignment with the eternal law. 
Therefore, the autonomy of human reason is grounded on its allegiance to eternal reason.   
John Paul II followed this approach by invoking the teaching of Leo XIII regarding the 
“essential subordination of reason and human law to the Wisdom of God and to his law.”299  Leo 
made an appeal to “higher reason” to which the human reason submits itself thus: “But this 
prescription of human reason could not have the force of law unless it were the voice and 
interpreter of some higher reason to which our spirit and our freedom must be subject.”300 If this 
is so, then, part of the essential role of conscience is to serve as a “mediator” [“interpreter”] 
between human freedom and law. It checks the human tendency to claim absolute autonomy. 
Hence John Paul II calls conscience the “proximate norm of personal morality,” as distinguished 
from divine law that is “the universal and objective norm of morality.” He argues that genuine 
human moral autonomy is found at the intersection of human freedom and God’s law when man 
freely submits to law of God. He affirmed with Bonaventure that:  
Conscience is like God’s herald and messenger; it does not command things on its own authority, 
but commands them as coming from God’s authority, like a herald when he proclaims the edict of 
the king. This is why conscience has binding force.
301
  
 
He locates the dignity of conscience precisely in “being the place, the sacred place where God 
speaks to man” even as he admits it to be a “mystery.”302 The concluding point I will draw from 
Veritatis Splendor is John Paul II’s elaboration on the judgment of conscience. Apart from 
                                               
299 Veritatis Splendor, 44.  
300 Veritatis Splendor, 44.  
301 St. Bonaventure, II Librum Sentiat. Dist. 39, a. 1, q. 3, conclusion: Ed. Ad Claras Aquas, II, 907b, cited in 
Vertitatis Splendor, 58.  
302 Veritatis Splendor, 58.  
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reaffirming that it is a practical judgment – judgment about what to do in the concrete situation, 
or the “application of the law to a particular case” that imposes some “moral obligations,” he 
argues that the role of conscience is to apply objective law to a particular moral situation without 
that law losing its universality: 
The universality of the law and its obligation are acknowledged, not suppressed, once reason has 
established the law’s application in concrete present circumstances. The judgment of conscience 
states “in an ultimate way” whether a certain particular kind of behavior is in conformity with the 
law; it formulates the proximate norm of the morality of a voluntary act, “applying the objective 
law to a particular case.”303   
 
However, the claim to the universality of natural law is one that continues to attract 
heated debate because it directly implies a claim to objectivity, as the text cited above makes 
evident. The question that remains to be clarified is, if human reason grasps interiorly the 
universal and objective law (natural law) the primary principle of which is, “do good and avoid 
evil,” that conscience guides it to apply to specific cases in the hic et nunc, what is the warrant 
for the claim that conscience could not be erroneous? And who determines this error? In other 
words, to claim that the human mind is capable of knowing the objective truth regarding good 
and evil, and can apply it to particular concrete cases through the light of conscience, is the 
ground for the autonomy of reason, and the absolute authority of conscience.  
The issue of erroneous conscience
304
 is another problematic associated with conscience. 
Error arises at the intersection of application of objective law to concrete cases. The traditional 
teaching is that error of conscience could arise as a result of ignorance of the law.  
By conscience, in a wonderful way, that law is made known which is fulfilled in the love 
of God and of one’s neighbor. Through loyalty to conscience Christians are joined to 
                                               
303 Veritatis Splendor, 59.  
304 See Johnstone for a critical analysis of this in “Conscience and Error,” in Conscience:Readings in Moral 
Theology, 14, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004) 
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other men in the search for truth and for the right solution to so many moral problems 
which arise both in the life of individuals and social relationships. Hence the more a 
correct conscience prevails, the more do persons and groups turn aside from blind choice 
and try to be guided by the objective standards of moral conduct. Yet it often happens 
that conscience goes astray through ignorance which it is unable to avoid, without 
thereby losing its dignity. This cannot be said of the man who takes little trouble to find 
out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the 
habit of committing sin.
305
 
 
It therefore distinguishes vincible and invincible ignorance based on the effort the individual 
made to inform oneself properly before taking a decision in conscience. So, conscience can be 
misled in its judgment of what is “right” and “wrong.” John Paul II affirms that human persons 
are capable of “discerning from evil” by virtue of their reason, but particularly by “reason 
enlightened by Divine revelation and faith.” And since on the Magisterium is reposed the sole 
right of providing “authentic interpretation”306 of deposits of faith (Scripture and Tradition), the 
Christian has the added advantage of being guarded from error by listening and adhering to the 
moral pronouncements of the Church. And this does not mean limiting the freedom of 
conscience, for according to him:  
The Magisterium does not bring to the Christian conscience truths which are extraneous 
to it; rather it brings to light the truths which it ought already to possess, developing 
them from the starting point of the primordial act of faith. The Church puts herself always 
at the service of conscience, helping it to avoid being tossed to and from by every wind of 
doctrine proposed by human deceit (Eph 4:14), and helping it not to swerve from the 
truth about the good of man, but rather, especially in more difficult questions, to attain 
the truth with certainty and to abide in it.
307
  
  
If the role of the Church’s teaching office is basically to illumine the truth individuals already 
possess (Cardinal Ratzinger applies this to the papacy as having no power but that of conscience 
                                               
305 Gaudium et Spes, 16  
306 Dei Verbum, 10.  
307 Veritatis Splendor, 64. The emphasis is ours. For the development of conscience, see CCC, 1784-1794.  
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which we shall explore in the next chapter when we examine conscience and community),
308
this 
implies the law that conscience mediates is innate. This seems to beg the question: if it already 
possesses the truth (“not extraneous”), then why border teaching it?  Of course this is a 
philosophical position that argues for innate ideas (or truth forms) that could be pedagogically 
drawn out. How does this holds up to another view that sees the mind as a tabula rasa at birth and 
learns everything through experience? This is an open debate we do not intend to indulge here. 
The foregoing has underscored the primary issues of conscience in the light of recent most 
important Church documents especially in relation to its notion and nature; its relation to law and 
objectivity, and its relationship to error and culpability. Given the evident ambiguity noted 
above, we now turn to Aquinas to see if we might find some clarity.  
 
2.2.2  Thomas Aquinas on Conscience 
2.2.2.1  An Overview of Aquinas’ Anthropology: St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 
remains the theologian of central significance in most contentious issues of Christian faith and 
morals including conscience. Given the incredible volume of his works, this segment would only 
attempt a synthesis of the essential contours of his thoughts on Conscience and that aspect of it 
that helps clarify some ambiguities as to its notion, nature and function.  
 Aquinas’ view of conscience can only be understood against the background of his 
anthropology which is largely an adaptation of Aristotle’s that we noted in Chapter one. Like 
Aristotle, he basically, views the human being as a “rational animal” or even more precisely, he 
agrees with Boethius that a human person is “a sentient being of a rational nature.” Reason 
                                               
308 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, On Conscience (Philadelphia: Ignatian Press, 1991), p. 36 
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constitutes the essential difference that distinguishes the human person from other sentient 
beings or animals. A human being is a corporeal being, composed of body and a rational soul 
forming a psycho-physical unity (a person). He shares Aristotle’s divisions of the soul into 
irrational and rational parts; while he further distinguishes vegetative and appetitive powers as 
constituting the irrational part, the speculative and intellective powers constitute the rational part. 
According to him, the “essential function” of every intellect is “to express the true and the 
false.”309 The intellective powers of the human soul operate as such but in a distinct manner: the 
speculative intellect is oriented to the absolutely true as its good, and the absolutely false as its 
evil. The practical intellect is not concerned with the absolutely true (as does the speculative) but 
has “conformable truth” (that which conforms to right appetite) as its good.310   
Obviously, like Aristotle, Aquinas gives priority to reason not just because it constitutes 
its specific differentia, but that it is where human persons reflect the Imago Dei (the image of 
God).
311
 The human person, like everything in creation, is oriented towards its natural end as 
ordained by the creator (God). God directs all creation through his eternally divine law. This 
teleological orientation is realized in human beings through reason as it is ordered to truth – the 
eternal Truth (God) and realized ultimately in the beatific vision. However, in practical terms, 
the human intellect cannot directly access this eternal divine law but only participate in it via an 
inner orientation of the mind towards natural law as they reflect on their experiences. Natural 
law then mediates the eternal law to the human intellect thereby ordering it towards its ultimate 
                                               
309 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Op. Cit., p. 360 
310 Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Op. Cit., p. 360 
311 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, Q. 93, a. 5, 6  
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goal – the beatific vision. He asserts “natural law is nothing else but a participation of the eternal 
law in a rational creature.”312The link between this background information and Conscience is 
that according to Aquinas, “the primary precept of natural law is that good should be done and 
pursued, and evil should be avoided,” and this he will identify not only as the foundation of all 
other precepts of natural law but also, and more importantly for us, is a constituent part of 
conscience – the synderesis. Therefore, the primary precept of natural law is the same as the 
primary principle of practical reason – a component of conscience. Let us now examine his 
theory of conscience in more detail.     
 
2.2.2.2  AQUINAS ON THE NOTION AND NATURE OF CONSCIENCE 
Aquinas’ mature treatment of Conscience is found in the Summa Theologiae especially 1, Q. 79; 
and treated in passing in 1-II, Q. 19.
313
 It is evident that he did not have any exhaustive 
development of his notion of conscience because even in Q. 79 he addresses it in merely two 
articles (articles 12 and 13) as part of his comprehensive treatise on “intellectual powers”.  In 
these articles he distinguishes “synderesis”314 from “conscience” affirming that both are not 
powers, but admits that while the former is a habit, the latter is an act.  According to him,  
                                               
312 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1-II, 91, 2; See also, AA. 2. This “participation” is imperfect.   
313 Aquinas also addressed the issue of Conscience in his Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard; and in 
Disputed Questions on Truth which we regard as equally valid but older expressions of his views on the subject.    
314 For a comprehensive history of the controversy surrounding this term, see Philippe Delhaye, The Christian 
Conscience, and Trans by Charles Underhill Quinn (New York: Descalee Company, 1968), 105-119. He notes that it 
was the Scholastics that stirred up the problem in an attempt to give a metaphysical status to habitual conscience and 
looking at the text of St. Jerome that “seems to say the habitual conscience is called συντήρησις, in contradistinction 
to the actual conscience, called συνείδησις. They accepted this word. Some historians today think however that there 
is a copyist’s error here, and that the same word συνείδησις is used for both the habitual and the actual conscience. 
This matters very little, in any case, for even if it is erroneous by origin, the word synderesis is practical.” Ibid., p. 
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 Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, 
but to a special habit, which is called the understanding of principles, as the Philosopher explains 
(Ethic. Vi. 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to 
a special power, but to a special habit, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said to 
incite good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, 
and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a 
natural habit.
315
  
Aquinas affirms in the previous article (11) that the speculative and practical intellects are not 
different powers but are distinguished and “named by their respective ends” (consideration of, or 
speculation on, truth and operations respectively). The basic function of the intellect is 
apprehension (knowledge) of truth. Now he argues that the basic framework of all knowledge is 
the capacity to understand principles. The speculative intellect has as a habit (a permanent 
disposition) the understanding of primary principles relative to speculation, and the practical 
intellect has as a habit the understanding of primary principles relative to operation (practical 
matters). This latter is designated as synderesis – the knowledge of first practical principles that 
enables it to distinguish “good” from “evil”. It is an inner disposition that inclines us to the truly 
good. Its relationship to natural law is that it has the precepts of natural law as its object. 
 On the other hand, Aquinas explains that conscience from its very etymology means “a 
relation of knowledge to something” (or “cum alio scientia” “knowledge applied to an individual 
                                                                                                                                                       
105.  The text of St. Jerome in question taken from the Glossa Ordinaria reads, “Plerique juxta Platonem, 
rationabilitatem animae et irascentiam et concupiscentiam ad hominem et leonem et vitulum referunt…Quartam 
supra haec et extra haec tria ponunt, quam Graeci vocant sunderesim: quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque 
non extinguitur…quam proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus sed ipsa errantia corrigentem…Hic est 
spiritus qui interpellat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus.” (“Most authors, following Plato in this , see the reason, 
the irascible, the concupiscible in the man, the lion, the ox of prophecy…The fourth psychological power that they 
see above and beyond the three others is called synderesis by the Greeks: it is the spark of conscience that was not 
extinguished even in Cain….It is properly illustrated by the eagle who does not mingle with the other animals, and 
can pounce down upon them. It is the ‘spirit’ that speaks for God in us through indescribable groanings”). See Ibid.  
315 Thomas Aquinas, S.T. 1. Q. 79. a. 12. The stresses are his. Aquinas defines “habit” as “a disposition of a subject 
which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation.” S.T. 1-II, Q. 50, a. 1 
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case”), and such application, in terms of knowledge, implies an act rather than a power.316 In 
other words, he defines conscience as the “application of knowledge to action.”317 He admits that 
the different attributes ascribable to conscience (“to witness, to bind, or incite, to accuse, 
torment, or rebuke”) are “applications of knowledge to what we do” (an act). However, given 
that a habit is a principle of act, sometimes conscience is given the name of its first natural habit. 
In other words, conscience and synderesis are often used interchangeably even though they 
should be properly distinguished.
318
  
 Therefore, synderesis is related to conscience as principle is related to act. This is 
understandable if we consider further this intimate relationship. Synderesis provides the basic 
principle of moral action that says “moral evil must be avoided.” When the individual encounters 
a moral situation like the urge to kill somebody (say, Mr. B.) his reason first queries thus, “is it 
proper to kill anybody?” Reflecting back on the first principle (“evil must be avoided”) if he is 
illumined by it, he judges that “killing anybody at all is an evil act.”319 He then may conclude 
that in the present situation, “to kill Mr. B is an evil act to be avoided.” The principle involved is 
                                               
316 Aquinas, S. T., 1, Q. 79, a. 13; In Disputations he says, “Hence, to be conscious (conscire) means to know 
together (simul scire). But any knowledge can be applied to a thing. Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit 
or power, but designates the act itself, which is the application of any habit or of any knowledge to some particular 
act.” Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, Q. 17, a. 1  
317 Aquinas, S. T., 1-II, Q. 19, a. 5 
318 Aquinas, Ibid  
319 This is rather a simple presentation as to how one arrives at moral decision. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
process of moral act (“order of action”) in Aquinas, see S. T. 1-II, Q. 15, a. 3. If we are to consider the above as a 
syllogism, the secondary deduction is the application of the virtue of prudence that helps in providing secondary 
principles of moral action and in this way relates intimately with conscience and synderesis. Error occurs from the 
secondary deduction and conclusion and not in first part (primary principles of synderesis are without error).    
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provided by the habit we call synderesis, and the conclusion is an act of conscience.
320
 Note that 
this conclusion is still a “judgment” as distinct from a “decision” as to how to act which is left to 
his will which is always free as to choice. Therefore, though synderesis and the act of conscience 
are intimately connected, it is evident that they are distinguishable. If the person goes on to still 
choose to kill Mr B. there results again the accusatory acts of conscience we noted above. Given 
this intrinsic connection, it does make some sense why the old scholastic terminologies: habitual 
conscience, actual conscience, and antecedent or consequent consciences
321
 were applied 
respectively to capture the different nuances inherent in the notion of conscience.   
 He admits that though there are many habits that inform conscience, however, “they all 
take effect through one chief habit, the grasp of principles called synderesis.”322 It is helpful to 
point out that Aquinas locates synderesis and conscience in the rational part of the soul as against 
locating it in the appetitive part like St. Bonaventure does.
323
 He insists that synderesis is not 
                                               
320 See how Aquinas presents this argument using adultery in Commentary on the Sentences, II, 39. Q. 3 (T. D. 
Williams 2008) 
321 For an explication of this traditional role of conscience, see Thomas D. Williams, Knowing Right from Wrong: A 
Christian Guide to Conscience, e- book edition (New York: Faith Word, Hachette Book Group, Inc., 2008), pp. 309-
363. Williams distinguishes judgments of conscience from decisions of the will. He then explains antecedent 
conscience as the act of counsel that guides our actions prior to our action. It “warns or encourages, commands or 
forbids.” Concomitant conscience is the role of conscience in accompanying my action while acting – providing 
judgment and giving me a sense of feeling good or bad about my present actions. The “consequent conscience” is 
the role of conscience as a judge of my past action[s] condemning or upholding them as right or wrong. This is 
usually accompanied by praise or blame (feelings of guilt) respectively. We shall be revisiting this distinction 
between decisions of the will and the judgment of conscience to show its significance for the role of conscience in 
behaviour at the end of this chapter. 
322 Aquinas, S. T. 1, Q.79, a.13  
323 Bonaventure locates conscience and synderesis in the affective part of the soul (the will), giving priority to the 
will against the reason. He argues that just as reason cannot move except as mediated by the will, in like manner, 
synderesis cannot move except as mediated by conscience. For an elaborate articulation of his thoughts on 
conscience, see Douglas C. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2001), pp. 21-37  
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subject to error because its assertions are as self-evident as the first principles of theoretical 
reason. As first principles, their stability is critical to knowledge derived from it.
324
He says:  
As a result, for probity to be possible in human actions, there must be some permanent principle 
which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human works are examined, so that that 
permanent principle will resist all evil and assist to all good. This is synderesis, whose task is to 
warn against evil and incline to good. Therefore, we agree that there can be no error in it.
325
 
 
 Aquinas affirms that synderesis is connatural to the soul as the light of the active intellect; 
therefore, it is impossible to extinguish it from the soul but it could be hindered in those without 
the use of free choice and/or reason (due to bodily injury or the like).
326
 He does admit however, 
that it could be extinguished in particular judgments especially in specific situations where:  
[T]he force of concupiscence, or another passion, so absorbs reason that in choice the universal 
judgment of synderesis is not applied to the particular act. But this does not destroy synderesis 
altogether, but only in some respect. Hence, absolutely speaking, we concede that synderesis is 
never destroyed.
327
 
 It is then with regard to “particular judgments” that error is related to conscience – it is subject 
to error based on wrong application of synderesis by way of illogical inferences that could result 
in wrong conclusions. However, he upholds the binding nature of conscience, even one in 
error.
328
 The reason is that the goodness of the will depends on reason in respect to its object – 
there is nothing in the will except that proposed to it by reason. If reason proposes an object as 
evil, even if this object is not evil but good in itself, the will by accepting it, accepts evil and 
                                               
324 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, trans by James V. Mc Glynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1953), Q. 16, a. 2 
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Disputed Questions, 16, a. 3 
328 Disputed Questions, 16, a. 2 
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therefore is evil. In this article he equates reason with conscience. Hence, reason or conscience 
that proposes something evil (though erroneously) still binds the will absolutely simply because 
it does not know it is in error. Hence an erroneous conscience binds absolutely.
329
 On the other 
hand, in the Summa, answering the question of the goodness of the will that abides by a defective 
reason, he evokes the culpable and inculpable ignorance that has long become traditional 
teaching. Culpable ignorance (is a voluntary act) does not excuse since one follows a defective 
reason or conscience in matters one is supposed to know better; but inculpable ignorance excuses 
for one fails to know not out of negligence but by the fact of his circumstances –  an involuntary 
act.
330
  
 It is open to debate whether the foregoing Aquinas’ treatise on conscience provides us 
with a lucid and integral account of the definition, nature, and function of conscience. If we 
answer in the negative, we might then assume perhaps that this lack is the reason the notion of 
conscience was taken over and developed by scholastics to the point that casuistry became its 
inevitable outcome; and it is perhaps still the reason why the issue remains contentious. Be that 
as it may, we add that Aquinas could neither be accused of leaving us in serious doubt as to what 
conscience is, nor of its nature and function even if he fails to provide an integral definition of it 
– that is, if one is ever possible given the double aspect that the reality entails.  
2.2.2.3  AQUINAS ON CONSCIENCE AND PRUDENCE 
 The issue that concerns this research is not so much the tension between the objective and 
subjective poles of conscience (its relationship to law as such), nor its proneness to error, as it is 
                                               
329 S. T. 1-II, Q. 19, A. 5;  
330 Aquinas, S.T. 1-II, Q. 19, a. 6 
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to find out if conscience does have an influence on human behavior as such. Unfortunately, we 
do not find any direct reference to this in Aquinas. However, his arguments on prudence and on 
weakness of the will seem to provide an opening to understand his mind on this. To that then we 
now turn our attention.  
Aquinas forges a link between prudence and conscience such that conscience does not 
function properly without prudence. He defines prudence as “the right judgment of things to be 
done” (recta ratio agibilium) distinguishing it from art which is “the right reason for things to be 
made.”331  Aquinas moral vision is geared towards living a good life in all its ramifications and 
not merely being a “good man”. He considers prudence as necessary to live a good moral life 
because reason needs to be perfected by an “intellectual virtue” in order for it to choose well the 
specific ends of human life. This intellectual virtue is prudence. For Aquinas, the goal or 
function of prudence is to determine the rightness of things to be done. He says, “Prudence is of 
good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life and the end of human life.”332 Given that 
the intellect is itself not infallible in contingent matters, the practical intellect that deals with 
operation (and its truth is about “conformity to right appetite”) needs a virtue that perfects it with 
regard to practical choices. So he distinguishes “three acts of reason” in respect to action thus:  
Prudence is right reason applied to action, as stated above (A.2). Hence that which is the chief 
act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such 
acts. The first is to take counsel, which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as 
stated above. The second act is to judge of what one has discovered, and this is an act of the 
speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third 
act is to command, which act consists in applying to action the things counseled and judged. And 
                                               
331 Aquinas, S. T. 1-II, Q. 57, a. 4 
332 Aquinas, S.T., 1-II, Q. 57, a. 4, ad 3  
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since this act approaches nearer to the end of practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of 
the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
333
  
Aquinas consigns counsel and judgment as acts proper to the speculative intellect, but command 
is about operation, and therefore specific to the practical intellect. This shows why prudence is 
located in the practical intellect but also has as goal the effecting of its chief act – command.  He 
argues that a prudent person should know universal principles and how to apply them to 
particular situations, but knowledge of principles is not the chief act of prudence. The obvious 
question this raises is, “how is prudence related to conscience?” The answer perhaps is found in 
his claim that prudence does not appoint the end of moral virtues but “to regulate the means.” It 
is synderesis (principles of natural reason) that appoints the end of moral virtues by directing 
them to act in accord with reason.
334
 In the prima pars secundae he notes two parts in choice: the 
“intention of the end,” that belongs to moral virtues; and the “preferential choice of that which is 
unto the end,” that belongs to prudence.335 James F. Kennan observes a shift in Aquinas on the 
role of prudence – admitting in prima pars secundae (Q. 66, a. 3, ad 3) that it not only directs the 
moral virtues “in the choice of means” “‘but also in appointing the end’” but later admits in the 
secunda secundae that it is synderesis that appoints the end but prudence “regulates the means.” 
Keenan however affirms that Aquinas still maintains the priority of prudence (as an intellectual 
virtue) over the moral virtues.
336
 It is not this priority that is at issue for us here,
337
 rather, it is the 
                                               
333 Aquinas, S.T. II-II, Q. 47, a. 8 (The stresses are his).  
334 Ibid. Q. 47, a. 7. He cites temperance and fortitude as two moral virtues that their end is precisely to be in 
conformity with right reason; the former insists that the agent should not stray from right reason in favor of passions, 
the later that he “should not stray for fear or daring.” 
335 Aquinas, S.T. 1-II, Q. 56, a. 4, ad 4 
336 James F. Keenan, “The Virtue of Prudence (IIa IIae, qq. 47-56), in The Ethics of Aquinas, Stephen J. Pope (ed.), 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 259-260 
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relationship of prudence to conscience as such (as distinct from synderesis). In other words, if we 
admit that Aquinas gives over to synderesis (principles of natural reason or natural law) the role 
of appointing the end to moral virtues and prudence regulates the means, how is this prudential 
role different from conscience since this latter is also the “application of knowledge to what we 
do”  in concrete situations as seen above? Moreover the traditional models of conscience 
(habitual, actual, and concomitant conscience) that tries to apply Aquinas’ distinction to 
explicate its nature and operation only reinforces the confusion as to its relation to prudence.  
Furthermore, if “judgment” and “counsel” are acts of the speculative intellect, are these 
analogous to or identified with the counsels and judgments of conscience? To underscore this 
point we need to revisit Aquinas’ psychology of action.   
 Aquinas’ psychology of action is articulated more exhaustively in the Summa. The 
analysis as to the exact sequence and order is open to differing interpretations and debate. We 
follow the scheme Daniel Westberg adopted because it agrees more with our own reading. 
Westberg reasons that Aquinas introduced an unnecessary complexity into the structure of 
human action and thereby made a fundamental change to Aristotle’s own structure that he built 
upon. According to him, Aquinas introduces will as a “separate force” and providing distinct 
stages in the process (in stage 8, for instance, he introduces choice or electio as an act of will 
[voluntas] where Aristotle made prohairesis an act of reason). 
338
 Evidently, Aquinas uses 
                                                                                                                                                       
337 Keenan dedicates sufficient space to show that Aquinas gives priority to Prudence over the moral virtues (Ibid).  
338 Ibid, p. 120 He argues that comparisons of various stages of action show an inconsistency especially in stages 1-
4; 8-12 of the process.  
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“electio” for choice (the ability to “receive one thing while refusing another”); but Westberg 
argues as follows:  
Thomas regarded liberum arbitrium and electio to be equivalent to Aristotle's prohairesis, 
understood in both a general and a particular sense. Prohairesis in EN III is treated as the 
principle of action, while in books VI and VII it is more specifically the act of choice leading to 
action. The terminology available in the Latin discussions allowed Aquinas to use liberum 
arbitrium for the general sense and electio for the particular (which may be distinguished as 'free 
choice' and 'choice'). The citation of Aristotle's description of prohairesis as intellectus 
appetitivus vel appetitus intellectivus is meant to underscore the primary contention, found in all 
of Thomas' treatments, that human choice involves an intimate combination of both reason and 
will.
339
  
Westberg argues that it is this “intimate combination” of reason and will in the process of human 
action that is usually distorted in most interpretations of Aquinas. Please see next page for the 
illustration of Aquinas’ process of human action. In that schema there are two major categories 
in the complex process of human action: order of intention and execution. The first four sub-
categories (1-4) are about the end of a contemplated act; and the second sub-categories (5-8) are 
deliberations about means. Categories (1-8) are in the order of intention (are immanent) or 
interior to the agent. The last four sub-categories (9-12) are about practical action or execution 
and the enjoyment of the completed act. While these twelve categories are split equally between 
intellect and will, their integral relationship should not be overlooked.  
 
Illustration of Process of Human Action in Aquinas 
 
Intellect       Will  
About the End 
1. Apprehension of the end    2. Wish, Willing the end (Velle, simplex 
(apprehensio; simplex intellectus)   voluntas) 
                                               
339 Westberg, Ibid. p. 88 Liberium arbitrium in Aquinas is the power of the human agent over his actions. It is the 
primary principle of moral action that is a power exercised by both reason and will together. S.T. 1-II, prologue; I, 1  
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3. Judgment about the end    4. Intention (intentio) 
Judicium circa finem (or judicium synderesis)  
    About Means 
5. Deliberation (consilium)   6. Consent (consensus) 
7. Practical judgment (judicium practicum) 8. Choice (electio) 
 
About Execution  
9. Command (imperium)   10. Use; application (usus; usus activus) 
 
11. Performance (usus passivus)    12. Enjoyment, completion (fruitio)340 
 
Aquinas locates synderesis and conscience within the intellect as acts of practical reason. They 
also fall within the order of intention since they do not exceed the point of decision.
341
 
Synderesis (as primary principle or “capacity” or “judgment”) and Conscience (as “capacity” or 
“process” of applying this knowledge to concrete cases) specifically involves 3, 5, 7 of the 
process (judgment about end, deliberation about means and practical judgment) but without 
detriment to its influence on 4, 6, and 8 (intentio, consensus, electio). The transition from 
intention to execution is achieved by “command” (imperium) which is an act of prudence. Like 
in “choice,” “command” is an act of reason that presupposes “an act of the will” and shows again 
the mutual relation between intellect and will. Aquinas says, “the reason reasons about willing, 
and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of reason precedes the act of the will, and 
                                               
340 Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 121-122. Westberg affirms that his table “is a compilation from various standard 
accounts; for the English terms see J. A. Oesterle, Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science ( Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ., 1957), 85; V. Bourke, Ethics: A Textbook in Moral Philosophy ( New York, 1966); and T. Gilby in the Black 
friars edn. of ST, xvii. 211 and xviii, 143 (where most of the Latin equivalents are also given). See also A. Gardeil, 
"Acte humain", DTC i. 339-46, at 343. For fuller discussion see T. Urdanoz, "Esencia y proceso psicológico del acto 
libre según santo Tomás", Estudios filosóficos, 2 (1953), 291318; and S. Pinckaers, "La Structure de l'acte humain 
suivant s. Thomas", RT 55 ( 1955), 393-412. Pinckaers pointed out the dependence of modern studies on C.-R. 
Billuart, Summa Sancti Thomae Hodiernis Academiarum Moribus Accommodata ( Paris, 1876).” Ibid, p. 120  
341 Robert J. Smith, Conscience and Catholicism, Op. Cit., p. 25 
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conversely.” 342   This is partly why interpreting Aquinas precisely is difficult. The foregoing 
shows not just the close relationship between conscience and prudence in Aquinas but also the 
close relationship he maintain in his moral theory between intellect and will in human action in 
general. Let us now examine contemporary theological views on conscience.  
 
2.2.3  Contemporary Theological Views of Conscience 
The approach of Veritatis Splendor emphasizes the letter of the law and asserts the authority 
of the Magisterium and a submissive model of conscience, apparently claiming that personal 
conscience and reason cannot be set in opposition to the teaching of the Magisterium, and 
seemingly setting the authority of conscience and the Church in opposition.
343
 
 
Jane Hoose: The epigraph above is an extract from Jayne Hoose that appropriately sets the tone 
for our examination of theological viewpoints in this section. Hoose’s basic argument is that in 
Veritatis Splendor, there is a visible tendency to suppress the conscience by “a move of power 
towards the Magisterium,” and that this constitutes a “departure” from Vatican II model of 
conscience that allows “free inquiry helped by the teaching or instruction, communication and 
dialogue.”344 At the root of her argument is that Veritatis Splendor (and by extension, the 
Catechism) instead of allowing for a “genuine intellectual or imaginative pursuit of the truth” by 
each individual [Christian], imposes on conscience the hierarchical Church’s interpretations of 
natural law that represents only one aspect (or a “guarantee” not a certainty) of the truth. She 
                                               
342 Aquinas, S. T. 1-II, Q.17, a. 1 
343 Jayne Hoose, “Conscience in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism,” in Conscience: Readings in Moral 
Theology, 14, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), p. 91. 
344 Jayne Hoose, “Conscience in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism,” p. 89.  
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argues that this imposition is a suppression of conscience and a delimitation of its autonomy and 
freedom.  
 Evidently, this revokes the complex problem of the relationship between the objectivity 
of law and its subjective interpretation and/or application. In this instance, it is a claim that the 
“interpretations” of the objective law does not have a warranty to an absolute claim to objectivity 
and/or certainty. In other words, such magisterial “interpretations” or teachings, are subjective 
rather than objective affirmations of the truth, and therefore should not be assumed otherwise. 
Such assumptions, as she claims are evident in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism, usurps the 
powers of the individual reason to be “imaginative” in its search for the truth, and therefore 
deposes the authority of conscience. I cannot make a judgment on her claim regarding the 
documents,
345
 but we can take up the issue of this “relationship” between the objective law and 
the subjective “interpretation” of it either by the individual or by an external authority in other 
authors. She however touches on the heart of the current debate the authority of conscience.   
 Linda Hogan in “Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II”346 raised very critical 
questions about the coherence
347
 of Vatican II documents on conscience. According to her, there 
are prevailing ambiguities regarding the role of conscience in the life of a Christian that people 
often wrongly assume that Vatican II addressed. She classified such ambiguities under four 
                                               
345 John Paul II addressed sufficiently this kind of mindset specifically in the same document, Veritatis Splendor, 54-
55; See also the article by Patrick McCormick, “Hierarchical Church Teaching and Conscience,” in Conscience: 
Readings in Moral Theology, 14, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), pp. 103-108.  
346 Linda Hogan, “Conscience in the Document of Vatican II,” in Conscience: Readings in Moral Theology, 14, ed. 
Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), pp. 82-88 
347 Hogan cited James Gaffney who declared an inherent incoherence in the documents of Vatican II on conscience. 
See James Gaffney, Matters of Faith and Morals (London: Sheed & Ward, 1987), pp. 115-133, cited by Hogan, p. 
82 
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related points: The relationship between conscience and law; the question of discernment and 
obedience; the problem of erroneous conscience; and the role of the Magisterium.
348
 She then 
goes on to pose these questions:  
Is conscience about following church law or about determining for oneself what is right 
and good? Is conscience about obedience or discernment? How can conscience err if it is 
the voice of God? What is the relationship between individual and institutional moral 
authority?
349
  
 
Evidently these are very critical and legitimate questions. Actually, all of these questions have 
been addressed by the documents we cited earlier except that Hogan is questioning the 
presuppositions inherent in the answers the specific documents of Vatican II provided. This 
obviously delimits the scope of her inquiry. Moreover, Vatican II only provided broad outlines 
that subsequent teachings should build upon in the development of thought and teachings.
350
 
According to Hogan, the document[s] coming out of Vatican II compounded these questions 
instead of resolving them. She develops her argument under four headings following the 
questions above. Regarding the relationship between conscience and law, she noted an ambiguity 
in Dignitatis Humanae and Gaudium et Spes. The former declared the divine law as the ultimate 
moral norm even while admitting that this norm is “not directly accessible” to both individual 
human persons and the Magisterium. However, since the document claims that individuals 
“participate” in the divine law through the conscience, it suggests an understanding that 
                                               
348 See Linda Hogan, “Conscience in the Document of Vatican II,” in Conscience: Readings in Moral Theology, 14, 
ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), p. 82. 
349 Ibid  
350 It is interesting to note that she acknowledged that Vatican II provided only broad outlines. See Hogan, p. 83.  
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conscience is “the capacity for moral consciousness, the traditional synderesis.”351 But Gaudium 
et Spes subordinates conscience to the law of God as interpreted by the Magisterium.
352
  
On the question of discernment and/or obedience she observes gross ambiguity in 
Gaudium et Spes where the role of conscience is first articulated as one of “obedience to the 
objective moral law,”353 only to also affirm it as discerning the “voice” of God that “echoes in 
their depths” and irrespective of their religious affiliations. She argues that these views conflict 
with each other.
354
 On erroneous conscience she wonders how the documents could affirm that 
conscience is the “voice” of God in human depths, and also hold that it is subject to error. She 
cites Cardinal Ratzinger’s comment in support of this ambiguity. According to her, Ratzinger 
ponders: “how conscience can err if God’s voice is directly to be heard in it, is unexplained.”355 
She traces the roots of this ambiguity to the concerns of the council fathers about lending too 
much weight to subjective aspect of conscience with its inherent dangers for relativism. They 
therefore “reintroduced the traditional formulae”356 that subordinates conscience to law and as 
interpreted by the Church, predicated on the assumption that it is subject to error. Though she did 
not indicate that the council fathers’ concerns were legitimate, she however seems to suggest that 
the move was like sacrificing proper definitions at the altar of expediency. She proposed that 
                                               
351 Hogan, “Conscience in the Document of Vatican II,” p. 83.  
352 See Gaudium et Spes, #50.  
353 Hogan, “Conscience in the Document of Vatican II,” p. 84. 
354 Hogan, “Conscience in the Document of Vatican II,” p. 84.  
355 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, quoted in Michael Allsopp, “Conscience, the Church and Moral Truth: John Henry 
Newman, Vatican II, Today,” Irish Theological Quarterly 58 (1992), p. 197, cited by Hogan, p. 85.  
356 Hogan, p. 85.  
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observing the distinction between rightness and goodness would help in understanding how an 
erroneous conscience (objectively wrong) could be subjectively good and blameless.
357
  
Finally, she also noted the ambiguity inherent in the document in explicating the 
relationship between conscience and the Magisterium. She queries the warrant for subjecting 
conscience to the objective law according to the “authentic” interpretations of the Magisterium 
as if the conscience is not also an “authentic” interpreter of divine law contrary to its earlier 
affirmation that conscience is the “voice” of God. He argues that unless the autonomy of 
conscience is respected its role becomes one of “passive implementations” of Church’s teachings 
and “mechanistic applications of predetermined principles.”358  
She admits that the authorities of conscience and magisterium need not be seen as 
mutually opposed but complementary, but this is the ideal goal that the personalist aspect of 
Vatican II could realize. She therefore proposed that when confronted with ambiguities, the 
“general moral framework”359 that Vatican II provided should be the guide but that entails a 
paradigm shift towards personalism.
360
 Evidently, the core of her analyses revolves around the 
restraints placed on the autonomy of conscience.
361
 It is refreshing that she recognizes that these 
ambiguities are not mutually contradictory but complementary. So, her critique only serves to 
                                               
357 Hogan, “Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II,” pp. 85-6. She refers to James Keenan’s work, “Goodness 
and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992), p. 
143. 
358 Hogan, “Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II,” p. 87. 
359 Hogan, “Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II,” p. 83. 
360 Hogan, “Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II,” pp. 83, 87   
361 William May presented a view that explains “our obligation in conscience to seek the truth where we can 
reasonably expect to find it.” See W. May, “Vatican II, Church Teaching, and Conscience,” in Conscience: 
Readings in Moral Theology, 14, ed., Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), pp. 95-101.  
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underscore the abiding tension in the relationship between the subjective and objective poles of 
conscience that will continue to stimulate debate. A critical point in her analysis is the fact of 
restraints put on the autonomy of conscience by imposing on it the interpretive authority of the 
Magisterium as a condition for its inerrancy. We have considered her views with respect to 
Vatican II documents with which we opened this segment. We noted the ambiguity inherent in 
its positions, and Logan’s perspective above underscores the need for more clarity in the ongoing 
development of this concept. Let us now examine some other views not specific to Vatican II 
documents. We turn to German Grisez and Russel Shaw.  
German Grisez and Russel Shaw’s co-authored an article with a critical comment on 
the different contemporary misconceptions of conscience in these words:  
Quite a few strange ideas about conscience are in circulation these days. There is 
conscience as an inner voice which pipes up saying “Don’t!” whenever one is tempted. 
There is conscience on Freudian lines – an irrational residue of infantile tussles with 
authority figures. There is conscience on a Promethean model, where one’s solitary 
conscience is the only gauge of right and wrong that matters. And, perhaps especially for 
some Catholics, there is conscience as rebel: “The Church can’t tell me what to do.362 
 
Their analyses explored the psychological roots of these models in an effort to show how they 
constitute misconceived notions of conscience. Essentially, from the psychological point of view, 
they distinguished the “voice” of superego from the “voice” of authentic conscience. They 
asserted, “superego is nonreflective and essentially nonrational. Whatever its role in the lives of 
particular individuals, it is not conscience.”363  They rejected all claims that identify conscience 
                                               
362 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” in Conscience: Readings in Moral 
Theology, 14, ed., Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), p. 39.  
363 Grisez and Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” p. 40.  
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with the “sense of right and wrong”364 that emerges later in adolescent moral development as a 
product of cultural and/or group dynamics characterized by legalistic allegiance to 
‘group/society’ demands but graduates to rebellion in the search for self-identity. This, they 
argue metamorphosed into a prevailing mindset today that sees conscience as “the principle of 
individual self-assertion against social standards.” They affirm that the claim that “I make my 
own rules” is to absolutize “individual desires” as the law; and this, in actual fact, derogates the 
dignity of conscience.
365
  
 They then conceived conscience as primarily “one’s awareness of moral truth – of that 
which is truly right and good to do.”366 This primary orientation of conscience towards the truth 
is what distinguishes it from either the cravings of the superego or the immature group-identity-
seeking legalistic models. The authentic and mature conscience instead of seeking for the 
shortcuts to the moral life, rather asks: “What is the “good and wise thing to do?” And the 
authentic or “mature” Christian conscience asks further: “What is the wise and holy thing to 
do?”367 They traced the most appropriate biblical understanding of conscience to Paul (Rom 
2:14-15) that was adapted by the council fathers (GS 16). And the basis for erroneous conscience 
they found in 1Cor 4:4-5 and 1 John 3:19-20.  
They held that Vatican II borrowed insight from Aquinas’ treatise on conscience for he 
distinguishes “moral principles, moral reasoning, and judgments of right and wrong” wherewith 
                                               
364 Grisez and Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” p. 40.  
365 Grisez and Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” p. 41.  
366 Grisez and Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” p. 41. 
367 Grisez and Shaw, “Conscience: Knowledge of Moral Truth,” p. 41. 
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he reserved “judgment” as a function of conscience.368 Conscience is therefore the last measure 
of what is right and wrong, hence the absolute moral authority it wields with an attendant 
obligation to obey it. One is obliged to obey even an erroneous conscience because one does not 
know it is erroneous for to have such knowledge indicates that one is not following his authentic 
conscience. The fact that conscience is prone to error implies the necessity of properly forming 
one’s conscience.  
They hold that the primary role of the Church is to act as a “guide” in the formation of 
right Christian consciences. Unfortunately, those “schooled in legalism” always assume that the 
Church is imposing “rules” by her teachings. Moreover, they noted that part of the reason for 
dissent to the Church’s teaching is hinged on certain ambivalent attitude - an inconsistency of 
character whereby people want to enjoy the privileges attached to Church membership but not 
willing to pay the price. Another reason is “lack of insight into moral truth” on the part of both 
the teacher and the taught.
369
 They argued that the moral teachings of the Church are neither 
‘mysterious” nor “impenetrable” but open to all in their basic principles. Failure to see the truth 
in them is with the individual rather than with the Church. They however observed that the 
Church has emphasized the normative aspect in her teachings (“do not commit adultery,” “do not 
kill,” among others) without giving proper attention to why people are usually tempted to do 
such things. Nevertheless, those who are genuinely open to the truth will always see the 
Church’s teachings as a “precious source of light” rather than an “imposition.”370  
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We think that despite the lucidity of the points Grisez and Shaw made in this submission 
they leave obscure the thorny issue of the tension between objective and subjective poles. There 
is a certain simplification of the problem such that one seems forced to conclude that the role of 
conscience is a mere passive obedience to the teachings of the Church.  
 Richard Gula took his point of departure in articulating his understanding of Conscience 
from seeking its biblical equivalent that he locates in the idea of the “heart” – the seat of decision 
and action, feelings and emotions, intention and consciousness.
371
 He distinguishes between 
three dimensions of conscience: “a capacity, a process, and a judgment.”372 As “a capacity” it 
discerns between good and evil; as “a process” it discovers more and more through inquiry and 
“critical investigation” what is right and good as distinguished from bad and wrong (a process of 
growth in knowledge). And as “a judgment,” it determines the moral quality of a specific action 
either yet to be done, being done now, or already done.
373
 This, according to Gula, “is the 
practical judgment that takes place in one’s heart where one is alone with God.”374 It is that 
application of the general principle of morality “do good and avoid evil” to particular and 
concrete act. He therefore argues that a proper contemporary understanding of conscience 
integrates the rational and emotive aspects of the human person:  
In the light of the three dimensions of conscience, a contemporary approach to conscience 
focuses on the whole person. Conscience includes not only cognitive and volitional aspects, but 
also affective, intuitive, and somatic ones as well. We understand the moral conscience 
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holistically as an expression of the whole self as a thinking, feeling, intuiting, and willing person. 
Conscience is the whole person’s commitment to value and the judgment one makes in the light of 
that commitment of who one ought to be and what one ought to do or not do.
375
  
 
Like Grisez and Shaw, he thinks that those who see conscience as “freedom from authority” or a 
“law unto itself” are misguided. He corrected the impression people have regarding the 
traditional role ascribed to conscience as the “proximate norm of morality” in these words:  
This does not mean that conscience independently determines what is good and what is evil. Nor 
does it mean that conscience makes all morality relative to a person’s own desires, or that one’s 
moral judgment is true merely by the fact that the judgment comes from one’s conscience. It does 
mean that the person’s sincerely reflective judgment of what to do sets the boundary for acting 
with integrity, or sincerity of heart. To say “My conscience tells me” means “I may be wrong, but 
I understand this to be an objective demand of morality and so I must live by it lest I turn from 
the truth and betray my truest self.
376
 
 
He argues that in this latter understanding of conscience, if such a person comes to believe with 
his whole heart that a particular line of action is “God’s objective call,” then that implies moral 
imperative like Luther’s assertion: “Here I stand, I can do no other.”377 Conscience in this sense, 
he says, is “where God speaks to us.”378 And this implies obedience that in turn calls for the 
proper formation of conscience. He then says that the limitations of our knowledge and 
experience imply that we cannot form our consciences alone. He broadened the scope of critical 
inquiry where we seek for counsel – what he called the “established sources of wisdom.”379 This 
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includes family, friends, all sources of wisdom in secular society, the academia, Sacred 
Scripture, and more specifically, the Magisterium.  
 He argues that the goal of conscience formation is to build good moral character. And 
since character emerges from our habits, it is therefore important for us to pay attention to the 
things we do and desire, the company we keep, the goals we aspire to, our role models, the 
values of our community, among others, since all these affect the choices we make and who we 
eventually become. He cautioned that even after a careful inquiry, we might still miss the mark 
as to what is objectively right. The problem of conscience is not about those who inquire and 
then make erroneous judgments, but those who fail to inform themselves properly. Judgment will 
be based not on the rightness or wrongness of our consciences, but on the “sincerity of our hearts 
in seeking to do what is right, even if we make mistakes.”380 Moral maturity, he says: 
If a person spends his or her life doing what he or she is told to do by someone else in authority 
simply because the authority says so, or because that is the kind of behavior expected by the 
group, then that person never really makes moral decisions which are his or her own…The 
morally mature person must be able to perceive, choose, and identify oneself with what one does. 
In short, we create our own character and give our lives meaning by committing our freedom, not 
by submitting it to someone in authority…As long as we do not direct our own activity, we are 
not yet free, morally mature persons.
381
 
Evidently, his submission revolves around moral maturity and freedom. And he defines “real” 
freedom as “learning to live within limits.”382The depth of his analyses requires that he goes a 
step further than the previous authors in placing the burden of the tension between conscience 
and law, not on any external authority, but on the individual. It is the individual that has the 
burden of proof that he/she makes a thorough inquiry before arriving at a decision. Such inquiry 
                                               
380 Richard M. Gula, “The Moral Conscience,” p. 57. 
381 Richard M. Gula, “The Moral Conscience,” p. 58.  
382 Richard M. Gula, “The Moral Conscience,” p. 60.  
154 
 
would necessary involve seeking counsel from the teaching authority of the Church. But the 
decision as to what to do remains with the moral subject. He concludes that unless we take 
charge of our lives, we run the risk of living an inauthentic life.
383
 Perhaps we have space for one 
or two more theological views.  
 Charles E. Curran developed what he called a “holistic understanding of 
conscience.”384 His analyses starts with an overview of traditional Catholic understanding of 
conscience that places, he seems to suggest, a stress on the conformity of conscience to moral 
principles and norms. He argues that even though moral principles and norms play a significant 
role in understanding conscience, there are other subjective considerations that impinge upon the 
decisions of conscience that ought to be given due consideration. In his view, “the objective and 
subjective poles of human and Christian morality” converge on conscience and have significant 
impact on our moral decisions. He examines four possible consciences: the “sincere and true,” 
the “insincere and erroneous,” the “insincere and true,” and the “sincere but erroneous.”385  
In exploring the relationship between the subjective and objective poles of conscience in 
these different possible qualities of conscience, he points out how even the “tradition” supports 
giving some “primacy to the subjective pole of conscience over the objective” pole.386 He traces 
the idea of syneidesis (as distinct from synderesis) to Paul’s understanding of the “heart” that 
became identified with the “remorse of conscience.” Catholic and Protestant traditions call this 
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antecedent and/or consequent conscience respectively. The former stresses the “legislative 
aspect” (objective pole), and the latter the “juridical aspect.”  
He notes the distinction scholastics made between syneidesis and synderesis - the former 
is the “judgment act” of conscience, the latter is the “element of the soul that makes us feel our 
sinfulness and corrects the other elements when they err.”387 According to him, Aquinas view of 
synderesis is that it is “a habit of practical reason by which one knows the first principles of 
natural law, and conscience as the act of applying the first principles known in synderesis to 
conduct.”388 He insists that it was the manualists that put a stress on the legal model where the 
judgment of conscience was virtually reduced to the conclusions deduced from the general 
principles and norms known by synderesis. However, they also made provisions for a non-
deductive alternative approach: what he called “connatural” approach to knowledge that the 
manualists left undeveloped. This is his point of departure in articulating a “holistic” model of 
conscience.  
The “holistic” model is his attempt to bring the “object” and “subject” poles of 
conscience together in decision-making but with a priority given to the “subject pole.”389 While 
the object pole is the “concrete reality involved in the decision making process,” the subject pole 
is the personal aspects of the agent making the decision (this involves all dimensions of his 
personhood: cognitive ability, affective and emotive aspects, and circumstances). What he claims 
as the priority of the subject is articulated in this way: 
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In moral decision making the subject pole and the object pole come together, but the 
subject pole makes decisions in many ways depending on how reason, grace, emotion, 
and one’s intuition are involved in the judgments of conscience. In making conscience 
judgments individuals will at times apply principles or norms to particular questions. In 
this context, reason functions in a discursive way.
390
  
 
His elaboration, apart from admitting the role of grace, gives a special role to prudence which he 
argues ought to “be rooted in the total person and modified by all the virtues of the good 
Christian.”391 It involves discernment as an aspect that is not merely intellectual but creative and 
imaginative. It involves an attention to the affective and emotional dimensions. And it is 
attentive to the intuitive aspect of the moral subject. He submits that conscience uses reason in 
“at least three different ways – a discursive deductive way, a connatural way, and a discerning 
and prudential way.”392 What is not clear in his analyses is how these come together in specific 
moral decisions. The distinction he tries to make between the object and subject poles becomes 
lost in the maize of explanations and examples. He set out to make a “systematic” development 
of the holistic model, but ended creating the impression that there is utter confusion in the mind 
of the moral subject. Of course he affirms this complexity:  
The holistic understanding of conscience proposed recognizes the complexity and manifold 
aspects of decision making. As significant differences also exist with regard to the object of our 
decision making, the process of our decision making is somewhat different in different contexts. 
Judgments about a marriage partner, a vocation to be or do a certain thing, whether or not to 
move to another city or to take a difficult job, differ from judgments about whether the country 
should have an all-volunteer army or the feasibility of nuclear power plants. More personal 
decisions will obviously take into account the particularities of the person; decisions on social 
issues require knowledge of all the data involved in community decisions and rely less on the 
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particularity of the person. Thus, not all judgments of conscience proceed in the same way but are 
somewhat determined by the matter under consideration.
393
  
 
William C. Spohn describes conscience as “the still small voice that makes you feel smaller 
still” and would maintain that there is no “precise definition” for conscience (like rationality, 
emotion, choice).
394
 He however adopts Sidney Callahan’s definition: “Conscience is a personal, 
self-conscious activity integrating reason, emotion, and will in self-committed decisions about 
right and wrong, good and evil.”395 He places emphasis on “anterior conscience” which describes 
the role of conscience in deliberation before a moral decision. For him, Conscience is a human 
way of “assessing and judging and not the authoritative voice of God.” Conscience is neither a 
“direct dictation” from God nor “merely a social construction.”  Just as it is distinct from God’s 
voice, though it could gain resonance from it, so also it rises above the inadequacies and 
pretensions of social institutions and as such differentiated from it. However, con-science implies 
a knowledge that is “self-reflexive and socially connected, knowing that is accountable to my 
deepest self, to human communities, and ultimately to God.”396 There is “mutual accountability” 
that comes with living in community – shared standards, visions, and goals. But these need 
discerning in the light of truth known in one’s heart and before God.  
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 He asserts that conscience is not a faculty but rather an integral mental operation that 
begins in “initial sensitivity to moral salience and moves to conscious empathy.”397 The process 
of deliberation is obviously complex:  
Mulling its options, conscience engages in “crosschecking” of critical thought, empirical 
possibilities, affective valence, imaginatively grasped analogies, intuitive insight, and social 
collaboration. Reason tutors emotion and emotion instructs reason; intuition is measured against 
remembered experience; imagination projects possible scenarios that are evaluated by affective 
resonance and critical reflection. All of these operations lead up to the act of making a moral 
judgment with as much freedom and commitment as we can muster. No amount of elaborate 
crosschecking can manufacture self-commitment. Finally, conscience produces more than 
individual decisions; it enters into the self-constitution of the person over time. Moral choices 
shape the character of the one who makes them insofar as they integrate personal character or 
retard moral development. We become what we do.
398
   
 
It is critical to note the stress above for we shall return to it. Conscience does shape our character 
over time as it guides our choices and decisions. He adopts Timothy O’Connell’s 
characterization of conscience as capacity, process, and judgment. It is a “capacity” to 
distinguish right and wrong and is the basis for universal morality. As a “process” it discerns 
what constitutes right action in unique concrete situations. The skill one brings to this exercise 
depends on personal experience, social consciousness, personal habits, and maturity.
399
 The 
“judgment” of conscience seeks to achieve “reflective equilibrium of reason, intuition, and 
emotion,”400 such that we are obliged to obey that decision even if it is objectively erroneous for 
that would “violate our personal integrity”. He distinguished “reflecting well” and “acting well.” 
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The latter calls for virtues like “resoluteness, courage, persistence and passionate attachment to 
the moral good.”401 He argues for the need to be willing to review the process of deliberation that 
led to our decisions especially if this is could harm others or questionable.  
 Spohn holds that “conscience relies on the quality of the moral group to which we 
belong.” 402He agrees that values are transmitted through socialization (better in groups than one-
on-one). Values are instilled through repetition and reinforcement in the larger society beyond 
the family. Therefore, moral neutrality either in families and other institutions is perhaps the 
greatest disservice to the moral development of our young. Conscience development is stalled or 
“dulled” if adequate vocabulary are not provided to the young or “dumbed down” into that self-
interest, or “desensitized” by unsavory images streaming through the media.  
 He makes a critique of moral development theories from Freud to Kohlberg. He 
particularly thinks that American moral development theory is built on Kohlberg’s and Gilligan, 
with little attention to their significant inadequacies. Kohlberg’s theory focuses on cognition 
perhaps because it was more measurable but at the detriment of the dimensions of emotion, 
intuition, and imagination. Gilligan’s assumptions regarding a distinctive feminine approach to 
morality is neither corroborated by empirical data except otherwise than claimed, nor 
philosophically justifiable. He concludes with examining the value of virtue ethics as “practices” 
that shape our life from the inside beyond the claims of psychological theories to a focus on adult 
formation that is ever ongoing within a community of shared values or belief system (with a 
stress on the Christian tradition).    
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Walter E. Conn presented a view of conscience that links the need to know with a desire to act 
– and to act knowingly (rightly) as a goal (an end). The same intuition that propel us to self-
transcend to affirm the true, propel us to act truly (even at a detriment to self). Conscience is at 
the core of the self-transcending progression. The spirit that cognitively seeks for meaning and 
inquires for truth transforms at the level of moral consciousness into a spirit searching for value 
and demands “self-consistency in knowing and in doing.”403 He defines conscience specifically 
as “the exigency to make our doing consistent with our knowing,” or “the morally conscious self 
in its drive to go beyond itself,” and more generally, as “the morally conscious self-evaluating, 
deliberating, deciding in response to the drive of its spirit for self-transcendence in the realization 
of value.”404  
He argues with Bernard Lonergan that this drive is for a “transcendental notion of value” 
that permeates the whole person and “apprehended in feelings.”405 He adopts Lonergan’s 
“transcendentals” as “the dynamic ground for questioning” in our search for the intelligible, the 
true, and the good. They are “transcendental notions” because they are beyond any particular 
area of questioning (What is it? Is it so? What must I do about it?). In practical reflection, we 
move from questions of fact to that of value and then to possible action as an effort to realize that 
value. In our effort to understand (what is it?) we encounter the transcendental notion of 
intelligibility which transforms to that being (is it really so?) and on to that of value (intention or 
desire for the really good) that lead us to a quest for its realization. He argues that success in this 
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drive for value is a happy conscience and failure is a sad conscience.  Though the self is at the 
center of each drive for self-transcendence, but it is at higher levels of moral consciousness that 
its significance is more pronounced. My conscience becomes identified with my consciousness: 
“I am my moral consciousness, my conscience.”406 To question then my moral consciousness or 
conscience is to question my sense of responsibility and an “attack” on my person, my 
authenticity, my integrity, my self-worth.  
He argues that this “drive for self-transcendence is affective at its very core.”407He 
affirms with Lonergan that “our feelings – joys and sorrows, fears and desires – give our 
intentional consciousness its mass and momentum, its drive and power.”408 He holds that at the 
fourth level of moral consciousness (deliberation and evaluation) or at the intersection between 
judgment of fact and value we have “an apprehension of value”. In other words, “we grasp value 
through feelings themselves”.409 He argues in line with Lonergan that “feelings are the source of 
values” but given that they are ambiguous, they need to be discerned. If feelings respond to 
value, they could move us towards self-transcendence. Some feelings are so strong that they 
determine the direction of life by shaping our “horizons" or the stance we take in life. Feelings 
are open to development, reinforced by approval or disapproval and given the critical value of 
feeling in moral consciousness, “enriching, refining, and pruning our feelings is the heart of 
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moral education.”410 Finally he examined the structure of the human good. The ultimate aim in 
our quest for value is its realization – what he calls terminal value. As individuals we seek our 
goals through particular goods and as person living with others, we cooperate with other to 
achieve common goods of order. Conscience is the exigency for a self-transcending drive in the 
realization of value. Given the claim of centrality of feelings in moral consciousness, we need to 
examine further the role of feelings in human behavior. 
2.3 Conscience: The Role of Feelings in Moral Behavior  
There is an obvious attempt in recent theological literature (as seen above) to integrate the role of 
feelings in our understanding of conscience. This is refreshing because, Sidney Callahan rightly 
observes the prevalence of “the automatic dismissal and neglect of emotion” in Western moral 
tradition.
411
 Charles Curran, William Spohn, Richard Gula, Walter Conn, among others, all agree 
on the need to integrate the aspect of feeling to our understanding of conscience. We shall revisit 
Callahan on this topic but let us first hear Gula again to underscore the need for this section:   
Conscience includes not only cognitive and volitional aspects, but also affective, intuitive, and 
somatic ones as well. We understand the moral conscience holistically as an expression of the 
whole self as a thinking, feeling, intuiting, and willing person. Conscience is the whole person’s 
commitment to value and the judgment one makes in the light of that commitment of who one 
ought to be and what one ought to do or not do.
412
  
 
We agree with the authors that have expressed the need for a holistic model of conscience – a 
model that takes cognizance of the “affective, intuitive and somatic” dimensions of our 
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personhood. They also see conscience as setting “the boundary for acting with integrity, or 
sincerity of heart.”413 It is not merely our “rationality” but also our “moral sensitivity” that sets 
us apart from other animals like the well-organized and socialized cousins, the chimps. Sidney 
Callahan stresses that “wholehearted commitment to the good and right is what distinguishes 
moral decisions of conscience from other kinds of decisions.”414 He devotes some space to 
addressing the “importance of emotions to a sense of self,” what he calls the “emotive bedrock of 
self-consciousness that constitutes the self.”415 He laments the “suspicion” that attends to the idea 
of “emotion” in Western intellectual history (from Plato to the present). While he identifies the 
“heart” as the metaphorical home of emotions/ feelings, however, he observes that emotion is 
often dismissed as “dangerous” and “irrational” as contrasted to the “mind” the metaphoric seat 
of rationality, and even links it to gender differentiation.
416
 This bifurcation between mind and 
heart has created a major problem for Western morality for it creates an internal difficulty in 
ascribing value or significance to emotions, or the “heart” in decision making. This anomaly is 
now in need of urgent attention because the reality is that the “heart” is more significant to 
determining our behavior than we ordinarily admit. Of course those who hold this view (or 
anything like it) have in the past been criticized for “endorsing romantic irrationality.”417 
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Callahan cites Dostoevsky who wrote in his notebook referring to a botched assassination 
attempt by a Russian terrorist in1878 that: 
What is moral is not completely decided by the simple concept of consistency with one’s 
conviction, because sometimes it is more moral not to follow one’s convictions…one stops short, 
because of some feeling, and does not complete the act. One curses oneself and feels contempt, 
but feeling, that is, conscience, prevents one from completing the act.
418
 
According to Callahan, Dostoevsky not only identifies conscience with feeling but considers a 
powerful emotion or feeling could inhibit an action on the scale of an assassination attempt. 
Uncovering how to develop such “feelings” among current terrorists will certainly attract huge 
investment. Perhaps this is the reason for a renewed interest in conscience. Nevertheless, 
Callahan is privy to Milan Kundera’s caveat on elevating feelings to the level of “value and 
truth” given the inherent dangers of national sentiments or patriotism (“love”) used as 
justification for great atrocities.
419
 Of course this constitutes a core objection to emotions being 
used to justify actions. It is considered unpredictable, and irrational. Negative emotions leads to 
crimes and other atrocities, positive emotions give rise to “mistaken sacrifices and misguided 
altruism.”420 Emotion not only beclouds reason but actually hinders our commitment to universal 
norms of justice. St. Ignatius and Kant built moral traditions on the repudiation of emotions and 
inclinations. Kant’s extreme view of inclinations (emotions, intuitions, passions) as lacking 
moral value is best captured below in his argument regarding the command to love:   
Undoubtedly in this way also are to be understood those passages of scripture which command us 
to love our neighbor and even our enemy. For love as an inclination cannot be commanded; but 
beneficence from duty, when no inclination impels us and even when a natural and 
unconquerable aversion opposes such beneficence, is practical, and not pathological, love. Such 
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love resides in the will and not in the propensities of feeling, in the principles of action and not in 
the tender sympathy; and only this practical love that can be commanded.
421
   
Callahan notes that currently ethicists and philosophers maintain the view that sentiments should 
not be admitted to moral reasoning except with extreme suspicion and even with rigorous 
analysis they should always be under “careful rational superintendency.”422 We do not object to 
this caveat in relation to emotions. But Callahan argues that the suspicion and subsequent 
rejection of emotion in moral valuation is hinged on false presuppositions:  
Unfortunately, modern moralists’ suspicions of emotion are based upon a particular psychological 
model of human functioning that has not changed much over the past centuries. There is an 
assumption, first, that reasoning can be thoroughly detached from emotion; second, that only 
detached reasoning will be reliably objective; and third, that emotions will only bias, cloud, and 
impede moral decision making. Recent psychological approaches to reason, emotion, and their 
interactions cast doubt on these presuppositions.
423
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around through his generosity, but rather, it is the one who contrary to his inclinations, acts beneficently as a duty. 
Even though preservation of life is a duty we all owe ourselves, but this act is amoral due to the inclination to it. 
This basic principle could be used to clarify the “moral worth” of other virtues. He thus distinguishes “practical 
love” and “pathological love” (as above) to make the same point.  
422 Callahan, ibid. p. 99 
423 Callahan, ibid, p. 99 
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Callahan points to new studies on human consciousness that support his claim. He argues that 
studies indicate consciousness is “colored” or “charged” or “heated by” feeling to distinguish the 
depths of its intensity and identity with the subject.
424
 He observes that “hot cognitions” is 
another name for emotions because they “move us, they press, they motivate.”425  Daniel 
Goleman underscores this point in the current edition of his book, Emotional Intelligence:  
The view of human nature that ignores the power of emotions is sadly shortsighted. The very 
name Homo sapiens, the thinking species, is misleading in light of the new appreciation and 
vision of the place of emotions in our lives that science now offers. As we all know from 
experience, when it comes to shaping our decisions and our actions, feeling counts every bit as 
much— and often more— than thought.
426
 
Emotions are considered the “primary motivating system for all activity” adapted for human 
survival such that they “infuse cognitive processing with subjective meaning;” and, for the 
specific goals of this research, it “makes empathy possible”427and ensures we “feel guilt” for 
behaving in an inappropriate manner. Moreover, when our cognition is “charged” with feeling, 
we own our actions, are personally involved rather than indifferent or apathetic, but committed 
or invested in our action. It is then possible to argue that feelings not only imbue our actions with 
meaning but the capacity to “feel” is crucial to our sense of being “human.” Imagine living with 
someone who neither laughs, feels excited about anything, nor shows a sense of fear, joy, or any 
                                               
424 Callahan, ibid, p. 100 He claims that “hotter consciousness” implies a closer affinity to the center of self. He links 
the “qualitative difference in consciousness” to an “activation of limbic system” (brain pathway) involving 
biochemical reactions and other physiological changes (face and muscular reactions may occur).  
425 Nico H. Frijda, “The Laws of Emotion,” in American Psychologist, Vol. 43, no. 5:351 cited by Callahan, ibid.  
426 Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: 10th Anniversary Edition (Kindle edition: Random House, 2012), pp. 4-
5. He says, “I take emotion to refer to a feeling and its distinctive thoughts, psychological and biological states, and 
range of propensities to act. There are hundreds of emotions, along with their blends, variations, mutations, and 
nuances.” He went on to list eight primary emotions and their variations (fear, anger, sadness, enjoyment, love, 
surprise, disgust, shame). See Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: 10th Anniversary Edition, Ibid. p. 287.  
427 Callahan, ibid  
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emotion. At some point you will begin to doubt if the person is really human. How would you 
even relate to the person since “relationship” has more to do with feeling than with thinking.  
A distinction is made between positive and negative emotions to show how the former 
“moves” one towards its objects and the latter “moves” one away from it. If we love somebody 
or something, we are drawn towards the object of our love and vice versa. The fact is emotion 
“induces” movement.428 The notion of being “drawn” describes not merely an attraction, but is 
basic to the “movement” or motivation (including physical movement) towards that object and 
extends even to the effort to protect and preserve that which we love. Conversely, when we hate 
something or someone, we “withdraw” or tend to avoid the object of our hatred. The notion of 
“withdrawal” is basic to other emotions that “hatred” elicits and extends to the desire or effort to 
eliminate or destroy that which we hate. We have all experienced both emotions and they help us 
understand how emotions are said to be “movers” or significant influences to our actions or 
behaviors. Political campaign and consumer product ads industry is built totally on the premise 
that emotions do significantly influence our actions. They appeal to our emotions than to reason.   
 Moreover, current research shows the integral relations between thought and feelings 
such that pure thought without the feeling component makes our cognitive experience barren of 
meaning.
429
 This is proven in cases of persons suffering from alexithymia, the incapacity to 
express feelings as a result of a dysfunction of the amygdala.
430
 An example is Gary. He has a 
                                               
428 Callahan, Op. Cit. p. 102 
429 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p.13 
430 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 15 and 50 He adds: “The amygdala acts as a storehouse of emotional 
memory, and thus of significance itself; life without the amygdala is a life stripped of personal meanings. More than 
affection is tied to the amygdala; all passion depends on it.” Ibid., p. 15  
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high IQ, cognitively brilliant, but was “emotionally blind” because he experiences “no angers, no 
sadnesses, no joys.”431  Theorists like Goleman argue that, “our feelings have a mind of their 
own;” sometimes they could act independently of our rational mind.432However, it is preferred 
that they work together for a healthy human functioning. He puts it this way:  
The connections between the amygdala (and related limbic structures) and the neocortex are the 
hub of the battles or cooperative treaties struck between head and heart, thought and feeling. This 
circuitry explains why emotion is so crucial to effective thought, both in making wise decisions 
and in simply allowing us to think clearly….Consider, too, the role of emotions in even the most 
“rational” decision-making. In work with far-reaching implications for understanding mental life, 
Dr. Antonio Damasio, a neurologist at the University of Iowa College of Medicine, has made 
careful studies of what is impaired in patients with damage to the prefrontal-amygdala circuit. 
Their decision-making is terribly flawed— and yet they show no deterioration at all in IQ or any 
cognitive ability. Despite their intact intelligence, they make disastrous choices in business and 
their personal lives…433 
 
Insights from researches like Damasio’s has given rise to opinions that “emotional intelligence” 
is an area critically needing development as that of cognition.
434
 We note however that tracing 
emotions to the amygdala and its limbic circuits does not imply emotions are merely 
“physically” circumscribed. As brain processes are said to constitute the matter but not the form 
of consciousness, so also the material processes within and around the amygdala constitute the 
matter and not the form of feeling. However, if the matter is impaired, the form will be distorted. 
Therefore, injury to the amygdala results in impairment of certain emotions that it serves as a 
                                               
431 Ibid   
432 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 20; Callahan cites those who hold that there is a “rational non-conscious 
mind operating below awareness” that induces us to emotional reaction. Goleman addresses this point. See Richard 
Lazarus, “Thoughts on the Relations between Emotion and Cognition,” in Scherer and Ekman, Approaches to 
Emotion, 247-57; Howard Leventhal, “A Perceptual Motor Theory of Emotion,” in Scherer and Erkman, 
Approaches to Emotion, 271-91.  
433 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 27-28 
434 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence,  
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conduit. Its role is primarily instrumental analogous to the role of wires for electricity. As our 
brain matter is not our thoughts, so amygdala is not our feelings. The “form” our thoughts or 
feelings take depends on other variables. In both cases, the moral quality of our thoughts and/or 
feelings is its direct link with conscience.  
We agree with Callahan’s observation that psychological work on emotion is very new 
and therefore yet to be integrated into philosophical and theological reflections.
435
 Part of the 
contribution of this research is to highlight the need to develop further the link between 
conscience and feeling. We strongly affirm that “feeling” is to conscience what “logic” is to 
reason. This view does not undermine the fact that conscience involves the application of reason. 
However, our experience shows that the “force” of conscience has little to do with reason or 
logic but everything to do with feeling. We do not mean here the authority of conscience as the 
absolute norm of subjective morality, but rather its “persuasive influence” or “power” over our 
actions and behavior.  We consider this a significant distinction if we are to understand the 
influence of conscience on human behavior.  
Conscience is often considered “impotent” in influencing behavior precisely because of 
the “impotency of reason”436 in influencing behavior. However, if the subtle but powerful 
influence of feelings on our behavior, as noted above, is taken into account, the conclusion will 
be different. Conscience is associated with all the emotions Goleman noted above: fear, anger, 
                                               
435 Callahan, Op. Cit. p. 95 
436 David Hume was the first to articulate this “impotency” in his Treatise on Human Nature, London: John Noon, 
1739, reprinted in Morality and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics Through Classical Sources, edited by 
Robert C. Solomon and Cancy C. Martin (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 2004, p. 206-220. 
 
170 
 
sadness, enjoyment, love, surprise, disgust, shame but it is often identified with fear and shame 
and only negatively so. But the multiple influence of conscience on our behaviors involves the 
emotions of fear, anger, sadness, joy, empathy, and shame.  Our capacity to feel these emotions 
in relation to morally distinct actions is at the heart of our character formation. It is a healthy part 
of socialization that citizens have a healthy “fear” of contravening the law. Lack of “fear” for the 
law is part of the symptoms that describe psychopaths and deviants. That fear acts as an “internal 
sanctions” along with the feeling of shame and/or guilt that are the consequences of acting 
contrary to acceptable behavior. We feel sad when we are remorseful of our acts. Inability to feel 
fear, shame, guilt, or sad has far reaching implication not just on our behavior patterns but on 
who we become. Psychopaths do not feel these emotions because they either have no functional 
conscience or more appropriately, because the “feeling aspect” of conscience is undeveloped. 
They lack “empathy” for the same reasons. Obviously this needs further study. We shall examine 
shame and guilt in the next section. But before we do, let us highlight certain insights that could 
help in the philosophical development of the link between conscience and feeling.  
We all know what it feels like to be “disappointed,” or feel “dissatisfied” with someone 
or something. Perhaps we know how the hunger for pleasure, the feeling of loss, the desire to 
know the truth or to avoid embarrassment could drive our actions in different directions. Are 
these not natural propensities or inclinations in us?  
 The fulcrum upon which Aquinas theory of natural law and of the virtues (and by 
implication, his moral theory) revolves is around his idea of “natural inclinations” (such 
inclinations like the desire to live, to avoid pain, to desire the good, to know the truth, to enjoy 
171 
 
beauty, among others).
437
 It is not only that these inclinations reveal to us the law of nature, but 
also that they are inclined to obey reason. However, in our fallen state, there is a disorder in our 
inner constitution such that our inclinations could revolt against reason. The idea of a virtuous 
life is to alert us of the need to live an ordered life – a life “in accord with reason”. And he 
defines moral virtue as “a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man 
would appoint it.”438 We have seen above how these virtues are under the guidance of prudence, 
and conscience is itself like a lamp for prudence. There cannot be a functional virtue of prudence 
without an active conscience. They are mutually complementary; while conscience as “capacity” 
(synderesis) holds priority of place, conscience as “process” is often identified with the role of 
prudence. The role of conscience as judge (accusing) often leaves us with a feeling of 
inadequacy, feelings of shame and guilt.  These feelings are now considered by some 
psychologists as a necessary part of healthy development.
439
      
Though Aquinas’ theory of action is essentially intellectual, but it admits of the role of feelings 
in moving the will. He admits explicitly that the “lower appetite” (our passions) could move the 
will even necessarily depending on the hold it has on reason.  
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of 
reason retains, to a certain extent its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a 
certain degree. Accordingly, in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, 
the will’s movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion 
                                               
437 John Paul II affirms that "natural inclinations do not acquire a moral quality, except insofar as they are connected 
to the human person and to his authentic realization." See Veritatis splendor, Ibid. n. 50.  
438 Aquinas, S. T. I-II, Q. 59, a. 1 The stress is his, and he is here quoting Aristotle’s definition of it in Ethics, ii. 6.  
439 See M. L. Hoffman, “Affect and Moral Development,” in New Directions for Child Development 16, ed. D. 
Cicchetti and P. Hesse (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982). M. Kaufman, The Brain in the News, November 12, 
1999 (Vol. 6, No. 19). Washington, D.C.: The Dana Press, cited by Michael J. Boivin, “Feeling Humans and Social 
Animals: Theological Consideration for an Evolutionary Account of Human Emotion,” in Journal of Psychology 
and Theology, Vol. 29: 4 (2001): 314+;  
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inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and passion holds 
its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
440
  
Aquinas is a student of Aristotle on this point. Aristotle holds that “mind and appetite” together 
can originate local movement.
441
 Our experience and research concur on the influence of 
passions and sentiments on behavior.
442
This only confirms what philosophers like Hume 
affirmed long ago but was highly criticized for asserting that reason is a slave to the passions.
443
 
He identified social consensus (“agreeableness and approval”), happiness, and utility as 
underlying principles for moral action, but eventually reduces all these to an ultimate universal 
principle: what he identifies as the “social sympathy in human nature” as constituting the “end 
                                               
440 Aquinas, S.T. I-II, Q. 10, a. 3 
441 Aristotle asserts in De Anima that, “Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, mind and 
appetite: 1. Mind, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in 
the character of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that which is the object of 
appetite is the stimulant of mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the 
action. It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e. appetite and 
practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, 
the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation. So too when imagination originates movement, it 
necessarily involves appetite.” BK. III, chapter 10, 433a, 17-20.  
442 See, Michael J. Boivin, “Feeling Humans and Social Animals: Theological Consideration for an Evolutionary 
Account of Human Emotion” Ibid.; A. R. Damasio, The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of 
consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999); M. L. Hoffman, “Affect and Moral Development,” in New 
Directions for Child Development 16, ed. D. Cicchetti and P. Hesse (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982).  
443 David Hume, in his A Treatise on Human Nature asserts: “Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this 
agreement or disagreement is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now, it is 
evident that our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible to any such agreement or disagreement; being 
original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and 
actions. It is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or 
conformable to reason. This argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. For it proves directly that 
actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it proves 
the same truth indirectly, by showing us that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by 
contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which are found to have that 
influence. Actions maybe laudable or blamable, but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable: laudable or 
blamable, therefore, are not the same as reasonable or unreasonable. The merit and demerit of actions frequently 
contradict, and sometimes control our natural propensities. But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, 
therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a 
principle as conscience, or a sense of morals”.443 The latter stress is ours. See Treatise on Human Nature, London: 
John Noon, 1739, reprinted in Morality and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics Through Classical Sources, 
edited by Robert C. Solomon and Cancy C. Martin (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 2004, p. 206-220. 
173 
 
(and beginning)” of all ethical inquiry.444 He considers reason as “inactive” in influencing moral 
behavior as such if contrasted to conscience (“a sense of morals”) that is dynamic.  He insists 
that morality is not an object of reason but of feeling or sentiment (emotion or passion).  
But can there be any difficulty in proving that vice and virtue are not matters of fact whose 
existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allowed to be vicious – willful murder, for 
instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact or real existence 
which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, 
volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, 
as long as you consider the object. You never find it till you turn your reflection into your own 
breast and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you towards this action. Here is a 
matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So 
when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the 
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of 
it.
445
  
Despite the many objections one could level against Hume’s views above, the insight he leaves 
us with is the central place he gives to feelings in his moral theory. He underscores this “feeling” 
as part of our natural constitution; he equates it with “conscience” or “a sense of morals” that 
finds its origin in “social sympathy” (as a necessity consequence of living with others).  
While Aquinas could be used to correct Hume based on the idea of virtues that reigns-in the 
unruly passions, it does not diminish the import of his insight. However, “passions” here are not 
to be understood wholly negatively. Aquinas affirms that “the passions, considered in 
themselves, are referable both to good and to evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord 
with reason.”446 Hence, it includes empathy, fear, and other emotions we listed above. 
                                               
444 This adapts the summary critique offered by Robert C. Solomon and Cancy C. Martin, Morality and the Good 
Life: An Introduction to Ethics Through Classical Sources, edited by Robert C. Solomon and Cancy C. Martin (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Company, 2004, pp.205-6. 
445 Hume, Ibid, p. 211 
446 Aquinas, S.T. I-II, Q. 59, a.1  
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 J.S. Mill is another eminent philosopher that considers feelings as central to both the 
notion and power of conscience to influence actions.
447
 He says:  
This feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not 
with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the 
essence of conscience, though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the 
simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations derived from 
sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all forms of religious feeling; from 
the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the 
esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement…Its binding force, however, 
consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do 
what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, 
will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory 
we have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it.
448
  
 
Again, there are several possible objections to Mill’s views on the origin and nature of the 
phenomenon of conscience, but we have to concede to him that “its binding force” consists in the 
“mass of feelings” associated with its presence.  Now, “binding force” here is not about the 
authority of conscience (as subjective norm of morality) but about its capacity to influence our 
actions. In the next segment we shall distinguish between the neurotic and normal feelings (of 
                                               
447 J. S. Mill conceives Conscience as an “internal sanction of duty” that could be identified as “a feeling in our 
mind” in form of pain following upon a violation of duty and in some serious cases could force us to desist from a 
certain act. Mill admits that this “ultimate sanction” of morality is a subjective standard for each particular act – “a 
conscientious feeling of mankind.” He however affirms that this internal sanction has no binding force on those who 
do not possess this feeling and neither would any form of morality have a hold on them except through external 
sanctions. He points to experience as proof to the force of this feeling on those cultivated in it. He proposes the 
cultivation of conscience based on principles of utility. This supports his view that external sanctions complements 
and consolidates internal sanctions. He disregards the question of whether our feeling of duty is innate or acquired 
but affirms that the “regard for the pleasure and pains of others” should constitute an innate component if such is 
possible. However, he asserts that even if “moral feelings” are rather acquired than innate, it does not make it any 
less natural than speech or reason are “natural” to man. Like these faculties, the moral feelings, if not natural, can 
like them be developed over time to a high degree such that it becomes spontaneous like speech or reasoning. We 
are inclined to agree with this line of reasoning and it supports a primary argument we shall be making in 
subsequent chapters that proper formation of conscience and character is community based. See, J.S. Mill, 
Utilitarianism, edited by George Sher, Hacket Publishing Company, Inc. In Morality and the Good Life (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2004, pp. 315-351. The stresses are ours.  
448 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Ibid., p. 340-341 
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guilt) that affirms the presence of an active conscience. Frederick Nietzsche built his theory of 
conscience on “neurotic guilt”. Though he concedes the power of “feelings” associated with 
conscience, calls it the “dominant instinct” but he eventually reduces it to feelings of guilt (a 
neurotic guilt) which is nothing but internalized desire for self-flagellation. He therefore reduces 
all of conscience to “bad conscience” that we must rid ourselves of in our development.449 He 
and Freud agree on this and probably helped to usher in the age that views conscience as a 
psychical baggage that needs trashing.  
 Part of the reason conscience was rejected in the last century up-till now stems from a 
reduction of all feelings associated with conscience to guilt, and particularly to neurotic guilt. We 
have underscored the fact that not every feelings associated with conscience is about guilt. 
Conscience provides us with good feelings about our self-worth and dignity. It promotes our 
self-esteem by praising us when we do something good. It encourages us to strive towards 
realizing our ideal self. It encourages by counseling us about the value inherent in promoting the 
goods of community and thereby promoting good relationships in society. Charles M. Shelton 
identifies “seven dimensions of conscience” (adaptive psychic energy, healthy defensive 
functioning, guilt, idealization, empathy, self-esteem, teleology)
450
that provides a deeper 
understanding of the different roles of conscience in our development.   
                                               
449 Nietzsche asserts, “This instinct for freedom forcibly made latent – we have seen it already – this instinct for 
freedom pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: 
that, and that alone, is what a bad conscience is in its beginnings.” See Geneology of Morals, p. 87.  
450 Charles M. Shelton, Morality of the Heart, p. 90-91. He argues that “adaptive psychic energy” is the 
“psychological fuel” for healthy development. Conscience helps us spend this fuel wisely. Healthy defensive 
functioning is necessary for proper navigation of complex life situations – sublimation and altruism are mechanisms 
of conscience for healthy adaptation. Guilt, if unhealthy, is crippling; but guilt in itself is “integral for healthy 
conscience functioning” and is “vital to moral growth.” Idealization is a critical aspect of conscience that pumps our 
hopes and dreams towards ideals and help actualize our potentials by “framing metaquestions” like, “what do I 
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The critical point we need to highlight is that often conscience is understood as not 
influencing behavior because our emphasis its cognitive aspect – the discerning of right and 
wrong. People who do not care about right and wrong do not have to border about what their 
conscience says.
451
 This is the reason for denying conscience influence in our behavior. But 
beyond this role, conscience’s most significant influence on our behavior is more subtle because 
a part of it is embedded in the sub-conscious (as internalized values), as part of who we have 
become, our sense of selfhood and self-worth, our dignity, our name, is more a feeling-we-feel 
than a thing-we-know. As such, its influence on our choices and actions are not just significant 
but superlatively so. It is not by accident that many philosophers came to the same conclusion 
that “social sympathy” is the primordial basis for morality. It is the same intuition that compels 
some traditions (including the Biblical tradition as noted earlier in this segment) to relate 
conscience to the “heart.” In many traditions (including Africa as we shall see) the “heart” is the 
seat of feelings and all that is good about the whole human person. The heart is the seat of 
conscience in these traditions because they conceive “conscience” as the soul of the human heart 
– that which provides it with its essential quality – the capacity to feel. Therefore, to be 
“hardhearted” is to have no feeling, and no conscience.  
                                                                                                                                                       
dream for?” “what am I becoming?” Empathy is critical for responding to life situations and for bonding 
indispensable for shared experience and moral growth. Self-esteem is a sense of inner worthiness or goodness that is 
essential for inner scrutiny and growth. Teleology provides us with the reason for doing anything. This “telic 
dimension” is a pivotal role of dimension that challenges us to provide reason for what we do and ensures we are 
responsible in our actions.  
451 See Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (Kindle Edition: 
Guilford Press, 1999) Location, 904. Hare argues that conscience is an internal sanction without which external 
sanctions lose their power for as he puts it: “this inner voice and the internalized norms and rules of society act as an 
"inner policeman," regulating our behavior even in the absence of the many external controls, such as laws, our 
perceptions of what others expect of us, and real-life policemen.” Ibid  
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The only qualification that this study helps us now to make is that though “feeling” is as 
central to conscience as “deliberation” but just as not all deliberation involves conscience, not all 
feelings involves conscience as well. It is the moral quality of both the feeling and deliberation 
that distinguishes acts of conscience (both in feeling and cognition). And as we have seen above, 
it is more appropriate considering the two processes as integral to the one act of conscience even 
though they are distinguishable. A boy travels 5miles to fetch water for a poor childless widow 
before going to school each day. The deliberative process that led to the decision and action to 
fetch water for her is obviously distinct from the feeling of empathy that precedes and 
accompanies that deliberation. Experience tells us that it was more the feeling of empathy that 
motivated the boy’s action rather than the deliberative process. But taking the two inner 
processes as one composite process, integral to the external action makes it a wholesome human 
event – a dynamic psycho-physical event – involving mind and heart, body and spirit (the whole 
person in a single act of love). At the center of that event is the conscience. If it was not present, 
the beauty of this act of love will be lost to our world. That is the tragedy of the death of 
conscience, and every effort aimed at diminishing its development or formation is a fatal wound 
to the heart of human civic life in any culture.  
2.4.0  Shame and Guilt: Pathologies of Conscience  
Is it reasonable to argue that Philosophy and psychology seem to have conspired in Western 
scholarship, as the foregoing shows (via Freud and Nietzsche), to reduce the notion of 
conscience to a pathology?
452
 We have maintained that this reductionism misrepresents the facts 
                                               
452 We noted above how Nietzsche considers conscience a mal-adaptation; for him “bad conscience” (identified with 
the sense of guilt) is the result of a repressed need for self-flagellation. For Freud it is repressed “social angst” (part 
of which is “castration anxiety”).  
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in a reconstructed and holistic view of conscience. A holistic view of conscience is one that 
integrates thought processes and feeling in its conceptualization. It admits that the capacity for 
“feeling” is an essential part of a healthy development. Therefore, the capacity to feel shame and 
guilt constitutes part of healthy human development than otherwise.  
 Aristotle considered shame as a quasi-virtue.  He defined it as “a kind of fear of 
dishonor” that produces an effect similar to that evoked by “fear of danger.”453 It is rather a 
“feeling than a state of character.” He however argues that this “feeling” is normal for youth who 
need its restraint given their many errors. An older adult does not need this feeling precisely 
because “he should not do anything that need cause this sense.” His argument is that the adult 
“good man” should be so formed in virtue that the case does not arise that he performs a 
disgraceful act: for “it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action.” A 
“good man will never voluntarily do bad actions.” 454For him then, shame is a “conditional” 
good; it is an inner restraint for those not yet formed in virtue. But should a “good man” ever act 
contrary to good reason, “he will feel disgraced.”455 However shame is not a virtue as such.  
 John Rawls describes shame as the “feeling that someone has when he experiences an 
injury to his self-respect or suffers a blow to his self-esteem.”456 He makes a distinction between 
                                               
453 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, chapter 8 (1128b:10) in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard 
McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), p. 1001 
454 Aristotle, Ibid  
455 Aristotle, Ibid 
456 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 388. He defines 
“self-respect” as a primary good that includes “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his 
conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out…and implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it 
is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.” See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ibid. p.386  
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shame as natural and moral emotion.
457
 The former is a feeling of shame for personal defects or 
“blemishes in our person” (like physical features) or our acts that manifest such defects which 
we and other significant persons in our lives consider we are entitled to have.
458
 The latter is 
feeling shame for lacking certain moral qualities or “excellencies” (virtues) that one is expected 
to have (by self and others) depending on one’s “plan of life.” He holds that we feel shame 
“relative to our aspirations, to what we try to do and with whom we wish to associate.”459 We 
feel moral shame when if we lack requisite virtues for our chosen “plan of life”. Basically moral 
shame is the pain we feel for real or imagined loss of self-respect and/or the esteem of others 
given our life orientation. He distinguishes between shame and guilt
460
 but we prefer Martin 
Buber’s account of guilt because he distinguishes between “neurotic” and “existential guilt.”  
 Martin Buber argues that Freud and his psychoanalytic theory denied the “ontic 
character of guilt” but rather reduced its source to ancient and modern taboos – the fear of 
parental and society punishments. Guilt is reduced to a ‘need for punishment’ or “moral 
masochism” and finds support in the sadistic superego. 461As these external mechanisms of 
control is internalized morality is born and having conscience as its watchdog.  He then 
                                               
457 He says “shame springs from a feeling of diminishment of self” and distinguishes between shame and regret. The 
latter being a feeling of pain for the loss of any good but the former has a more “intimate” or special connection with 
our person and those upon whom we depend for affirmation of our self-worth.  
458 Rawls, ibid 
459 Rawls, ibid 
460 He argues that mere expectation of punishment may explain fear or anxiety but not guilt. Reference to harm or 
disadvantage that one experiences for past actions may explain “regret” but not guilt (not even remorse). He 
considers fear and anxiety that often accompany guilt as not “moral emotions”. A moral feeling is distinguished 
from natural emotions in that experiencing it “invokes a moral concept and its associated principles.” When we 
narrate its experience it is always in reference to an “acknowledged right or wrong.” Rawls, ibid. pp. 421-22   
461 Martin Buber, “Guilt and Guilt Feelings,” in Conscience: Theological and Psychological Perspectives, C. Ellis 
Nelson, ed. (New York: Newman Press, 1973), p. 225 
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distinguishes “neurotic guilt” from “existential guilt”. Neurotic guilt is that guilt feeling that has 
no basis for it; it is “groundless” as differentiated from “authentic guilt” (guilt feelings that are 
based on reality) finding intensification in “existential guilt” that arises as a consequence of our 
morally reprehensible actions in relationship with others.
462
 He argues that while therapists may 
tend to heal the “neurosis” of guilt, they cannot heal nor should they try to heal existential guilt 
for it falls beyond their practice. Existential guilt is the result of injuring the order of human 
relationships. It is only the person who inflicted that wound that can heal it.
463
 Guilt is then an 
essential part of human development for the proper ordering of human relations/society. Perhaps 
the distinctions made by E. M. Pattison provide even more clarity on the subject.  
E. M. Pattison distinguished four categories of guilt: 1. civil objective guilt; 2. 
Psychological subjective guilt-feelings; 3. Existential guilt; 4. Ontological guilt.
464
 Civil 
objective guilt is impersonal and may have no reference to objective norms of morality. A person 
may be convicted as objectively “guilty” of an “offense” like sheltering Jews who were being 
persecuted in a Nazi regime. Psychological subjective guilt feelings he argues to be “an affect” – 
“the subjective experience of internal condemnation of one’s superego.” According to him “guilt 
feelings” has no necessary link to either civil objective guilt or to the existential ego 
guilt.
465Existential ego guilt is “a violation of the relationship” and reflects a “denial” of one’s 
values and commitments to others for the sake of certain narcissistic advantages. He considers 
                                               
462 Buber, Ibid. pp. 229, 232 
463 Buber, ibid. p. 232 
464 E. Mansell Pattison, “The Development of Moral Values in Children,” in Conscience: Theological and 
Psychological Perspectives, C. Ellis Nelson, ed. (New York: Newman Press, 1973), p. 238-262 at 248 
465 E. M. Pattison, ibid. p. 248 
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this guilt as not a feeling but a situation.
 466
 He identifies “ontological guilt” with original sin – 
implying by this “man’s basic responsibility for his life and behavior.” He calls it a “situation, a 
reflection of man’s awareness of what he is.”467 This domain is not open to treatment by the 
psychotherapist.  He argues that psychotherapists have been trying to reduce guilt feelings while 
neglecting “existential guilt situation.”468  He considers morality less about “guilt feelings” than 
it is about existential guilt – our relationship commitments. He noted the conscious and 
unconscious dimensions of our choices as worthy of attention but maintains the reality of our 
freedom. He affirms we are “responsible for everything that we are and do” and distinguishes 
between superego moralism that degrades the self (makes it “feel” guilty) and ego morality that 
affirms the self as having integrity such that it admits its guilt (“I am guilty”).469  
Evidently, Pattison creates an unnecessary dichotomy between consciousness of guilt and 
its feeling. In an attempt to posit “objectivity” of “existential guilt” he neglects the fact that a 
cognitive understanding of guilt in this distinction is non-recognizable without its psychological 
component: the feeling aspect. But we agree with his conclusions: that instead of focusing on 
assuaging our “feelings” of guilt, to rather focus on its external causes – healing the rupture in 
the relationships we have commitments to; for as he argues, “[t]he resolution of guilt feelings 
does not change the basic violation of relationship which is existential guilt.”470 In other words, 
even if we manage to calm our feelings, the objective “guilt” of our reprehensible actions 
                                               
466 Pattison, ibid. pp. 248-9 
467 Pattison, ibid. p. 249 
468 Ibid 
469 Pattison, ibid. p. 251 
470 Pattison, ibid. p. 251 
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remains in need of healing. It is for this reason that some psychologists are now saying, if we 
hurt somebody, it is necessary that we “feel” guilt because it ensures we be careful next time.471 
To be insensitive to such feelings is not just abnormal but dangerous to human relationships and 
society.  
Hanna Arendt affirms that “the inability to feel moved” or an inability “to think from 
the standpoint of someone else” is itself pathological.472Steven J. Bartlett in his phenomenal 
study of human evil argues forcefully that what is needed to bridge the yawning gap between 
moral reasoning and moral action is an “affective cement” that bonds to efficaciousness.473 Part 
of the “affective cement” we need to change certain patterns of unhealthy behavior is a healthy 
“sense of guilt” for that behavior. Its intensity ensures a quicker transition to new behavior.   
The pathology associated with “guilt” is as a result of “neurotic guilt” (a guilt feeling that 
has no basis in reality, as noted above). Our experience with mentally sick people shows the 
reality of this form of guilt. Freud and Nietzsche however reduced all guilt feelings (of 
conscience) to “neurotic guilt” and thereby confused us by blurring the distinctions. Though 
Freud recognized the social value of “guilt” as an internalized mechanism for social order (in 
conformity to social demands based on fear of consequences should one act otherwise, a form of 
“civilized self-interest”), he still considers it a “repression” of personal instincts and desires that 
ought to be overcome as one matures. What Freud fails to realize is the integral nature of social 
                                               
471 Charles M. Shelton agrees that guilt is psychological tightrope because if experienced too intensely, it has a 
crippling effect but “to deny the experience of guilt deprives one of a naturally occurring psychic experience whose 
function nourishes sensitivity and altruistic response.”  See Morality of the Heart, p. 91.                                                                                                                                                               
472 Hanna Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), p. 64 
473 Steven J. Bartlett, The Pathology of Man: A Study on Human Evil (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas 
Publishers Ltd, 2005), p. 280  
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relationships for the realization of the goals of personhood. By viewing the individual as sharply 
distinct from the community, and whose goals are sharply or diametrically opposed to that of the 
community, he fails to realize that without the community to create the context for the realization 
of the goals of all, the individual will not exist as such. The formation of the individual to 
conform to the goals that foster community does not need to be interpreted as a “frustration” or 
“repression” of individual goals but a “growing up” to attain one’s fullest potentials.  Guilt in 
this dynamic is a vital form of growing up to one’s responsibility as a human person – someone 
that lives with others. Since we all live with others (in society) we therefore need to be capable 
of feeling guilt to be truly and fully human.  
2.5.0  Conscience Formation: The Significance of Perception of Moral Atmosphere 
In this research “moral atmosphere” describes the norms and values shared by a given 
community of agents (as family, group, or community). Therefore individual “perception” of 
“moral atmosphere” refers to knowledge of such norms and values by the individual agent. The 
moral quality of the “norms” and “values” are relative to the community’s universe of meaning 
but open to evaluation as to its objectivity. Kohlberg is credited to have first used this term to 
explain the link between individual competence in moral reasoning and behavior.
474
 An 
important distinction is that “moral atmosphere” is about individual perception of shared norms 
and values within a given community. It is not about the “perception” of the group. If the moral 
atmosphere is perceived as low, then the moral climate is considered as capable of affecting the 
individual negatively. If it is high, it affects the individual positively. The negative impact of 
                                               
474 See Marianne S. de Wolff and Daniel Brugman, “Moral Atmosphere and Moral Behavior: A Study into the Role 
of Moral Atmosphere for antisocial behavior,” in The Development and Structure of Conscience, Willem Koop, 
Daniel Brugman, et al eds. (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), p. 136.  
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perception of moral atmosphere on the individual is a tendency to minimize rather than 
maximize their moral competence due to group pressure.
475
  
We agree to a certain extent with William Spohn that the quality of our Conscience 
depends on the social group we belong to (the kind of family units, school attended, other social 
units, ethnic or cultural group) for “values are transmitted through groups.”476 Psychologists are 
yet to reach consensus as to the significance of moral atmosphere for behavior at different levels 
of moral formation: for example, the perception of moral atmosphere is more significant for the 
family than it is for the school.
477
  Wolff and Brugman research conclusions include “Moral 
competence did not moderate between perceived moral atmosphere and moral behavior.”478 They 
cite other sources to support this conclusion.  In other words, it is highly probable that a person 
with good moral judgment will adopt the values of the group he identifies with even if those 
values are low on his personal scale. This conclusion only supports what we already know by 
experience captured by the adage: “bad company corrupts morals.” Evidence from research 
shows that community consensus of “what constitutes value” is more critical predictor in 
influencing behavior patterns or change among adolescents.
479
  The implication of this will 
become clearer in chapter four when we consider the moral roots of systemic corruption. 
                                               
475 See A. Colby and L. Kohlberg, The Measurement of Moral Judgment. Vol. 1: Theoretical foundation and 
research validation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), cited by Wolff and Brugman, Ibid  
476 William Spohn, “Conscience and Moral Development,” p. 133.  He cites Timothy O’Connell’s claim in Making 
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There was once a deplorable sight on TV where a mother (caught on security camera) 
actually employs her kids to effectively steal jewelry and other items in a mall. It is obvious that 
the moral atmosphere in the home where these kids are raised is corrosive for conscience 
formation regarding rights to property. It is equally true of a community that awards titles to its 
sons and daughters who are notorious for embezzling public funds except that part of the funds 
were used to promote some local interests.  We shall examine this further in chapter four.  
There is no theological debate as to the significance of “moral atmosphere” for 
conscience formation precisely because it is considered a given.
480
 A healthy moral atmosphere 
promotes proper formation of conscience because it upholds objective standards of behavior. A 
parent sees some pencils he/she did not buy for the son/daughter and asks “whose is it?” If there 
is no satisfactory explanation given, he/she says, “I want you to return it to wherever it came 
from.” The moral atmosphere this creates for the child is that it is not alright to keep what does 
not belong to you. An unhealthy moral atmosphere is one where values are skewed towards 
personal and/or group interests to the detriment of objective standards. For an example, James 
belongs to a tribe “A” and is a lecturer in a federal university in a multi-tribe nation in a 
developing world like Nigeria. He gives “handouts” for his course (this is a highly profitable 
racket that bleeds the students in Nigeria of today). Each student pays a lot of money for these 
“handouts” except for any of James’ students who happens to come from his village. Each 
semester there are usually between 5-8 students from his town that take his course. The other 
students are from different tribes. These “other” students resent this racketeering and even more 
the favoritism part of it, but they have little choice here. If they do not comply, they fail the 
                                               
480 This is a functional terminology found in socio-behavioral psychology. Theology has no equivalent terminology 
but does consider the moral quality of the social environment vital for character formation.  
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course. Back home, James is one of the elites of the town. His “handout” racket has made him 
rich. The villagers know the story of the “handouts” but are very pleased their sons and 
daughters are singled out for special favor. So when James visited home, his village chief offered 
him a title in recognition of his “benevolence” to his people.  His “virtues” were extolled during 
a festive ceremony as the community celebrates the “achievements” of one of their sons, 
presenting him as a “hero,” a “virtuous son of the soil” worthy of emulation. Objectively, James 
has no “virtues” as such or a very twisted one at best. So, it is presumed that celebrating a man of 
questionable “virtue” ought to yield a low moral atmosphere for each young person present at 
that ceremony. It also points to a deeper problem: Is it possible that this community has a 
different notion of “virtue?”    
Though it is difficult assessing the exact impact of a single event like the above on the 
moral formation of persons from this community, but this difficulty does not diminish its 
significance. While research data will help illumine the significance of individual perception of 
moral atmosphere for moral formation, but its theological importance does not depend on such 
conclusions because there is a significant difference between controlled experiments and deeper 
real life situations; between scientific conclusions and theological ones. Common sense tells us 
not to expose young children to certain adult “practices” because we know intuitively that it will 
influence them even if we do not have “scientific evidence” to back that up. When a group of 
people define “virtues” and “vices” based solely on “self-interest” or “group-interest” and would 
promote that as “right conduct,” this poses a major problem for conscience and morality.  
Interestingly, this practice is more universal than one would ordinarily think (for these are 
primarily “utilitarian” principles that you will find as standard practice in unexpected places). It 
187 
 
might help finding out if this skewed notion of virtue is deliberative or instinctive. A deliberative 
stance is one founded on solid philosophical principles or assumptions arrived at after a critical 
assessment of all its merits and demerits in the light of some form of objective standards. An 
instinctive stance is the opposite of the above. It is an un-reflected response to life situations 
without deep thought as to its long term implications except that it “benefits” me/us in the short 
term. Is it then possible that the story above captures in essence the significance of “moral 
atmosphere” for conscience formation?  
The individual perception of the “moral atmosphere” is viewed here as critical to 
formation of conscience because it reinforces in the individual whatever “values” the moral 
community encourages or discourages. Given that we cannot hope to legislate our way to 
morality, and no nation has limitless capacity for application of external sanctions, the 
imperative for developing internal sanctions becomes not just obvious but a profitable public 
policy initiative in the long run. This has been the vital role of religion in every culture. Now that 
religion is breaking down, the only veritable social mechanism for developing this inner sanction 
is threatened. Developing a healthy moral atmosphere is critical to reinforcing the development 
of internal sanctions. That is precisely what conscience is – an internal sanction for right living.   
2.6.0 An African View of Conscience? 
Is there a coherent and homogenous African view of conscience? We cannot answer in the 
affirmative to this question. Perhaps someone should do a systematic study of the notion of 
Conscience among African tribes. That will be a daunting but most rewarding task for 
scholarship. At present, what we have is a laudable ongoing attempt to articulate the notion of 
conscience among different African peoples/tribes by African theologians. We deeply commend 
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their efforts. It is arguable however that there exists a common feature in these notions 
comparable to the notion of “community” among Africans (we shall examine this in the next 
chapter). It is this common feature we shall seek to identify. Given that the notion of conscience 
is linked to personhood and community in African perspective of this term, we shall only attempt 
to identify the basic contours of this notion in this segment and leave its fuller development 
(formation of conscience in relation to community) in the next chapter.   
 Ferdinand C. Ezekwonna who wrote a book on this topic claims simply: “most African 
traditional religions have the concept of conscience as located in the heart.” 481 He then 
proceeded to examine the notion of conscience among the Igbo of Nigeria who, according to 
him, use “Obi” (heart) as synonymous to conscience. The Igbo also use “uche” and “ako” to 
represent “mind” and “prudence” respectively. We may add here that among the Igbo, a 
prudential heart is a conscientious heart. Ezekwonna submits that “obi ocha” ((clean heart) and 
“Obi ojộo” (ugly heart) are equivalents to “good” and “bad” consciences respectively. The 
“guilt” of conscience is described as the “obi n’apia ya utali” (the “heart is flogging” the 
person).
482
 He then claims that “individual conscience for Africans should be the conscience of 
the community and the community conscience becomes that of the individual,” since “Obi” is 
the nexus between individual and community.
483
 Obviously there is a difficulty in this claim. Is 
there an identity between the individual and what he calls “community conscience?” There seem 
to be. He argues that the “child is expected to act within the conscience of a particular 
                                               
481 Ferdinand C. Ezekwonna, African Communitarian Ethic: The Basis for the Moral Conscience and Autonomy of 
the Individual (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2005), p. 191 
482 Ibid, cites Metuh Emefie Ikenga, Comparative Studies in African Traditonal Religions, p. 235 
483 Ezekwonna, Ibid. pp. 191-2 
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community.”484 He however follows Abanuka’s distinction between “customary” and 
“community” consciences. The former is when someone follows the dictates of the community 
out of fear and the latter out of conviction.
485
 He also admits with Abanuka that someone who 
acts with due reflection on the laws and weighs the consequences of his actions is more helpful 
to the community than if otherwise. So the notion of community conscience neither destroys 
individual conscience nor autonomy. Before we examine another African author’s perspective on 
conscience we recall here the claims of Ezekwonna: 
[T]he conscience of community is not just blindly following the law which makes people think 
that the community overrules the individual conscience but one has to question and reflect on it 
with the community and when he acts, having the interests of all at heart, then he is acting with a 
community conscience. It is in this connection that Africans believe that the internalization of the 
external voice of the community or authority by the individual is what makes him begin to tell 
himself this is good and that is bad. Therefore conscience is not innate in human beings but 
formed in every stage of the person’s life.
486
 
 
 Bénézet Bujo articulates an African notion of conscience that maintains the close link 
between individual conscience and the “conscience” of the community. However, his analysis 
that promises to offer more clarity as to the distinction between the two ends seems to blur the 
very notion of African view of conscience. Bujo contrasts the Western notion of conscience that 
stresses radical individualism in decision making and that of Africa that stresses radical 
communalism. The African ethic is profoundly communalistic such that the individual cannot be 
understood apart from the community. Therefore the notion of conscience shares the same traits. 
He posits the “word” as central to the life of the community. Africans believe in the power of the 
                                               
484 Ibid. pp. 192-3 
485 B, Abanuka, A New Essay on African Philosophy (Enugu, 1994), cited by Ezekwonna, Ibid  
486 Ezekwonna, ibid. p. 194 
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word to nourish or destroy the community. The word does not “vanish” because it comes from 
the “heart” of the speaker (not the writer) and carries with it life giving or death dealing powers. 
The African not only hears the word but “eats” it such that it is part of the person – and the 
person is part of the community. The community transcends the living to include the “living 
dead” called “ancestors.” The good word is “eaten” and “digested” within the community 
through the agency of representatives and/or elders (sages) who help ensure the vitality of the 
word in communion with the ancestors. What constitutes the ethical life revolves not on 
individuals but on the community since “thinking” is essentially “relational.”487 
 So Bujo considers the “word” at the heart of conscience. Given that moral decisions are 
not merely individualistic but profoundly communal, the entire community is involved in solving 
moral problems through “palaver” (communicative dialogue).488 Even in very personal decisions, 
the individual always acquiesces to the views of the community. The “palaver” or what we prefer 
to call a “communal moral dialogue” is never aimed at some abstract truth but to seek wisdom 
that has an “existential importance” in securing the life of the community.489 It is for this reason 
                                               
487 For the foregoing see Benezet Bujo, The Ethical Dimension of Community: The African Model and the Dialogue 
between North and South (Kenya: Pauline Publications, 1993), pp. 70-2 
488 Albertine T. Ngoyi describes African “Palaver” as “a dialoguing institution of unlimited domain. African 
tradition functioned along the axis of the dialogue. The palaver was an institution in its own right, not a transitory 
activity. It was, and still is, a stable institution with its own rules, one of which, dialogue is essential. Every 
participant is a dialoguing partner with full powers to demand to speak and to do so for as long as is necessary. It is 
not just idle talk; everybody is bound to listen. In traditional Africa there was no autonomous religious, economic, 
judicial, educational, or moral authority. All the authorities came under the dialoguing institution. African life 
revolved about the axis of the dialoguing institution with unlimited domain.” In “M. Tshiamalenga Ntumba: A 
Philosopher Attentive to the Problems of African Theology” in African Theology: The Contribution of the Pioneers 
(Limuru, Kenya: The Pauline Press, 2008), pp.163-181, at 172  
489 Bujo, ibid. p. 77 
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that Bujo argues that the African ethic does not operate with the classic principle of synderesis: 
“Do good and avoid evil,” but proceeds from “promote life and avoid killing.”490 He summarizes 
What then is conscience from an African perspective? It is about talking with and listening to one 
another. The ear, which has a similar function as that of the female sex organs, takes in the semen 
of the word and lets it penetrate deeply into the human person. In the human depth, the word is 
turned into life or death according to the inner states of the individual. The word, which was 
transformed in the depth of the human person, has to prove itself true and be successful in 
confronting other words, expressed by different members of the entire community. The word of 
the individual has to prove its innocence in public. During the process of talking and listening to 
each other, the word which brings death is rejected, whereas the one which promotes life is 
confirmed and integrated into the service of the community. What the community refuse or 
confirms through palaver, with the active participation of those concerned, merits respect, lest the 
individual should expose him/herself and the community to death.
491
  
 
We consider the above “definition” as radically different from Ezekwonna’s view. 
However, Bujo’s perspective above stresses the “sociology of knowledge” most evident in all 
African ethics. Conscience serves the community through open dialogue that does not seem to 
have any absolutes as to what the “true good” is. It has to be discovered through dialogue in the 
light of what serves the community best. This sounds very much like a pragmatic model of the 
“true” and the “good”. It has very deep implications in terms of what constitutes “value,” the 
“true,” or the “good”. In other words, the most direct implication to this research of this notion of 
conscience is perhaps its radical relativism of the “true” and the “good”. What constitutes the 
“truly good” is whatever serves the community best. This does not mean that the individual is 
unnecessarily sacrificed for the community because as Bujo claims, “it owes its life force to the 
single members.” Rules are not imposed by the community on individuals because “consensus” 
                                               
490 Bujo, ibid  
491 Benezet Bujo, The Ethical Dimension of Community, p. 78. E. E. Uzukwu, a reader for this research, notes that 
Bujo source is “Ogotomelit: Griaule, M. Conversation with Ogotomeli (London: Oxford Press, 1965). This perhaps 
might be an editorial oversight on Bujo’s part.  
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is the critical core of palaver (dialogue). Therefore individuals are at liberty to share their insight 
into any problematic prior to reaching a decision as to what constitutes “right decision and 
action”.492  This is a radical departure to Western view of both moral decision making and/or 
conscience.  
However, Bujo thinks the African approach “prolongs and completes” the Western model 
that has birthed radical individualism with its sharp distinction of “objectivity” and “subjectivity” 
to the detriment of inter-subjectivity and communal dimension of moral decision making. The 
difficulty with this notion is how it responds to the same critical assessment of social-learning 
theories of moral development we have noted in the first section. It is evident that African ethical 
theories are open to the same critique of ‘prudential considerations” and “ego-protection” as 
noted in our earlier critique. Bujo however elaborates on the merits of his model. 
He argues in relation to conscience that the ecclesial dimension in the formation of 
conscience is a critical component that the African communalism could help retrieve.
493
 The 
Holy Spirit, he argues, is the giver of truth. And this Holy Spirit is not an exclusive preserve of 
any individuals as such but given to the Community. Therefore the search for ethical norms and 
what constitutes right moral conduct is a community and/or ecclesial effort and mandate such 
that Lumen Gentium (a Vatican II document) would note that the ecclesial community (enjoying 
“a supernatural appreciation of the faith – sensus fidei”) cannot err as a body “in matters of faith 
and morals.
494
 The individual is counseled never to take arbitrary “decisions of conscience” but 
                                               
492 Bujo, ibid. p. 80  
493 Bujo, Ibid. p. 80 He argues, citing Aquinas, that the grace of the Spirit is given for the service of the community 
and not for individual 
494 Bujo, Ibid. cites Lumen Gentium, no.12.  
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always in consultation with the community of believers (often as represented by its leadership). 
What this supposedly “African model of conscience” offers is the absolute priority and centrality 
of dialogue in relation to knowledge of the truth/good at all levels of ethical problematic.  
Laurenti Magesa explains that the African “ethical consciousness” is essentially a 
religious one. The African believes in the inter-connectivity of everything that exists; both 
animate and inanimate beings are suffused with the “life force” that mediates God’s blessings 
and/or curses (through events, people, and things). The moral codes are embedded in the 
“traditions” of the people, and these “traditions” have a deeply sacred character. In the African 
mind “being” and “doing,” are interchangeable. So, understanding that ‘the ontologically good is 
the ethically good’ can one appreciate and understand the moral sense of the African and the 
direction of ethical pursuit.”495 He singles out “hospitality” and “greed” as the quintessential 
“good” and “bad” respectively in African moral consciousness. Both underscore the critical 
value of whatever promotes or destroys life of the community. He did not directly write on 
conscience but highlights the important role of shame and guilt in African moral psychology. 
The two are not sharply distinguished as in the West where shame is associated with “being” and 
guilt with “feeling.” The former is assumed to go deeper than the latter. He argues: 
In African Relgion, however, guilt and shame interpenetrate so closely that , even if we accept 
Bradshaw’s distinction, it is understood that “feeling” results intrinsically and radically from 
“being,” and “being” leads ineluctably to “feeling” and “doing.” Thus, it is not possible for a 
person to have done wrong if there is nothing wrong with the person. An individual with evil eye 
harms others because he or she is evil. Indeed, if a certain individual has made a mistake, to a 
certain degree that same person is a mistake. Being and doing cannot be divorced in the African 
understanding of things. Guilt in African Religion, then, is the psychological/moral stage of 
                                               
495 Laurent Magesa, African Religions: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 
1997), p. 58 He cites Adegbola, “The Theological Basis of Ethics,” in K. A. Dickson and P. Ellingworth, eds., 
Biblical Revelation and African Beliefs (Maryknoll, New York: Obis Books, 1969), p. 118. 
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development where a person “owns up to” personal worthlessness or shame. Shame is the 
primary factor in the recognition and confession of guilt.
496
   
 
He argues, citing Agnes Heller, that the disorders that are often associated with shame in 
Western categories
497
 are the result of wrongdoing that also affirms one as worthless. But these 
conditions need to be permanent conditions since with admission or confession of guilt relevant 
rituals or remedies will heal these conditions when the “shame” is removed. They distinguish 
“shame of the face” from “shame of the heart or soul;” the former is light, the latter deep. To 
sleep with an in-law is light shame but to commit incest is deep shame that needs ritual 
cleansing.
498
 Each community establishes the specific values or codes that when contravened 
brings shame to individuals or groups. The “fear” of being put to shame is an internalization of 
the external “sanctions” or “taboos” and a critical part of moral formation. While the “eye of 
others” maybe considered as a form of “externalized” sanctions, but its real force is an 
internalized fear of shame and its consequences (especially fear of being ostracized).  
Therefore, to ignore the role of shame in African moral formation is to ignore totally its 
critical role in moral development. For this reason, we think that one disservice that the 
deliberate or accidental “Westernization” of Africa has done (and still ongoing) is that it 
                                               
496 Magesa, African Religion, ibid. p. 170 
497 John Bardshaw argues that “Shame is the source of the most disturbing inner states which deny full human life. 
Depression, alienation, self-doubt, isolating loneliness, paranoid and schizoid phenomena, compulsive disorders, 
splitting of the self, perfectionism, a deep sense of inferiority, inadequacy or failure, the so-called borderline 
conditions and disorders of narcissism, all result from shame. Shame is a kind of soul-murder. Once shame is 
internalized, it is characterized by a kind of psychic numbness, which becomes the foundation for a kind of death in 
life. Forged in the matrix of our source relationships, shame conditions every other relationship in our lives. Shame 
is a total non-self-acceptance.” See J. Bradshaw, Bradshaw on the Family – A Revolutionary Way of Self-discovery 
(Deerfield Beach, Florida: Health Communications, 1988), p. 2. Cited by Magesa, ibid. p170-171 
498 Magesa, Ibid. p. 172 
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mediates the erosion of some vital African traditional “values” - one of which is the traditional 
mechanism of moral sanctions. An uncritical assimilation of Western ethical or religious and 
socio-cultural system of thought has given rise to a gradual erosion of such critical values like 
shame without which our own moral fabric collapses. Hence we affirm the need to retrieve 
critical elements in the traditional system of shame in Africa if we are to recover or retain our 
fast vanishing deepest values. African ethical system is communalistic and without a system of 
shame in place the entire edifice crumbles precisely because individual conscience has little 
meaning or force apart from the mechanism of community shame or sanctions. If active, they 
complement and reinforce each other; if passive, both fail.  
The near fusion between individuals and community creates an inner hiatus between 
conscience (as an internal sanction) and “community conscience” (an external sanction) 
enforcing ethical behavior through the mechanism of shame rather than guilt. Perhaps it is right 
to affirm that for Western ethics “guilt” is big, and “shame” small; but for Africans, “shame” is 
big and “guilt” small. If we are right, then, imagine why the Christian ethical model that stresses 
the individual (in reference to sin, confession, and virtue) is a difficult “fit” for African mindset 
and therefore needs serious theological reconstruction. The difficulty will be how to integrate the 
helpful elements of Westernization with “healthy” aspects of African communalistic ethics. We 
say “healthy” because there are obvious problems with African communalistic ethics that will be 
identified in the next chapter.  
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2.7.0   A Critical Synthesis of Chapter Two   
We will now attempt a critical synthesis of the salient points made in this chapter. Freud 
presents conscience as an internalized “social angst.” We have argued that by forcing a 
distinction between the “conscience” and the “ego-ideal” Freud was unable to articulate a 
holistic and more positive view of conscience that not only reproves but also approves. If the 
“ego-ideal” is viewed as the positive aspect of the same reality (of conscience) it will not only 
edge it closer to the theological notion of conscience but will transform the negative connotation 
associated with “repression” given that the contents of “ego-ideal” are as “internalized” as the 
contents of “conscience.”  This would reconstruct Freud’s wholly negative view of conscience 
such that instead of reading the social angst (the reproofs that gives rise to conscience) as 
“repression,” upverts or reverses to “elevation” precisely because they are primary lessons in 
self-transcendence and therefore represent a symbolic moment in the growth of the individual.  
So, instead of “repression” we prefer the term “symbolic elevation” for it captures the 
experience of “growth” at all levels during this time: physiologically (bipedalism is a unique 
symbolic form here), cognitively, emotionally, morally, and spiritually.  We argued above that 
the real “repression” would be the stifling of the capacity for selflessness and empathy (if the id 
is given an unrestricted expression),
499
 and research shows these are the roots of the moral 
sense.
500
 We have argued that stifling the potentialities for selflessness and/or empathy implies 
                                               
499 We have seen the catastrophic results of experimenting with giving the id all it wants among youths and young 
adults: drugs addiction, sexual promiscuity, alcoholism, to name but few. It is unimaginable how social relationships 
could be forged without a mechanism to discipline the id. Without social relationships there would be neither family 
nor society as we know it.     
500 See “Chapter One” of this research.   
197 
 
raising person with a disabled conscience – those who cannot feel bad about hurting others.501 
Another name for such people is psychopaths. They have no conscience and cause so much pain.     
What we find consistent among the psychological theorists apart from Freud is an early 
effort to wean the child from infantile self-fixation towards the interests in others or what Adler 
calls “social interests”. We argued that this self-transcending effort is at the core of the 
development of conscience and morality. Erikson describes it partly as the “capacity” to find 
oneself as one loses oneself in others or to redefine oneself by including others. We agree with 
Adler that the degree we are capable of including others in our interests – or making the interest 
of the larger whole our interests, to that degree does the individual or culture experience 
development. We consistently hold that the development of this capacity is the critical role of 
conscience.  
Piaget and Kohlberg helped consolidate the foregoing by highlighting the integral 
relationship between cognitive and moral development. We highlighted how these two cognitive 
structuralists underscored the role of feelings in the notion and development of conscience. 
                                               
501 Dr Maggie Mamen, a clinical psychologist that has worked with children for 20 years says this: “In the field of 
children’s mental health, there appears to be an even more disturbing trend than simply the behavioral and societal 
consequences of raising a generation of overly indulged youngsters. Many of these children, before they enter my 
office to have the magic wand of therapy waved over them, have already been diagnosed by well-qualified, 
experienced medical or mental health practitioners as having a recognizable, identifiable psychiatric disorder, such 
as depression, anxiety, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, bipolar disorder, and the ubiquitous oppositional 
defiant disorder. A psychiatric diagnosis of any kind carries with it many implications, not the least of which is that 
the disorder must have some biological or neurological basis, and can thus potentially be treated biochemically. The 
number of prescriptions for psychotropic medication for children is increasing astoundingly, despite the fact that 
their central nervous systems are still developing rapidly, and the long-term effects of these medications are 
unknown”. Excerpts from The Pampered Child Syndrome:   
http://www.tvo.org/TVOOrg/Images/tvoresources/DDBCDBBE-AF7E-77E6-9CBE911BDA4B0BB1.pdf. Accessed 
on August 14, 2012   
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While Piaget affirms it originates from “feeling” of respect and/or social sympathy, Kohlberg 
considers “feelings” in form of “perception of moral atmosphere” at the heart of conscience 
formation. While we noted in our general critique the problem with claims to a universally 
applicable invariant structure of moral development, nevertheless, we admit a progression in 
moral development as a fact of our experience. Kohlberg claims that those at lower levels of 
moral development act out of fear of punishment while those at higher levels act out of self-
condemnation. Most of the Western authors reviewed in this study seem to share this view.  
However, social learning theorists like Bandura made a sweeping critique of all 
psychological development theorists for reductionism and for manipulating experiments to 
predetermined goals. Their insight highlights the significance of other aspects of human 
experience like “affects” and “environment” in moral development that are rather neglected by 
psychological theorists in favor of the cognitive apparatus.   
We argue that internal and external factors all play a part in the development of 
conscience and morals. We singled out the role “affect” or “emotions” play as a vital part of the 
human moral formation (particularly the formation of conscience) that has been overlooked. We 
explored the significance of emotions/affect as “drivers” of human behavior. Providing a link 
between affect and conscience underscores the latter’s significance for shaping behavior at 
deeper levels than incidental decisions. Most of contemporary theologians we reviewed show an 
increasing interest in admitting the role of feelings (affect or emotions) in the understanding of 
conscience. This is a clear departure from traditional and classical views of conscience that is 
solely cognitive (the intellect without regard for the role of emotions).       
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The theological analysis of the notion and nature of conscience found in Vatican II 
document, and the Catechism shows evident inadequacies and ambiguities. We did not address 
ourselves to finding a solution to these ambiguities since our concern is neither with 
“objectivity” of norms (as found in the relationship of law to conscience) nor with the possible 
“errors” of conscience. We are rather concerned with searching for the influence that conscience 
has on behavior. Research indicates that cognitive maturity neither guarantees moral maturity 
nor behavior change. We prefer to argue that cognitive maturity and emotional intelligence 
(maturity) harness the powers of conscience for transformative behavior. Obviously Aquinas 
notion of conscience we examined does not lead us to this conclusion. He however admits with 
Aristotle the power of “emotions” to determine our choices and actions. Other theologians 
(Callahan, Curran, Spohn, Gula, Conn) philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, provide 
insight for retrieving the role of emotions in the conceptualization of conscience. We 
acknowledge the problems associated with the notion of “emotion” in morality. We however 
insist that an accurate (not necessarily adequate) notion of conscience should give a central place 
to “feeling” because that is precisely what is at the very core of this phenomenon (conscience). If 
you remove “feeling” (feeling good or bad) from it, the notion becomes meaningless.  
Given that conscience is often identified with pathological guilt, we examined the notion 
of guilt as an “emotion” and differentiated “neurotic” guilt from “existential guilt”. We affirm 
that we need to feel “existential guilt” to be truly human and to live in society with others. Our 
analysis of “shame” distinguishes it from “guilt” to underscore the uniqueness of African moral 
tradition built on “shame” rather than “guilt.” Given the close affinity between individuals and 
community in Africa, the notion of conscience finds its full expression in the community 
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conscience. Therefore, it is not internal sanctions (“individual conscience”) but external 
sanctions (“community conscience”) that operate through the mechanism of “shame” that is at 
the heart of African moral formation. This is a significant input of our research and one that has 
serious implications. We insist at the end of this chapter that a retrieval of some form of a 
traditional system of shame in Africa is an imperative for moral development even if this means 
leaving it vulnerable to an obvious critique.  Our response to such a critique will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter Three 
Conscience and Community: Socio-Moral Conditions and Conscience 
Formation  
3.0    Introduction to the Chapter 
One of the most disturbing reality of the last 50 years is the systemic corruption that 
crippled (or still crippling) most African nations (and much of the developing world) since their 
independence. In many cases, this led to violence, unstable governments, and even failed states. 
But while the consequences of corruption and poor leadership have been essentially contained 
within the respective nations in form of underdevelopment, the reverse is the case with respect to 
the corruption and unscrupulous leadership evident in the developed world.  
At present, the world economy is yet to recover from the prime mortgage crisis that 
started in the United States in 2008 and reverberated around the globe. There is universal 
consensus that it was individual and cooperate greed that nearly brought the world economy to 
its knees. Millions lost their life savings, homes, and businesses. Even whole nations (Iceland, 
now recovered, Greece, and Spain) were or are teetering on the verge of insolvency. One of the 
rescue measures put in place to solve the problem was “new regulations” that were hurriedly 
formulated and voted into law, in the United States Congress, to check runaway greed. The 
question this raises is obvious: “is it an effective measure to legislate our way to morality?” The 
obvious answer is “No”. In the last chapter we insisted that external sanctions can only 
complement, but never replace internal sanctions. Moreover, recent events show that these 
regulations have little “teeth” given the loopholes inherent in the regulations themselves ensured 
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by interest lobby groups in the United States congress. This is similar to the cabals whose 
“interests” have contributed in no small measure to the underdevelopment of Africa.  
When a social system encourages individual or even special group interests to trump an 
evident Common Good (or overall interests of the whole)
502
; then, what is the guarantee that 
such a society or community will not self-destruct? If the “interests” of a few opportunists have 
rendered Africa comatose for decades in a society that boasts of communalism (a stultifying 
paradox) what is the real hope for an African future development? If individual and cooperate 
greed orchestrated a global recession, what is the hope that the world will not experience another 
depression in the nearest future (with unfathomable consequences) given that “individualism” 
remains the cornerstone of modern capitalism? If the fate of billions of people is left to 
individual decisions about making profit (the basic meaning of “market forces”) based on the law 
of demand and supply that consistently show little regard for how an individual’s choices and 
actions affect the life of others, then perhaps the situation calls for a global referendum on 
capitalism itself. Conversely, if a society that boasts of being irrevocably “communalistic” 
consistently shows a nuanced individualism at the core of its operating principle, then it signals 
the time for a radical deconstruction of its primary ethics. This chapter underscores the error in 
both situations.    
 We argue here that there is an urgent need to rediscover or retrieve the intrinsic bonds 
that hold society together. Our analysis shows that while the notion of “social contract” (evident 
in first world societies) or “social relationships” (exemplified in traditional or tribal 
                                               
502 It is mind-numbing listening to the argument in American media about the rationality of tax-cuts to the 
millionaires and billionaires (“because they create jobs”) when the country is struggling under an overwhelming 
debt burden.   
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communities) seem to suggest this bond, it is rather the moral voice of the community that 
preserves it. In fact it is the moral voice of the community that upholds the values inherent in the 
notion of social contract and all social relationships. It is the moral voice of the community that 
forms and preserves conscience such that when the moral voice is lost, the very fabric of moral 
formation is moribund. The complementary nature of the relationship between the moral voice of 
the community and the individual conscience is not only highlighted but even more pertinent is 
exposing how it serves as the custodian of both socio-moral responsibility and society itself.  
This chapter also argues that the consequences of the loss of the moral voice of a given 
moral community is not just deformation (or loss) of conscience along with its symptoms (or 
“pathologies”) that include a corrosive form of “tribalism” that has emerged in both developed 
and developing world, but even more significant perhaps is its global ramification that include 
but not limited to terrorism and recent forms of cross-border crimes or international scams. We 
shall explore the socio-moral conditions that enable the loss of moral voice and how 
globalization has glocalized these conditions and its consequences.  
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3.1   The Notion of Community 
The notion of community is described by W. B. Gallie as an “essentially contested concept” due 
to the endless debate it generates.
503
 But does this imply that no evident consensus exists as to its 
meaning? We do not think so. Philip Selznick points out the need to adhere to the rule that 
allows “definitions in social theory should be weak, inclusive, and relatively uncontroversial.”504 
He argues at the same time that what is more critical pertains to issues arising from the 
formulations of theories rather than definitions. He suggests a loose definition of community by 
Robert M. Clever and Charles H. Page:  
Wherever the members of any group, small or large, live together in such a way that they share, 
not this or that particular interest, but the basic conditions of common life, we call that group a 
community. The mark of a community is that one’s life may be lived wholly within it. One 
cannot live wholly within a business organization or a church; one can live wholly within a tribe 
or city. The basic criterion of community, then, is that all of one’s social relationships may be 
found within it. 
505
 
 
Though Selznick identifies from the above “comprehensiveness” as a “threshold criterion” for 
defining the notion of community, but he considers this too demanding or exclusive. He refines 
that definition by arguing that “a group is community to the extent that it encompasses a broad 
range of activities and interests, and to the extent that participation implicates whole persons 
                                               
503 See W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” in Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56, 1955-6, 
1967-98 cited by Andrew Mason, in Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their 
Normative Significance (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 18. A. Mason cites Raymond 
Plant, Harry Lesser, Peter Taylor-Gooby, and Michael Taylor as holding similar views while Brian Barry would 
critique this view as an open door towards relativism. “Obscurities of Power,” in Government and Opposition, vol. 
10, 1975, pp. 250-4 in A. Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging, Ibid. p. 18.  Philip Selznick acknowledges 
the lack of consensus as to its definition. See P. Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, Loc. Cit. p. 357 
504 Philip Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 357 
505 Robert M. Maclever and Charles H. Page, Society: An Introductory Analysis (New York: Rinehart, 1949), p.8f 
cited by Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 358 
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rather than segmental interests or activities.”506 This allows “community” to be seen as a 
“variable aspect of group experience” 507 such that groups can experience varying degrees of 
community life. What is critical for him is a mutuality of “shared beliefs and commitments”508 
but does not necessarily include “all” of one’s social relationships that suggest location.   
Obviously many sociologists would consider location or territoriality as essential to the notion of 
community. For instance, Robert H. Winthrop defines community as “a geographically 
localized population distinguished by extensive social interaction, relative self-sufficiency, and a 
common CULTURE or identity.”509 Selznick admits the importance of “locality” but does not 
think it constitutes an essential part of the definition. He argues that while locality or “common 
residence” is “congenial” as a practical matter for forming or sustaining community, but 
incorporating it into the definition excludes other forms of forming communities (like shared 
beliefs or activity) that do not involve location. The “internet communities” or internet-based-
network of relationships and activities is a current phenomenon that wholly supports Selznick’s 
line of argument even though he was making a case for certain forms of institutions to be 
considered as communities or “quasi-communities.”510  
                                               
506 Ibid  
507 Ibid  
508 Ibid 
509 Robert H. Winthrop, Dictionary of Common Concept in Cultural Anthropology (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1991), p. 40  
510 Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 359. He would however distinguish “community” from “pure organization.” 
The latter is formed with the aim of mobilizing and directing human energies towards a specific goal, the former has 
only a generic but no specific purpose. This allows him to argue for “special-purpose institutions” or organizations 
like the police force, the army, or religious organs to form “communities” because “purpose” is not too rigidly 
defined while allowing “participation” to be essential.  
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Andrew Mason provides a perspective by distinguishing what he calls the ordinary sense of 
community from “mere society or association.” Adopting the classical distinctions of Ferdinand 
Tönnies, he argues that “mere association” is when a group of people interact “primarily on a 
contractual basis” with the aim of satisfying personal or group interests; but a community also 
involves a group of people but they share common values, a way of life, and an identity.
511
 He 
further defines a “group of people” as “a collection of individuals who either act together or 
cooperate with one another in pursuit of their own goals or who at least possess some common 
interests.”512 For him, a common sense view of community would admit it as a “sub-set” of 
“groups” such that “all communities are groups but not all groups are communities.”513  
Mason considers some communities as “collectives,” which he describes as “subjects of 
goals, decisions, and actions.”514 He defines culture as “a way of life which is informed by a set 
of interconnected traditions of thought and inquiry.”515 In his view, a way of life means “a set of 
rule-governed practices,” loosely held together at least to form a discernible body of socio-
political, and economic activity.
516
 Members of a community by sharing a “way of life” would 
                                               
511 Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and their Normative Significance 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 21. Ferdinand Tonnies distinctions between 
Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft in Community and Society, translated by Charles P. Loomis (New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 2002)    
512 Ibid 
513 Ibid 
514 Ibid. p. 22 
515 Ibid This is only one way of defining a culture. There are several views.  
516 Ibid  
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invariably share a distinct “culture.” Both terms then can be “nested” thereby allowing individual 
members to share different “ways of life” and “cultures.”  
He affirms that “personal commitment” or cooperation is at the heart of community since 
the “way-of-life” exists only if members abide by the rules of engagement. The degree of 
commitment is open to scrutiny by members as a criterion for mutual acceptance.
517
 He adds 
“solidarity” and “no systematic exploitation” as extra qualities of a “moralized” notion of 
community, thus distinguishing it from the ordinary notion above. He means by “solidarity” not 
merely identifying with the group but that members must at a minimum give serious 
consideration to the interest of others (give it “non-instrumental weight in their practical 
reasoning”).518 Following John Baker he argues that there is no genuine “sense” of community if 
there is the “degrader and degraded; the exploiter and exploited”519 for these terms contradict the 
very notion of community.  
Mason’s distinctions provide helpful insights to the complexity of defining community. It 
is reasonable to concede that sharing a common culture or way of life should be form part of its 
defining characteristic. However, we would insist with Selznick that one need not live one’s 
whole life in it so long as there is evident “commitment” to its values and interests. We shall 
                                               
517 Ibid., pp. 24-27 
518 Ibid  
519 Ibid The difficulty will be establishing how mutual concern is interpreted and enforced. The John Rawl’s 
principle of difference insists on the citizens being ‘unwilling to be better-off unless it improves the condition of the 
worst-off’ has many critics. Thomas Nagel, according to Mason, holds a view that admits mutual concern even 
when the “best-off accepts benefits that worsens the condition of the worst-off, provided the benefits are sufficiently 
large.” See T. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 73 cited by Mason, Ibid. p. 29. Consider perhaps President George 
Bush’s “tax-cuts” benefits to the Billionaires in this light and you may understand its “rationality”. How could 
general reluctance to be better off than others be “socialized” in a healthy measure for the good of the community?  
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examine later the implication of exploitation to the malformation of a community, but let us first 
delineate distinguishing characteristics of a community.  
 
3.2 The Nature of Community  
Apart from the insights from the foregoing, Philip Selznick’s notion of community we started 
with above is attractive not merely based on its inclusivity but more importantly because he 
argues for a normative theory of community that is at once affirmative and critical. It identifies 
the salient elements of a good community and provides insight as to how to critically assess what 
constitutes a departure from the goals of a standard community. In line with this objective he 
identifies seven integral elements of a viable community: “historicity, identity, mutuality, 
plurality, autonomy, participation, and integration.”520  
Historicity implies shared history and culture. It is characterized by custom (or way of life), 
language, institutional life, and shared major life events. It might include territorial elements: 
location, size, and demography. The moral element in a sense of history is inherent in the insight 
experience provides in the determination of means and ends, as well as the practical value of 
commitment. Identity is the result of socialization. It is natural for humans to identify with 
people, place, or thing that share some commonality with them: kinship ties, beliefs, ideology, 
among others. Selznick holds that it is very problematic evaluating the “moral worth” of a 
formed identity. He therefore distinguishes a “community” from a “sense of community.” He has 
this to say: 
                                               
520 Philip Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 361 
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Fixed identities – local, religious, ethnic – are likely to generate demands for self-affirmation that 
all too often lead to insularity and withdrawal. This parochialism is a chief source of virulent 
antagonisms. Hence the formation of identities can be destructive of community. The gains of 
security and self-esteem must be balanced against the loss of more comprehensive, more 
inclusive, more integrative attitudes.
521
 
 
We know now from current experience (of religion-based forms of terrorism) how destructive of 
community certain forms of “identity” with a given community could be. We shall see later how 
“fixed identities” (certain forms of tribalism) could constitute a form of social pathology.  
Mutuality refers to the need for cooperation and interdependence at all levels of life in a 
functional community. A community cannot exist without an active mutuality or reciprocity.  
 However, Selznick suggests mutuality needs to “implicate persons and groups as unities” 
rather than multiplicities.
522
 Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) would consider this “unity” in 
multiplicity (of subjects) as constitutive of community.
523
 Wojtyla however considers this unity 
as “accidental” both to each subject and to their sum because he views “personal subjects” as 
“substantial subjects (supposita)” while community is constituted by a set of interpersonal and 
social relations and therefore only an accidental being.
524
 Selznick insists that merely applying 
the principles of contract cannot sustain a community because the level of mutual cooperation 
needed is not pre-determined but could call for a more “diffuse and open-ended duties” that 
                                               
521 Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 362. The emphases are ours.  
522 Ibid. p. 362 
523 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community, Loc. Cit., p. 238 
524 Ibid He is obviously arguing from a metaphysical perspective.  
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sometimes require “unequal contributions rather than a carefully balanced reciprocity.”525He sees 
a progressive transition from association to community; from reciprocity to solidarity, and on to 
fellowship – when mutuality transcends mere contractual relationships (exchange), often 
ephemeral to create deeper bonds of caring, commitment, and interdependence.
526
  
He presents plurality as underscoring the value of “intermediate associations” in the vitality of 
the community. Through such associations, or sub-groups, the bond between individual members 
with the larger community is extended and maintained. Without such associations, each 
individual is isolated from the life of the community precisely because the “community” as such 
is more of an abstract and/or “impersonal” entity. He holds that the “group structure” helps in the 
balance of power in a centralized system.
527
 Put succinctly: 
Thus understood, plurality is a normative idea. It does not refer to every dispersal of power and 
commitment, every proliferation of interests, groups, and authorities. A healthy differentiation of 
institutions and of personal, family, ethnic, locality, and occupational groups depends on the 
capacity of each to preserve its own well-being within a framework of legitimacy, and without 
fracturing or fragmenting the social order.
528
 
 
It is important to note this view of “plurality” as an important feature characterizing the notion of 
community. The reason will become obvious when we examine “pathologies” of community. 
Selznick considers plurality as a form of “healthy differentiation” if and only if it could maintain 
                                               
525 Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 362 
526 Ibid  
527 Ibid  
528 Philip Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 363 
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its legitimacy without undermining (“fracturing or fragmenting”) the social order. We shall 
revisit what this implies in a community where groups have sharply opposed interests.  
 Autonomy is a character of a community for obvious reasons: it is critical to selfhood and 
personal identity. Therefore, individuals make a free choice to be part of the community even 
though this may not be understood in absolute terms.
529
 Selznick points to the need “to protect 
freedom in associations as well as freedom of association”530to underscore the fact that 
individuals need protection of liberty in relation to the domineering influence of an external 
authority but also in relation to the influence of the in-group which sometimes prove to be more 
oppressive and exploitative of the individual. Autonomy does not however imply “unconditional 
opportunity and choice” but is predicated on the assumption that “the worth of a community is 
measured by the contribution it makes to the flourishing of unique and responsible persons.”531 
Hence, autonomy properly understood includes inculcating a deep sense of commitment towards 
the common interest of the community.  
Participation evokes the idea of “sharing” or “solidarity” we saw in Mason’s description 
above. There are different forms of social participation. Selznick identifies the most basic as 
“procreation, child-rearing, work, kinship, friendship.”532Other forms of participation are 
extensions of these basic frameworks. It is a word that has deep implications in all forms of 
                                               
529 We neither choose our parents, nor our family, ethnicity, or primary community as such. However, we form free 
associations, and people do migrate to other countries and become citizens in a country other than their 
country/community of birth.  
530 Selznick, p. 363 
531 Ibid 
532 Ibid 
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relationships by determining its depths. Participation is essential to the vitality and dynamism of 
the community. The more involved the members of the community are in collective activity the 
more a sense of community flourishes and vice versa. Selznick however considers “mass 
mobilization of detached individuals” as less than the ideal communal participation. Participation 
does not imply individuals give up their own individual pursuits but that they commit to 
furthering the goals of the community as needed. This means that sometimes the “needs” of the 
community demand that individuals sacrifice their own interests for the greater good of the 
community. The deeper individuals and groups are willing to “participate” in the community to 
that extend will they be integrated into its life and be part of its vitality and dynamism. 
For example, many young wives do sacrifice a lucrative career in other to “participate” in 
the role of procreation and childrearing not just vital to aims of marriage (raising a family) but 
critical to populating and developing the community. Without this sacrifice, the community will 
inevitably self-destruct, making it impossible for individual dreams to survive. Therefore, 
individual ambitions cannot thrive at the detriment of the communal goals. Another example 
might help: In American politics, subsidy or tax-cut for the top 1% has become an electioneering 
hot-button issue. It is baffling how this state of affairs came into being. The simple logic is that if 
American billionaires do not consider it “reasonable” to make some sacrifices as part of a 
concerted effort to bail out the country (the goose that laid the golden egg) at a time of serious 
economic distress, it not only shows a disturbing lack of commitment to the greater goals of the 
community but also reveals a puzzling irrationality since they may likely lose more money in the 
event of a collapsed economy.  This is a classic case of how self-interest, if not outright greed, 
could blind us or desensitize us to reality.  
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Integration explains the development of “institutions, norms, beliefs, and practices”533 
that build and maintain a healthy community. He argues that the “quality” of community is 
determined by the “character” of its institutions.534 Therefore, integration tries to hold all the 
qualities above in tension – in the light of prevailing circumstances. He concludes:  
A fully realized community will have a rich and balanced mixture of all these seven elements. We 
cannot ignore the givenness of received custom and decisive events, but the appeal to historicity 
must respect the other values, so far as they are affected. Similarly, the claims of plurality and 
autonomy must be balanced against those of mutuality and participation. In this normative theory, 
the moral quality of community is measured by its ability to defend all the chief values at stake, 
to hold them in tension as necessary, and to encourage their refinement and elaboration.
535
 
While it is possible to argue that the seven elements delineated by Selznick above does 
not exhaust the requirements for a viable community, we however affirm that they provide the 
sufficient and necessary conditions for a viable community. The uniqueness of a given 
community is constituted by the interplay of these elements just as they determine its strengths or 
deficiencies. For instance, a community where mutuality and reciprocity is properly balanced 
will be reflected in strong commitment of its individual members and sub-groups to the general 
wellbeing of the community. Conversely, where such mutuality and reciprocity is skewed or 
deficient will give rise to a community where plurality implies division (multiplicity) instead of 
unity. The degree of this division will determine the degree of fragmentation within the 
community itself to the point where an authentic community may no longer be viable.  
 
 
                                               
533 Ibid 
534 Ibid. p. 364 
535 Ibid 
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3.3   THE LOSS OF A SENSE OF COMMUNITY 
 Social scientists and ethicists have noted the dangers of losing our sense of community. 
Amitai Etzioni, a social scientist, in The Spirit of Community, lamented the loss of “traditional 
communities” as the harbinger of the loss of a sense of community. Invoking Ferdinand Toonies’ 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft distinction, he argues forcefully that the preference “moderns” 
placed on the gesellschaft is rather misleading. Gemeinschaft is the notion of community arising 
out of kinship and loyalty bond that is as deep as it is exclusive. Gesellschaft on the other hand 
arises out of contractual relations (“du ut des I give so that you will give”)536 that is as superficial 
as it is inclusive.  
The former is considered “primitive,” “backward,” “restrictive,” and appropriate for 
tribal villages, towns and uncivilized communities; the latter is “modern,” “rational,” 
“autonomous” and suited for cities, metropolis, and developed societies.537 While the former 
promotes “we-ness” or solidarity and/or collectivism, the latter supports “me-sm” or what 
popular culture calls individualism and assures an “unfettered pursuit of self-interest”538that is 
the bedrock of private enterprise in a free market economy. He shows how even those who 
promote this latter mindset admit it comes at a high price: an “unfettered market” does not only 
                                               
536 Ferdiand Toonies, Community and Society, trans by Charles P. Loomis (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 
2002), p. 252 
537 Emitai Etzioni, The Spirit of the Community: The Reinvention of the American Society (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1993), pp. 116-117. See a different perspective that leads to same conclusion by Stanley Huerwas in The 
Huerwas Reader, J. Berkman and M. Cartwright eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 178-199 
538 Ibid. Etzioni earlier argues that “When the term community is used, the first notion that typically comes to mind 
is a place in which people know and care for one another – the kind of place in which people do not merely ask 
“How are you?” as a formality but care about the answer. This we-ness (which cynics have belittled as a “warm, 
fuzzy” sense of community) is indeed part of its essence.” p. 31 We simply define “collectivism” here as the 
intellectual persuasion that stresses inter-subjectivity or human interdependence that allows individual ambitions to 
be subjected to communal interests (though not necessarily consumed by it).  
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imply loose social relations but loose morals as well. This became the fertile ground upon which 
“Wall Street” emerged in the 1980s.  
The notion of “street” underscores the inherent freedom and lack of moral inhibitions that 
sharply contrasts the restrictions imposed by moral discipline commonly associated with a sense 
of “community.” It is not then surprising that ‘”The street” became, ‘a den of thieves’ thick with 
knaves who held that anything went so long as you made millions more than the next guy”?539 
Though the pursuit of self-interest without hindrance was promoted by American governments as 
a “social force that revitalizes economies and societies,” it was not long before even its strongest 
advocates recognize that it is an ideology that spirals greed out of control.
540
 It was this ideology 
that is at the root of the prime mortgage crisis that resulted in the global recession from which the 
world economy is still struggling to overcome.  
In addition to the above ideological monster, the contractual model of social relationships 
(gesellschaft) in its modern evolution has other equally troublesome siblings: statistics show a 
fast-paced fragmentation of modern families:
541
 a high percentage of divorce with an alarming 
increase in single parenthood, and an equally troubling decrease in birthrate especially in 
developed economies. This development has been linked to the same ideological persuasion that 
stresses “individualism” in form of “careerism” that considers individual success as the only path 
to self-fulfillment such that collective goals of a nuclear family, and ultimately that of the larger 
                                               
539 Ibid, p. 118 
540 Ibid. p. 119 
541 See R. Philips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Societies (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988); F. McAllister and L. Clarke, Choosing Childlessness (London: Family Policy Center, 1998); Mitch 
Pearlstein, From Family Collapse and American Decline: The Educational, Economic, and Social Costs of Family 
fragmentation (Lanham, Maryland: R&L Education, 2011), pp. 29-90 
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community (nation) is sacrificed at the altar of personal ambition. Despite all possible benefits of 
careerism, it is a fact that it has also created an unhealthy competition in the family resulting in a 
work frenzy that give rise to neglected and abused children, increase in rate of divorce and its 
consequences chief of which is the subsequent fragmentation of the nuclear family, more 
alienation, more dysfunctional homes, more abused children that are more likely to grow up to 
be deviant.
542
  Add to this scenario old parents that are abandoned by their children, neighbors 
that never care to know each other even though they have shared apartments for years, children 
and young adults that are fast losing the capacity for inter-personal relations (modern technology 
has consolidated this), and an increasing indifference or a growing insensitivity to the pain we 
cause others even as we ironically become hypersensitive to all pain. These are part of the 
baggage we can trace to this same model.      
The question that is begging for an answer is whether the global community and/or 
individual nation states can read the signs of our time (like the reason behind the recent 
recession) as a wake-up call that allows them to critically re-evaluate the socio-philosophical 
foundations upon which modern social and economic relations are built or maintain an almost 
irrational following of ideologies that have the potential to drive it to the precipice. The answer 
                                               
542 Amiti Etzioni outlines the statistics on modern American family, the divorce problem and its effects on Children 
in The Spirit of Community, Op. Cit. p. 72-77. We cite here the quote he culled from Judith Wallerstein in Second 
Chances: Men, Women, Children a Decade After Divorce: “In our study, one out of three of the young men and one 
in ten of the young women between ages nineteen and twenty-three at the ten-year mark are delinquent, meaning 
they act out their anger in a range of illegal activities including assault, burglary, arson, drug dealing theft, drunk 
driving, and prostitution. Many of these children got involved in one episode of breaking the law before age 
eighteen, but a disturbing number of them continue this delinquency pattern into their early twenties…The kind of 
misbehavior that we see – abuse of drugs and alcohol, petty vandalism, and the like – is widespread in our society, 
divorce or no divorce.  Although such misbehavior emerges in children of divorce, the more frequent pattern in their 
lives is one of underachievement, low self-esteem, and inhibition of anger related feelings of rejection.” Cited by A. 
Etzioni, in The Spirit of the Community, p. 75-6; We add that there is evidence that African couples who migrated 
abroad for greener pastures are experiencing higher percentage of divorce than those back home in Africa.  
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to this question will invariably lead to a need to retrieve the deeper social bonds that hold society 
together – at the root of which is a recovery of a sense of community. It is our assessment that 
this “sense” is dangerously eroding, if not virtually lost, not only in many nations of the 
developed world, but ironically, in many of the developing world as well, and particularly in 
Africa where it is uncritically assumed that community thrives. Given this paradox, we now 
consider the idea of community in Africa keeping in mind the qualities listed above for a viable 
community if the reader considers these as objective criteria for evaluating any community.  Our 
view does take cognizance of the complexity of the notion of community as noted below:   
The community does not constitute a primitive and simple social relation. It is complex, since it 
associates in a very fragile way heterogeneous feelings and attitudes; it is learnt, as it is only 
through a socialization process, which, strictly, is never completed, that we learn to take part in 
interdependent communities. It is never pure, since communal links are associated with situations 
of calculation, conflict, or even violence. That is why it seems preferable to refer to 
‘communalization’ (Vergemeinschaftung) rather than community, and to find out how some 
‘diffuse solidarities’ are constituted and maintained.
543
 
 
Boudon and Bourricaud highlight the inherent complexity in the notion community that 
we do not intend to ignore. Our preceding chapters on moral responsibility have underscored 
selfishness as a native human tendency that goes against the grain of what community is about. 
The rivalries and conflicts in families and communities are often issues around competing 
“interests.” A healthy community is one that has succeeded in balancing these competing 
interests to the degree that majority of its members realize it is in their remote or proximate 
interest to promote the community interests above their individual ones but never vice versa 
                                               
3 Raymond Boudon and Francois Bourricaud, A Critical Dictionary of Sociology (London: Routledge, 1989), 74, 
http://www.questia.com/read/103532610 
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since the trajectory of self-transcendence moves ever upwards. The genius however is how to 
hold individual and communal interests in a healthy tension. We do recognize the value of 
“conflicts” in the dialectics of social evolution.544 We affirm that conflicts in all human 
communities arises not only to the degree this tension is disproportionately maintained but as a 
necessary part of the process of developing all forms of social relations. This complexity 
associated with the notion of community is made even more apparent as we turn to consider the 
notion of community in African context.  
3. 4. Community and African Communalism 
We have examined African notion of community in relation to personhood and responsibility in 
Chapter One, and African notion of Conscience in Chapter two. We will now attempt a further 
development of the notion of community in relation to the concept of Communalism.  
 African communalism
545
 is a philosophical concept or framework that encapsulates how 
the notion of community permeates every aspect of the African mind, culture, moral and civic 
education, and/or way of life. Polycarp Ikuenobe argues that “the idea of communalism in 
                                               
544 Georg Simmel has shown how “contradiction and conflict” constitute critical elements of “unity” (either as peace 
in a community or personal harmony). He considers a “pure unification” (“Vereinigung”) as “empirically unreal”. 
See “Conflict as Sociation,” in Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings, fifth edition, L.A Coser and B. Rosenberg, 
eds. (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc. 1989), pp. 175-177 at 76. We acknowledge Karl Marx does 
leave us with the dialectics of class conflicts but that is not the direction of our argument here even though we admit 
some element of his notion of “dialectics” in our understanding of the value of conflicts in general.  See other 
elaborations on the social value of conflict according to Lewis A. Coser in The function of Social Conflict (Glencoe, 
III. The free Press, 1956), pp. 151-156  
545 This distinguishes other uses of the term in history as noted by the definition offered by Randon House 
Unabridged Dictionary that distinguishes two notions of the term: first as “a theory” or “system of government” 
where “independent communes participate in a federation.” Secondly, as “the principle and practice of communal 
ownership;” one may find an example of this in communist and/or socialist political philosophies. A third notion is 
attributed to RH Webster, as the “strong allegiance to one’s ethnic group rather than to society.” For the forgoing, 
see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communalism 
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African cultures may be understood in terms of the moral ideas of personhood, community, and 
their connection.”546 He adds that it “provides the basis for understanding moral principles and 
values” in African traditions.547 Our concern here is not so much the broader aspects of this 
concept but essentially to stress how it enables us to understand not just how community 
permeates all aspect of African life, but more importantly, how community is the context for 
moral thought, moral education, and moral responsibility. The idea of communalism in African 
perspective underscores the critical nature of community for the holistic moral formation of the 
African person. Community is everything for the African person. This was noted in the last 
chapter with the phrase: “because we are, I am.” It is the community that provides the individual 
with the notion of what is right and wrong, with a sense of personhood, and with requisite honors 
invests dignity to a successful “son of the soil” for making the community proud. Ikuenobe adds:  
[I]n African cultures…it takes a whole community or village to raise a morally good child; the 
morally good child is the pride and proper representative of the community. The educational 
element of communalism in African cultures implies there is a concerted effort on the part of 
every person in the community to help others learn how to behave or act properly. This is done by 
constant prodding, ribbing, poking, and chiding by neighbors, friends, relatives, or elders. 
Everyone in the community wants to raise a child that they, as a community, can be proud of. In 
this sense, parenting is also a community responsibility. There is an organismic process of 
educating a person. 
548
 
 
Obviously the above is a sharp contrast to the Western model of child moral education. Though 
the community is indirectly involved in some way in the moral education of the child in the West 
but it pales in comparison to the direct involvement of the African model. There is a serious 
                                               
546 Polycarp Ikuenobe, Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions, Loc. Cit. p. 
93 
547 Ibid 
548 Ikuenobe, Ibid. p. 73 
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implication in this. Given the critical involvement of the community in how a child is formed, it 
implies that any deficiency in the moral ethos of the community impacts directly on the moral 
formation of the child and vice versa. In other words, seeking proper identification of the moral 
potencies or deficiencies of an African person does not so much have to look at the person as 
such but to the moral community of formation. This community model of moral assessment is 
actually in practice in some African cultures. Among the Igbos of Nigeria, it is customary to 
know what a child is capable of by simply inquiring after the family/parents. It is significant that 
traditional inquiries related to behavior are often centered on “families” and/or “groups” as 
opposed to individuals. This seems to be a big deal!
549
 But what significance does it have for 
understanding clusters of human behavior in our times? It is difficult to say. Dozie-Okafor 
distinguishes African communalism from other communalistic systems in history:  
African communalism is unlike the socialist or communist system of ‘to each according personal 
need, from each according to personal abilities’. It is still different from the principle of state 
monopoly of the factors of production. It is still further removed from the system of private 
monopoly of bourgeois aristocracy. Communalism entails basic common ownership and 
involvement in the factors of production. Participation is neither informed by radical 
individualism nor unmitigated collectivism…It involves a delicate conscious balance between 
self-centeredness and altruism.
550
 
 
                                               
549 This research does not concern itself with details “as to content” of child-formation as such but to identify the 
“process” as per primary modes of formation. For the details of such formation, see Ferdinand C. Ezekwonna, 
African Communitarian Ethic: The Basis for the Moral Conscience and Autonomy of the Individual, Loc. Cit. pp. 
103-166; Gregory I. Olikenyi, African Hospitality: A Model for the communication of the Gospel in the African 
Cultural Context (Enugu: Snaap Press, 2001), pp. 102-133; John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy 
(Nairobi: East African Education Publishers, 1995), pp. 100-146.  
550 C. Dozie-Okafor, Towards Integral Nationhood (Owerre: Lemmy Press, 1994), p. In many parts of Nigeria 
communal ownership of land is still in practice. An individual cannot sell even his own share of the family land 
without the consent of his kinsmen among the Igbos.  
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In the light of the concern we expressed in the last segment for the erosion or loss of a sense of 
community and the consequences of an “unfettered pursuit of self-interest,” some African 
scholars have identified “greed” (the direct antonym of “hospitality” in Africa) as the “universal 
evil.” It stands in direct opposition to what communalism and community stands for in Africa. 
Laurenti Magesa puts it succinctly thus: 
Greed constitutes the most grievous wrong. Indeed, if there is one word that describes the 
demands of the ethics of African religion, sociability in the sense of hospitality, open-hearted 
sharing, is that word. Hospitality negates greed. It means the readiness and availability to form 
community. It means that one remembers and honors God and the ancestors and is ready to share 
with them through sharing the gift and power of life with other members of the family, lineage, or 
clan. The purpose of hospitality is to enhance life in all its dimensions. Its foundation is in the 
very structure of existence itself.
551
 
  
The vital force of the universe which sustains life in all its dimensions and in which every 
member of the African community is sharing (includes the living dead called ancestors),
552
 
demands sharing as a permanent constitutive element of existence that underscores the very idea 
of communalistic orientation of African thought and way of life. African communalism 
conceives all life as a unity and/or organismic. Everything shares in some form in the vital force 
that animates and preserves all things. Greed distorts the very order of existence itself by 
reserving to itself by a skewed sense of right what belongs to all as a gift. A greedy person 
therefore contravenes the first and most important moral code of communalism that obliges 
everyone to share all resources, material and immaterial gifts, with one’s family, relations, clan, 
                                               
551 Laurenti Magesa, African Religions, Loc. Cit. p. 62. Some scholars would however consider “witchcraft” as “the 
evil” per excellence in the context of Africa. John Mbiti describes it broadly as the use of mystical power in all its 
manifestations to cause harm to others. See African Religions and Philosophy, Op. Cit., p. 202  
552 For a deeper understanding of Ancestors See Benezet Bujo, African Theology In Its Social context, trans by John 
O’Donohue (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2006), pp. 23-32  
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and friends. It is the willingness to participate in this essential “sharing” that is constitutive of 
having a “sense” of community. In Africa, all formation is to imbibe this sense. To possess it 
implies one has acquired the African spirit. It is a spirit that shares because it cares. It is not an 
accident that hospitality is a cardinal virtue in Africa.   
Kwasi Wiredu however holds that the difference between communalism and 
individualism as one of difference in life styles than morality as such;  a difference of degree 
than of kind since those who practice communalism give “considerable value” to individualism 
and vice versa; and that both ideas can “co-exist” in the same society.553 We disagree with the 
first position because we consider there is an intrinsic difference between them rather than 
merely external (life-style). It is the internal difference that gives rise to the difference in external 
expression of it (life-style). However, we admit that communalism and individualism could “co-
exist” in the same system only as an index that measures the degree to which people have 
assimilated or accepted either viewpoint as mainstream philosophy of life. It also indicates there 
is no such thing as a thorough going communalistic or individualistic system yet in existence, for 
even absolutists regimes had pockets of individualistic practices. While no system is leak-proof, 
it is important to identify which direction the natural pull goes: towards individual or communal 
interests? Our analysis in chapter two indicates that a self-transcending tendency is indicative of 
personal growth and a community that has more people willing to sacrifice personal interest for 
the common interest is in a much healthier place than otherwise.  
                                               
553 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1996), p.72 
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There is a caveat though about who constitutes a “member” of the African community, 
and what criterion determines the rightness or wrongness of an action.  First level of analysis 
identifies “blood” relationship as the “primary determinant” of who belongs to the community or 
“tribe”. This is different from being born in the community. The second determinant of 
membership is ability to undergo community initiation successfully.  Thirdly, we identify the 
capacity and/or willingness to abide by the norms of the community. Fourthly, strangers who do 
not qualify for membership by the first or second markers, may be accepted as “adopted 
members” when they distinguish themselves by their actions as extraordinarily loving and kind 
towards the community. This is rare,
554
 but a refreshing possibility.  
The criterion for membership is a salient area of reflection because it holds the code for 
bringing down walls of division among multiple ethnic groups in Africa. We admit that 
legislation is the key to this. A less rigid criterion for membership in African communities is a 
pre-requisite for deeper relationships across ethnic lines and as vital element for national 
integration. Nigeria has a history where people from one ethnic group are considered “outsiders” 
in a different ethnic group even when they were born and bred in that “other” ethnic community. 
They have no privileges or rights unless such were made possible by civil law. Even then, it is 
difficult to implement. This needs to change given how it impacts social “integration” and nation 
building by removing the frustration and animosity often linked to feelings of alienation. This is 
precisely the point Selznick makes above in reference to problems of “fixed identities” that is the 
source of antagonisms and insularity in communities. Our experience indicates that a hardline 
                                               
554 See John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1995), p. 104 
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view of membership becomes even more problematic when it spills over into religion. We have 
more than a fair share of its negative consequences.  
It is interesting to note that ordinarily, deviants are never fully “accepted” neither as 
members of African communities nor of any other human community as such. But there is a 
unique exception. In Africa there are deviants or “troublesome” members of the community who 
become “acceptable” if and only if they would fight and win wars against the perceived 
“enemies” of the community. In this way, rogues can become absorbed in a community but 
never to the extent of becoming title holders or respected member of the community. It is not 
evident that this is a native habit of all human communities but it may be worth investigating. 
This scenario has changed dramatically as a result of religious affiliation and/or political 
dispensation of benefits. In the latter, the “external enemy” is interpreted through the lens of “in-
group” and “out-group” matrix such that each ethnic group feels bound to support its 
representative in government at all costs since he/she brings or expected to bring their own 
“share” of the national cake either by fair or foul means. This obviously impacts the quality of 
institutions built from such a premise, as we have noted earlier.  
Interestingly, since it is the privilege of the community to determine what is right or 
wrong in Africa, the above scenario has an even deeper implication beyond justifying skewed 
political benefits. From a very broad communalistic moral perspective, what is right is whatever 
promotes the life and development of the community; and whatever destroys or diminishes the 
life and development of the community is wrong. It is this primary criterion functioning as a form 
of primary principle that informs how moral codes (secondary principles) are formulated from 
community to community. While the above primary principle remains unchanging, secondary 
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principles can change or reformulated to meet new demands that fulfill the basic demands of the 
primary criterion. V. Mulago argues that life preservation in the community is the indispensable 
criteria for anything moral:  
Every effort must be directed to the preservation, maintenance, growth, and perpetuation of this 
common treasure [life of the community]. The pitiless elimination of everything which hinders 
this end, and the encouragement at all costs of everything which furthers it; this is the last word in 
[African] Bantu customs and institutions, wisdom and philosophy. 
555
 
 
Kwasi Wiredu’s position in Cultural Universals and Paritculars reflects the same mindset: he 
claims that “man or woman is the measure of all value (Onipa na ohia);” and moral values aim at 
“harmonization of all interests as the means, and the securing of human well-being as the end of 
all moral endeavor.”556 He laments the influence of urbanization and/or industrialization on city 
dwellers, who lacking the benefits of systems of sanctions and moral responsibility that 
traditional communities provide, become prone to crime and irresponsibility.
557
  
There is an obvious attraction for supporting the above perspective: if people get 
thoroughly formed by it, it could possibly yield an egalitarian society. But it has inherently deep 
and dangerous set-backs: Primarily, it is prone to serious abuse. It provides justification for 
“self-interest” to easily transmute to “group-interest” merely on the basis of “group” or “kinship” 
rather than its ethic. This is a clear example of what we classify as the extended ego phenomenon 
where self-interest merely masks itself in the very notion of “group” but without changing its 
                                               
555 V. Mulago, “Vital Participation,” in Dickson and Ellingworth, Biblical Revelation and African Beliefs, cited by 
Magesa, African Religions, ibid. p. 63. 
556 Kwasis Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 65 
557 Ibid. pp.71-2 
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inner content or nature. So instead of being transformed in this encounter with “others” (as 
selflessness does) it transforms others into itself. In other words, “self-interest” does not cease to 
be self-interest merely by referring to a given group. It needs some objective criteria of 
assessment.  
In a healthy community, “self-interests” (interests of its individual members) is the 
conceptual platform for self-communal- transformation. The “self” sacrifices its interest for the 
“greater good” of others. The result is a dual transformation (for the self and others in 
community): this self-transcending action begets a self-transcending reaction analogous to a 
nuclear fission reaction that is diffused throughout the community affecting all layers of its life – 
and particularly strengthening the subterranean fabrics of its moral life. This is the dialectics that 
forges the spirit of the community/nation. It always looks beyond itself, and it should also look 
beyond the short-term gains to the individual community or tribe to the long-term gain that 
impacts the larger communities of humanity. The notion of an “extended ego” above, given its 
parochial vision, does the very opposite. This is why it is very dangerous to be uncritically 
allowed to guide the moral anchor for formulating communal, national or international policies. 
Whenever the “interest of the community” (tribe or nation) is uncritically interpreted, it easily 
could slide into serious moral abuses.  
In the light of the above, it is then easy to see how “looting” of national treasury by an 
ethnic representative could become "justifiable” to members of his community based on the hope 
that it will benefit their community (a disguised self-interest). This skewed thinking has birthed a 
monstrously corrupt system in Nigeria and around Africa. It is however not peculiar to Africa. It 
is a similar mentality that is behind the pork barrel politics that often result in “a road to 
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nowhere” (a common saying in the United States that has historical basis in a road in Alaska). It 
is behind the lobbying frenzy that is transforming politics and distorting regulations that is 
changing business culture and our lifestyle.  
This emergent power of “grouped interest” is what we call the modern tribe. It has a 
positive dimension but a more potently destructive power for community like no other because it 
represents the unleashing of the “extended ego” phenomenon on a grand scale. It is behind many 
foreign policy formulations like ones that loudly condemn African leaders for their lootings but 
silently accept it from them for “safe-keeping”. It is the same mentality that forms and sustains 
the “looting club” in many government enclaves particularly in Africa as a distinct “tribe” of 
those that share similar interests. The unity and strength of a nation is revealed in the capacity of 
its units (groups) to know when and how to effectively sacrifice their “group-interest” for the 
common interest of the nation. Americans are aware how lobbying or “pork” is destroying the 
beauty of its democracy. Africans are also aware how their leaders have looted the nation, given 
crumbs to their communities and grown too fat on the resources that should have benefited all. 
Anytime we allow self-interest to go unchecked, we fall into its trap – and runaway greed results 
to the detriment of all.  
Communalism in Africa not only shields the community from the ills of runaway greed 
but also ensures that the spirit of the community is preserved at all times. Individual achievement 
is considered a futile effort unless it has a tangible effect on the community. We saw in the first 
chapter how personhood is a quality that is acquired through the community’s system of 
recognition and approval. It is the same mechanism of approval that establishes one as a 
“successful son/daughter of X community” based on the condition that there is visible evidence 
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that one’s prosperity has translated to community prosperity. In such a situation, it is not the 
individual achievement that is at issue, but rather the degree to which such achievement 
improves the lot of members of the community. The imperative here is the constant reference to, 
and the need to help, the community. This is an internalized (or socialized) mandate.  
Every African has a deep inner orientation towards the primary community at the center 
of which is his/her family. This orientation is not unique to Africans, but how it impacts their 
whole life orientation has an African twist to it. The deeper question though is whether African 
communalism, as a philosophical persuasion, able to override native self-interest and instill 
altruistic attitudes beyond kin and reciprocation – beyond ethnic boundaries? The logic is that if 
it does not, or could not, then there is need to deconstruct this to fit African needs today. 
Common sense suggests that Africa needs a winning philosophical strategy if it must overcome 
the competition of this and succeeding centuries. Communalism in its present formulation is a 
primal philosophical orientation to life developed as a survival strategy in traditional societies 
that has a lot to teach the rest of the world about the ends of community. However, different 
ethnic communities need to first maximize the inherent values of communalism by a self-
transcending effort towards more inclusivity as opposed to isolation. Africans need to show the 
rest of the world that they can co-exist with one another peacefully working out new strategies of 
cooperation in a world that is becoming more and more globalized and for that reason more 
complex. The different ethnic communities need to show they are capable of evolving a true 
commonwealth where resources are equitably shared in common union as a proof of the 
authenticity of their claim to communalism. This is an imperative that contemporary statehood 
demands. We all know the implications of not meeting this challenge.     
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3.5 RECIPROCITY BETWEEN CONSCIENCE AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 
In chapter one, part of our analyses of moral responsibility reveal four defining elements: 
a response to action upon us, interpretation, accountability, and social solidarity. We noted the 
significance of seeing human beings primarily as “responders” – we respond to actions done to 
us based on our interpretations of the meaning of actions done to us. We noted that this has 
serious implications for all forms of relationships (local, national, and global). Moral 
responsibility is developed from childhood based upon the interpretation individuals attach to 
actions done to them: the love and care of the mother or care-giver to the benevolence 
experienced in the larger community, the child develops trust and reciprocates love and care over 
time. Conversely, as indicated above, research on abused children has shown the negative impact 
of interpretations of “what was done to us” in the development of the child. The child often 
develops mistrust and is more prone to have difficulties with issues of love later in life.  
 There is strong evidence across cultures that a community where everyone is looking out 
for everyone else shows closer bonding and an active sense of community. Children brought up 
in such a context will no doubt show a sharper instinct for empathy or sympathy which, as we 
saw in chapter one, is the root of the moral sense that we associate with conscience and 
consequently to moral and social responsibility.
558
 In other words, children brought up in a 
context where everyone is made to take care of everyone else – a social context with an active 
sense of community – will more likely develop an active conscience than someone formed in a 
contrary social context - where every other member of the community is held with active 
                                               
558 We have noted the link between moral sense and conscience in the writings of representative thinkers like David 
Hume, John Newman, J. S Mill, among others.  
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suspicion or mistrust. It is like language; you develop the capacity to speak the language you are 
exposed to during your childhood. The former is still obtainable in rural communities around the 
world, and the latter in cities and metropolis. We admit a possible mix of both realities in some 
metropolis where “closed housing estates” try to evolve an active sense of community different 
from what is obtainable outside its gates. It does show however that they admit something of 
value has been lost in the larger community outside. 
 What is lost is the “moral voice” of the community. The moral voice is possible only in 
social units with an active sense of community. Amitai Etzioni provides us a sense of what the 
moral voice is about in relation to the community:  
When the term community is used, the first notion that typically comes to mind is a place in 
which people know and care for one another – the kind of place in which people do not merely 
ask “How are you?” as a formality but care about the answer. This we-ness (which cynics have 
belittled as a “warm, fuzzy” sense of community) is indeed part of its essence. Our focus here, 
though, is on another element of community, crucial for the issues at hand: communities speak to 
us in moral voices. They lay claims on their members. Indeed, they are the most important 
sustaining source of moral voices other than the inner self.
559
   
Developing a moral character is like learning a language. It starts with exposure to the right 
environment: a community with active moral voices. Then the child (individual) listens to the 
moral voices and his/her native capacity or potentiality become actualized to the degree it is 
exposed and exercised. And like language, its quality depends on its source. Etzioni affirms that 
the “community lays claims on its members.” It implies that members of the community play a 
critical role of holding its members “accountable” to some basic principles of right and wrong. It 
challenges them to uphold such values or else risk some form of disciplinary measures. It is 
expected that members comply because they would not want to risk public embarrassment. All 
                                               
559 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of the Community, p. 31. The stress is his.  
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members of the community are “executors” of the moral discipline of the community. Etzioni 
illustrates this role of the community in his experience at a campus community where there was 
much compliance to the traffic every morning because each person knows the other person’s car. 
If you get out of line, expect the ribbing and chiding from the community at lunch that day! In 
another instance, he forgot to mow his lawn and a neighbor politely asked if he “needed the 
services of a good gardener” and another reminded him that such neglect will destroy the beauty 
of the neighborhood and result in poor valuation of property.
560
 In these instances, the 
community acts as “external sanctions” that helps maintain moral discipline in that specific 
community. Its moral voice is active because each individual member tries to play their part by 
reminding each other of their moral and social responsibilities.    
 Etzioni argues that contemporary American society is experiencing the erosion of socio-
moral values because the communities have lost their moral voices such that individual members 
are afraid of appearing “self-righteous” and/or “prudish”. Despite the dangers of “self-righteous” 
zealotry, he however prefers we err on the side of this self-righteousness than on the side of 
being “immobilized by fear” of displeasing others to the detriment of building a healthier 
society. He argues that the “disinclination to lay moral claims undermines the daily, routine 
social underwriting of society.”561The inability to maintain the moral voice of the community 
melts away the “social glue that helps hold the moral order together” and we are left with either a 
bloated legal sanctions system or moral anarchy.
562
 He continues to argue that: 
                                               
560 See Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of the Community, p. 33 
561 Etzioni, The Spirit of the Community, p. 35. The stress is his.  
562 Ibid. p. 36 
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It is unrealistic to rely on individuals’ inner voices and to expect that people will invariably do 
what is right completely on their own. Such a radical individualistic view disregards our social 
moorings and the important role that communities play in sustaining moral commitments.
563
 
He is therefore convinced that we cannot build a “civil and decent society without a moral 
voice.”564 The alternative to this is either a “police state” or moral anarchy.  
We have already noted earlier that we cannot legislate our way to morality. Failure to 
maintain the moral voices of the community implies that the natural social process of moral 
development will be impaired: the moral voice of the community is the non-coercive form of 
“external sanctions” that is vital in the progressive formation of conscience (internal sanction). 
Its absence is similar to the absence of parental figures (father and mother voices) to the growing 
child in the primary family unit. If the father and/or mother fails to provide moral nurturing as 
the child grows up, due to fear of offending the child’s sensibilities, that child is endangered. 
Such neglect constitutes an “abuse” of nurturance that has serious consequences. Similarly, a 
community that has lost its moral voice due to fear of offending the sensibilities of its individual 
members “abuses” the humanity of its members; destroys the potentialities and the great 
possibilities that maintaining its moral voice would otherwise have called forth in its members 
with the attendant benefits accruable to the community.  
The question is, if it is true that we are primarily “responders,” to what extent does basic 
formation models in popular culture take account of this? We are living at a time when 
children/youths are becoming more and more vulnerable to poor moral formation due to a 
plurality of, but inter-connected, factors: 1. family fragmentation that provides no stability for an 
                                               
563 Ibid. p. 36 
564 Ibid. p. 37 
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enduring moral modeling. 2. Schools emptied of moral ambience such that teachers and school 
authorities no longer act as re-enforcers of morals and the school environment therefore provide 
little or no moral modeling or nurturing. 3. Moral Indifference of secular society (a lack of any 
religious orientation) completes the triad that provides the perfect atmosphere conducive for 
evolving a culture of social anomie. When most are denied the privilege of any form of religious 
formation they are deprived one source of moral formation that could have made some major 
difference.  Given this scenario, is it possible that we cannot imagine the results that these 
present formation realities will force upon us in less than 50 years hence? It will definitely be a 
surprise if we do not necessarily have to evolve a police state or live in a sustained anomie or 
social anarchy not too long from now.
565
  
More importantly for us, we need to ask if the African model sufficiently takes note of 
the implication of community moral voices in its basic formation process. The African 
communal model we tried to delineate so far indicates a community-based-formation process. 
The individual has no existence apart from the community. The community is still largely 
involved in the formation process in most African communities with some discernible exceptions 
in the cities centers across the continent. However, one significant problem is that the content, 
rather than the form is changing. We will address this in the section on pathologies of the moral 
community. Suffice it to say that African seems to have an enviable advantage for an enduring 
moral formation, the results does not seem to match the promises of the model. Why?  
                                               
565 Evolving a police state is already a “progressive” or “proactive” reality in our time. We will be amazed if we are 
to be told the extent to which our privacy has become invaded in recent times by state intelligence apparatus. We are 
entering a decade of increased “smart proactive legislation” aimed at keeping “enemies at bay”. It is nothing short of 
“smart police state.” It is the direct expression of the tragedy of failed moral formation process.  
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3.6 CONSCIENCE AS ANAMNESIS OF THE COMMUNITY  
From a theological perspective community is more precisely defined as a “communion” 
(koinonia) of minds and hearts in an effort to form (and act from) one spirit. It is therefore not 
just a union (a relationship) of essences but of being itself. Cardinal J. Ratzinger (now Pope 
Benedict XVI) called it the “fusion of existences” (but this in respect to the Church’s relation to 
Jesus).
566
 He argues that “communion” is a situation where the “seemingly un-crossable frontier 
of my “I” is left wide open” such that one is “assimilated” into the “Other”. This “fusion of 
existences” gives form to a single entity (the Church).567  He argues:  
In this way communion makes the Church by breaching an opening in the walls of subjectivity 
and gathering us into the deep communion of existence. It is the event of “gathering” in which the 
Lord joins us to one another. The formula “the Church is the body of Christ” thus states that the 
Eucharist, in which the Lord gives us his body and makes us one body, forever remains the place 
where the Church is generated, where the Lord himself never ceases to found her anew; in the 
Eucharist, the Church is most compactly herself – in all places, yet only one, just as he is one 
only.
568
 
 
We find in the above formulation not only an insight to understanding the Church’s relation to 
Jesus but of the essential element in all authentic relationships – the primary openness to the 
“other” such that participating in, and assimilation into the life of another is made possible. It is 
within such openness to the other that we discover our most authentic selves through openness to 
the truth – the ability to hear the voice of conscience deep within oneself as a memory 
                                               
566 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Called to Communion: Understanding the Church Today (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1996), p. 37 
567 Ibid. The assimilation is into Jesus who made this openness possible by his total giving of himself.  
568 Ibid. p. 37  
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(anamnesis) of the voice of the moral community regarding the “good”. We shall elaborate on 
this shortly. It is perhaps helpful to retrieve at this point an important insight from Wojtyla.  
 Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) made a distinction between the “I-thou” or the 
interpersonal dimension of relationship, and the “we” or social dimension of relationships to 
underscore the importance of “personal subjectivity” for a deeper understanding of the 
communal dimension. He admits that though the “I” is in a sense “constituted by the thou”,569 
but that this “thou” is always an “other” or another “I”. This implies a multiplicity that is at the 
center of the “unity” constituting community. The “thou” being another “I” expresses both a 
separation and a connection. However, the “thou” does contribute to my “self-affirmation” and 
helps to “ground me as an “I”. It is the reciprocity (as reflexivity) involved in I-thou relationship 
that characterizes it as “interpersonal” implying a “participation” in the being of another 
person.
570
 This calls for “mutual” self-disclosure critical for shared vision and goals that in itself 
is reason for mutual self-transcendence and self-sacrificing acts of love. It is this interpersonal 
character that is critical in constituting the “I-thou” or what he calls “interpersonal community”. 
We already noted in chapter one his view that the self (as I or thou) is constituted by his/her acts, 
in the same way the “I-thou” relationship and/or community is similarly constituted by its acts. 
The deeper the bonds between the “I-thou” relationship, the more it develops “the character of 
trust, a giving of oneself,” and become more responsible and accountable to one another. He 
considers this “responsibility” as a “reflection of conscience” and the “transcendence” that 
                                               
569 Wojtyla, Person and Community, Loc. Cit, p. 241 
570 Ibid, p.245 
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constitute the personal dimension of any authentic community. For him, “community” means 
“that which unites.”571 When my “I” connects to many it transforms to a “we”. He argues: 
I and thou refer only indirectly to the multiplicity of persons joined by the relation (one + one), 
whereas directly they refer to the persons themselves. We, on the other hand, refers directly to the 
multiplicity and indirectly to the persons belonging to this multiplicity. We primarily signifies a 
set – a set, of course, made up of people, of persons. 
572
 
 
Though Wojtyla distinguishes between the social dimension of community and the inter-
personal, but he does so without sacrificing the “inter-subjective” nature of community 
relationships. He conceives the “we” as many “I’s” who by virtue of circumstance or choice have 
come to “exist and act together.” It is the relationship they share to a “common value” or the 
“common good” that bring them to act together. Though they remain individuals (an I and a 
thou) but the “direction” of their relationship and the “dimension” of that relationship has been 
reconstituted and by the direction determined by the common good.
573
 It is the common good 
that conditions and determines the individual goods of each subject of the community. It does not 
destroy but verifies, affirms and enriches both the personal and interpersonal dimension of the 
community relationships. He holds that if a “diminution” or “distortion” occurs with respect to 
the “I”, the cause should be sought in some form of distortion in the “I’s” relation to, or 
interpretation of, the common good.
574
 It is perhaps also the case in multiples of communities.  
                                               
571 For the foregoing see Wojtyla, Ibid. pp. 245-6 
572 Ibid. p. 246 
573 Ibid. p. 247 
574 Ibid. p. 248 
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Conscience, as the key element of the self-fulfillment of the personal self, points in a special way 
to transcendence and, so to speak, lies at its subjective center. Objectively, transcendence is 
realized in a relation to truth and to the good as “true” (as “benefitting,” honestum). The relation 
to the common good, a relation that unites the multiplicity of subjects into one we, should 
likewise be grounded in a relation to truth and to a “true” good. The proper dimension of the 
common good then comes to view. The common good is the essentially the good of many, and in 
its fullest dimension the good of all.
575
 
 
The import of the above insights cannot be ignored in any serious analysis of the moral 
community.  We see the evident similarity in the views of Ratzinger and his predecessor 
regarding community. The primary “openness” to the other makes it possible for shared vision 
and shared ideals – especially the ideals of the “true” and the “good”. This openness is then an 
aperture towards truth and goodness both in the individual and the community.  
While views of what constitutes the “common good” may vary across culture but it is not 
in doubt that without openness and trust, a common notion of the common good cannot be 
formulated and affirmed by all within a given group or collectivity. Where such division exists, 
distortion persists, and therefore there can neither be an authentic community nor a relevant 
moral voice. The reason is simple: the moral voice is the expression of the moral unity of a given 
community. It encapsulates the community’s moral vision and points towards the ideal 
community it envisages. Our natural orientation towards the ideal of the true and the good is an 
internal proof there is in us an aperture towards transcendence. We have noted the integral 
connection between transcendence and conscience. According to Ratzinger, “what characterizes 
man as man is not that he asks about the ‘can’ but the ‘should’ and that he opens himself to the 
                                               
575 Ibid. p. 249 
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voice and demands of truth.”576 It is this capacity for truth that Ratzinger considers “a limit to all 
power and a guarantee of man’s likeness to God,” the proof of which we see in the martyrs who 
were “witnesses of conscience.”577 It is about the “should” that this research is concerned.  
Though Ratzinger observes the traditional distinction between two levels of conscience (see 
chapter two for synderesis and conscientia), he however prefers to replace synderesis with 
anamnesis. This platonic concept he considers not only “philosophically deeper and purer” but 
also in tune with the critical “motifs of biblical thought and anthropology”.578 He argues that the 
concept of “anamnesis” is in sync with Paul’s use of it in his letter to the Romans:  
When Gentiles who have not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to 
themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show what the law requires is written on 
their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness…” 579 
 
He goes on to quote Basil who said that the “love of God” is a necessity imposed by our rational 
nature rather than a discipline imposed by external circumstance. This “spark of divine love” is 
an inherent capacity given to us by God to enable us to obey Him. This is what makes it possible 
for us to distinguish the “good” and the “bad”. He then argues: 
 This means that the so-called first ontological level of the phenomenon of conscience consists in 
the fact that something like an original memory of the good and true (they are identical) has been 
implanted in us, that there is an inner ontological tendency within man, who is created in the 
likeness of God, towards the divine. From its origin, man’s being resonates with some things and 
clashes with others. This anamnesis of the origin, which results from the god-like constitution of 
our being, is not a conceptually articulated knowing, a store of retrievable contents. It is, so to 
                                               
576 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, On Conscience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press), p. 29 
577 Ibid. p. 30 
578 Ibid. p. 31 
579 Romans 2:14-15 cited by Ratzinger, On Conscience, p. 31 
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speak, an inner sense, a capacity to recall, so that the one whom it addresses, if he is not turned in 
on himself, hears its echo from within. He sees: That’s it! That is what my nature points to and 
seeks.
580
 
The above encapsulates all that is vital to this research regarding “anamnesis of origin”. 
As our title for this segment indicates, we are applying this anamnesis of origin (“original 
memory of the good and true”) to not just the individual person but even more critically to the 
moral community. We argue that it is not just the individual that recalls within oneself this 
“original memory of the good and true” but the community as well. Every community at some 
point in their history necessarily needs to retrieve this original idea of what the “good and true” 
is or should be especially when there is evident signs it has become either distorted or 
ambiguous. Obviously, in line with the insight we gleamed from Wojtyla on the I-thou 
relationship above in the constitution of the community, it is to the degree the individual subjects 
of the community are open to themselves and each other would the possibility of a shared vision 
of the good and true be realized. It is the degree of openness to the good and true of each subject 
that enables or triggers a “recall” of it within oneself and the subsequent openness to each other 
(and one another) results in a shared vision (without) of what they have gleamed from within. 
The closer the relationship, the deeper the trust and the bond of unity witnessed in the 
community. 
 Ratzinger stresses the significance of the relationship between the “within” and “without” 
when he assert there exists a “constant dialogue between the within and the without.”581 He 
argues in reference to the “Christian memory” which though is “always learning” but also 
                                               
580 Ratzinger, On Conscience, p. 32 
581 Ibid. p. 35 
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“distinguishes from within what is genuine unfolding of its recollection and what is its 
destruction and falsification.”582It is only from the purview of this within-without dialogue that 
he locates the proper role of the papacy and the Church in its role and authority to teach and 
educate the Christian conscience. He insists that the anamnesis of the good and true that is 
“instilled” in our nature (within) needs the “assistance from without so that it can become aware 
of itself.”583 Therefore, the power exercised by the Pope is merely the power of being an 
“advocate of the Christian memory” which he never imposes from without but “elucidates” and 
“defends it”.584  He then concludes that “all the power that the Papacy has is the power of 
conscience”.585 It fights against all that threaten to destroy this memory – especially the 
“subjectivity forgetful of its own foundation,” and the “pressures of social and cultural 
conformity.”586The foregoing on the papacy is not only a powerful claim but it provides an 
equally powerful insight. It underscores not only the significance of conscience for Christian 
faith but even more so at a broader level of the equally “sacred mores” that hold society together.  
If “pagans” (according to Paul) “have the law written in their hearts” as a proof of God’s 
divine imprint, their articulation of the “good and true” remains sacred memory even though, as 
Ratzinger observes with respect to Christian memory, is constantly in need of purification and 
expansion. This is why we insist on the power of the moral voice of the community not only for 
the development of individual conscience but for its purification and preservation. It is precisely 
                                               
582 Ibid The stress is his.  
583 Ibid. p. 34 
584 Ibid. p. 36 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid.  
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the creative dialogue between the individual and community that makes the retrieval of the 
sacred imprint of the good and true possible. The ideal I is actualized only in dialogue with a 
“thou” and/or “we”. Conversely, the ideal community is realized to the degree this “creative 
dialogue” is allowed and reflectively moderated. It is captured by the category “participation” in 
Selznick’s characterization of “elements of community” above. Edward Sapir prefers to speak 
of “creative participation” between individual members as critical to realizing the “consensus” 
we call “culture” (with reference to past heritages).587 In other words, each individual plays a 
critical part in creating and sustaining the kind of society they live in or hope to live in.  
If individuals “participate” in creative dialogue aimed at building up the community, they 
impact upon it as they are impacted by it. As “responders” (who reflect on actions done to them) 
their interactivity become “creative” by first being “disruptive”.588 The “creative dialogue” we 
have in mind here is essentially critical of all status quo and all novelty. It subjects every value 
to the test of the really good and true precisely because it can recall its own memory of it only 
through creative dialogue. The “disruptive” nature of this dialogue is essential to the purification 
of both individual and collective memory of the good and true. It is the core of what it takes to 
retrieve and retain the moral voice of the community as well as purify and retain an active 
conscience. A useful illustration of such creative dialogue is one that began after the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the United States. The consumerist culture that lured millions into an 
                                               
587 Edward Sapir, “Why Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist,” In Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, 
Culture, and Personality. D. Mandelbaum, ed. (Berkeley University of California Press, 1968), p. 321 
588 We note that at the most superficial level of dialogue, mutuality is maintained only by allowing the status quo to 
be maintained – even in face of gross abuses (the common aphorism says, “don’t rock the boat”). But “creative 
dialogue” essentially “rocks the boat” because it wants to ensure that it is safe to take this boat into deeper waters. 
At this level, “creative dialogue” is first “disruptive” before it achieves “creative equilibrium” – “creative” at this 
level means what it implies: it is life-giving. Creative dialogue therefore questions all inherited ‘customs” and 
“traditions” to evaluate their truth content and value in the light of an inherent memory of the true and good.  
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incredible but totally avoidable debt was up for critical review.  It is still an ongoing process. 
Though it is unfortunate that this has to be forced upon the community by difficult life 
circumstances, but it is important to note that it is often “difficult life situations” that creates the 
conditions for calling forth the deeper inner resources that births all forms of transformation of 
individuals and cultures. The middle-east “spring” is another typical more recent example.   
In the light of the above we also argue that the “voice of God” that “echoes in our 
depths”589 (conscience) is doubly mediated by the peculiarity of both the individual and the 
community. It is not a “monotone” one hears in a solitary “pure vertical relationship” but is 
realized at the intersection of the vertical and horizontal poles of Divine-human interaction. It is 
heard as a “harmony” of voices in the midst of the moral community, and can neither be heard 
nor formed without reference to the other, a concrete community. We stress with Niebuhr that at 
the core of conscience is the approval or disapproval of my conduct based on my readings of 
“patterns of relationship”590 in a community of be-ing. Therefore without this approval or 
disapproval within a nexus of being, the “voice of conscience” will neither be formed nor could 
it be heard. It implies the sanctity of conscience has a communal basis – drawing from both poles 
of relationship.  It is “sacred” because it is essentially a “memory” of that “good” (value) which 
the community had approved and held as sacred in the past, continues to hold or forgotten to 
hold as sacred, or simply needs to learn to hold as sacred. A negation of that “good” and/or 
“value” is what each community describes as “evil” (good or bad; and right or wrong, when 
                                               
589 Gaudium et Spes, n.16 
590 R. Niebuhr explains that “my conscience represents not so much my awareness of the approvals and disapprovals of other 
individuals in isolation as of the ethos of my society, that is, of its mode of interpersonal interactions.” Eric Mount, Jr. agreeing 
with Niebuhr view but adds that “[T]he others in whose presence the self knows itself are, to a large extent, not freely chosen 
despite the attempts we make at evading the judgments of some others and our preoccupations with the judges we think we want 
to please most.” See Conscience and Responsibility, p. 57.  
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acted upon). To value this content of memory as “sacred” is to be open to community – a 
primary step to self-transcendence. It implies openness to the voice of conscience deep within 
oneself and in the voice of the moral community.  
The vertical pole (within) completes but does not replace the communal pole as another 
aperture for disclosure in the process of self-transcendence (for the individual) that both sustains 
the content of community’s sacred symbols as well as sets it up for critical review in a dialogical 
reciprocity or the “creative dialogue” that we identified as the precursor of change. This 
conjunction of openness (the vertical and horizontal aperture of disclosure), sustain the unique 
mystery each individual and his/her conscience remains as well as sustains the possibility of 
encounter with Truth. It is precisely why we can say that God speaks to us deep within our soul 
through our conscience, and the complement to this is a Nigerian (Igbo) proverb that says: [onu 
madu bu onu Chukwu] “the voice of the people is the voice of God.” God speaks to us in and 
through the community even as he speaks through us to the community as we lend our “voice” 
to the shaping and molding of our community according to the ideal community we envision 
through creative dialogue.   The role of the Church in such a dynamic is to help purify and 
maintain the quality of the moral voice of the community and of individual conscience by 
pointing both to harmonize with Gospel values. It achieves this by providing the context and 
direction of this dialogue and thus helps in the proper formation of both the individual 
conscience and that of the community. It makes sense then to affirm with Ratzinger that the 
Magisterium “has no power except that of conscience.”  
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3.7.0 SOCIO-MORAL PATHOLOGIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
One of the greatest modern tragedies on the African continent is the 1994 Rwandan fratricidal 
genocide.
591
 That such a tragedy could happen in a largely Catholic country forces a question: 
“What went wrong with the people and the Gospel?” Attempts at answering that question reveal 
how the Churches played a part in institutionalizing a “genocidal mentality” when it allowed 
itself to be immersed in the existing “divisions of a divided and stratified society.”592 The 
unfortunate result was that these tribal divisions become “baptized” and institutionalized as 
“good” in the perception of the people. This provided the Rwandan political leadership, known 
for their Catholic piety, a justification that only emboldened and reinforced their bloodlust. This 
ironical “baptism” of evil in Rwanda only repeats what we have seen somewhere else: the 
“Christianization of racial oppression” as witnessed in the United States (especially in the South) 
during its inglorious history of slavery and the bitter fight to eradicate it. The lesson is simple: 
whenever the Church immerses itself in existing divisions, uncritically assimilated ideology 
transmutes into “the Gospel” and directly or indirectly helps in institutionalizing evil, and as 
such does more harm than good over time. Therefore, a critical aspect in the process of 
incarnating the Gospel in a given context ought to begin with a proper descriptive understanding 
(a phenomenological assessment) of the socio-moral context. This is the concern that informs 
this segment of our research.    
                                               
591 We recognize similarity of this genocide to that of Burundi where minority Tusti tried to eliminate majority Hutu 
in 1973, 1988, 1993.  
592 See Ian Linden, “The Churches and Genocide: Lessons from Rwandan Tragedy,” The Month (July 1995), 261; 
Andrew Mason has argued earlier that “A group of people might count as a community in the ordinary sense but not the 
moralized sense. They might share values and a way of life, identify with the group and its practices, and regard each other 
as members, whilst systematically exploiting one another” Mason, Community, Op. Cit. p. 32 
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3.7.1    GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Socio-moral “pathology”593 is defined in this research as “diseases of the mind” that 
affect both individuals and whole communities such that it shapes behavior and attitudes that 
eventually result in great harm to others (and ultimately oneself). These “diseases of the mind” 
are revealed in actions and mental attitudes of a given person or social group that seeks to 
undermine the ultimate growth and development of another human person, a distinct group of 
persons, or the whole of the human community.  In other words, it is identifiable through actions 
and attitudes inimical to individuals, social groupings, ethnicities, nationalities. It could be 
revealed in actions and/or mental attitudes that seek to alienate rather than integrate; divide rather 
than unite; oppress rather than liberate; obscure rather than reveal; enslave rather than empower; 
kill rather than heal; destroy rather than create; corrupt rather than vivify any single member 
and/or group of the human community at any given time. In this wise, it could be revealed not 
just in actions or attitudes but in philosophies and ideologies, customs and mores, religious 
doctrines and cultural ethos that seeks to achieve any of the above negative possibilities.  
 We prefer “pathology” to vices and sins not because these latter are conceptually 
redundant or incapable of articulating the socio-moral reality we are analyzing, but because we 
consider “pathology” as not only capable of provoking attention to a modern audience it also 
conveys a nuance of meaning to an increasingly secular society deaf to any notion of vice and/or 
sin. Moreover, the notion of “pathology” refers to the “origins of a disease” and/or any deviation 
                                               
593 Steven J. Bartlett provides a deep and broad historical analysis of this concept and its appropriateness in 
understanding moral evil in contemporary culture. He distinguishes “lanthanic, chronic, active, and acute as degrees 
of pathology, where “lanthanic” represents ignorance of a disease that is present which makes it even more 
dangerous depending on the nature of the disease. See The Pathology of Man, Loc. Cit., pp.13-67, at 40 
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from a healthy, normal, or effective condition that we consider functionally more effective in 
conveying a sense of what is happening to the community as a socio-moral entity.  
 We started this chapter by pointing to the universality of moral corruption. We have 
distinguished the constitution of “communities” as against “contractual societies” and their 
implication for moral responsibility. Our analysis shows that “societies” by promoting 
“individualism” at the detriment of “community interests” expose the human community to 
many moral dangers. In a twist of irony, African communities founded on communalism that 
stress “communal” over and above individual interests does not seem to evolve (as historical data 
shows) more altruistic minded individuals as one would expect from the foregoing analysis.  
It is a fact that the continent has produced an unprecedented number of leaders and/or 
dictators whose greedy appetite proved to be insatiable. They pillaged their people’s resources 
(and are still doing so!) showing neither pity for the suffering masses nor any evident care of the 
common interest of the people they serve.
594
 They accumulate unbelievable wealth and live in 
equally incredible opulence even as the rest of their tribe and fellow countrymen wallow in 
poverty and destitution. Some own whole estates and live in expensive mansions that would be 
the envy of many ancient and present monarchs while their people still live in sharks. Some have 
fleets of “private jets” and most boast of owning not just fleets of cars but driving the best of 
exquisite cars even though the roads remain death-traps for all users and the creative imagination 
of African “geniuses” are left to rot away or leave for greener pastures abroad such that 
                                               
594 George Ayittey in a recent TED Conference characterized these leaders as the “Hippo generation” (an allusion to 
Hippopotamus) of leadership that “swallow” the resources of the land without thought to the consequences. He 
distinguished them from emerging “Chita generation” of leaders whose intent is to create wealth and grow African 
talents and resources for the common good of all.  
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innovative dreams like building the “first African car!” remains a virtual impossibility in the 21st 
century. How is this situation possible?  
The hard question is, “how could a communalistic model of formation give birth to these 
monsters of selfishness?” We do not intend to offer a simplistic answer as we do recognize that 
there is no evident guarantee communalism would necessarily eradicate the native drive towards 
selfishness. The assumption is that it should mitigate it if the primary argument is true. Hence, 
the greater difficulty is coming to terms with the degree or “excessiveness” to which greed (as 
selfishness) is practiced in the continent. It is practiced to absurd proportions in Nigeria. In 
contradistinction to the principles of communalism enshrined in basic formation process. It is 
either something is wrong with the claims on communalism or something is wrong with the 
system. It is even possible it is both, but we prefer to stay with the later. We look for patterns 
because they provide a more objective criterion for universal application. Each community needs 
to uncover what is peculiar to their situation. But a closer look at the communalistic model 
reveals an inherent pathology one of which we will now attempt to identify and analyze. The 
Nigerian community is our chosen context. We will identify two primary pathologies (tribalism 
and superstitious mentality) as feeding other ancillary “pathologies” (like excessive greed, 
excessive materialism, corruption, cronyism, chronic fear of the unknown, witchcraft mania, 
material and spiritual dependency). These identified “pathologies” are far from exhaustive. 
Though space will only allow us an analysis of one: Tribalism, yet it provides us sufficient 
reason to argue that the communalistic model we have in Nigeria today (and Africa by extension) 
is most probably in need of critical review or reconstruction.  
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Illustration: A Map of Nigeria 
 
Source: Nations Online Project: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/nigeria_map2.htm 
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3.7.2 PRIMARY PATHOLOGIES OF THE NIGERIAN COMMUNITY 
Nigeria is a sovereign nation in sub-Saharan Africa. Its geographic coordinates are: 10 00 
N, 8 00 E. It is bordered by Niger on the North, the Atlantic on the South, Benin republic on the 
West, and Cameroon on the East. It landmass is approximately 923, 768 sq. Km.  The census 
figure of 2006 affirms that there are 150 million people in it constituted by people of different 
ethnic identities and language groups. Though political power is formerly shared among three 
main ethnic groups (Hausa, in the North, Yoruba in the South-West, and Igbo in the South-East), 
however, the reality is that there are in Nigeria today 371 identifiably distinct ethnic groups 
based on language differences.
595
 This is an incredible variation! Social scientists will have fun 
studying these variations and how they impact the constitution and dynamism of the country 
itself. These different ethnicities were amalgamated into one political unit called Nigeria by the 
British colonial power in 1914 (the Northern and Southern protectorates included all these ethnic 
nationalities). One obvious quality that this rainbow coalition bequeaths to the nation, as of 
necessity, is a strong sense of ethnic identity.  
Some argue that we do not have a nation as such but a conglomeration of ethnic 
nationalities held together by artificial cleavages. They have a valid point given that the idea of 
one nation called “Nigeria” has never been subjected to a plebiscite or referendum. Therefore, 
many of these ethnic “nationalities” feel rather coerced into a union that they have little or no 
reason to validate. An attempt was even made by the Igbos (a major ethnic group) to secede in 
1966 but resulted in civil war that Chinua Achebe, recently categorized in his latest book (There 
                                               
595 For a more comprehensive list of tribes and their locations, see “Tribes in Nigeria” published here: Online 
Nigeria.com, www.onlinenigeria.com  
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was a Country), as genocide.
596
 Since then some of the minor ethnic groups, especially the Niger 
Delta people (South-South) in whose land the Nigerian crude is mainly produced, have recently 
taken to arms and demanding the control of their oil and/or self-government that they know 
cannot be granted. Each time, political settlements and a subtle formula for power sharing have 
provided the basis for maintaining a fragile sense of peace. To then assert that the above scenario 
creates serious difficulties for nation building is at best an understatement.   
Be that as it may, the hard fact is that we have one country we can call our own. Many 
ethnic nationalities around the world passed through the anguish of years of bitter wars to form a 
country. We should consider it an advantage not to have gone through that (except for the Igbos 
who are still licking their wounds). There is a certain advantage in numbers if its potentials are 
properly harnessed for growth and development. Nigeria has the largest population in the 
continent. Evidence from history indicates that it is not the first nation to be constituted by many 
divergent ethnic groups.
597
 What is lacking is perhaps a home-grown philosophical framework 
for nation-building complete with an adequate power-sharing formula and/or a compelling 
ideology that forges the political will to freely choose to form a formidable union that will be the 
envy of the continent. It has both the human and natural resources to do so. The “pathologies” 
we now identify and describe are intended to underscore the major ailments that obfuscate the 
vision of nation building particularly in Nigeria but could be applicable elsewhere in the 
continent.  
                                               
596 Chinua Achebe, There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra, Kindle Edition (New York: The Penguin 
Press, 2012), pp. 227-241 
597 The United States, Britain, Canada, and Soviet Union are but obvious examples of nations constituted by 
divergent ethnic nationalities but were able to forge a union that benefits them.  
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3.7.3 TRIBALISM AS A PRIMARY PATHOLOGY 
I identify the fundamental cause of Nigeria’s problems as the lack of unity and solidarity of her 
peoples. Nigeria suffers from the paralysis of selfishness. She is yet to become a nation. She is, 
at best, a collection of nations, at worst, a state held together at gunpoint….In the absence of 
solidarity, and with the perpetuation of religious and ethnic divisions by some leaders, we have a 
situation where Nigerians are found to be incapable of building a just and humane nations they 
and generations yet unborn can be proud of. In a multiethnic and multi-religious land like ours, 
unity of vision and purpose is an indispensable requirement for nation building.
598
  
In the light of the above epigraph, we reach deeper to identify tribalism as the primary 
reason for “lack of unity and solidarity” in Nigeria and indeed Africa.599 It is therefore our 
answer to the question as to what constitutes the greatest obstacle to nation building in Nigeria. 
In our judgment, it is the quintessential pathology because it is at the core of how self-interest is 
unleashed on a grand scale in traditional societies. It is for that reason critical to understanding 
conscience formation as well. Note however that this research does acknowledge the value or the 
positive attributes of “tribes”. Actually some modern cooperate groups are actually being 
                                               
598 Anthony O. Akinwale, The Congress and The Council: Towards a Nigerian Reception of Vatican II (Ibadan, 
Stirling-Horden Publishers, 2003), pp. 19-20 
599 Cardinal Roger Etchegaray (Rwandan Papal envoy), pleaded that the “waters of baptism’ should be allowed to 
flow deeper than the “blood of tribalism” implying how deeply rooted this vice is. See J.J. Kritzinger, “The 
Rwandan Tragedy as Public Indictment of Christian Mission,” Missionalia 24:3, 1996, p. 345. In the Lineamenta for 
Ecclesia in Africa, the synod of bishops underscored the point of the disastrous effects of tribalism when they say, 
“ethnic divisions and tensions” can lead to “disastrous crimes,” and pleaded for a stop to “negative forms of 
solidarity” that originates from a stress on the “ethnic group.” This could be done without undermining the 
significance of ethnic groups. See Lineamenta, nos.17, 64, 67 cited by Jay, J. Carney, “Waters of Baptism, Blood of 
Tribalism,” African Ecclesia Review vol. 50 (March- June, 2008): 23-24 
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organized along tribal alliances for effectiveness.
600
 Based on our analysis in chapter two, a 
purely psychological consideration of the value of ethnic solidarities reveals that we form our 
primary identities from basic associations such as found in families and primary communities 
(our kinship relationships). The love and support that they provide us is an invaluable anchor that 
is irreplaceable in life.  
However, the notion of “tribalism” as used here has a purely negative connotation. It is a 
“disease of the mind” because it refers to an evident and unwarranted prejudice towards 
members of a different ethnicity that result in an uncritical favoring of one’s ethnic members in 
all matters, irrespective of merit, and at the detriment of others (outside one’s ethnic group). 
Like racism or xenophobia, it is prejudice based solely on ethnic difference. We consider it the 
greatest obstacle to nation building not so much for its preferences (for one’s tribe, or “in-
group”) but more importantly for its prejudices and how this feeds other major pathologies 
(especially corruption). Tribalism makes one blind to the defects and inadequacies of its own kin 
and the merits and inherent good qualities of the other tribe[s].  
Now this does not mean individuals have not formed friendships and alliances across 
tribal lines. These are exceptions. Our concern here is with the norm, not the exceptions. Tribal 
sentimentality has blinded Nigerians from identifying and harnessing the inherent strength or 
                                               
600 Dave Logan, et al, has argued in Tribal Leadership that forming tribes is almost part of our genetic code. As they 
argue, “Tribes helped human survive the last ice age, build farming communities, and, later, cities. Birds flock, 
fishes school, humans “tribe””. They would however argue that tribal culture evolve and develop in five distinct 
stages: life sucks, my life sucks, I’m Ok, you are not, we’re great, and life is beautiful. It is the role of the tribal 
leader to help each tribe upgrade from the lowest dumps to the height of achievement and as a group. This is study 
for cooperate leadership but may provide some useful insight on the inherent value of “tribes” in general. See Tribal 
Leadership: Leveraging Natural Groups to Build a Thriving Organization (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers, 
2008) p. 3+ 
253 
 
celebrating the unique gifts of the different ethnic configurations in its demography and is 
ironically impoverished by what ought to constitute its riches.
601
   
Thomas and Znaniecki argue that every cultural problem is mediated to the individual 
through his primary group by way of socialization (“social education”) such that we relate to 
others based on the attitude of our social group towards them.
602
 In other words, the 
discriminative and prejudicial attitudes towards other tribes are learnt in the bosom of the family 
and primary community. Gordon Allport writing in The Nature of Prejudice asserts as follows: 
There is one law – universal in all human societies – that assists us in making an important 
prediction. In every society on earth the child is regarded as a member of his parents’ groups. He 
belongs to the same race, stock, family tradition, religion, caste, and occupational status. To be 
sure, in our society, he may when he grows older escape certain of these memberships, but not 
all. The child is ordinarily expected to acquire his parents’ loyalties and prejudices; and if the 
parent because of his group-membership is an object of prejudice, the child too is automatically 
victimized. 
603
 
Old prejudices that are sometimes centuries old live on in the family and tribe and transferred 
consciously or unconsciously from one generation to the next without justification. We know 
that long before the European scramble for Sub-Saharan Africa, the different ethnic communities 
lived in mutual [dis]trust of other groups. Different forms of alliances (like inter-tribal marriages) 
were the primary sources of brokering peace.  
                                               
601 Peter Ekeh’s classical argument on the “two publics” (the tribe and the state) remain relevant to this issue as to 
why there is loyalty to the tribe and none to the state. But we are looking at this problem from a different lens – the 
deeper psycho-moral roots. See Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the two Publics in Africa: A Historical Statement,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History vol. 17, 1 (1975): 91-112 
602 See W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (Boston: Badger, 1918, vol. II, 
1881, cited by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice, p. 212. We acknowledge the distinction Allport made 
between “in-group” and “reference-group” where the latter is preferred to the former based on personal interests. G. 
Allport, ibid. p. 37-38 
603 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice: 25th Anniversary Edition (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 31 
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Historically, there were constant inter-and-intra-tribal aggression and war among the 
different tribes of Nigeria before and even after the arrival of the white missionaries.
604
 These old 
aggressions left deep psychical wounds and built walls of distrust and prejudice through 
generations to this day
605
 and across tribal lineages: The Igbos hardly trust the Yorubas and vice 
versa, the same could be said of the Hausa towards the Igbo and the Yoruba, and vice versa. The 
same is the case with the other tribes: Ijaws for the Itshekiris, among others, often increasing in 
intensity to the degree of geographical affinity revealing its roots in old rivalry. The dynamic 
repeats itself within the tribes: there is prejudice and distrust of the Ijebu-person by non-Ijebus in 
Yoruba-land. The Onitsha man distrusts the Obosi man based on old rivalry; and the average 
Igbo person considers an Onitsha indigene as more Ika-igbo (not full-blooded Igbo) than Igbo 
and the Onitsha man looks down on the rest of Igbo land as captured by the cynicism underlying 
the phrase: “nwa onye-igbo” (child of Igbo person) often used by the Onitsha person. The same 
distrust is evident among “Ika-Igbos” of the Delta region for indigenes of Igbo-heartland.  In 
Hausa-land this dynamic is even more complex. Apart from the Hausa Fulani found mainly in 
the North-west, the North-East and North-Central are probably the most heterogeneous region in 
the entire country; and most do not necessarily consider themselves as Hausas even though they 
use Hausa language to communicate across ethnic lines (among these are the Jukun, the Tivs, the 
                                               
604 See A.A. Akande, “The Impact of Intertribal Wars on Mission Work in Nigeria,” in African Mission Report, Jan 
6, 2011; P. O. Olatokunbosun, The History of West Africa (Ilesa, Nigeria: Fatiregun Press, 1981); Ray I. Jacob, “A 
Hisotrical Survey of Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria,” Asia Social Science, Vol. 8, No. 4 (4:2012): B. Salami, “Ethno-
Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposal for New Management Strategies, European Journal of 
Social Sciences, Volume 13:3 (2010), 345-353.  
605 Many consider the root causes of present day ethno-religious violence as a more complex social political 
phenomenon. Andrew Kakabadse was cited by Meg Handley as implicating oil companies who sometimes pitch 
ethnic groups against each other for economic reasons (See Langley, “The Violence in Nigeria: What is Behind it?” 
Time Magazine, March 10, 2010.  
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kataf, the Bura, the Marghi, to name just a few). There are hundreds more.
606
 Is it possible that 
this generational rivalry and distrust could be overcome?
607
 
We noted in chapter one Thomas Hobbes’ argument that man is by nature brutish and 
wired for self-interest. He identifies three primary causes of quarrels among human tribes. 
Firstly, given that we have to compete for same resources, people invade others to dispossess 
them (personal or communal gain). Secondly, fear of losing our life and property impels us to 
constant defensiveness as a safety measure in a hostile environment. Thirdly, we take pride in the 
reputation inherent in winning wars. Gordon Allport who actually cites this argument in his 
theory of prejudice agrees with its claims but not its roots causes. He rejects the claim that 
hostility is a “root instinct” or “basic power drive” in human nature by merely pointing to wide 
spread conflicts in the history of cultures. According to him, experience and experiments point in 
a different direction – it mostly depends on the love and care children receive when they are 
little. When we watch children we notice that that what they care for is love and affection. 
Hostility only arises as a response to “frustration and disappointment.” Therefore to claim that 
“negative attitudes towards people are more basic than affiliative attitudes is to reverse the time 
sequence,” and misrepresent the order of needs as we actually find it in human nature.608  
                                               
606 See Mark Amaza, “The North that Southerners don’t Know” in Economic Confidential, May 15, 2012.  
607 The historicity of inter-tribal conflicts in Nigeria (and other African nations) provides hindsight to question some 
views that suggests African Traditional religions (and society) consider “intolerance anathema” (See E.E Uzukwu, 
God, Spirits, and Human Wholeness, p. 54) given that tribal conflict was common and there was no unifying 
political structure to test the validity of claims of tolerance in ATR across ethnicity. Moreover, it is arguable that 
“intolerance” is not implied in the “pragmatic” orientation to choice of deities among Igbos. However given that the 
Igbos are tolerant of other religions provides a basis to argue that plurality of gods helped them evolve religious 
tolerance so long as it does not interfere with what they themselves believe! 
608 See Gordon Allport, Ibid. pp. 214-5 
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However, he admits that the frustration theory of prejudice is a more probable option 
given that it admits hostile attitudes or hatred as part of our nature but makes no wild claims as to 
it being more basic than love.  He likewise admits the claims of another theory involving human 
nature that argues that “insecure” people are more prone to “develop prejudice as an important 
feature” or personality trait. He argues:  
This theory stresses the importance of early training, pointing out that most highly prejudiced 
people have lacked a secure and affectionate relationship with their own parents. For this reason, 
or others, they grow up craving definiteness, finality, authority in all their human relationships – 
and this pattern lends them to exclude and fear groups that seem less familiar and safe than their 
own.
609
 
 
In the light of the above we might need to raise some critical questions. If we need to trace the 
roots of wide spread prejudice as found in tribalism, we should critically evaluate not just the 
rational for recycling old rivalry that have lost their relevance in the present dispensation, but 
even more pertinently our basic childhood formation.
610
  
Generational transfer of hostility between tribes may in large part provide clues to 
tribalism but poor child rearing practices could trigger other ills that find expression in excesses 
relating to greed, power, and sex that we see exhibited daily by our leaders. One obvious 
question is “How adequate is the model of child rearing in Nigeria/Africa?” This research does 
not intend to answer this question for obvious reasons of scope. However, just a cursory 
                                               
609 Gordon Allport, Ibid. p. 216 
610 There will be obvious attack on such views as this due to a skewed logic that sees every criticism (internal or 
external) as a devaluation of African way of life. The reality is that a people that do not engage in self-criticism or an 
evaluation of its practices will self-destruct. An Igbo proverb says, “onye amaghi ebe mmiri bidoro maba ya agaghi 
ama ebe ono zee ya” (he who does not know where rain started beating him will not know where he was sheltered 
from it).   
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comment, apart from all that could be said in the positive, we wish to affirm that most Nigerian 
cultures still maintain that “if you spare the rod you spoil the child.”611 Many Nigerian children 
passed through (and still ongoing) very tough childhood rearing-culture that leaves one 
wondering not just the degree of psychical scars they live with but even more critical is the 
degree of affection that was (is being) imparted during the critical formation years. Add to this 
the fact that mainstream Nigerian culture does not have a habit of “verbal expression” of 
affection. Is it then not proper to ask, “if a child grows up with lots of spanking, and without ever 
hearing the parents, or anybody for that matter, say to him/her “I love you,” does this impose any 
serious defect?” If we employ the insights of our psychological analysis in Chapter two to such a 
scenario, the highly probable result would be a whole class of dysfunctions that implies equally 
dysfunctional adults: part of which includes adults perpetually in search of love but only in its 
disguises or symbols: sex, money, and power. Given what we now know of many of our leaders, 
is it not possible that their abysmal failures are rooted in morbid dysfunctions than in conscious 
choices? We hope a more extensive research be done in this area by scholars in the field of 
behavioral sciences in Nigeria/Africa.
612
 
Given scholarly consensus that there is an enormous influence of environment on who we 
become, we think it is time we begin to take this more seriously in Nigerian formation process. 
                                               
611 It is yet to be seen if this ancient wisdom is completely wrong. The present culture in the West that eschews in 
absolute terms all forms of “spanking” may be proved in time to be a mistake. We do not see any problem with a 
moderate use of spanking as part of a robust system of discipline. 
612 The Nigerian child most likely learns love through other body languages apart from speech expression. We are 
more physically (than verbally) expressive of love. What he/she lacked from verbal expression was likely 
compensated through physical expressions like “touch” (mandatory breast-feeding, backing, cuddling, etc), and the 
constant physical “presence” of the mother or the surrogate. Moreover at the present time, the verbal component is 
being added in some homes. So change is already happening.  
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For instance, it is still common practice that many children often below the age of ten serve as 
nannies, house-helps, and business helps (if you are a boy) long before they are supposed to 
leave the warmth and comfort of their parent’s homes. In chapter two we understand these to be 
critical years for formation of a variety of vital identities and affectations. Often these children 
are maltreated in their new homes. There are many horrible stories of child-abuse in the system 
and we now know its implication for malformation and development. But the practice is still a 
current reality. Even though we did not set out to analyze childrearing protocol in Nigeria but it 
does seem a passing glance at it warrants the need for a second look. There is a possibility that 
our child-rearing practices need a critical review that this research cannot offer.  
However, it is fair to argue from the above, that if prejudice results from “frustration and 
disappointment” or due to “insecurity” resulting from lack of love and affection (implying poor 
rearing practices), then, we may not have to look too far to see part of the root causes of tribal 
prejudices in Nigeria (and perhaps Africa). It is perhaps more convenient to argue simply that it 
is a socialized behavior – it is learnt through miming the prejudicial attitudes of our parents and 
older members of our tribe.
613
But we do not limit this to merely “miming” alone. Rather, we 
suggest that perhaps “insecurity” that results from poor rearing practices could add significant 
content to the peculiarity of Nigerian tribal prejudices.  
Allport’s analysis of his theory of prejudice is formulated under six major headings based 
on their areas of emphasis: 1. The Historical perspective places emphasis on the historicity, and 
therefore, the specificity of each human conflict and the prejudice underlying it. The Marxist 
                                               
613 Mark Heim argues forcefully on the relationship between sin and the “mimetic character” of our nature”. See “A 
Cross-section of Sin: The Mimetic Character of Human Nature in Biological and Theological Perspective,” in 
Evolution and Ethics: Human Morality in Biological and Religious Perspective, Loc. Cit., pp. 255-269 
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strain of this argument identifies “economic exploitation” as the reason for whipping up 
prejudice and discriminative behavior (examples are the Jews under Hitler, and racist sentiments 
against Negros in the United States). While this supports Hobbes view of “rationalized self-
interest” above but it fails to account for why not all persons within the same historical context 
develop prejudice.  
2.  The Socio-cultural perspective emphasize how native fear invoked by socio-cultural 
concerns like “urbanization” results in prejudice and discriminative behavior against all 
perceived symbols of whatever monster is assumed to be responsible for destroying all that is 
familiar and secure (Jews were hated in New York at a time for serving as a “symbol of the city 
life” that is destroying long-held values). This perspective indicates a generational transfer of 
animosity; it implies that individuals inherit, assimilate or imitate the prejudicial judgments of 
their parents and ancestors. We have noted earlier the validity of this argument even as we point 
out its irrational basis.  
3.  The Situational perspective refers to theories of prejudice that place emphasis not on the 
historical past but on the present circumstances of a people. There are varieties of this argument. 
One we consider critical is “atmosphere theory” that argues that a child/adult reflects the kind of 
environment he grows up or lives in. Supposing a child did not inherit prejudice from his parents 
in the village but moving to the city, encounters a different mindset, one of alienation and 
discrimination, he eventually reflects what he perceives. We intend to develop further this theory 
in the next segment because of its critical importance.  
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4.  The Psychodynamic perspective is one that traces the roots of prejudice in the primary 
drive for power (or self-interest) inherent in human nature as was reflected in Hobbes’ argument 
above.  
5.  The Phenomenological perspective stress that our actions generally, not just our 
sentiments, proceed “immediately” from our “view of the situation” we confront.  This seems 
similar to the “situational perspective” above but has a phenomenological emphasis (as method) 
that makes it distinct. The two perspectives can actually be combined. Allport puts it this way: 
His response to the world conforms to his definition of the world. He attacks members of one 
group because he perceives them as repulsive, annoying, or threatening; members of another he 
derides because to him they are crude, dirty, and stupid. Both visibility and verbal labels, as we 
have seen, help define the object in perception so that it can be readily identified…. Obviously, 
the stereotype plays a prominent part in sharpening the perception prior to action.
614
 
This perspective does illuminate some aspects of our peculiar context. For instance, some 
Igbo people are often puzzled by the degree of hostility and prejudice that they perceive from 
other tribes. Perhaps this provides opportunity for introspection on possible unwholesome 
cultural attitudes that may be peculiar to them that other tribes consider “repulsive, annoying, or 
threatening.” The same is true for other tribes. Such discovery could perhaps lead to targeted 
civic education aimed at eliminating one root cause of tribal prejudice.  
As an example, it is a self-evident truth that the average Igbo person is achievement 
oriented, and so he works very hard, is rugged and can succeed in the most difficult conditions, 
travels wide in search of opportunities, is a developer (makes a home where he goes), and is very 
generous to causes he subscribes to (especially to his religious community). This is perhaps why 
they constitute (as individuals) the single most successful major block of people in Nigeria. 
                                               
614 Allport, Ibid. p. 216 
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However, the average Igbo person is also known to be rather crude, obnoxious, confrontational, 
as thrifty as the Jew, and most Nigerians will add, he has a vexing “I too know” mentality. 
Obviously, these are neither qualities that nurture inter-tribal relations nor any relation for that 
matter.
615
Despite this, it is still to their credit that they seem to get along well with others given 
that they are widely travelled and virtually inhabit most corners of the country and the globe. A 
saying in Nigeria is, “where an Igbo-man does not survive, nothing can survive.”  
6. Earned Reputation perspective traces the causes of prejudice to the “stimulus object” 
as such. Given that “reputation” could be either “earned” or gratuitous and as such “unmerited,” 
an “interaction theory” tries to link them. It argues that prejudice may result out of genuine 
differences or “realistic estimates of the stimulus (the true nature of groups)” and in part from 
“irrelevant” factors (like “scapegoating, conformity to existing tradition, stereotypes, guilt-
projection,” among others).616 There is evident prejudice, at least in the south of Nigeria, that the 
North enjoys too many unmerited privileges. Southerners argue that they had free education 
offered by government, yet they were literally begged to go to school. They claim leadership of 
the country as their “inheritance”617 (from the British colonial regime) and have actually held 
                                               
615 We do not have the resources to make any serious analysis of the characteristics of the different tribes here. It 
will mean volumes of work. But suffice it to say in passing that the average Yoruba comes across as intelligent, a 
lover of life, with a flowery, flamboyant attitude to life similar to a sanguine personality. At the same time, he is 
loquacious and/or boastful, seemingly lazy, and rather slippery such that it is common to hear, at least among the 
Igbo, that “a Yoruba person cannot be trusted.” The average Hausa comes across as affable, amiable, truthful, 
simple-minded, simple lifestyle, but at the same time, he comes across as lover of idleness, anti-education, irrational, 
uncritical, easily irritated or sentimental, and prone to religious fanaticism. Evidently, these are but very broad 
classifications over an amazingly heterogeneous demographic. But it does help to really identify how we ordinarily 
see ourselves if we are to understand how to purify our perceptions in order to relate better across tribal lines.   
616 Allport, ibid. p. 217 
617 Mallam Maitama Sule, in a speech “Why the North Leads” at his book launch has this to say, “Now this is it. We 
the Hausa/Fulanis are chosen specially by God to rule. No apologies to the Yorubas, no apologies to the Igbos. And 
thank goodness the minorities are not in doubt about this matter. All the same no apologies to them either. Our 
mandate to rule this country derives from the ‘tacit approval’ of God….The Igbo man like the Indians will sooner 
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that leadership (often by force of military dictatorships) longer than the south and as a result 
cornered many government privileges that the Southern tribes consider unwarranted especially 
given that the oil money that lubricates those privileges come from the South. In other words, 
they argue that the North adds nothing to the common purse but takes the bulk of federal 
earnings. The South-Easterners consider themselves as being systematically marginalized since 
after the civil war (1967-70) and they have strong evidence to prove it. The South-Southerners, 
from where all the oil is produced, have never been in power (except by “accident” of history 
with Goodluck Jonathan)
618
 and they have since taken up arms to redress what they perceive as 
monumental marginalization. These are partly the “stimulus” that provide some complexity and 
a nuanced perspective to tribal prejudice in Nigeria.  
We noted above that TRIBALISM is identified in this study as a social “pathology” 
partly because it conveys the idea of “roots” of a disease. It is a sociological DIS-EASE with 
others that has moral roots and implications: through discrimination and alienation it not only 
disrupts social relationships but actively fosters passive-aggressive behavior that is at the root of 
violent eruptions that was the reason for inter-tribal wars in all cultures, and more recent 
                                                                                                                                                       
take a ‘shop’ than he will a ‘post’. To him, the ‘ego’ (money) of the market is worthier than the ego (pride) of the 
office. He would rather cut your throat in the open market than cut the public purse in the inner recess of an office. 
So you can see the Igbos and the Yorubas are not only followers by inspiration, they are by no means meek. The one 
is un-meeked by its polytheism as the other is shrewd by entrepreneurialism. We Hausa/Fulanis are the only ‘God-
chosen’ inspired by Almighty Himself to rule. It is not of our making. We are only fulfilling God’s will on this side 
of the earth….So the earlier the Igbos, the Yorubas and the madding minorities come to terms with this ethereal 
reality, the better for the country….As for us, we swear by the ‘Mount of Sinai’ and we swear by the ‘Sea of 
Galilee’ that we will not shirk from our God-given responsibility. WE WILL KILL, WE WILL MAIM AND WE 
WILL BANISH ANY PEOPLE WHO DARE TO STAND BETWEEN US AND THIS COVENANT. Forget about 
rotational presidency. That is bullshit! We are the medium through which God’s kingdom on this earth shall come to 
pass. Jure divino!” This is cited by Adedapo Adeniran Esquire, Nigeria: The Case of Peaceful and Friendly 
Dissolution (Lagos, Nigeria: Arymson Publicity, 2008), pp. 78-79, 82. 
618 Goodluck Jonathan was the vice-president who coincidentally became the president after Shehu-Musa Yaradua 
died in office. He eventually stood for election as an incumbent and won, thus becoming the first elected president 
of Nigeria from the South-South or Niger Delta region.   
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Rwandan genocide (among others). It is also considered a socio-moral pathology in this study 
because it etches the idea of self-interest deeper within the psyche of its victims by emphasizing 
how we are different rather than how we are similar with others.
619
 
Tribalsim feeds on “distrust” of others outside of one’s kin. In so doing, it activates more 
readily the basic insecurity and fear in all humans that drive them toward self-preservation – but 
the “self” now becomes more and more exclusively defined (the less of others, the better). It is 
not surprising then, that it ultimately leads to distrust of all – including, in some cases, the tribe! 
It is a psycho-social pathology precisely because it is rooted in native insecurity that considers 
“outsiders” as threats to its wellbeing. It creates a false reality. Though it’s basic philosophical 
roots could be claimed to be utilitarian, but without utilitarian fine points that includes the 
greatest number. Tribalism is pathetically exclusive. It is basic self-interest that manipulates 
kinship solidarity as a means to its ends. It is evident then why it deforms rather than forms 
conscience – it hinders the primary capacity of conscience as a natural self-transcending 
mechanism for moral consciousness.   
  Tribalism is then the crudest manifestation of self-interest at the group level. It has 
enormous implications for social disintegration. In Nigeria it is at the root of mediocrity and 
inefficiency in government because positions are often filled based on tribal sentiments rather 
than reasons of merit. There have been too many cases of incompetent persons put in sensitive 
positions because he is from a particular tribe while more qualified persons go without job. It is 
at the root of so much looting (or corruption) we see in Nigeria (and Africa) – some of which are 
                                               
619 Richard Baxley has argued forcefully how M. Gaddafi played-up tribal sentiments to rule Libya but in the event 
of the Arab Spring, the different tribes that were marginalized became the first to defect to the rebels. See “Shifting 
Loyalties: Libya’s Dynamic Tribbalism,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 33, 2 (2011).  
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not just ridiculous but borders on insanity. Political office instead of being considered an 
opportunity to serve is rather an opportunity “to grab” a portion of the “national cake” for oneself 
and for one’s tribe. In this irrational mindset, a looting spree ensues with no vision as to the 
future of the commonwealth or the common good.
620
  
A typical example is the present situation in the North where masses of young people, 
who were deliberately left uneducated by a succession of their leaders, are massively 
unemployed, and have now become hordes of beggars. But their “big brothers” were the leaders 
of yesterday
621
 who instead of investing the resources of state to develop the North, looted them 
and are still sitting on their loot and living like princes in the midst of harrowing want and 
misery. The political elites of the North would prefer to provide periodic “hand-outs” to their 
beggarly brothers than create opportunities for them to become self-reliant and independent. The 
destitution of these jobless youths ensures and perpetuates their dependency which is further 
exploited at will by the same elites for political and religious purposes.  
Therefore, it could be argued that tribalism, which is very strong in the North (among the 
Hausa Bakwai or Fulani) has been faithfully promoted and exploited for political purposes by the 
Northern elites (and/or oligarchies). And religious fanaticism in the North is primarily a 
politically motivated strategy that exploits native “tribalism” at the level of religion. The only 
difference is that “kinship” is more narrowly defined to exclude non Moslems. The constant 
mayhem and horror we experience now in the North unleashed on Christians is the brainchild of 
                                               
620 See Geoffrey Mwakikegile, Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria (Huntington, N.Y: Nova Science Publisher, 
2001), p. x; Rotimi Suberu, argues for true federalism as holding to key to Peace, See Federalism and Ethnic 
Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2001).  
621 The North ruled Nigeria (often by force of arms) for 39 years out of 50 years since independence! 
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similar violence unleashed on non-Northerners for political reasons in the past. It is the seed of 
acute tribalism. There is therefore a unique variation of tribalism practiced in the North. It is a 
political tool for grabbing and maintaining power by the political elite. It retains a stranglehold 
on power by a callous calculus of disempowering hordes of poor and unthinking masses of 
people. It is not an accident that the greatest fear of Northern oligarchy is the enlightenment of 
the masses of its people. So, it discouraged formal education, but encouraged religious education 
that brainwashes any vestige of the capacity for critical thinking these folks might have. This 
ensures their ultimate submission as the “will of Allah!”  
How can a coherent notion of nationhood be articulated in a situation where most are 
after a narrow self-interest? Is it possible to build a strong and vibrant nation with a bunch of 
tribes all seeking how to out-smart the other in getting a slash at the national cake? At best it will 
be a marriage of convenience that is forever perching at the edge of disintegration. The little 
gains of tribal solidarity are not sufficient to build a viable commonwealth. One needs to give 
way to the other.  
It is pertinent to stress that tribalism, as a socialized behavior, is realized only through a 
deformation of conscience. Conscience, we have maintained, is the natural mechanism for self-
transcendence or the internal mechanism for moral sanctions. But its formation depends on the 
external structures (family, community). Here we see the power of the primary group in the 
formation of conscience. If a child grows up experiencing discriminatory behavior or prejudice 
towards those of other tribes (or by extension, religion), its conscience becomes deformed by 
reason of a distortion not just in its principles of judgment but often in the reasoning process 
itself. The reason being that there is firstly, a distortion of reality itself, which then supports a 
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distortion of primary principles of reason (or logic): “Those outside my tribe are not ‘one of us’ 
and those ‘not one of us’ are not to be trusted; Mr X is not one of us. Therefore, Mr X is not to 
be trusted.” The same delusion and distortion repeats itself at the level of religion: “Those not 
members of my religion are ‘not one of us,’ and those that are ‘not one of us’ have no intrinsic 
right to live; Mr X is not a moslem. Therefore it is right to ‘eliminate’ Mr X. The first premise is 
loaded with all forms of misinformation that results in a socialized narrowing of the mind to see 
and judge others differently.
622
 It is here precisely that ‘conscience’ is primarily deformed by 
mis-education which eventually learns to reason in a distorted manner unless a reverse 
socialization (re-education) occurs.  
What are the solutions to eradicating this socio-moral virus? It is evident from the 
foregoing that it is possible to reverse the form of reasoning associated with tribalism only by a 
proper formation of conscience that happens if and only if there is proper re-education or 
socialization aimed at not “seeing others differently” but as a “WE”. Others are my other-
SELVES and without whom I cannot possibly arrive at my fullest potentials. So, the first 
solution is reformation of conscience through the same socialization process that formed it. But 
the form of education we advocate is not just one that is left to merely the free choice of willing 
members but rather one that is realized through a legislative mandate. It is to be taught 
mandatorily in all schools. For this to happen especially in the North, a massive grass-root 
conscientization drive is required.  
                                               
622 We consider the foregoing as the aboriginal roots of all conflict we see in Nigeria that provide the psycho-moral 
background for other viewing, interpreting, and responding to other social, political, and religious experiences.  
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The second solution is a stronger legislation against discrimination with a constituted 
body to ensure its implementation across the nation. Gordon Allport considers legislation as one 
of the remedies to discrimination not only because it prevents people from acting out their 
prejudice, but that in the long run, it also affects mental attitudes.
623
 Legislating against racism in 
all its forms was and still remains the most effective tool in combating it as evidence shows in 
the U.S.A. and South Africa. It is surprising that there is hardly any outstanding legislation 
against tribalism in Nigeria.
624
 Ironically, Nigerians fought as a nation against racism (apartheid) 
in South Africa, and Nigerians in diaspora today fight against “racist sentiments” in the United 
States, Britain, or anywhere they find themselves around the developed world. But they are silent 
with regard to tribalism at home. Why? This ‘silence’ is part of the problem. It indicates we live 
in denial of this monstrous “elephant in the room.’  
We therefore recommend national dialogue on tribalism as the third solution. This brings 
this monster out of our mental closet (our subconscious) to national consciousness. Through 
open national dialogue we expose its ills, arrest the canonizing of tribalistic practices, and 
perhaps gradually develop a real national consciousness that so far is virtually nonexistent. Even 
more pertinent is the fact that this dialogue will trigger conscience reformation at a national level 
(a re-socialization process) because it helps open-minded members of the different tribes to have 
a rethink of their primary assumptions that everything about “my tribe” is sacrosanct. It forces us 
to reevaluate the possible “gains” of tribalism against that of a de-tribalized nation where 
everyone counts, and resources are used to develop every part of the country. The National 
                                               
623 Gordon Allport, Op. Cit., p. 477.  
624 There is a legislation against discrimination 
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Youth Service Corp (NYSC) was a laudable project aimed at national integration but because it 
was erected on a creaky foundation, it could not achieve its objective. Many Southerners now no 
longer want to be sent to the North for fear of their lives. A dialogue directed at the ills of 
tribalism, taught in schools, and punished by law, will transform ethnic consciousness to a 
national one if we commit to it. So, unless we are ready to consciously take the risk of building a 
viable nation that we will be proud of (it will most probably experience setbacks) we will remain 
in our tribal cocoons, afraid of each other, demonize or cannibalize each other, and incessantly 
compete for the “national cake” till we self-destruct and/or disintegrate.  This paper does not 
have the luxury of arguing for a rationale for staying as one nation.
625
  
The foregoing analysis of deep-rooted tribalism questions the claims of “communalism” in 
Nigeria (and Africa) as a “way of life” given that it does not seem to go skin deep to 
accommodate other tribes. This superficiality is revealed firstly in relationships with other tribes 
and subsequently with regard to one’s own kin – where greed proves to take no hostages as we 
shall see in our analysis of corruption.
626
 In Chapter five we will explore more on “solutions,” 
                                               
625 Adedapo Adeniran has argued forcefully in his book Nigeria for a “peaceful and friendly dissolution”. While we 
respect his salient reasons, we however prefer the bigger picture that sees ‘strength in numbers’. America’s strength 
is not just in the diversity of its demography but in its numbers as well. If Nigeria fails as a Nation, it is not only the 
failure of a nation but of a race. If a nation with an unprecedented array of bright minds like Nigeria cannot mobilize 
the intellectual and political resources to build and sustain the largest black nation in the world, then, it is the final 
proof that the black man cannot lead himself. The global consequences of a failed Nigeria are too dire to be 
contemplated simplistically or allowed to happen.  See A. Adeniran Esquire, Nigeria: The Case for Peaceful and 
Friendly Dissolution, Op. Cit.  
626 The depth of this superficiality is even more pronounced if we are to consider the degree to which people 
victimize their own kin through real or imagined witchcraft or sorcery, a dimension that runs so deep that the fear 
(phobia) it generates constitutes a dimension of pathology that has eroded the psyche of an average Nigerian 
(African) perhaps like no other phenomenon does. See for example, Misty L. Bastian, “Vulture men, campus cultists 
and teenage witches: Modern magic in Nigerian popular media,” in Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: 
Modernity, Witchcraft and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa, edited by Hennrietta L. Moore and Todd Sanders (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 71-96. Paradoxically, this phobia has increased exponentially with the advent of 
Evangelical Christianity (Penticostalism) that evolved a culture of feeding the people on this fear as a membership 
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but let us now examine how a strain of tribalism as an international pathology is localized by the 
phenomenon of globalization.  
3.8.0 CONSCIENCE AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 
This last segment of this chapter finds a link not just between globalization and conscience 
formation, but even more important is how it links tribalism and globalization to underscore its 
impact in conscience deformation. This conclusion is deducible from the foregoing segments. 
We have established that there is an integral connection between conscience formation and the 
moral community. If we concede to the symbiotic relationship of all things, or at least minimally 
admit of the interconnectivity between the global and local community, as globalization 
indicates, then, it becomes reasonable (if not self-evident) to argue that the global impacts the 
local (and vice versa, but not to the same degree) analogous to how the community impacts the 
individual, and the individual impacts the community. We intend to show there is an 
interpenetration of the global in the local such that not only is a virtual community discernible 
but that its “transformative powers” have significant consequences (good and bad) for moral 
formation that is often underestimated.
627
 Given the elusive nature of the concept of globalization 
and the wide spectrum it covers, we need to delineate the aspect of it that concerns this study.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
strategy. This phenomenon will be examined in post-doctoral research on the theme: “Religious fanaticism in 
Nigeria: It Moral, Political, and Economic Origins.” 
627 Manfred B. Steger asserts, “Indeed, the transformative powers of globalization reach deeply into the economic, 
political, cultural, technological, and ecological dimensions of contemporary social life.” See Globalization: A Short 
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), preface.  
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3.8.1 Defining Globalization 
Globalization is a social phenomenon with economic, political, environmental, religious, 
cultural, and ideological dimensions. It therefore necessarily “extends beyond any particular 
academic discipline,” and as such provides great opportunity for inter-disciplinary 
conceptualization of this complex phenomenon.
628
However, this extensiveness does pose a 
clarity problem. Manfred Steger rightly observes that “globalization” has been applied in 
describing “a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age” as “competing labels” that 
when conflated (for instance, conflating “process” and “condition”) obscure rather than clarify 
its meaning.
629
 In an attempt to differentiate, he suggests “globality” as a term that signifies a 
“social condition” and “globalization” as signifying “social processes.”630For him, “globality” is 
not a static condition but a future oriented social condition “characterized by tight economic, 
political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make most of the currently 
existing borders and boundaries irrelevant.”631 As such it is liable to evolve into something else 
(like “planetarity” that expresses a condition of “colonization of our solar system”), making it 
rather “indeterminate”.632 He imagines different value specifications driven by either an 
individualistic or communal and/or cooperative norms as possible social manifestations of 
globality.  On the other hand, the concept of “globalization” refers to “a set of processes that 
appear to transform our present social condition of weakening nationality into one of 
                                               
628 M. B. Steger, Ibid  
629 Steger, ibid., p. 8 
630 Steger, ibid., p. 8-9 
631 Ibid. p. 8 
632 Steger, Ibid. pp. 8-9 
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globality.”633 He considers the “shifting forms of human contact” at the core of globalization 
such that an affirmation of globalization necessarily implies denationalization, a movement 
towards “postmodern globality,” and basically futuristic.634 We assume that it is the “social 
process” that brings about the “social condition.” The former is on-going and while it determines 
the later, both are ever evolving and therefore fluid and/or non-static.    
He suggests a definition of globalization as, “the expansion and intensification of social 
relations and consciousness across world-time and world-space.”635He distilled four elements 
from other definitions of globalization: firstly, it involves creating of new and multiplication of 
the existing social networks and activities. He then uses the idea of “global imaginary” to refer 
to the growing awareness that we all belong to a global community. He thinks that as this grows, 
it weakens the local and national imaginary and as such “destabilizes and unsettles the 
conventional parameters within which people imagine their communal existence.”636  
 What we affirm from Steger above is the dynamic nature of the concept of globalization. 
It is intrinsically a “process” and therefore an evolving phenomenon. We have no problem 
adopting his definition for functional reasons (“the expansion and intensification of social 
relations and consciousness across world-time and world-space”). We also acknowledge as 
helpful the insight in the distinction he makes between globality and globalization as social 
                                               
633 Steger, Ibid. p. 9 
634 He argues that globalization implies three assertions: first, a gradual abandonment of modern nationality, second, 
a gradual movement towards the new condition of post-modern globality; third, we are not there yet. See Steger, 
Globalization, p. 9.  
635 Steger, p. 15.  
636 Steger, p. 10.  
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condition and process respectively. However, the critical point he makes is how globalization, as 
a process of intense social relations, is transforming our consciousness such that “national 
imaginary” is being displaced by a global one as people gradually realize we belong together to a 
“global community.” This transmutation of national to “global imaginary” maybe gradual but 
have the potential to transform how we view ourselves. There are two aspects: A perception of 
the world skewed in favor of defined private interests of a few and a more inclusive view - one 
that sees the bigger picture of an emerging global community and works towards a more 
egalitarian society. Globalization is being shaped today by these opposing forces with 
interlocking interests.
637
  
Our concern here is not so much how globalization unfolds as it is about stressing the 
significance of “tribal interests” in shaping that process.  Specifically we identify these 
international “tribes”638 as the multi-national corporations whose interests the political powers 
in the developed world (in Europe and North America) often work hard to protect through local 
and international legislation and specific foreign policy agenda.
639
 The political and economic 
forces that have consistently tried to shape world events in order to protect their “strategic 
                                               
637 Some literatures on the part of those who prefer a more egalitarian society in a globalized world include: Jean 
Houston who argues that there is an ongoing “repartnering” of the self that results in a shift towards a new way of 
being community (“epigenesis of society”) in a global society. See Kosmos, fall, 2009:10; J. B. Quilliigan makes a 
case for “global common goods,” and Mark Gerzon argues for “global citizenship,” Walter J. Hickel points to the 
“rise of the commons,” and R.D. Hames argues for a shift from the industrial to the “Gaian Paradigm”. See Kosmos, 
Fall, 2009: 5+ 
638 We use the term “tribe” for these international players for functional reasons alone. They represent how similar 
“interests” bond people towards a common agenda. Such common interests link multinational companies and their 
home governments to pursue a relatively common policy agenda aimed towards common economic goal.  
639 There are too many resources on this topic. See for instance, Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the PostColonial 
World: The New Political Economy of Development (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 
2001), pp. 46, 89, 144-162, 173-195; Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of 
State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 134-274; Walter Rodney, How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa (Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1982), pp. 95-113, 205-280  
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interests” see globalization as a potential tool for achieving their primary goals which remains 
unchanging: maximizing economic and political dividends.  
The special interests that drive cooperate agenda of multinational companies and foreign 
policies of governments is as pathological as the tribal interests of different ethnic groups in 
relation to the common good of a given nation (like discussed above). If this agenda is solely 
driven by profit and at the detriment of the opposing party in the relationship, then the 
underlying drive is pathological. The reason is simple: their interests blind them to the harm they 
cause not just to the “other” party but to themselves (in the long run) analogous to what we’ve 
seen in our analysis of tribalism above. They only see the other party as “wholly other” (an “out-
group”) and very different from themselves. Blood kinship is displaced by “interest” kinship 
(profit). All tribalism is about preserving native interests. Therefore, a person who belongs to an 
“international tribe” has the same basic psycho-moral orientation as the local bigot. Both are 
blinded by self-interests. The only difference is location. The former has a wider extension of 
influence (international); the latter is a local player.  
We therefore consider any form of orientation to international relations that is based 
solely on profits and at the detriment of the opposing party as a distinct form of tribalism – 
“international tribalism.” Given that it is about identifying and preserving native interests at all 
costs, it finds “kindred spirits” (those who share similar interests) in every nation and locality. It 
can easily corrupt weak local leadership to act against the interests of their people for personal 
gain (in form of economic or political interests). This explains why it plays a big role in 
establishing and reinforcing corruption in any given nation or local community. The “lobby 
group” has emerged in developed nations as a non-coercive but an effective form of power 
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employed by the emergent “international tribes” to achieve its political goals at both the local 
and global arena. The political goal is always an important step towards the real goal of 
economic profit. There is therefore a significant shift in how local governments get involved in 
the interests of multinational companies. Realizing that the degree to which they exercise 
political influence at home would be the degree they would be able to make that home 
government to work for it abroad, they therefore established powerful lobbies that recruit virtual 
membership into the “tribe” of the political class by making them have “vested interests” in the 
“interests” of the tribe (the Cooperate group). Such “interests” often overrides national interests. 
There is a growing membership of this virtual tribe among the political class such that a 
significant power shift from the people to the “tribe” is becoming discernible.   
The extension of native interests across national borders describes in part the pathology 
we call international tribalism. Given that globalization enhances the interpenetration of the 
global in the local (what we call “glocalization”) it is expected that international tribalism as a 
socio-moral phenomenon may become more acute in the years ahead.  Developing nations my 
find itself enveloped by a new form of colonialism: for instance there is already a new stampede 
for African lands. We should expect to see more and more big and powerful international tribal 
interest groups exploring the loopholes (or lobby to create one) in the local legislations around 
the world to promote or preserve their interests. While the developing nations are particularly 
vulnerable to this emerging tribe, developed nations are far from immune from its fangs either. 
For instance, United States is already feeling the heat of the enormous power of lobby groups in 
influencing government policy and cultural patterns of this great model of democracy. They, 
275 
 
along with other developed nations, already find it hard to track and tax the earnings of 
multinationals.  
All tribalism (local or international) like all forms of selfishness, has a way it gets round 
to hurting itself. It is not that there is no healthy “self-interest.” What makes tribalism unhealthy 
or pathological as such is the good it denies and/or the bad it promotes in order to further its 
ends. At the local level, tribalism is blinded by prejudice to the merits of others outside the tribe, 
and does not hesitate to cause harm to them by denial of benefits or services. At the international 
level, it is blinded by desire for profit to see the harm it causes the local people or the good it 
could create among them. It is blind to the harm it causes the common good or the global 
community (including itself) in the long run. This is where the foregoing links to the formation 
of conscience – the human capacity to self-transcend or overcome self-destructive interests.  
3.8.2 Local and Global Moral Pathologies: Toxic Moral Atmosphere and Conscience 
The relationship between local and international tribalism is that both represent socio-moral 
pathology that emit toxic moral atmosphere at the local and global arena. A toxic moral 
atmosphere impact moral formation at all levels. At the local level, tribalism hinders the proper 
moral formation (conscience formation) of individual members of the tribe because they stress 
difference with others at the detriment of similarity. Stressing how others are different from us 
establishes a deep sense of distrust and makes it impossible to build deep and lasting loving 
relationships across ethnic lines. People cannot make sacrifices for one another for when there is 
no trust, there is no love. This is the seedbed for political instability in Nigeria with all its 
attendant ills. We established earlier how this feeds on, and reinforces corrupt practices. When a 
given community praises their “son” who stole millions/billions from the common purse simply 
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because he is “one of us,” it distorts the moral compass of the community and results in a 
malformation of conscience especially of its younger generation. 
 On the other hand, “international tribalism” hinders proper moral formation at deeper 
levels than it has hitherto been given credit for. It injects a toxic moral atmosphere into the local 
space in different ways. For instance, when multinational oil companies collude with local 
political leadership to ignore establishing a benchmark for developing the local community but 
instead are indifferent to the environmental hazards resulting from oil drilling, spillage, among 
others, they create not only hardship, hunger and disease, but deep discontent and animosity 
among the people. Such discontent and animosity could deepen in a globalizing world where 
information of what obtains in other parts of the world is accessible to the local people. 
Globalization enables the local community a quick and easy access to information, and when 
they realize in quick time the degree to which they have been cheated and/or looted, they are not 
expected to be happy campers, nor should they.  
Moreover, when the “international financial institutions (often beholden to the “tribes”) 
impose conditions like SAP (Structural Adjustment Programs)
640
 that create more hardship on 
the already suffering masses of ordinary people while allowing billions of dollars in looted funds 
from the same country to be banked abroad, they  exacerbate the poor economic conditions in the 
                                               
640 The IMF and World Bank imposed austerity measures called “SAP” on Nigeria in 1986, during President I.B. 
Babangida regime (1985-1993) where billions of dollars were looted out of the country (12.4 billion dollars of oil 
windfall remains unaccounted for as the report of the “Okigbo Panel of Inquiry” got missing. By the time 
Obasanjo’s regime (1999-2007) negotiated settling our debtors in 2005, the facts were mind bugling as captured by 
a newspaper editorial recently: “Whereas all that we borrowed and for which we had repaid over $40 billion while 
still owing $35 billion by 2004, was less than $18 billion; now we owe $6.2 billion that will, according to DMO, rise 
to $9.02 billion by year end and $16.76 billion by 2015.” Is this believable by any logic? But these are realities some 
“developing nations” go through. See Punch editorial, “Onkonjo-Iwuala and the New Debt Trap,” Punch, Jan 28, 
2013, http://www.punchng.com/editorial/okonjo-iweala-and-the-new-debt-trap/ 
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local space. Capital flight increases joblessness and worsens the economic hardship of the people 
that itself creates ripples of negative effects, that includes, but not limited to, inspiring young 
people to seek abnormal or unhealthy pathways to survival. The toxicity of the moral atmosphere 
would make such criminal pathways not only an enticing option but could be interpreted 
especially in the minds of younger generation (who are more prone to peer pressure from across 
the global web) as “justified.”  
It can be argued that 419
641
 and related internet-linked criminal activities  came into force 
in Nigeria during the SAP years of Babangida’s regime, a regime that is also known to have 
legalized corruption in Nigeria. This form of making money from unsuspecting local and 
international victims exploded at a time when successive leaderships were looting the country’s 
treasury without anybody ever holding them accountable; rather, those who were benefiting from 
such corrupt governments sing their praises in public (they give them local and national titles) 
while youths graduate from the University and roam around jobless. Might is then seen as right. 
If a society (local and international) develops a habit of praising and rewarding those who do 
wrong instead of punishing them, it arrests the inherent capacities for forming consciences in its 
moral system and a culture of irresponsibility is born.  
                                               
641 “419” refers to a variation of “advance fee fraud” mail scam that has been traced back to the 19th century in the 
“Spanish prisoner” incidence. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance-fee_fraud   Coincidentally, it has been 
made popular as “419” in the modern times due to its Nigerian variation of it. It is an ironic humor that “419” 
actually is the section of the Nigerian Criminal Code that deals with “obtaining property by false pretences” See 
Nigerian Law, Part 6, Division 1, Chapter 34, section 419. It reads: “Any person who by any false pretence, and 
with intent to defraud, obtains from any other person anything capable of being stolen, or induces any other person 
to deliver to any person anything capable of being stolen, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for 
three years.”  http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20Act-Part%20VI%20%20to%20the%20end.htm 
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Moreover, if we consider again that we are “responders” to action done to us (chapter 
one) we see that irresponsibility begets irresponsibility. This is not just true at the local level, but 
even more so at the global level. The distance that used to be a factor in the principle underlying 
the idiom: “the chickens have come home to roost” is virtually overcome by globalization. 
Therefore, at no time in the history of humanity does the flipside of the golden rule have greater 
implication: “do not do unto others what you will not want done to yourself.” Globalization 
enables both the affirmation and contravention of this principle to a degree that is unprecedented. 
 We are witnessing the rise of “fringe” groups: characterized by the use of their 
talent/resource base to fight causes they believe in: “Activists,” “Terrorists,” “Wikileaks” 
“Hackers Anonymous,” to name only a few, are merely harbingers of the future of protests. 
Technology has not only enabled us to see how we are connected, but ensures we impact each 
other accordingly. It is perhaps only a matter of time for the emergence of a more sophisticated 
fringe “experts international” who are either benevolent creatures (those having lost their 
national allegiance to the “global imaginary” fight to defend the global commons from the “tribe 
of vampires”) or carnivores, an “elite killer squad” sent by their paymasters to draw the last pint 
of blood from the hapless masses already comatose at their knees.  Edward Snowden is perhaps 
an example of this mold of fringe “experts”. There are probably more waiting in the ranks. Time 
will tell wither the pendulum swings. But the confrontation seems oddly inevitable.
642
 But we 
                                               
642 Snowden recently chose SXSW for his first virtual appearance because he is already a hero among new 
generation technophiles. A Forbes report on that event shows they think the security situation is a “call to arms” for 
these technophiles. They have been “radicalized” by these conscienceless data mining and they think now that NSA 
is part of the threat model they have to fight. We are “responders” to what is done to us. See, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/03/09/why-edward-snowden-chose-sxsw-for-his-first-live-video-
appearance/ 
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affirm that the hope of humanity lies with a rediscovery of the milk of human kindness in our 
relations. We insist that this is only possible if we find ways of retrieving conscience formation.  
CONCLUSION  
We therefore conclude that if the international community recognize the symbiotic nature 
of  human relationships, admit that what happens in Africa affects all nations in the very long run 
(regardless of how long this takes effect) then governments will reconsider its policies towards 
third world nations (particularly Africa). This research is not about the details of the complicity 
of the “developed world” in the fate of Nigeria (and Africa by implication), for good or bad.643 
Rather, we prefer to argue that when “strategic self-interest” is the sole criteria for policies of 
engagement with the world outside of one’s nation (be it governments or multinational 
companies), then the “global community” loses its moral anchor or “moral voice” analogous to 
the local community that loses its moral voice for the same reasons (selfishness).  As with the 
local community where individuals develop malformed consciences, the global community that 
loses its moral voice helps form nations of “terrorists,” “scammers,” “hackers,” and “rabid 
shooters” that are fast changing the way we live.  
Considering the costs in talents and treasure (trillions of dollars, thousands of lives lost) 
of war alone, one wonders if these “reactionary wars” could not have been proactively prevented 
by a more robust and beneficent approach to foreign relations agenda by those nations that shape 
world events. The spike in these fringe elements shaping both national discourse and global 
                                               
643 See instead, Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of 
Development (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 46, 89, 144-162, 173-195; 
Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 134-274; Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington DC: 
Howard University Press, 1982), pp. 95-113, 205-280.  
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lifestyles puts a question mark not just on individual nations where they originate but more 
importantly perhaps on the principles that shapes foreign policy agenda of the international 
community and/or nations that have influenced their socio-political and economic life overtime.  
We therefore call for a paradigm shift in the underlying principles guiding foreign 
policies of these nations (all nations that are classified as “developed world”).  The signs indicate 
the trajectory of human history is about to experience a monumental shift.  Moreover, the 
shifting nature of international crime reveals reciprocity of good and bad within the global 
community.
644
 Socio-economic data support this argument and current trends suggest a search 
for a new paradigm of global engagement.
645
 Though we assign the principal task of internal 
“moral reform” to Nigerians themselves we also identify how past and current policies, 
actions/inactions of the international community could trigger, galvanize, and sustain the 
momentum of that internal effort at reform or obstruct and/or slow it down.  
We call for a paradigm shift in the policy of engagement between the local and 
international community that takes seriously not just the reciprocity enabled by globalization, but 
more importantly recognizing that the benefits inherent in a robust, proactive, and beneficent 
approach to foreign relations far outweighs its demerits in the long run. Such attention sees the 
                                               
644 We note particularly the “mail scam” that began as a Nigerian “419” mutation, but has become a global 
nightmare; the new “piracy” that is becoming an international puzzle; the new face of terrorism and multi-victim 
aggression are all home-grown “bad conducts” that have now found international markets. Moreover, it is not 
particularly smart for any nation to assume they can “throw money at crime” and stop it. International scam at least 
has proved not only difficult to stop but frustratingly costly. If a nation spends more money fighting scammers than 
what is scammed, then the loss is near double. Promoting internal sanctions is always a better and smarter 
alternative to legislative approach and its implementation.  
645 Jean Houston argues that there is an ongoing “repatterning” of the self that results in a shift towards a new way of 
being community (“epigenesis of society”) in a global society. See Kosmos, Fall, 2009:10; J. B. Quilliigan makes a 
case for “global common goods,” Mark Gerzon argues for “global citizenship,” Walter J. Hickel points to the “rise 
of the commons,” and R.D. Hames argues for a shift from the industrial to the “Gaian Paradigm”. See Kosmos, Fall, 
2009: 5+ 
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wisdom inherent in a truly reformed and prosperous Nigeria (Africa), and adopts morally sound 
foreign policies rather than ones based merely on strategic self-interests that often could promote 
suffering in countries with inadequate regulatory systems that could defend the rights of the poor 
and the vulnerable. When powerful external forces prey upon vulnerable countries and 
communities consistently, disaffection is entrenched, and eventually becomes the seedbed for 
persistent national crisis in those countries and results in future global nightmares. The same 
approach holds the key to winning the war against terrorism
646
 or overcoming the horde of 
“scammers” that now throttle the globe for it addresses the root causes rather than the symptoms.   
A paradigm shift in the primary principles that define foreign policy agenda that we 
advocate is made possible when each nation opens itself to the “global heart”647 from where the 
milk of human compassion flows. Anodea Judith explains: “Each of our hearts is a cell in the 
global heart, giving and receiving love. Each time we create an act of love, we inspire others to 
do the same.”648 This also implies that each time we create an act that negatively impacts others 
we sow a seed of hate that is harvested and recycled in time. Since every moral act has its 
consequences in history (good or bad effects), it is only proper to act in such a way that we “co-
                                               
646 Anodea Judith argues for shift from “a love of power to the power of love” as the answer to all forms of violence 
in the new age of human development. She says, “Peace is a creative process of actively joining I and thou into a co-
creative we. It requires authentic communication, empathic listening, and wildly creative solutions.” She cites the 
deep incite from K. Clottey and A. Ababio-Clottey: “The holiest place on Earth is where an ancient hatred has 
become a present love.”  See Waking the Global Heart, p. 294-295 
647 Anodea Judith writes extensively on what this implies in Waking the Global Heart: Humanity’s Rite of Passage 
from the Love of Power to the Power of Love (Santa Rosa, CA: Elite Books, 2006), particularly pp. 287-328.  
648 Anodea, ibid, p. 288 (and the stress is ours).  
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create” rather than destroy. The attitude that allows us to do this is compassion, the power to 
“feel with another,” or “to feel another’s suffering.”649  
This attitude is not limited to human relations but relations to all life. Think of the impact 
of this attitude when oil companies in places like Nigeria have an inviolable policy of ensuring 
the wellbeing of the local community as a priority in all their dealings. This will not only ensure 
that the eco-system is preserved or renewed (where destroyed) but would raise the standard of 
living of these vulnerable and suffering people and in the long run, create an affection of 
friendship rather than discontent. In this way, they help in the formation of consciences in the 
people in these communities because moral responsibility begets moral responsibility and vice 
versa. The Dalai Lama observes that when compassion characterize our actions and we are 
devoted to the welfare of others we let loose a “power and potential for good” not otherwise 
possible and opens the doors of friendship with “all sentient beings”650 We will end this chapter 
with the words of Pope John Paul II who sees this “friendship” born of compassion as 
“solidarity” that is the gateway to peace and development:  
                                               
649 Ibid, p. 291 
650 Dalai Lama, How to Expand Love, translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Atria, 2005), p. 134, 
cited by Anodea Judith, Waking the Global Heart, ibid. p. 291. We add that America is leading the world in the war 
on terror. It is fast changing American lifestyle and much of the rest of the world. The answer lies not in military 
might but in redefining how America relates to the world. This provides it with an opportunity to open its heart for 
the world to fall in love with this great country again as it once did before “militarism” hijacked its foreign policy 
agenda. And behind this militarism are the “tribes” (mentioned above) whose self-interests could drive America to 
the precipice. For instance, if you listen to the on-going gun-control debate you find a sinister mentality that seems 
to prefer that over 11,000.00 Americans die (2011) in the relative “safety” of American homes and streets than stop 
the flow of guns (or profit) using second amendment as cover. If that ridiculous number of unwarranted death does 
not raise a “terror alarm” for America, one wonders what ever will since America is by all standards self-
destructing. They are dying in their thousands in their own homes in a single year more than the combined deaths 
attributed to terrorism and the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. This is astoundingly ridiculous! But nothing 
explains better the power of the new tribe. If this could happen to America, consider the fate of poor countries that 
are infinitely defenseless against this kind of cabal. A stitch in time saves nine. America needs to look inwards or it 
would definitely self-destructs, albeit gradually.   
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The solidarity which we propose is the path to peace and at the same time development. For 
world peace is unconceivable unless the world’s leaders come to recognize that interdependence 
in itself demands the abandonment of the politics of blocs, the sacrifice of all forms of economic, 
military, or political imperialism, and the transformation of mutual distrust into collaboration. 
This is precisely the act proper to solidarity among individuals and nations. 
651
 
  
                                               
651 John Paul II, “Solicitudo Rei Socialis” [On Social Concern], in Catholic Social Thought, p. 423. The stresses are 
his.  
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4.0  CHAPTER FOUR: CONSCIENCE AND SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
4.0.1   INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
In the foregoing chapters we have tried to show that conscience formation is at the root of 
moral responsibility because it functions not merely as a natural mechanism for internal 
sanctions but also provides the individual with the capacity to transcend debilitating self-interest 
that remains the albatross for moral responsibility. It enables an individual to develop a moral 
sensibility for the wellbeing of the whole community as against a fixation on narrow self-
interests. This moral consciousness to seek the good of the whole than the few is developed 
through socialization process that starts in the primary community (family, village or local 
community) as the child/individual listens to the voice of significant others (parents, caregivers, 
teachers, local religious and civil leaders). However, when the primary community fails to model 
for the child or individuals proper standards of behavior, conscience malformation occurs. We 
showed how tribalism is a psycho-moral pathology that distorts the process of moral formation at 
different levels in the Nigerian socio-moral space. As it encourages distrust of others outside the 
tribe, it pollutes the moral atmosphere that then creates disaffection across ethnic divides.  
Analogously, globalization enables international tribalism (what we identify as a form of 
“institutionalized self-interest”) to create similar disaffection in the local communities by 
adopting the policy of “divide and conquer” to achieve selfish political and/or economic ends 
(maximizing profit at the detriment of the vulnerable local people). We argued for a paradigm 
shift in the primary principles guiding foreign relations from solely “strategic self-interest” to 
one of “compassionate engagement” between equals and for the sake of the global common 
good. Such mutual partnership takes seriously the symbiotic nature of all life and the reciprocal 
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efficacy of human acts. It therefore creates peace by first creating affection of friendship through 
due diligence in acting responsibly (or with high integrity) in all its relationships with other 
nations and peoples.  
This chapter examines how the foregoing analysis provides the sufficient condition for 
systemic corruption to thrive (especially in Nigeria). While examining the nature and definition 
of corruption, differentiating “systemic” from “incidental” corruption provides some clarity to 
our theme. Ample illustrations of corrupt practices in Nigeria provide the lens through which we 
see more clearly the insights of the preceding chapters. It then becomes more lucid in this 
chapter how “institutionalized self-interest” (that we identified with “tribalism”) 652  is the oil that 
lubricates the wheels of systemic corruption locally (and globally) by destroying the foundations 
of moral formation through the distortion of basic process of forming consciences.   
Though we present systemic corruption in Nigeria as essentially a leadership disease 
(enabled by a preponderance of leaders that are venal) but we also admit the complicity of the 
masses in its practice. However, we are able to show through our analysis of “sociality of sin” 
how the common people are properly “victims” of a corrupt system, generally speaking, than 
genuine “accomplices”. Nevertheless, though most are indirectly coerced into corrupt practices 
by a broken system, it may not constitute sufficient condition for lack of culpability at the 
individual levels of participation in corruption in many particular cases.  
                                               
652 This research has put a stress on “tribalism” as a representative psycho-moral pathology that impacts “systemic 
corruption” significantly than any other. It is presented here as “institutionalized self-interest.” Illustration 3 
describes how the wheel of corruption is driven in Nigeria: Tribalism - malformation of consciences - systemic 
corruption as a theoretical construct that encapsulates the essential elements of this research. Seeking the roots of 
other problems like “religious fanaticism” would perhaps replace “tribalism” with “illiteracy” or any other relevant 
primary pathology.    
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We reaffirmed our arguments in previous chapters that when socio-political forces 
manipulate or toy with the “standards” of behavior in order to achieve specific private ends at the 
detriment of the common good, they unleash forces they cannot readily control to the detriment 
of all. So, today’s evils are the results of yesterday’s misdeeds, irrespective of whether our 
assessment of the trajectory of history as moving in a spiral or linear progression.  
We evaluated the recommendation of three theories of systemic corruption to show either 
their inadequacy or relevance for the Nigerian situation. We consider the “big-bang” and 
“targeted gradualism” as approaches that provide useful insights that could serve as possible 
recommendations for Nigeria at different historical contexts. While we consider the recent 
efforts at reform as credible platforms for present and future consolidation, we however doubt 
the possibility of sustaining them due to inherent lapses in the system since those to implement 
these reform initiatives are likely to compromise it since they are used to living on rent.  
We therefore recommended a more holistic approach to systemic corruption that not only 
incorporates the salient recommendations of mainline theories but also goes further to address 
the root causes. We identified the primary pathology of Nigerian corruption as tribalism (as 
noted above). We highlighted its “kinship” to “international tribalism” that both sustain corrupt 
practices locally and globally. In the Nigerian situation, we underscored the dangers of praising 
immoral practices that kinship solidarity enables. We recommend safeguarding our traditional 
moral formation process but only through critical deconstruction because of inherent 
ambivalence that calls for a shift from compactness to differentiation.  
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4.1.   THE NOTION OF CORRUPTION 
There are as many definitions of corruption as there are authors. In order not be lost in the 
maize of definitions, we shall point out some of them and adopt a functional definition. In a 
recent work, Laura S. Underkuffler examines mainstream theories that define corruption based 
on their areas of emphases (those on law are definitions that stresses it as an illegal act; duty, 
stresses it as a “breach of duty;” and relationship, stresses it as a “betrayal of trust and secrecy” 
or as “inequality”). This includes theories that either stress “public interest” or “economic 
considerations” and others that offer a combination of foregoing emphases. Her conclusion was 
that none of these definitions were adequate. She cites an example of “combination theory” as:  
We recognize political corruption when a public official ‘A,’ in violation of the trust placed in him by the 
public ‘B,’ and in a manner which harms the public interest, knowingly engages in conduct which 
exploits the office for clear personal and private gain in a way which runs contrary to the accepted rules 
and standards for the conduct of public office within the political culture, so as to benefit a third party 
‘C’, by providing C with access to a good or service ‘C’ would not otherwise obtain.
653
 
 
According to Underkuffler, the above definition is made richer by virtue of its complex 
combination of elements most mainstream theories leave out. She argues that corruption is more 
than “illegality, breach of duty, betrayal, secrecy, inequality, the subversion of public interest, 
and inefficiency,”654 irrespective of whether these elements are considered alone or together. The 
reason is that they fail to capture the “essence of corruption” – for according to her, “they are 
                                               
653 Mark Philp, "Contextualizing Political Corruption," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (eds.), 
Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (New Brunswick, 2002) (3rd edition), 41, 42 cited by Laura S. 
Underkuffler, “Defining Corruption: Implications for Action,” in Robert I. Rotberg. Corruption, Global Security, 
and World Order (Kindle Locations 631-632). Kindle Edition.  
654 Underkuffler, Ibid. Kindle location 538  
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not, alone or in combination, all that compose the corrupt core.”655  Therefore even the complex 
definition above is still inadequate.  She argues that “corruption is an explicitly moral notion; 
corruption describes in general parlance, a powerful all-consuming evil.”656 As a consequence, 
any attempt to understand this concept without due attention to its moral aspect “will be both 
descriptively and programmatically inadequate.”657 She argues that corruption is not a term that 
is morally neutral but one that is at core a concept that expresses a transgression of a “universal 
norm” and therefore carries with it the added weight of offsetting the moral fabric of the larger 
society. It is like a “virus” or “cancer” that destroys its host either aggressively or gradually. 
 To underscore this moral “core” of corruption is the reason for this chapter. The 
inadequacy of mainstream definitions and theories of corruption that Underkuffler analyzed stem 
from a neglect of this moral core such that corruption is often placed at same level with any other 
social malady like poor healthcare delivery services. The reason could often be traced to a 
tendency among scholars to appear to be non-judgmental or morally neutral or indifferent to 
value-laden concept. A deeper reason perhaps is the need to retain its conceptualization within 
measurable limits. In other words, the need for statistical “data” could be driving a morally 
neutral conceptualization of corruption. The result is a conceptual gap in a deeper understanding 
of this phenomenon. But corruption is a “morality-loaded” concept and ought to be treated as 
such. It is precisely for this reason that we adopted an interdisciplinary approach that enables us 
                                               
655 Underkuffler, ibid. Kindle location 541 
656 Ibid 
657 Ibid 
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an exploration of various backgrounds that could provide relevant insights as the data for our 
theological reflection on this problematic.  
 The tendency to bracket morality out of our conceptual understanding of corruption not 
only obscures its meaning but more importantly has a sedative effect on those engaged in it. And 
interestingly, corruption is a term with tentacles up to the ivory towers, such that even scholars 
have to confront it in their own work. For instance, when a scholar is paid a huge amount by an 
interest party to provide research that “favors” this client’s perspective irrespective of where the 
data points. That is “corruption” per excellence (the “corruption” of research data or of truth). 
This simple example indicates not just the wide reach of this concept (it is not limited to the 
behavior of public officials) but also points to its essence. It is a distortion of the moral order. 
However it achieves this distortion by first disabling the “gatekeepers” or the moral security 
apparatus of the rational intellect (intellect and will), at the core of which is the conscience. 
Bracketing morality out of a concept like corruption we effectively neutralize its power to evoke 
moral questions and the query of conscience. But such approach also disables the critical help 
towards an ultimate solution which we repose in internal rather than in external sanctions.  
 In view of the foregoing, we see the need to tighten the definition of corruption. J.S 
Nye’s definition of corruption is considered a classic: “behavior which deviates from formal 
duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private regarding influence.”658 This definition supports moral neutrality even as it 
                                               
658 J.S. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 61, 1967, pp. 417-27 cited by Acha F. Ndubisi, Nigeria: Hope or Hopelessness? (Enugu: Cecta, 1991), p.46 
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admits it to be “deviant” behavior – when it “deviates from formal duties” of office. In this way, 
it not only limits corruption to “public office” but is silent if this is a willful act. The last 
segment: “violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence” is 
rather vague as to what type of “rules” needs to be violated to qualify it as corruption. In 
communities where the unwritten “rule” is “do whatever is in your power to help your family, 
kin, or friends,” there will hardly be any act that would pass that test. We therefore propose the 
following definition that borrows slightly from Mark Philps above: 
Corruption is an act of moral disorder whereby a human person knowingly and willfully abuses 
public trust and harms public interests by acting deceitfully and in a manner that violates 
statutory standards of conducts (for office, position, status) for the clear reason of private or 
personal gain (pecuniary or kind) or to favor a client (kin, friend, foe) in a manner inconsistent 
with approved and objective standards of moral conduct.
659
  
While admitting that there is no perfect definition, we do think that the above is framed to 
underscore the moral “core” of corruption and place it properly where it belongs: a moral 
concept placed squarely within the individual’s moral judgment and conduct. It is therefore not 
just a “deviant” behavior, that is obscure, but one that is “morally disordered” based on the 
premise that it ruptures not merely the inner sanctums of individual character but also the very 
moral fabric of society itself. It recognizes that corruption is committed beyond the confines of 
“public office” (bribery is often given by those not “in office”). So the concept of “person” not 
only broadens its extensions beyond public office, but also affirms the primary dignity of the 
actor as a sane, rational and willful being – a moral agent (refer to Chapter One). Acting 
“deceitfully” is a word that is at the heart of the definition we propose because every act of 
corruption is intended to “deceive” those who have the right to know (often, the public). It is not 
                                               
659
 This is our formulation adapted from Mark Philips definition cited above. 
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just “approved rules” of a given community, but one that passes the scrutiny of others beyond 
that community – a more “objective” even if not “universal” code of moral conduct. In this way, 
“rules” of local communities could be tested by more universally accepted standards of behavior.   
We admit however that fighting a “system” of corruption will require targeting the system more 
than the individual, but since we are proposing a “holistic” as opposed to segmental approach, 
we insist on the significance of developing a culture of moral integrity by individuals within the 
system as the ultimate solution to corruption. Therefore our definition above retains the moral 
force necessary to trigger the judgments of conscience in a social system crafted to develop 
moral integrity in its members. It is clearly not morally neutral. It is not merely a matter of 
“legality” of the act, such that the agent seeks for ways to “out-smart” the law. It is an act that 
speaks about the “character” of the agent. It is about integrity. It speaks about “who” the agent is 
at his/her very core. The definition engages the agent internally before the considerations of 
external sanctions (criminal law) that is a penal remedy. In this way, both internal and external 
sanctions work towards the same goal. A morally neutral definition provides a buffer to the agent 
such that remedies are but bandages to the wound without the necessary medicinal properties. 
Let us now explore the notion of “systemic” corruption.  
4.2.   The NATURE OF SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
The need to define systemic corruption is aimed at distinguishing it from “incidental,” 
“systematic” and/or “systemic” corruption.660” Omar Azfar thinks that the term “’incidental’ 
                                               
660 See S. J. Kpundeh, “Political Will in Fighting Corruption,” in Corruption and Integrity: Improvement Initiatives 
in Development Countries, UNDP, OECD, cited by Simplice Asongu, in “Fighting Corruption in Africa: Do 
Existing Corruption-control levels Matter?” http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen,de/41194/ MPRA paper no. 41194, posted 
11. September 2012.  
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does not ‘denote rarity’ but that various aspect of corruption are not part of the same system” 
such that incidental corruption “could be either rare or widespread.”661 Kpundeh and Asongu 
hold a contrary view. They consider “incidental” as denoting rarity of corruption. This later view 
is captured in Asongu’s distinctions between the three forms of corruption cited below:  
Firstly, incidental corruption is characterized by petty bribery and involves opportunistic 
individuals or small groups. In this context corruption is the exception rather than the rule. High-
level private sector actors and senior officials seldom border with such theft. Secondly, Systematic 
corruption is organized, not necessarily institutionalized or pervasive but recurrent. It usually 
involves large gains which are subject to popular scandals. While it is entrenched and functions 
with a large number of officials, intermediaries and entrepreneurs, this form of corruption 
originates from high-level civil servants that recognize and exploit the illegal ventures and 
opportunities in government departments and agencies. Hence, this practice is the direct violation 
of the rule of law. Thirdly, Systemic corruption is pervasive, institutionalized (perhaps accepted 
but not necessarily approved), and built into the economic and political institutions. It occurs and 
flourishes in situations where public sector wages fall below a living-wage. In contrast to 
systematic corruption, it involves all levels of employment.
662
  
 
The above distinctions, which we endorse, provide more clarity for delineating “incidental” 
corruption from a more endemic form of the disease we identify as ‘systemic” corruption. While 
we admit the coherence of the distinction between “systematic” from “systemic” corruption 
above, we however do not attach much significance to it in this study. Systematic corruption may 
be considered as a midpoint between incidental and systemic corruption. It is neither 
institutionalized nor a rare phenomenon; it is neither a pervasive nor a minor form of 
corruption.
663
 It could therefore be subsumed or classified under “incidental” or ‘systemic’ 
                                               
661 See Omar Azfar, “Disrupting Incidental and Systemic Corruption” 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/32Azfar.pdf  
662 Simplice Asongu, “Fighting Corruption in Africa: Do Existing Corruption-control levels Matter?” 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen,de/41194/ MPRA paper no. 41194, posted 11. September 2012. The emphases are 
ours.  
663 John Waterbury distinguishes between “endemic,” “planned,” and “developmental” corruption as relevant for his 
times but one that no longer provides sufficient clarity for understanding this phenomenon today. See J. Waterbury, 
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corruption depending on one’s approach. For functional reasons, we prefer to retain the broader 
distinctions between incidental and systemic corruption. Omar Azfar describes systemic 
corruption as “analogous to organized crime” in these words: 
Many countries in the world suffer from systemic corruption. This type of corruption is analogous 
to organized crime: participants act not independently but in concert with one another, 
maintaining the system that allows them to extract rents and taking their own share of the rents. 
Systems of corruption can involve the sale of jobs, the sharing of rents from bribery or theft, and 
the compromising of systems of integrity that could control corruption.
664
 
  
Systemic corruption in this research therefore describes a situation where corruption has become 
endemic, pervasive and institutionalized, such that it is considered part of the “normal” 
functioning of the entire spectrum of socio-economic and political apparatus (or system). It is a 
form of “moral decay” so pervasive that it has become a “way of life” such that the “abnormal” 
becomes the norm. There are too many illustrations on systemic corruption as a global 
phenomenon often overseen by kleptocracies.
665
 The difference is that it has a crippling effect on 
poorly run countries (especially those in the third world) than countries with a more robust and 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Corruption, Political Stability, and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco,” Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 11, 426-45; August 1976.  
664 Omar Azfar, “Disrupting Incidental and Systemic Corruption,” WB33_PACC_CH08.qxd 2/27/07, Page 251; 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/32Azfar.pdf 
665 Kelly Greenhill explains “kleptocracy as “’government characterized by rampant greed and corruption’ which 
privilege the personal wealth and political power of government officials and the ruling class at the expense of the 
population.”  See Greenhill, “Kleptocratic Interdependence: Trafficking, Corruption, and the Marriage of Politics 
and Illicit Profits,” in Corruption, Global Security, and World Order edited by Robert I. Rotberg (Kindle Locations 
1405), Kindle edition. Instances of kleptocracies: Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay (1954-1989) turned the country 
into his personal fiefdom; Alberto Fujimori of Peru bought off the legislature, the army, police, the media to 
maintain power and collect rent; Francois and Jean Claude Duvalier of Haiti or Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire all 
turned their countries into personal companies and transferred public funds to their private pockets and that of their 
families and friends. In Nigeria it was the same for most military dictatorships particularly General I. B. Babangida 
and Abacha; the civilian Regimes from Obasanjo to the present are accused but they all seem to have taken an oath 
to “protect themselves” by protecting each successive government from substantive probe and prosecution.  
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sophisticated organs of government (like in the developed world). But even the later have to 
contend with organized crime that sometimes exercises tremendous influence regarding how 
government is run.
666
 We are however more concerned here with the Nigerian situation.  
In Nigeria, experience suggests that corrupt practices have corroded the system such that 
it becomes “abnormal” to have things done “normally”. For instance, getting a new passport or 
driving license (or renewing them) are routine services the average Nigerian would “expect” to 
pay “a fee” over-and-above whatever the official fee is to get this done. So, if you go to the 
immigration office to process a new passport and you actually get this done in “good time” 
without “settling” anybody (giving bribe) to facilitate it will be considered an “abnormal” and 
“exceptional” occurrence for the ordinary Nigerian. Mind you, it is not that you do not have the 
“right papers”. It is just that the “system” has evolved an unwritten rule that “mandates” you to 
“pay extra” for every service you receive from public servants. In a situation of systemic 
corruption, the standards rules of conduct for public office is discarded and replaced by the 
“unwritten rule” evolved into the system. This is why ‘systemic’ corruption is a pernicious virus 
difficult to eradicate. It has become a “way of life” and the abnormal is the new “normal.”  
 A classic study on corruption in Nigeria by Acha F. Ndubisi compared the Nigerian 
socio-political space to a “zoological garden” – a “Giant Zoo” where rationality seems to be in 
permanent stasis and responsible behavior is considered an aberration as captured by the 
numbing cliché, “This is Nigeria,” implying that the “corruption glut” that has overtaken the land 
is perhaps a unique “achievement” or a “lifestyle” that those who have to live in it must learn to 
                                               
666 The Mafia for instance has been known to have deep reaches at certain times in the governments of the countries 
within which they operate (examples of American mafia, the Italian and Japanese Mafia, to mention a few). See 
Kelly Greenhill, Op. Cit, Kindle Location, 1426   
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adopt.
667
  He does acknowledge that alongside this “zoo” exists the possibility for a healthier 
state of affairs he calls “paradise” inhabited by principled and responsible Nigerians (the 
“humans”). Nigeria will rise to its great potentials if leadership of the country is allowed to 
emerge from it. In other words, he lays the primary blame of this “oversupply of corruption”668 
to intellectually and morally deficient leadership, but also recognizes that the average Nigerian 
often share some of the blame by their complacency or failure to hold their leaders accountable 
and by direct participation in corruption. He uses Kohlberg’s model of moral development to 
argue that the leadership in the country is occupied by people within the pre-conventional stage 
of moral development, hence, act like animals – turning the country into a human zoo. 669  
Given the moral deficiency of leadership, it was easy to turn these “unprincipled” leaders into 
willing tools in the hands of neo-imperialist forces that often prefer the “zoo” arrangement for 
their selfish economic ends. So, the few principled ones did not last. He particularly mentioned 
General Murtala Mohammed (was Military Heads of State 1975-1976)
 670
  who was quickly 
eliminated by powerful forces in a coup de tart because his actions during the six months he was 
in power suggest he was ready to clean the Augean stable. His revolutionary ideas to rid Nigeria 
of corruption did not please the imperialist forces that seem to prefer maintaining the corrupt 
                                               
667 See Acha F. Ndubisi, Nigeria: Hope or Hopelessness? Op. Cit. pp. 7 and 45 
668 Ibid, p. 45 
669 Ibid. pp. 20-33 
670 See Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. 137,164 
http://www.questia.com/read/27390109; Tsuzom M. Ndakotsu, "Nigerian Names as Access Points,"African 
Research & Documentation, no. 101 (2006), http://www.questia.com/read/1P3-1334043081  
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status quo. So they changed the government and installed a puppet that will protect their 
interests.
671
  
The policy of installing and/or maintaining a corrupt government in power has done the 
greatest harm to evolving a credible and accountable governmental structure in the so called 
“developing world”. Those who benefit from their vulnerability protect their underdevelopment. 
If the leadership is corrupt, there is little hope for overcoming systemic corruption. Now, it is 
evident that every leadership in Nigeria thrives on the patronage of our neo-colonial “godfathers” 
(directly or indirectly). For instance, Governor Orji Uzo Kalu, a presidential candidate, had to 
brazenly advertise his “connections” to the CIA and to United States Congress where he openly 
went to solicit for their “anointing” before his presidential ambition can gain traction. As if that 
was not enough, the White House demanded for his unconditional release when arrested by 
EFCC, an anti-corruption agency.
672
 American Congressmen were present at his inauguration, 
and they even held a press conference describing him as the hope of Nigeria! Kalu made no 
secret of his questionable “connections” with foreign secret service or power. However, given 
that this is a person who could not account for gross irregularities in administering state accounts 
while in office, to be released on the pressure from “above,” you can imagine the perception that 
creates about United States in the imagination of the average Nigerian privy to this incident. 
These are ways those in power (in specific foreign countries) destroy the goodwill their people 
                                               
671 Ibid, pp. 59-68 
672See Bode Eluyera’s online commentary in http://nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/bode-eluyera/could-orji-kalu-
be-a-cia-agent.html posted on July 20, 2007 
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enjoy in other countries where they exercise influence.
673
 If the political elite resort to boasting 
not of their real achievements but of their “connections” with foreign powers, it denotes not only 
a deep crisis of identity among them but a crisis of “integrity” for their foreign political 
godfathers or collaborators.
674
 We shall provide examples in the next segment how foreign MNC 
(multinational corporations) play a major role in systemic corruption (at least in Nigeria). 
However, this research places the onus of corruption squarely on the home front. We 
agree with Ndubisi that poor work ethic is at the roots of systemic corruption. It is obvious that it 
thrives more where morals are allowed to run low. Ndubisi captures this in his description of 
“endemic corruption” as an “abuse of office” in governmental and private institutions that cuts 
across the “police, customs, banks, courts, hospitals, various ministries and educational 
institutions”. He asserts that “Money is given to, or demanded by, public officials so that they 
will ignore the rules of conduct set up by government for public good.”675 The police will take 
“egunje” (cliché for bribe) and allow a vehicle that is not “road-worthy” or “without proper 
papers” to operate; the custom will do the same to allow sub-standard goods or “contrabands” 
                                               
673 The average Nigerian (and you might add most people in the third world) loves the United States and its people, 
and the same could be said of other western countries. The problem is when leaderships and entrepreneurs in these 
countries undermine this basic goodwill and destroy trust. They trample upon it when in the blind pursuit of selfish 
interests they collaborate with local leadership in thwarting what is the common good of the ordinary people.  This 
is what needs to be reversed if trust and goodwill will be restored. They need to be seen to be fair.  
674 The above scenario is part of the reason why we included the global dimension in our study. If corruption is to be 
contained in Nigeria, the international governments that have deep interests in Nigeria need to come clean, play fair, 
and genuinely want the country to overcome corruption. A deliberate effort by such governments to work hard to 
reverse the burdens of skewed foreign policy objectives of yester years is a noble effort that will yield great 
dividends in time for both countries. Until such happens, it will be a near impossible task to eliminate systemic 
corruption in Nigeria without the active and “positive” collaboration of our imperialist political and economic 
godfathers (particularly the United States and Britain).  We do not see anything inherently wrong in being a political 
or economic godfather so long as this status is not maintained at the detriment of the wellbeing of the common man. 
We will later explain the core elements of this collaboration.  
675 Ibid. p. 47 
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into the country. The banker will take bribe and keep illegal funds in their vaults.
676
 The 
government hospitals are run down because equipments are often in disrepair despite huge 
monetary allocations; doctors paid to work in government hospitals use their job as “recruiting 
ground” for clients to their private clinics and hospitals. If you want “real treatment” you go to 
their private clinics. The government dispensaries only dispense “prescriptions” which you buy 
from the open markets. Before Prof. Dora Akunyili, the former Nigerian General Director of 
National Agency of Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), from 2008-2010,  
closed the fake drug stores, the traders in the “open market” went to the extent of selling “baby 
food” stuffed into capsules as drugs!  
Ndubisi describes “planned corruption” as an “instrument of control” that politicians use 
to “retain power at all costs”. The leadership in order to guarantee his stay in office doles out 
favors and benefices of his office based on political calculations rather than on any rules of 
conduct, merit or objective need. In other words, the leadership “dispenses the wealth of the 
nation as he pleases regardless of rules of conduct.”677 In Nigeria we see this in lavish donations 
at public and private functions with no accountability, granting of contracts to cronies without 
due process (oil block allocation is one of the most juicy forms of political favor anyone could 
                                               
676 There are too many heart-rending accounts relating to this: For instance, government officials were able to 
withdraw billions of naira of government funds and transfer them to personal accounts with collusion of bankers 
simply by limiting the amount to a legal limit but in “multiples” in one day. This was how billions of pension money 
was laundered into private accounts. The money was shared by all involved in the pension scam. A simple clerk on 
Level O4 had 18million naira in one of his accounts with the same bank where the pension fund was held in trust!  
677 Acha F. Ndubisi, Op. Cit., p 48.  
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receive), political appointments based on favor than merit, pardoning of political criminals in 
order to return them to relevance.
678
 An example is the Story below: 
Alamieyeseigha was the elected governor of the oil-producing Bayelsa State in Nigeria 
from 1999 until his impeachment in 2005. As alleged in the U.S. forfeiture complaint, 
Alamieyeseigha’s official salary for this entire period was approximately $81,000, and 
his declared income from all sources during the period was approximately $248,000. 
However, governor, Alamieyeseigha accumulated millions of dollars worth of property 
located around the world through corruption and other illegal activities. After his 
impeachment in Nigeria, Alamieyeseigha pleaded guilty in Nigeria for, among other 
things, failure to disclose a bank account in Florida and also pleaded guilty on behalf of 
his shell companies to money laundering violations. As further alleged in the complaint, 
the funds forfeited were held in an investment account in Boston that was fraudulently 
opened in the name of Nicholas Aiyegbemi and were traceable to the undisclosed 
Alamieyeseigha account in Florida…’With a declared income of less than $250,000, Mr. 
Alamieyeseigha accumulated millions of dollars’ worth of property over a six-year 
period,’ said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. ‘Today’s announcement – the first 
forfeiture judgment obtained under our Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative – sends a 
powerful message about the United States’ commitment to rooting out corruption far and 
wide. Foreign corrupt officials are on notice that we will not permit them to stash their 
corruption proceeds on American soil.’679  
On June, 13, 2012 a U.S District Court Judge Rya W. Zobel, sitting in Massachusetts granted a 
motion for forfeiture of assets worth $401,931.00 traceable to Alamieyeseigha. This is the first 
major judgment of this kind in the United States under a new legal arrangement on money 
laundering. Interestingly, the current President, Goodluck Jonathan, was the deputy Governor to 
Alamieyeseigha.  His impeachment for fraud was what paved the way for Jonathan’s ascendency 
to political power (as governor). He now decided to favor his former boss by granting him 
amnesty at a time when the country is seriously in need of sending the right message about 
corruption.  While we lament on this turn of events, we are excited that American government 
has finally woken up to its duties. There are many like Alamieyeseigha whose loot still corrodes 
                                               
678 President Jonathan just granted amnesty to his convicted former boss (Gov. Alamieyeseigha) as the Federal 
government response to the judgment of forfeiture of assets traced to corruption. This shows how unserious the 
present government in Nigeria is about fighting corruption.  
679 See Department of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-827.html (The stress is ours).  
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the tills of U.S banks and whose properties tarnish the splendor of this great country.  The U.S. 
government should pursue this noble course vigorously and pressure the Nigerian government in 
the right direction: fighting corruption by ensuring the proceeds of loot has no place to hide in 
America. This is to be the test case for Obama administration’s seriousness for helping to build 
stable institutions in Nigeria [and Africa], and as part of a broader roadmap (or moral high 
ground) for retrieving the proceeds of Nigerian scam artists, if not overcoming  the attraction for 
international scams among Nigerian actors currently in the field.  
Ndubisi also identified “developmental corruption”680 as a distinct form of corruption 
perpetrated in government sectors handling developmental projects like building ports, roads, 
dams, schools, hospitals, among others. The tenders hardly follow any due process, and often 
given to a crony at an “up-front” fee – in Nigeria 10% of the contract price is the normal but may 
not be the only “fee” paid for contracts award. The winner of the contract often sub-contracts out 
to someone else and whatever remains of the “mobilization fee” (after paying the statutory 10%) 
is spent by the time the actual contractor gets his contract. This is one reason why some contracts 
are never finished. The other reason is that some contracts are never meant to be executed. There 
are many contracts that never took off at all even though money for it has been allocated or paid 
in full in the books.
681
  
                                               
680 While this distinction is helpful in understanding certain aspects of corruption, we prefer to subsume it within the 
broader distinction of “systemic corruption.” 
681 Ndubisi asserts inter alia: “Awarding contracts that would never be executed after the contractors had received 
mobilization fees was a deliberate hidden policy of most of the past military governments (federal and state 
governments).” A. F. Ndubisi, Op. Cit., p. 52 He cites in the same page the case of a governor in Anambra state who 
asked an obscure contractor to tender for road contract and inflate the cost of the contract from N4 million to N6 
million and that he would use his executive power to approve the higher tender. The plan, according to his source, 
was that the company will be paid a mobilization fee of N2 million to purchase equipment valued at 0.3 million 
naira to enable it start the construction and then abandon it after three months. The governor will then confiscate the 
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The appetites of those interested in the funds for the government projects are insatiable. 
So, in some cases, the fee for doing the work increases exponentially with time – sometimes 500 
% without the job getting done. An example is the National identity card project. A project 
initially estimated at a cost of 50million U.S dollars rose to $214million dollars with only a 
handful of Nigerians getting it. The government functionaries involved were charged to court by 
the ICPC (Independent Corrupt Practices and Other related Offenses Commission) but the 
charges were later dropped. Now Billions more are being allocated for the same scheme.  This is 
considered by critics as a “white elephant project” that the government uses as conduit to enrich 
itself or siphon money to its political cronies. Anyone familiar with corruption in Nigeria will be 
sympathetic to this view until proven otherwise.  
 We have provided only Nigerian examples in describing the nature of systemic 
corruption because this chapter focuses on Nigeria as a geophysical and socio-moral entity that 
localizes our study. But this should not lead the reader to forget that systemic corruption is a 
global phenomenon. Each of the cases described above and in the next segment all have their 
equivalences in North America, Europe, and Asia. In the next segment we simply provide a view 
from an “insider” that perhaps help illustrate better the nature of corruption in Nigeria.   
4.3 DIGGING DEEPER: THE NATURE OF SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 
In this segment we try to look at corruption in Nigeria from the eyes of an insider: Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iwuala is the present finance minister and coordinates the Economic team of the present 
government; she was also the finance minister during the Obasanjo regime (1999-2007) whose 
                                                                                                                                                       
equipment and sell it. The company will be richer by 0.5 million, and the governor will pocket 1million. The 
contract will be over. This fraudulent process could, and have been recycled over and over again by public 
executives in Nigeria.  
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administration initiated reform against corruption (she is a Harvard and MIT graduate, former 
vice president of the World Bank).  She admitted in her book on this topic that “for far too long 
corrupt officials and their associates have acted with impunity in their corrupt dealings; and for 
any fight to be successful, impunity has to be reined in.”682 She goes on to provide examples that 
not only illumines the nature of corruption in Nigeria but also illustrates the problem as systemic. 
She describes the nature of corruption in Nigeria as graded. She places at the top level 
“Corruption on a Grand Scale” that describes how public officials steal public assets.683 Though 
she did not provide us any history of kleptomania among Nigerian executives, but she sheds light 
on two celebrated cases: The same Governor Alamieyeseigha cited above, was arrested at 
Heathrow airport, London on September 15, 2005, and a search of his home revealed 
£920,000.00 in cash. He was latter charged for laundering £1.8 million (this is different from the 
U.S. case described above). He was on bail, but he jumped bail and left Britain disguised as a 
woman. His subsequent impeachment made it possible to prosecute him since sitting governors 
enjoy immunity from prosecution. He was charged to court and sentenced for a short sting in jail.  
James Ibori was another governor who is presently serving time in British prison (she 
mentioned him but did not provide details). Ibori stole millions of dollars from his oil rich state 
(Delta State). He jumped bail in London, but was found and extradited from Dubai. His arrest 
was as result of collaboration between Nigeria government and Britain. Scotland Yard lived up 
to its reputation for diligence and perseverance. In April, 17, 2012, he was sentenced by 
Southwark court in London for stealing $250 million from his state. It was revealed he also used 
                                               
682 Ngozi Okonjo-Iwuala, Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 2012) Kindle Edition, Location 1809 
683 Ibid  
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his state as collateral for 40 billion naira loan ($266 million). He had many companies he 
operated in Britain through agents that were also sentenced. Part of what was confiscated 
includes a £2.2 million pound home in North London; £311,000 home in Dorset, London; £3.2 
million home in Johannesburg South Africa, A fleet of armored range rovers (£600,000.); 
Mercedes Benz Maybach 62 GT for which he paid €407,000.00 cash and a Bentley Continental 
GT (£120,000.). The central bank is said to keep in its custody as “exhibit” the $15 million 
dollars bribe he gave to Nuhu Ribadu, the then Director of EFCC (Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission). Interestingly, most exhibits often develop wings and disappear. For 
example, Mustafa A. Balogun was Inspector General of Police (March 6. 2002- Jan. 2005) He 
was prosecuted and jailed (6 months!) for stealing billions of Naira of public fund. Actually 16 
billion naira was actually recovered from him but that amount got missing between the new IGP 
and the EFCC!  The same is the case with Abacha’s loot described below.  
General Sani Abacha was the only Nigerian Head of State or President to ever have 
family prosecuted or flustered for fraud precisely because he was dead. He stole billions just like 
the rest of his “tribe”. According Okonjo-Iwuala, it is estimated that Abacha stole between $3-5 
billion U.S dollars of public fund and these were laundered to foreign banks abroad. She asserts: 
Of the amount stolen, more than US $ 2.2 billion was carted away from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria in truckloads of cash in the form of foreign currency and travelers checks. Most of this 
money was laundered abroad through a complex network of companies, banks, and shell 
concerns before finding its way into foreign bank accounts operated by the Abacha family and 
their cronies. At the peak of these activities, more than 70 companies, and more than 32 banks— 
including some of the world’s best-known banks— had money laundered through them.
684
 
She also points out that contract inflation constitutes another form of fraud Abacha engaged in. 
She cited the Pasteur Merieux Vaccines that was aimed at helping poor families. Abacha 
                                               
684 Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the Unreformable, Op. Cit., Kindle Locations 1704-1706 
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awarded $111 million contract to his family company (Morgan Procurement Ltd). The true cost 
was $22.5million. The company pockets the excess amount ($88.5 million).
685
  
 The involvement of foreign companies in massive corruption has a long history that is not 
peculiar to Nigeria.
686
 Okonjo-Iwuala describes the Nigerian aspect of this problem in these 
words: “Foreign companies have been involved in worst cases of corruption in developing 
countries. Nigeria is replete with accounts of such corrupt and corrupting behavior by foreign 
companies.”687 She cites Siemens as having admitted giving government officials €10million to 
facilitate contracts between 2001- 2004.
688
 She then cites the TJSK consortium (comprising of 
Technip, France; Snamprogetti, Italy; Kellog Brown and Root, a Halliburton Subsidiary, U.S.A; 
JGC, Japan) were bidding to provide services to a $12billion gas project owned jointly by 
Nigerian Government and Shell Group. It later won a $2 billion contract after employing a 
“consultancy” firm (Tristar Investment) with a pledge that includes $180 million bribe laundered 
to foreign accounts of some Nigerian government officials. She points out that “Nigerian people 
collectively pay the price of such bribery through inflated contracts and undermining of the 
country’s institutions.”689 
                                               
685 Ibid. Kindle Location 1713 
686 The most recent report by International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has shown how real and 
bogus companies have used “nominee directors” to secretly launder dirty money around the globe. We do hope that 
they could reveal where Nigerian government officials (past and present) hid their loot apart from a rather vague 
general mention of known havens like Swiss banks and some Western banks as referenced above. See 
http://www.icij.org/blog/2013/04/highlights-offshore-leaks-so-far; http://www.icij.org/offshore/who-uses-offshore-
world; http://www.icij.org/offshore 
687 Okonjo-Iwuala, Ibid. Kindle Location 1718, the emphasis is ours.  
688 Ibid 
689 Ibid. Kindle location 1730 
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 She also identifies “corruption from the bottom” that describes how the poor and 
vulnerable members of our society are “intimidated” by those who exercise some form of power 
over them. The example of Rose, a 21 year old girl undergraduate who was marked down by her 
professor because she could not afford to pay for the “handouts” (photocopies of lecture 
materials) either with money or “other means”. She was so demoralized that she dropped out, 
putting an end to one great effort to overcome the cycle of poverty. This form of corruption has 
become one of the most disturbing in recent years; one that needs urgent attention.    
A systemic rot has befallen Nigeria once solid system of public tertiary education. Similar tales 
abound of public health workers asking for under-the-table payments for services and diverting 
hospital supplies, drugs, and equipment to their private clinic. Nigeria is bedeviled by very poor 
provision of public services in education and health, largely because of corruption and 
undermining of the institutions by a small percentage of the population.
690
 
Obviously the above descriptive analysis of corrupt practices in Nigeria is far from exhaustive 
but it does reveal there is virtually no mechanism for accountability built into the system or 
rather, there is no effective implementation of existing mechanisms of accountability.
691
  As such 
it becomes easy for the leadership to act with “impunity” either at the highest or lowest levels of 
service delivery. We will examine some solutions she proposes later.  
 While Okonjo-Iwuala provides an insider view of the reality of systemic corruption in 
Nigeria, we would also highlight some of Daniel J. Smith’s viewpoints that we consider a 
relatively objective analysis by an outsider (a western author) that this research could find on the 
                                               
690 Okonjo-Iwuala, Ibid. Kindle Location, 1742 
691 Nigeria inherited the British Code of Conduct for public service and has evolved others codes and Tribunals (like 
the Code of Conduct Tribunal, with later additions by successive governments the latest of which is ICPC and the 
EFCC).  
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specific subject of systemic corruption in Nigeria.
692
 His objectivity perhaps stems from his 
immersion in the country for about 15 years – he lived and taught in a Nigerian University as 
part of his social research as an anthropologist. He therefore had the opportunity to interact and 
do business with Nigerians and learn to see with their eyes. His interpretative analysis would 
therefore provide useful insight in understanding both the reality and the background of 
corruption in Nigeria from a more dispassionate observer and social scientist. Though his 
research was presented in a book of seven chapters, we will highlight the essential points of the 
first part of his work that help deepen our understanding of the nature of the problem.  
 Firstly, he argues that corruption in Nigeria can only be properly understood within a 
broader (and global) context of political and economic inequality. He considers it rather dubious 
for the developed nations to acknowledge corruption as a “pervasive” global problem, but in 
dealing with developing nations like Africa prefer to adopt a “misguided stereotypes” approach 
that links corrupt practices, poverty and other social maladies to a “timeless cultural 
traditions.”693  So instead of using such “misguided” stereotyping to explain corruption in 
Nigeria or backwardness in Africa, should rather invest in understanding the larger context of 
historical patterns of political and economic inequalities that has left these nations and masses of 
their people vulnerable to a host of social ills that includes corruption.  
                                               
692 See Daniel J. Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007) Kindle edition.  
693 Ibid, Kindle Location 565. He illustrates this with example examples: Italy, for instance, is a nation that its own 
scholars admit is riddled with corruption but remains a “respectable” member of G8 
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 Secondly, he admits that while it is obvious “Nigerian e-mail scams”694 are symbolic of 
why Nigerians have bad reputation worldwide, however, its international dimension “obscures 
the fact that the primary victims of Nigerian corruption are Nigerians not foreigners.”695 He 
explains that these are scams crafted by a few con artists in Nigeria and practiced on 
unsuspecting Nigerians on daily basis in form of “advance fee,” “fake contracts” and “impostor 
official” frauds that many gullible Nigerians are constant victims. It only gained international 
notoriety by virtue of internet access. Therefore to think that its primary targets are only 
foreigners is grossly misleading. He says:  
The main losers in all these schemes are the ordinary Nigerians, because national resources are 
looted and squandered by a relatively small group of criminals, international investors are 
extremely wary of Nigeria, and Nigerian global reputation is smeared to the point where many 
honest Nigerians living, travelling or doing business abroad are assumed to be criminals until 
they prove otherwise.
696
 
He admits that the king-pins (the real masterminds) of Nigerian criminal networks should be 
categorized among the international criminals of the ranks of brutal dictators, bank “execu-
                                               
694 These are letters sent by con artists (mostly from Nigeria) as part of “confidence tricks” that lure people into 
parting with their money after first establishing the “trust” of their victims by promising to transfer huge amounts of 
money (either stolen or inherited) into their victims personal accounts in order to elude local law or detection.  
695 Ibid. Kindle Location 586 
696 Ibid, Kindle Location 593. We agree totally with this assessment having witnessed directly this form of treatment 
for many years while studying and working abroad as a Nigerian. Profiling and stereotyping the Nigerian as first a 
criminal until he proves otherwise comes at a very high cost to self-respect and human dignity that only experience 
duly appreciates its pain. This dehumanizing practice ought to stop because it is the seedbed for grooming ill will 
against the West. Many honest Nigerians are repeatedly harassed and made to pay a painful price for being honest. 
Due to the power of prejudice, some westerners are never satisfied that a Nigerian is ever honest even when he/she 
has proved it with many years of record. If one’s record does not prove it, what does? This is an irrational mindset 
that should never be part of State policy not only because of its capacity to destroy peoples’ lives but that these 
encounters provide openings for sowing seeds of “hate” instead of “love” for a country of one’s dreams. The 
struggle today to reverse the negative mindset in the Arab world against the West should have started long ago in 
paying attention to how people are treated. Nobody loves to suffer for a crime he did not commit. Honest Nigerians 
should not be made to suffer for being honest law abiding citizen where they reside. If such dehumanizing practice 
continues, its cumulative effect on the psyche of a people can be predicted.  
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thieves,” ponzy-schemers, or the mafia of any stripe.697 However, he notes that the interpretive 
narrative changes if one realizes that the low-level senders of the bulk of these scam letters are 
young (mostly between 18-25 years age range), jobless school dropouts and unemployed 
graduates who struggle to survive in a system broken down by monumental corruption of its 
leadership often with the collaboration of foreign partners. It is not an accident that the content of 
these letters reflect a mindset that describes direct or indirect collaboration of “developed” 
countries in the looting of Nigeria (and Africa) as confirmed above by Okonjo-Iwuala. 
Ironically, the relative success of these scam letters is an unsettling “proof” of the assumptions 
behind them. Unfortunately, those who reap the dividends of the e-mail scams are hardly the 
poor jobless guy in the cyber-café in Nigeria but the few at the top who have the resources to 
pull through with its complex demands that includes being well “connected” at the top in a 
complex but loosely connected network.
698
   
 Smith recounts his experience as project adviser to an NGO under the auspices of USAID 
in Nigeria that is of critical importance for this study. He describes how presumptions about 
Nigerian corruption “infused” his thinking such that he was sucked into participating in 
“discourses and practices” that maintain inequality and “reproduce stereotypes” about corruption 
of Third world partners [and Nigerians].
699
 Given the deluge of explicit warnings from his 
supervisors and other expatriate colleagues, he was predisposed to finding corruption 
everywhere. He was therefore ever on the alert with suspicion and distrustful of those he had to 
                                               
697 Smith addresses other aspects of Nigerian corruption in areas like NGOs and Politics that this chapter cannot 
accommodate. 
698 Ibid. Kindle Locations 727-730.  
699 Ibid, kindle location 1571 
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work with. He had to cross check everything, and sometimes do some clandestine investigation 
to find out if for instance the drivers used the office vehicle for personal purposes, wondered if 
those who negotiated purchases got kickbacks, or if trainers paid the locals what was stipulated 
for them, and his inner struggle to teach the trainees how to write grants, among others.  He says 
 With hindsight and the aid of greater familiarity with social science literature about the dynamics 
of inequality, particularly in the arena of development, it is now much easier to see that I was not 
in fact a watchdog against corruption but a culpable and complicit actor in the whole enterprise of 
development-related corruption (Hancock 1989; de Waal 1997; Uvin 1998). During my years 
with the NGO I never stole any project money. I never took a kickback from a contractor, or 
awarded a job to a friend or a relative. I never submitted fake receipts to reimburse myself for 
expenses not incurred. By any conventional Western standard, I could not be reasonably accused 
of involvement in corruption. But if I examine my life as an expatriate working for a development 
project critically, it becomes clear that my vigilance regarding corruption among my Nigerian 
counterparts involved significant hypocrisy. My assumptions, privileges, and lifestyle were at 
least as morally problematic as anything I feared my Nigerian colleagues could have done with 
project resources….First and foremost, the hypocrisy of expatriates who criticize Nigerian 
corruption is evident in the inequality that characterizes the differences in economic position 
between expatriate staff and even the most senior local stag.
700
 
He goes on to describe how he earns a salary of $29,000.00 which, by the way, in 1989 is very 
modest by United States standards. But his Nigerian counterpart, the project manager (his equal, 
if not superior) earns $400.00 a month. He, Smith, has free fully furnished housing, free utilities 
like power where the town has none. He has the services of a night guard, and the compound 
supervisor doubles as steward, cook, errand-boy who does the shopping, cleaning, washing, etc. 
The guard earns less than $50.00 dollars a month and has 10 children to support. While it is not 
realistic expecting that these people be on the same salary scale as himself, rather, the problem is 
the selective vision (the “blinders”) that sees only the corrupt practices or its possibility without 
at the same time seeing the inequality that motivates or reinforces such corruption. Here is what 
he says: 
                                               
700 Ibid, kindle location 1613-1615.  
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Part of the context of understanding Western culpability, and in this case my own complicity, in 
sustaining Nigeria's notorious corruption is recognizing the peculiarity of a system that 
legitimizes my privilege, but is on the lookout for a local staff person who awards a contract to 
provide office stationery to an in-law to help a struggling business, or might terminate a driver 
who carries passengers for a fee in the office vehicle on his way back from an assignment in order 
to raise some extra cash for his children's school fees. These actions are viewed by Westerners as 
forms of corruption. Yet the larger system of inequality is taken for granted, at least by most of us 
who are its principal beneficiaries.
701
 
He argues that though Nigerians are aware of these disparities and resent them, they were also 
“resigned” to them. While he did not witness any open antagonism, he does wonder if their 
perception of the gross inequalities provide “justification for corruption?” Could these 
inequalities invoke a feeling of “entitlement”?  Is it possible that the “corrupt” Nigerian NGOs 
“see themselves as entitled to these resources as a kind of compensation for these 
inequalities?”702 Smith answers these in the affirmative.  
 It is important to highlight Smith’s argument that the content of email scam letters are 
“cultural commentaries”703 of the perception of the average Nigerian describing how the 
Nigerian leadership has pillaged their country in collaboration with their foreign partners in 
crime. The significance of this hermeneutic is crucial for two reasons. First, it reveals a mindset 
that not only rationalizes criminal behavior but actually intent on justifying it.
704
 There is perhaps 
a conscious or unconscious intent on retrieving what they consider is legitimately theirs. It makes 
little sense to merely argue that this perception is misguided.
705
 There is overwhelming evidence 
                                               
701 Ibid, Kindle Location 1634-1635. The emphasis is ours.  
702 Ibid 
703 Ibid, Kindle Location 748 
704 Ibid, Kindle Location 1515 
705 It will be naïve if not simply ridiculous to hope that a people who have witnessed the level of looting in Nigeria 
should feel otherwise. If such monumental pillage that has brutalized and paralyzed masses of its people has 
happened in any of the developed countries of the Northern Hemisphere especially the United State and Western 
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that the wealth of the country is being pillaged and siphoned off to foreign countries that the 
average Nigerian can assess on a daily basis. The samples above are but the tip of the iceberg.
706
 
Secondly, any effort to contain or eradicate scam emails that does not seriously address this 
mindset becomes an effort in “selective vision” that is doomed to fail because it merely treats the 
symptoms rather than the disease. This research prefers a holistic approach that understudies the 
roots of the disease without neglecting to pay attention to the symptoms as well.   
4.4. NIGERIAN SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
For me, I am just struggling. I could not finish university because my parents did not have the 
money and our government does not care about the people. Obasanjo and his boys are stealing so 
much money while the rest of the society is falling apart. That's the real 419. What I am doing is 
just trying to survive. I would not he here sending these e-mails looking for rich, greedy 
foreigners if there were opportunities in Nigeria. How much do I really get from this anyway? 
The people getting rich from this are the same people at the top who are stealing our money. I am 
just a struggle-man.
707
 
Those are the words of a Nigerian e-mail scam writer. The emphasis illustrates already the theme 
for this segment. Social conditions influence behavior. Not that we are taking scam artists words 
for it. In chapter one our analysis of moral responsibility indicates that we are “responders” to 
what is done to us. In chapter two our analyses reveal that moral development is a natural 
                                                                                                                                                       
Europe, it will be definitely considered an act of treason – a national security matter. The foreign culprits will be 
considered “enemies of the State” and treated as such. Every tool of state power will be used to bring them to justice 
and rightly so. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking is not extended to those who sully the image of these “great” 
nations abroad. They turn a blind eye to those who steal from the poor (“beggar countries”) and grow fat on the 
blood of the starving. And it is precisely this sullied image that has groomed the crimes and terror they now have to 
spend trillions of dollars combating. This approach of “selective vision” is not only immoral but irrational.  
706 Nigerians are daily inundated with news of corruption which always ends up being overtaken by more of the 
same without anyone being punished for it. The latest of such was the fuel subsidy scam (2012) where the 
government budget was $1.5 billion but a probe panel revealed government expenditure was actually $15billion! 
The central bank, NNPC (a government-run company in charge of oil), the Auditor General all have different 
figures. Even the Chairman of the probe Hon. Lamido Farouk was accused of receiving bribe for $3million to bury 
the case. At this time, nothing came of the investigation which was televised on National television. See also 
http://economicconfidential.net/new/news/national-news/1235-n108-trillion-2012-revenues-where-is-the-evidence 
707 Daniel Jordan Smith. Op. Cit. Kindle Locations 732-736. Obasanjo was the President of Nigeria (1999-2007).  
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process that is either enabled or thwarted by environmental factors. Social conditions such as 
“unemployment,” not only have direct economic costs but also psycho-moral costs.708 When we 
are pushed to the wall, survival instinct takes over and becomes the primary driver for action. It 
is therefore self-evident that moral integrity is difficult to attain in an environment where there is 
little accountability. The foregoing confirms there is little accountability for public funds in 
Nigeria. This reality constitutes the major theme of daily conversation among Nigerians.  
But Nigerians are a very resilient and forbearing people.
709
 For instance, the Niger Delta 
people have watched helplessly for decades as their land bleeds liquid gold (oil) and the money 
carted away into private pockets of government functionaries. They are left with wastelands and 
polluted waters that take away from them even the capacity to earn a living. Without industries, 
even basic utilities in these communities, their youths are left with little option but to seek 
redress but by unlawful means. This resulted in blown pipes, more environmental disasters, and 
many lost lives. But it took that crude form of intervention for our leaders to begin to consider 
development plan for the Niger Delta that ought to have been a default standard approach from 
the onset. What this gross oversight has introduced in the system is a pattern of corruption in the 
oil sector. It will take years to plug the gaping hole created by oil bunkering and theft that recent 
investigation (2012) reveals is at 250,000 barrels per day which translates to about $6.2 billion 
                                               
708 See C.D. Dooley and R.A Catalano, “Psychological Effects of Unemployment,” in Journal of Social Issues, 
4:1988 
709 It could also be argued that what is considered “resilience” is another way to express “psychological defeat” - a 
condition of surrendering one’s fate to forces of domination and oppression. Paulo Freire describes well this 
condition as part of the strategy of the oppressor to keep the people sedated (“anesthetize the people so they will not 
think)” using manipulation or force to keep them in this state (P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 149). 
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dollars as annual loss to the national purse.
710
 Though this research is not about Niger Delta 
crisis, but its complexity illumine the goals of this research. There are many literatures specific 
to the Niger Delta crisis. For instance, Eboreime and Omotor argue as follows:  
 The activities of the multinational oil firms have been characterized by severe environmental 
problems in host communities. These include the physical alienation of scarce agricultural land 
by oil exploration and production companies; the flaring of over 70 percent of associated gas, 
which causes acid rain, reduces soil fertility, pollutes sources of drinking water, incorporates 
carcinogens into both marine and aquatic food chains, generates intense heat and perpetually 
banish night in many host communities; fishery decline; biodiversity loss; delta forest loss and 
land degradation. Frequent oil spillage has also been reported as a major cause of decline in 
agricultural decline and increase in health problems attributable to oil industry activities (see 
Shell 2000, Nyemutu Robert 1998, Obi 1997, Ikein 1990).
711
  
They argue that the Niger Delta, from where the oil wealth of the nation flows is the poorest 
developed of the entire country. Even the recent intervention programs aimed at alleviating 
poverty in the region are being directed to the rich than the core poor. Our view is that the Niger 
Delta crises (poverty and militancy) could have been avoided if excessive greed and self-interest 
have not blinded reason all these years. It was the poor socio-economic conditions of people of 
the Niger Delta that gave birth to armed struggle which, apart from loss of lives, further exposed 
the region to the massive oil theft, vandalizing of oil pipelines and subsequent spillage that 
further devastates the region. Moreover, by exposing this region to the oil mafia also gorges open 
                                               
710 http://economicconfidential.net/new/news/national-news/1235-n108-trillion-2012-revenues-where-is-the-
evidence  
1263-fg-deliberately-misrepresenting-me-on-foreign-reserves-oby-ezekwesili 
711 Matthew I. Eboreime and Douglaston G. Omotor, “Development Interventions of Oil Multinationals in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta: for the rich or the poor?” in Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crisis, Causes, Consequences and 
Opportunities for Peace, Victor Ojakorotu editor (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2010), p. 64: See also O. G Omene, “The 
Impact of Oil Exploration on the Inhabitants of Oil Producing Areas of Nigeria,” in Journal of Food, Agriculture and 
Environment (2009), cited by Eboeime and Omotor, Ibid. p.63 
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a channel to other nefarious activities in a region with a nebulous history.
712
 The political 
resolution achieved with the militancy is only a temporary measure won at very high socio-moral 
costs. Nigeria is once again being led by the nose and exposed to a dangerous pattern of 
“settling” criminals in order to maintain a fragile peace needed to keep oil wealth flowing. This 
is how a culture of corruption evolves and systematized.  
Recent investigation revealed that 88 percent of the oil blocks are owned and operated by 
multinational oil companies (Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Total Elf, Agip, Addax) who 
collectively produced in 2012 over 80% of Nigerian crude (2,212,445bpd) as against indigenous 
production of 276,000bpd.
713
 Some are scandalized by this figure on the basis of its absurdity but 
our concern is what it implies in a culture like Nigeria. It will be hard to explain how one 
acquires 80% of a nation’s oil reserve except you have been hand-in-gloves with the very leaders 
that have milked the country dry. Even then, you would have thought that such enormous 
privilege could have been an incentive to prioritize community development in the Niger Delta. 
It will be ridiculous to imagine that these multinationals do not understand what priority to 
community development entails in their field.
714
 Why should it take only serious violence – one 
                                               
712 We think the marginalization that led to militancy and oil bunkering activities has opened up the sensitivities of 
this region to both old wounds and old passions because of its notoriety during the trans-Atlantic slave trade.  
713 See Segun Adeniyi, “Real Ownership of Indigenous Oil Blocks Revealed, Economic Confidential, Online 
edition, March 2013, http://economicconfidential.net/new/financial/facts-a-figures/1280-real-ownership-of-
indigenous-oil-blocks-revealed.  
714 We are aware of the complexity associated with settling different groups of disaffected peoples in the Niger 
Delta. We argue that such complexity would not have arisen if there has been a proactive approach ab initio, a “blue 
print” for the development of the Niger Delta that includes infrastructural development, educational and 
employment opportunities for these communities. Selective approach to settlements, directed at chiefs, or prominent 
members of the community only succeeded in increasing inequality and triggering discontent that results in more 
settlements of the “vociferous” and “loud”; and the cycle repeats itself. The same strategy is what is still adopted for 
“settling” recent MEND militants. It is a time-bomb waiting to explode. Other “leaders” will emerge, and the war 
will once more resume.  
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that results in loss of crude production and/or profit to bring attention to an issue that ought to be 
a default measure?  This is how a people become “groomed” in deviancy. Hence, it is not just by 
exploiting and maintaining inequality in the Niger Delta that they have implicated themselves 
with the evolution of a culture of corruption but even the method adopted for “cleaning-up-the-
mess” may imply grooming immorality and reinforcing corruption.  
The United States Department of State travel advisory for Nigeria commonly paints a 
gory picture of life conditions in the country.
715
 Reading it you would wonder how on earth do 
people live there? It paints a picture of a country that lacks not just basic social utilities like good 
roads, transportation, power and water supply but more importantly that you are not safe in many 
parts of the country. It warns that “visitors and residents have experienced armed muggings, 
assaults, burglaries, car-jacking, rapes, kidnappings, extortions, often involving violence.”716 It 
adds that the police are usually not responsive when any of these happen. It identifies many part 
of the North that travel is not recommended because of bombings and killings which has become 
a constant part of experience there due to the activities of Boko Haram an Islamic militant group. 
 Thousands of lives have been lost as they go on rampage bombing churches while in session, 
setting homes ablaze while people sleep. The internet is replete with pictures of their victims.  
This research is not about image laundering. We admit there is so much insecurity in 
Nigeria that it bellies any problem the common Nigerian had to confront. Travelling by road is 
not safe not just because roads are death traps (except that some improvements have been made 
more recently) but that armed robbers have been known to open fire on big transport buses and 
                                               
715 http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_987.html#safety 
716 Ibid  
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both the corpses and those lucky to be alive have been robbed after first stripping them naked to 
ensure they have not hidden money anywhere. This is changing too as the economy transitions 
gradually to cashless economy. Armed robbers had a free reign in some cities at one time or 
another to the extent they were actually sending “Notice” to residents informing them when they 
were coming. The idea was that “you better keep money for us or else you will be sorry”. And 
they usually keep to their schedule!  
Now, this is happening in a country where low level government functionaries have a 
resident police escort. Private person who have the means can pay for police escort that follows 
them around for protection. This is national security for hire that is still practiced today. The 
poor are left to their fate. They not only have to worry about how to earn their daily bread 
(millions have no jobs, no welfare for the unemployed, the government does not yet have such 
statistics), but also they are exposed to death on the road, in the street, and at home. If they get 
sick, they have no insurance. To get treatment many have sold their lands and all available 
assets. So, if you do not die of hunger, you may not be lucky with disease. If you are lucky to be 
alive and healthy, you may not escape the bullet of the armed robber or the bomb of a militant. If 
you struggle out of all these, and perhaps lucky to have a successful son, daughter, brother, or 
sister abroad, you become a moving target for kidnappers who are looking for ransom! And 
supposing they have not gotten to you in any of these other means, you might run into ritual 
killers or other gory situations dealing with dark forces.
717
 In these situations, the common belief 
is that people in power are often implicated.   
                                               
717 See Smith, Op. Cit.  
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The above is but a partial and soft description of the social conditions the average 
Nigerian has to endure in a country where billions of dollars go into private pockets and 
siphoned away to foreign lands. The question is, “if you find yourself in such a space, would you 
conscientiously claim it cannot influence your actions?” If it does, is it possible for you 
determine a priori the direction of influence? It is critical asking these questions because unless 
those engaged in the project called Nigeria (either economically or intellectually) are in touch 
with the harsh realities of the suffering of the common Nigerian, they will not understand the 
deeper roots of those “scam letters” and other forms of scams emerging from there. These harsh 
social conditions explain why the average Nigerian would prefer to “check out” abroad, and they 
are leaving in droves to other countries in search of greener pastures that create its own peculiar 
problems.
718
 But these realities do not necessarily imply or suggest that all Nigerians are corrupt 
as many Westerners must have realized through dealing with them. However it does provide a 
context that illumines the problem.  
4.5. Theological Reflection on Sociality of Sin: Sinful Social Structures 
The rediscovery of the social nature of sin is perhaps one of the theological 
breakthroughs of the last century. Biblical scholars agree as to the scriptural basis of the idea of 
social solidarity and social consequences characterizing sin.
719
 Patrick Kerans made a critical 
                                               
718 The “brain drain” factor remains a major problem for Nigeria and other African countries despite the argument 
that the money remitted effectively balances out its deficits. Often it is the brightest and most talented that leaves our 
shores to other lands leaving the country depleted of necessary brain power and talents for its transformation. 
Ironically, despite the many contributions of these Nigerians (doctors, Nurses, engineers, technocrats, among others) 
in their countries of residence, there is hardly any positive image accruing to it from the media except the negatives 
– of crime, and of course without referencing its enabling condition: the looting spree and particularly where the 
funds went – to the “developed world.”     
719 Scholars agree that that Genesis 3-11 is an account of the social effects of sin and its historical development. See 
Patrick O’Keefe, What are they Saying about Social Sin (Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 1990), p.6  
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analysis of the Christian idea of Sin tracing its evolution from the idea of evil to an 
understanding of the notion of social sin.
720
 The evolution of this concept is not our concern here 
but rather to underscore the critical importance that an understanding of this notion entails for 
any relevant theological reflection affecting a specific socio-cultural group. While the idea of the 
personal responsibility is not lost to our Christian understanding of sin, but articulating a social 
dimension of sin is a paradigm shift that enriches the extensions of that responsibility.  
  As social organisms, individuals live in community within a web of social relationships. 
Social scientists have helped us deepen our understanding of the nature of this relationship 
between the individual and society. Berger and Lukmann affirm a “dialectical relationship” 
between individual and his social world. According to them, “Society is a human product. 
Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.”721 Henriot explains these as a dialectical 
process represented in three moments: “externalization,” “objectivation,” and “internalization.” 
Externalization represents the origins of society as a construct of individual persons as they 
“externalize” values they consider important to them. These structures over time take a life of 
their own as they achieve “objective” status as an autonomous life-style or culture. At this level, 
no conscious choice of individual persons is needed to maintain this lifestyle. Henriot explains 
that at this level “reification” may occur. This simply means the tendency to see a particular way 
of life as beyond human constructs but seen as either natural or an act of God.
722
  Reification is 
                                               
720 Patrick Kerans, Sinful Social Structures (New York: Paulist Press, 1974).  Note that Kerans work is dedicated to 
understanding the sinful social structures particularly in North America to which he adopts “inversion of categories” 
as a method towards that understanding.   
721 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of 
Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 61, Cited by O’Keefe, Ibid., p. 43.  
722 O’keefe, Ibid, p.45.  
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considered as a serious obstacle to change. Finally, “internalization” is the necessary 
consequence of “objectivation.”  This is how a given society socializes the individuals in it. A 
given community begins to do things in a given way and will claim against forces of change: 
“this is how we have always done it.” In other words, a given way of acting becomes inherited 
and passes from one generation to the next. It becomes a way of life into which individuals are 
born and bred. It becomes their reality, their life, their world. It is therefore not surprising that it 
is often difficult to bring those socialized within a given cultural context to “see” what is perhaps 
so obvious to an external observer. Francis Bacon called it “idols” that influence our perception.  
 Social structures of sin therefore refer to ‘institutionalized wrongdoing’ or a ‘system of 
oppression’. O’Keefe definition of “social structure” provides some clarity to the term:  
[A]n ordered pattern of relations that is established and becomes routine. Structures involve 
policies and institutions that make up the patterns of societal organization as well as the 
worldviews, perspectives, and value systems by which we interpret our experiences so as to bring 
coherence and meaning into our lives. Structures therefore are both external and internal to the 
individual person. In order to bring about a lasting reform of external structures, it is often 
necessary to bring about a change in the internal structures.
723
 
 
The key point is “ordered pattern of relations” that has become routine within a given society or 
community. Institutions are part of the “structures” of society and within a given social system. 
O’keefe goes on to define “institutions” as “a distinctive complex of actions, providing 
procedures through which human conduct is patterned, e.g. marriage and organized religion.”724 
It provides “typologies for our actions,” and in this way influences our behavior. Finally, he 
                                               
723 Mark O’Keefe, What are they Saying about Social Sin?, Ibid. p.46 
724 O’Keefe, Ibid, pp. 46-47  
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defines “systems” as “a complex of social structures and institutions.”725 In order words, 
“systems” is a more general concept that could include structures and institutions.  
It might then become clearer why we said above that “social structures of sin” in this 
study refers to “institutionalized wrongdoing” or a “system of oppression.” We are not concerned 
with the different structures or institutions within a given system or society but specifically with 
that aspect of it that has a negative influence on human behavior. It is meant to capture the 
“totality of circumstances”726 that prevails over an individual within a given society and at a 
particular time. The influence of this “totality of circumstances” on human behavior is 
presumably enormous. It is “assumed” because it cannot be wholly grasped much less computed. 
It makes sense when Patrick Kerans distinguishes between “circumstances” and “situation” 
giving greater extension and influence to the former.
727
 It takes time to build a system of 
oppression but once in place, it has far reaching effects and takes time to dismantle. While it is 
inconceivable that a specific individual may be held responsible for building any given system of 
oppression, it however remains true that such a system is the responsibility of the individuals in 
it. Vatican II points out the integral relationship between personal sin and social structures:  
To be sure the disturbances which so frequently occur in the social order result in part from the 
natural tensions of economic, political, and social forms. But at a deeper level they flow from 
man’s pride and selfishness, which contaminate even the social sphere. When the structure of 
affairs is flawed by the consequences of sin, man, already born with a bent toward evil, finds 
there new inducements to sin, which cannot be overcome without strenuous efforts and the 
assistance of grace.
728
 
                                               
725 O’Keefe, Ibid. pp. 47 
726 Piet Schoonenberg used this term to explain what it means to be “situated”. See P. Schoonenberg, Man and Sin 
(Notre Dame: University Press, 1965), pp.104-5. 
727 Patrick Kerans, Sinful Social Structures, Ibid. p.74 
728 Vatican II Documents: Gaudium et Spes, n.25.   
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Though the construction of a ‘system of sin’ is a complex, it remains true to say it finds its 
deepest roots in “man’s pride and selfishness.”  In chapter two we have noted particularly the 
role of conscience as a natural mechanism for self-transcendence. We have argued that without 
conscience, we lose our capacity for altruism and give free reign to the beast in us that acts only 
in self-interest. Without conscience, we build and enable structures of sin. Metaphors have been 
suggested as helpful in understanding the nature of Sin and social sin for that matter.  
Patrick McCormick examined sin under six different metaphors.
729
 Using the metaphor of 
“sin as an addiction,” he helps us see not just how sinful acts could become addictive but 
underscores the nature of influence one kind of sin could have on another forming a chain that 
sometimes engulfs a whole nation.
730
 Keran’s idea of “knowing ignorance” is a metaphor he uses 
to explain the root of social sin in “bias”. We dwelt extensively on the roots of bias in chapter 
three to explain tribalism. Keran here considers “bias” as the “source of irrationality” that is at 
the “heart of sin” – and particularly as it affects social sin.731 Keran argues that there is a 
dialectical relationship between individuals and situations as well as society. We have noted 
above the distinction he makes between circumstances and situation. While “circumstances” are 
all the factors that exclude (“not me”) and is beyond the control of the individual, “situation” 
includes the subject, and is within his vision and consciousness. It is that part of his 
circumstances he is aware of and doing something about – implying an interaction. He argues 
                                               
729 McCormick examined sin under six headings: stain, crime, spiral, personal, sickness, addiction, See Sin as 
Addiction (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1989).  
730 Helen Caldicott’s work, Missile Envy, documents how “American Greed supports its militarism” around the 
world. See Caldicott, Missile Envy (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), p. 265.  
731 Patrick Kerans, Sinful Social Structures, p. 72 
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that “most of the factors in a situation, no matter how private and intimate, are structured by 
society.” The implication here is that our “knowledge, attitude, and behavior” are learned or the 
product of socialization. How to cope with problems is a critical part of that socialization.  
Interestingly, we inherited part of the solutions to life’s problems. Nobody wants to 
reinvent the wheel. So, we follow a pattern of behavior that was prescribed to us. The acceptance 
of this pattern is so thorough such that it has become a form of “reality”. He says, “reality itself 
is limited to that which everyone thinks it is. This is general bias.”732 This is institutionalized 
behavior. If the behavior is wrong or sinful, it is a social form of sin, and the social structure that 
enables it is systematized. He argues further:  
We learn early to act on the basis of our own biased insight into a situation – a bias towards 
protecting our own personal interest. This further skews the subsequent situation, provoking 
others to still further defensive action…Bias, narrow self-interest, defensiveness, shortsightedness 
– these qualities are all dynamic qualities. They tend to overcome their opposites.
733
  
 
There is no doubt that corruption in Nigeria is enabled by sinful social structures. We 
identified in chapter three how the basic framework of this structure in more traditional societies 
like Nigeria is “tribalism” which is the institutionalization of narrow “self-interest” that activates 
“bias, defensiveness, shortsightedness,” and in the case of Nigeria insatiable greed that tilts the 
scale of any sense of social equality outrageously out of balance. Since everyone is seeking his 
narrow self-interest, there is universal distrust of each against all. Every opportunity given for 
service translates as one to have a cut of the national “cake” (and as much a chunk as one 
possibly can!). It is not strange that local tribalists develop affiliation, a form of intentional 
“kinship” with “international tribalists” analogous to what Kelly Greenhill calls “kleptocratic 
                                               
732 Patrick Kerans, Sinful Social Structures, P. 76.  
733 Kerans, Ibid. pp.77-78 
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interdependence,”734 since they share same interests (personal and/or private profit at all costs 
and to the detriment of any rational sense of the common good). In such a Hobbesian jungle, it is 
survival of the fittest, and the vulnerable poor are constantly used as baits for carnivores with 
voracious appetites. Such diseased minds can only spin out irrational choices from 
“excellencies” and “distinguished” gentlemen/women such that the wheels of statecraft spiral out 
of control towards the precipice. Obviously, corrupt behavior (like every sin), is addictive and 
possibly infectious if the conditions are right.  
We noted in the foregoing chapter our extraordinary capacity for miming. So, just as 
tribalism is mimed or learned by those exposed to it, corruption is learnt by gradual assimilation 
of it as “acceptable behavior.” It becomes a “social sin” or “socialized sin”. When policemen 
openly demand bribe as a “right” each time they stop you at their checkpoints, they not only 
scandalize masses of younger people but are actually playing a critical role in institutionalizing 
corrupt practices and deforming of individual and collective consciences. It is the moral 
equivalent of a priest abusing young people. They destroy that which it is their primary duty to 
protect. It has become an unwritten rule that you cannot get any service from the police without 
bribing your way to it unless you have some connections at the top to give orders to subordinates 
(“Oga’ at the top”). But then, there are certain attenuating “circumstances” that make some of 
their actions not so culpable. It is a fact that the police are underpaid. But even that meager salary 
                                               
734 Kelly Greenhill explains “kleptocracy as “’government characterized by rampant greed and corruption’ which 
privilege the personal wealth and political power of government officials and the ruling class at the expense of the 
population.” And “kleptocratic interdependence” he describes as “a set of profit- and power-driven, self-reinforcing 
domestic and international relationships between criminal groups and government officials.” This relationship is 
characterized by four conditions: Sharing of Sovereignty (political, functional, and social powers of the State), 
privileging of private gain over public good in poorly run countries,  poor legal or juridical accountability, some 
fusion of licit and illicit economy.  See Greenhill, “Kleptocratic Interdependence: Trafficking, Corruption, and the 
Marriage of Politics and Illicit Profits,” in Corruption, Global Security, and World Order edited by Robert I. 
Rotberg (Kindle Locations 1348-1349, 1405 and 1409). Kindle Edition. 
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have been known in the past to be withheld for months by their bosses who leave them in interest 
yielding accounts while their poor colleagues wait on their goodwill.   
When traditional rulers give “sacred titles” to someone who became rich overnight by 
looting state or national treasury or a similar crime, proclaiming him/her an “illustrious 
son/daughter” constitutes the deepest rupture in the moral consciousness of the younger 
generation. While anthropologists like Smith might describe this as part of “kinship patronage 
system” that does not in all cases carry the same moral weight equivalent to Western conception 
of corruption, we have reservations for this explanation. While his view is a common explanation 
among social scientists for any patron-client relationships found in most cultures in varying 
degrees, we reject its “relativization” or “de-moralization” of an obvious wrongdoing since it 
poses the greatest threat to any reform effort. There is no moral justification for doing the same 
things you readily condemn in others. If the village chiefs think it is “wrong” for public servants 
like Abacha to cart away billions of dollars of public funds from the central bank and dump them 
into his private account for personal use, their own kinsman doing the same does not justify it 
except if they are bent on building a kingdom of thieves.  It is about the objective evil inherent in 
that type of behavior we call “stealing”. A consistent rationalization of “stealing” masked by 
repeated appeals to native kinship patronage only helps to consolidate the rupture that already 
exist in the psycho-social framework for moral development. This is how tribalism first destroys 
a system before it eventually self-destructs. The same is true of the mentality that rationalizes 
racism or xenophobia.  
Interestingly, in some Nigerian moral traditions, stealing is considered a cardinal “sin” or 
wrongdoing. For instance, among the Igbos, persons of shady characters, those who “steal” other 
peoples’ stuff (material goods like goat, yam, clothing, money, among others), are often 
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“eliminated” or made to “disappear.” This means they are killed by community justice system 
because they constitute a threat to the entire wellbeing of the community. A personal experience 
was in the late 70s (79-80) when a “cleansing” of the land of all armed bandits and criminals of 
that stripe was carried out by young traders in Onitsha, Nkpor and beyond in old Anambra state 
of Eastern Nigeria. It was called “boys Oye!” All the crooks (particularly armed bandits) who 
have been terrorizing the land were searched out, executed in public and burnt. This jungle 
justice continues to happen from time to time in the East of the country primarily because the 
government security system is grossly inefficient. The most recent was carried out by a vigilante 
group (Bakkassi Boys) also in Igboland but were later disbanded by Obasanjo regime for their 
excesses.
735
  
The point is that traditionally, stealing is considered a cardinal offense in the traditional 
Igbo mindset and by extension most of the other tribes as well. Perhaps retrieving the power 
inherent in language would re-capture the Nigerian and African imagination that corruption is 
stealing. We addressed in chapter three the role of shame and guilt in traditional African society.  
We shall address some of these in the concluding part of this chapter and the next. African moral 
tradition is founded on “sharing” but had always excluded “sharing ill-gotten wealth” since it 
dishonors both humans, the gods, and the ancestors. There is an obvious need to retrieve this 
older ideal of “sharing” through a constructive hermeneutic that articulates a morality for nation 
building if not for a morality of personal transformation.  
                                               
735 The “Bakkassi Boys” is a local vigilante group that emerged in Anambra State, East of Nigeria in 1998 as a 
response to the heightened state of insecurity. Armed robbers were having a field day and the poor masses were 
helpless. They were first composed of traders and artisans but as their demand spread across the South-East, they 
probably got mingled with persons of questionable character. They were disbanded in 2002 by the Obasanjo regime. 
See Daniel Smith, Op. Cit. Kindle location 2706, 
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We strongly condemn the practice of rewarding crooks who steal public funds that should 
be behind bars on the pretext that it is a way of retrieving some part of the national cake for a 
given ethnic nationality that feel politically or economically marginalized. It is therefore our 
view that the traditional kinship (patron-client) relationship is in need of deconstruction in itself. 
While we admit its values for maintaining all forms of social relationships, we also realize that it 
has in recent times been subjected to an unhealthy hermeneutics with grave consequences for 
moral development and nation building. The question is how to both retain its inherent values 
while circumventing its inadequacies. Our approach here is to apply the power of differentiation. 
We identified “tribalism” as a contagion in this study to differentiate it from a healthy 
kinship relationship. While kinship connotes bloodline, it also implies the core extensions of 
one’s primary affection and trust circle. Tribalism on the other hand is born of fear and distrust. 
It is an unhealthy mental mode that distorts how individuals or groups interpret, understand, 
relate to, and control their world. It does have very narrow advantages for those who practice it. 
Though it ensures that instincts necessary for survival of the tribe is developed and retained, it is 
blind to the broader horizons of reality and “survival” as such. If “survival” is narrowly defined 
in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, then tribalism may be “rationalized” but can never 
be “justified”.  
We have shown in that last chapter how by destroying social trust, tribalism is able to 
rupture the most basic fabric of social order. It does not merely distort the proper formation of 
conscience, but impacts its core function – the capacity for self-transcendence. It also hampers 
the capacity for true nationhood. In a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, nationhood can only be 
possible when the different ethnic communities are able to self-transcend – look beyond their 
specific “corporate selfhood” and shake hands of fellowship with other tribes to be able to build 
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a viable nation. Without this willingness to live an authentic “communalism” that every 
community in Africa boasts about at a deeper and broader level, it will be impossible to 
formulate a serious national ideology that is important for statecraft. We will all be fishes 
swimming in our own small streams without the opportunity to experience the big rivers and the 
seas that our communalism could have flown down to us to enjoy.   
We can therefore trace many social ills to it: Chinua Achebe, for instance, admits that 
“tribalism was endemic”736 and took pains to point out how this is at the heart of the “Problem 
with Nigeria” and its symptom in the marginalization of the Igbos. For all their sins, the Igbos 
remain a gift to Nigeria worth celebrating. Because of their industry and enterprising spirit, many 
uninhabitable places have been turned into money spinning machines in all parts of the country. 
They have a habit of making any place they come to their home. They develop it as they live and 
do business there. If their talents are positively assimilated in Nigeria, they would definitely 
contribute more to our nation building than any foreign investor program could ever do because 
there is a certain positive energy that acceptance gives to a person and a people.  Just as African 
Americans are struggling against all odds of discrimination (essentially being “unaccepted” to a 
large degree) to survive where fate have planted them, the Igbos are going through the same in 
Nigeria (perhaps at a less intense level). Given our analysis in chapter two on the psychology of 
moral development, and given their relative success, imagine what they made of their lives 
(positiveand consider in that light what acceptance (at bottom means love) would do in their 
lives and that of the nation.  The same could be said for the different ethnicities. Each has their 
                                               
736 Achebe, Morning yet at Near Dawn, Loc. Cit., p. 83 
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special talent, which if properly harnessed, would make our country a beautiful kaleidoscope of 
colors. Is it too late to celebrate our differences and our harness our different energies?  
The alternative is tribalism with its pathetic history: monumental corruption, political 
instability, violence and/or war that results from inability to articulate a deep sense of 
nationhood; lack of basic infrastructure and/or backwardness, hunger, chronic disease, and 
poverty together give birth to a dependency culture that has made Africa a beggarly spectacle, a 
pure caricature of her inherent wealth and dignity, that the world is forced to behold pitiably 
displayed on news media daily. These are but some of the devastating effects of tribalism in most 
nations of Africa. Nigeria, the so-called “giant of Africa,” is a monumental disgrace to all indices 
of what constitutes nation building, no thanks to tribalism. It is for this reason that we insist that 
if we are to make any serious progress in overcoming corruption, and take giant strides in nation 
building, we need to tackle this monster.  
 Though we admit that a people’s life situation (social circumstances) could influence 
how they respond to their environment or determine the vices they develop, it is also true that 
with critical reflection and diligent effort, it could shape their vision and provide opportunity to 
the virtues they ought to strive for in order to realize that vision. While we admit the significant 
impact external agents play in the destruction or balkanization of Africa, we do place the full 
burden of our fate in our own hands. The words of the prophet Hosea, “my people die for lack of 
knowledge,”737 fits the Nigerian and African narrative so perfectly that her “enemies of progress” 
(both internal and external) have exploited this lack to maximum advantage for too long 
                                               
737 Hosea 4:6 The Holy Bible, New Revised Standard Version (Hendrickson Publishers, 2008) 
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precisely because we are too naïve (or ignorant) to see in order to remedy it.
738
  From selling our 
sons and daughters into slavery in exchange for mirrors, whiskey, or handkerchiefs to the looting 
of our treasury and banking them in foreign lands; from killing sons and daughters for bits of 
diamonds or gold to the destruction of our ecosystem and arable land because of oil money, we 
have proved beyond measure that “we die for lack of knowledge.”  
Hence, the ambivalence we Nigerians express regarding corruption (we are its greatest 
critics but also complicit in its practices) only mirrors the mental confusion that results from a 
debilitating illness. Admittedly, the masses of Nigerians are complicit in corruption often as 
“victims” of their social conditions (social context). However, in the process of contextualized 
response, they are evolving an unhealthy mental mode to rationalize an unhealthy practice 
instead of evolving a mental mode for mobilizing against a social virus. If this becomes 
internalized, “reification” becomes inevitable. This is already occurring at some level given that 
most Nigerians believe that it is only God that will save the situation.
739
 Most seem to have lost 
the will to fight for the kind of country they desire or deserve. A psychological paralysis is 
already occurring similar to what the communists achieved with coercive propaganda. Therefore, 
                                               
738 Aimé Césaire captured this in his play, “Uno Saison au Congo,” where he describes the plan B of four expatriate 
bankers in the Belgian Congo after its independence. One of them explained to his colleagues that he knows these 
“savages” so well that he knows how to control them post-independence. They understand only pain and flattery. 
What will they want in the new arrangement? He answers that they will be looking for “rich pickings: they will want 
to be presidents and members of the parliament, senators and ministers; and they will want credit notes and bank 
accounts and cars and villas and luxurious living. The basic principle now must be to over-feed the savages, to stuff 
them full with all the things their greed demand. Then they will become meek and humble of heart, simple to 
manage. Since we are talking about the representatives of the people, it is they who will persuade the population at 
large to accede to the proposals of the bankers. So there will be a fruitful conspiracy.” There is hardly anything in 
those lines that has not come true in post-colonial Africa. It is such a shame to be so predictable. See Aimé Césaire, 
Une Saison au Congo, Paris 1966, cited by Bénézet Bujo, African Theology In Its Social Context, Loc. Cit, p. 54 
739 Daniel J. Smith argues that, “Even as Nigerians feel resigned, enticed, trapped, and compelled to participate in 
their country's ubiquitous corruption, they also feel angry, frustrated, dismayed, and betrayed. See Daniel Smith, 
““The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria,” in Corruption, Global Security and World 
Order, Op. Cit. (Kindle Locations 3940-3941) 
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this unhealthy mental mode is a greater threat than corruption itself and therefore in greater need 
of rehabilitation. It is essentially tribalism that breeds and maintains this unhealthy mental mode. 
Tribalism, as “institutionalized self-interest,”740 and at the detriment of the common good of all, 
compromises not just the very basis for national unity and a critical factor in nation building, but 
even more critical is how it compromises the capacity for self-transcendence that we assert as the 
core attribute of conscience and without which a higher moral consciousness or individual and 
social transformation becomes a fantasy.  
Nevertheless, we are quick to add that survival is the most fundamental human right. 
Therefore, when people are subjected to live in sub-human conditions while cognizant of the fact 
that they have the material resources to live a better life, they have little option than to act in such 
a manner as to “survive the system” than lose their lives. The monumental looting of the treasury 
in Nigeria (and Africa) that the West has tacitly allowed to go on for decades by receiving its 
proceeds into its coffers based on the calculation that it somehow benefits its economy 
741
 is not 
just unconscionable but the greatest atrocity to the suffering people of Nigeria (and Africa). This 
research insists that the West must have to take giant steps to reverse this trend if not for the sake 
of the suffering peoples of Nigeria and Africa, at least to protect its own touted sense of integrity.   
 
                                               
740We argue that any form of institutionalization of self-interest will breakdown the system at some point. For 
instance, Daniel J. Smith used “Patron-client system” to explain the basic framework of social relationships and 
assistance in Nigeria (and Africa) that implies “personal interest as intertwined with group interests,” that is now 
breaking down – giving way to more “individualistic pursuit of wealth and power” See D. J. Smith, “The Paradoxes 
of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria, in Corruption, Global Security and World Order, Op. Cit. Kindle 
location, 3925.  
741 Rose Ackerman noted that “Some developed countries resist efforts to control corruption because they believe 
that payoffs in developing countries benefit their own domestic businesses.” See Ackerman, Corruption and 
Government, Op. Cit., p. 177 
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4.6  SEEKING SOLUTIONS: THEORIES OF SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION  
We have identified the level of corruption in Nigeria as systemic rather than incidental. The 
question is how do we even begin to solve this problem? This section is not concerned with a 
descriptive analysis of solutions proposed for corruption; we leave that task to economic 
theorists and social scientists. We are concerned with the deeper but broader picture – the 
underlying presuppositions of representative theories for eradicating systemic or even incidental 
corruption. Authors, particularly from the field of economics and social sciences have proposed a 
variety of solutions that we condense here under the following headings:  
Gradualism: This is an incremental approach to reform - a gradual but consistent 
incremental institutional reform based on the assumption that consistency is the best guarantee 
for overcoming systemic corruption.
742
 Though this remains perhaps the most common approach 
to systemic corruption, yet it begs the question because it is predicated on the assumption of 
guarantee of consistency precisely the lack of which is what makes systemic corruption so 
endemic. What is rather guaranteed is that systemic corruption will overtake any institutional 
reform that is introduced no matter how gradual since there is no possibility of quarantining the 
different anti-corruption agents in the same system. It is therefore a measure that may have some 
short-term advantages but with no guarantee of sustainability over the long term. However, there 
is a hope that partial changes could evolve into a full scale reform when new allies are added and 
grows into a critical mass of people who desire the dividends of a more effective system.
743
  
                                               
742 See Michael Johnstone, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, pp.198-208. See also “Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundations for Institutional 
Reform,” Online paper (fall):1997. 
743 See Rose Ackerman, Corruption and Government, Op. Cit. p. 220. 
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The Big Bang: Rothstein argues for a “big-bang” approach to corruption. He rejects 
gradualism above or any such incremental approach as wasteful – for it only succeeds in wasting 
resources given the fact that most anti-corruption agents are normally “bought-over” by the 
system. He therefore prefers waiting until one can deal with it and “bang” out the bad guys.744 In 
other words, times of crisis or revolutionary changes provide opportunity for changing the rules 
of engagement instead of business as usual. Evidently, the “big bang” theory is practicable in 
dictatorships and revolutionary governments. Military dictatorships with good revolutionary 
intent can clean the Aegean stable and provide a relief and deterrence for corruption.  
A close example of the “big-bang” approach is what happened in Ghana in 1979 following the 
military coup that brought Jerry Rawlings to power. The Ghanaian Armed forces Revolutionary 
Council under General Rawlings (AFRC) “carried out a much wider ‘house-cleaning-exercise’ 
aimed at purging the armed forces and society at large of corruption and graft as well as restoring 
a sense of moral responsibility and accountability in public life.”745  It is arguable that this 
“purging” as a psycho-social event succeeded in establishing probity and public accountability in 
Ghana that it still reaps its dividends today. Many Nigerians express similar aspirations for the 
“Rawlings method” as solutions to Nigerian corruption. This explains the feelings of nostalgia 
and regret Nigerians often express for the times of General Murtala Mohammed in whom they 
see a revolutionary leader with a vision for a corruption-free Nigeria but was short-lived because 
he was overthrown in a coup that many believe was externally orchestrated.  
                                               
744 See Rothstein, “Anti-Corruption – The Big Bang,” in A Q & G Working Paper Series, 2007:3, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338614 
745 See online profile of General Jerry Rawlings, http://www.jjrawlings.info/about.html 
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Though the “big-bang” solution to corruption is deemed impracticable in a democratic 
arrangement (except you have an exceptionally strong leader with a sterling moral quality),
746
 
but it becomes an inevitable or an increasingly attractive option when the political class 
consistently fails in their duty to ensure that the masses reap the dividends of governance. It 
therefore remains a possible option in Nigeria. But it is not a determinable option because you do 
not know what the “revolutionaries” will turn out to be when they assume the mantle of power. 
This is the greatest problem the world faces with the aftermaths of the “Arab Spring” when the 
“bad guys” were banged out. But this is always the danger inherent in manipulating socio-
political outcomes solely for private interests and at the detriment of justice and fairness. It has a 
costly price tag.    
Targeted Gradualism: Rose Ackerman advocates a “middle range” incremental approach 
that seems to admit the insights from both the “big-bang” approach and “gradualism”. It targets 
specific sectors of socio-political institutions with focus on government accountability. The same 
critic for gradualism is relevant here as well. However, like gradualism, it has some short-term 
advantages that have the potential for incentivizing a more extensive reform. In the case of 
Nigeria, and Africa, she particularly provides us a window into the role of the international 
community in the fight against corruption that converges with our position that includes “asset 
recovery” and “capacity building” as its key elements. She admits that though asset recovery has 
recently become part of United Nations treaty, she argues that “one key require element is to 
                                               
746 Except in cases like what happened in Susurluk, Turkey that illumined the complicity of highest government 
officials in corruption and resulted in a change of government. A car accident on November 3, 1996 in that country 
revealed the victims as the police chief, a member of parliament, an international criminal by name Mehmet Ozbay 
(alias Abdullah Catl) wanted by Interpol, he was carrying an identity card signed by the interior Minister, the trunk 
was full of dollars and weapons, and the occupants pockets were filled with cocaine. See Ezel Akay, “A Call to End 
Corruption: One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light: New Tactics in Human Rights.” www.newtactics.org  
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make corruption a predicate offense to the application of money laundering requirements.”747 
We cannot agree more with her! Some of her recommendations include insisting on the need to 
make the burden of recovery of corrupt assets to the host country less difficult citing instances of 
Congo, Nigeria, and Kenya (all in Africa).
748
    
We think that if the international community could adhere strictly to merely these two 
counsels, reform in Nigeria (and Africa) will take an unbelievably new positive turn. It will be 
the equivalent of our own “big-bang” moment that reverberates through the entire system 
triggering ripple effects capable of unraveling the entire system of corruption. But perhaps this in 
itself is the greatest fear of the West that paralyzes it from acting even in its own traditional 
interests of maintaining any condition that enables free flow of raw materials to the West. But 
they forget that failed States are nobody’s gain. Nigeria particularly is teetering on the edge of a 
possible revolution. A deliberate reform targeted at government accountability that includes 
retrieval of a good measure of what was looted would provide a strong buffer to possible 
unregulated reform (or violent uprising). It is delusive to think African Spring will never happen. 
The time of opportunity to regain African trust is now. The window is robust asset recovery.  
Ackerman’s proposal includes considering the “underlying institutions and habits of 
behavior that make corruption endemic in some countries…”749 Apart from providing the 
impetus for our research, we particularly stress the highly probable impact of asset recovery as 
                                               
747 See Rose Ackerman, “The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption,” Copenhagen Consensus2004, p. 37. 
748 Susan Rose-Ackerman, “The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption,” Copenhagen Consensus2004, p. 
37. http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Default.aspx?ID=225. See also Corruption and Government, 1999, 
pp.177-197.  
749 Ackerman, “The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption,” Ibid. p. 15 
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part of any serious reform initiative. Asset recovery is crucial not only because its loss is 
responsible for the impoverishment of Nigerians despite their oil wealth and a critical factor not 
just in reinforcing corruption within the political leadership, but even more pertinent is that it 
breeds and feeds a negative perception about the West as the source of their woes and the 
consequent criminal trends that emerges from this mindset as evident in Nigeria e-mail scams 
and other failed or tittering states in Africa.
750
 Turning around this mindset is achievable with a 
robust effort by the West to track and return Nigerian (and African loot). It will establish a heart-
felt accord with the individual Nigerians (and Africans) that has the potential to turn them into 
vanguards against Western scam artists and those who wish to do them harm. It is the single 
possible act that has the potential to positively rejuvenate Western image in Africa since the 
slave trade, colonization, and the ills accompanying its scramble for her natural resources and the 
recent revival of land grabbing quests by Western interests in Africa mentioned below.  
 Moreover, asset recovery will be more effective than aids because it will be a symbol of 
justice and truth as well as a powerful incentive for further accountability and reform. We have 
consistently argued in line with H. R. Niebuhr that we humans are “responders” to what is done 
to us. If the West will dedicate the same resources and zeal to locating and returning Nigerian 
                                               
750 General Michael Mukasey, US Attorney General said in April 2008 offered a grim assessment of the rising threat 
of global criminals affirming that they are “more sophisticated, they are richer, they have greater influence over 
government and political institutions worldwide ... and [they] are far more involved in our everyday lives than many 
people appreciate.... [Consequently], we can't ignore criminal syndicates in other countries on the naive assumption 
that they are a danger only in their homeland, whether it is located in Eurasia, Africa, or anywhere else."' Kelly M. 
Greenhill, “Kleptocratic Interdependence: Trafficking, Corruption, and the Marriage of Politics and Illicit Profits,” 
in Corruption, Global Security, and World Order edited by Robert I. Rotberg. (Kindle Locations 1332-1333). 
Kindle Edition.  We need to keep stressing the fact that the international community can no longer afford to think 
that what happens to Africa does not affect it. There is no rational basis for holding to this script any longer. The 
more impoverished the nations of Africa become, the more creative elements within it will try to reinvent 
themselves in an attempt to survive. And all options will likely be on the table. Somalia home-bred piracy is a good 
example. A failed Nigeria will be a global nightmare, but knowing that a transformed Nigeria means a more robust 
economy that will benefit all parties in the global community should provide additional incentive for a concerted 
effort by the West to insist on reform against corruption in Nigeria.  
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and African loot in Western Banks and economy equivalent to what they dedicate to money 
laundering from the West into Africa (or drug trafficking), it will not only result in monumental 
reform in governance in Africa but will yield huge positive political dividends in the relationship 
between the West and African nations far into the future. The reason is simple: it will change the 
prevalent negative perception of Westerners as “looters” and “polluters” of Africa to a more 
positive perception and nomenclature. The significance of this is beyond measure. It is in this 
light that these words of David Cameron at the G8 Economic summit sound refreshing if given 
teeth and effective implementation:     
[A] few years back a transparency initiative exposed a huge black hole in Nigeria’s finances – an 
$800 million discrepancy between companies’ payments and government’s receipts for oil. This 
is leading to new regulation of Nigeria’s oil sector – so the richness of the earth can actually 
enrich the people of that country. And the potential is staggering.… So we’re going to push for 
more transparency on who owns companies, on who’s buying up land and for what purpose, 
on how governments spend their money, on how gas, oil and mining companies operate, on 
who is hiding stolen assets and how we recover and return them.
751
 
 
If these words are followed by concrete actions “targeted” at identifying and returning 
Nigerian loots that are currently in Western Banks or liquidating properties and businesses that 
are in circulation financed through these loots and returning its proceeds to the people of Nigeria; 
and ensuring that Nigerian and African loots no longer find easy access to their economy, then 
the West would have helped initiating a deliberate targeted reform that this research argues as a 
critical element in tackling systemic corruption in Nigeria in particular and Africa as a whole.  
                                               
751 See http://economicconfidential.net/new/news/national-news/1235-n108-trillion-2012-revenues-where-is-the-
evidence 
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Therefore the recent trial and imprisonment of former Nigerian Governor Ibori in London 
is a worthy effort in this direction. A similar follow up in the U.S.A with its forfeiture ruling 
against the former governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa state of Nigeria is encouraging because 
of recent collaboration between Nigeria and the U.S.A that includes the return of “looted funds” 
as a predicate offense to money laundering legal initiatives. Obviously these two cases represent 
but a tip of the iceberg of looted Nigerian funds currently abroad, but it is a very good start that 
needs to be lauded and sustained.  
 Susan Ackerman made some general recommendations for curbing systemic corruption 
that specifies and differentiates the roles of the international community from that of the local 
community (or domestic government). The role of the international community, apart from what 
we have noted above, includes but not limited to making anti-corruption reform a condition for 
international aid policy; a closer monitoring of how effectively loans or grants are utilized; 
ensuring that multinational companies desist from paying bribes and enlisting them in any 
reform program given their enormous leverage with governments; and establishing new 
international institutions focused on fighting corruption.
752
  
Her recommendations for the local community include: political structural reform; she argues 
that “scandal and crisis” (political and/or economic) could provide an opportunity for reform; 
that the size of government or growth in private sector may increase demands for reform;
753
and 
sustaining reform could be ensured by compensating those likely affected it (which may include 
                                               
752 For details of how this could be done see Ackerman, Corruption and Government, Op. Cit., pp. 179-197 
753 She argues that when the government is large in absolute size but small in relation to the private sector, reform 
might occur since both the government employees are unafraid of getting jobs elsewhere and private businesses that 
do not depend on government funding to the degree that they would block reform agenda. See Ackerman, Ibid, p. 
219.  
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“golden handshakes”), offering legal incentive bonuses, severance payments, and assistance in 
changing jobs or retraining costs for getting jobs in the private sector, restructuring and 
deregulation. These are possible constitutive elements of a reform program.
754
She therefore 
advocates a form of “partial reform” that could begin in cities and spillover to other places as 
such programs become popular. There is a possibility that such popular programs could become 
institutionalized over time and therefore difficult to reverse.  She rejects the idea of creating 
“enclaves” of integrity where government quarantines some sectors and excludes them from 
normal rules such that they could concentrate on developing a model.  
She argues that the problem with “enclave” approach in fighting systemic corruption is 
the disaffection it creates and the fact that it cannot be sustained in a new government that does 
not support it. Moreover, adopting economic liberalization without first establishing political and 
legal restructuring could result in blocking of reform by those who benefited in the first reform 
effort from the selling of state assets. This maybe the case in Nigeria today given that President 
Obasanjo’s regime privatized State assets that some argue only benefited himself, his friends and 
cronies. He is accused of having handpicked and installed a weak leaders to succeed him as a 
smart strategy that allows him maintain a proxy hold on power in order to protect his interests. 
From this viewpoint, it is highly probable that he can only support a cosmetic form of anti-
corruption reform.
755
 Ackerman however insists that reform is made easier if supported from 
                                               
754 Ibid., p. 220  
755 Reports have shown that any investigation by the current administration that reaches to the point it implicates the 
former president Obasanjo ceases to proceed. Recently members of his own inner caucus went to press to make 
some demining revelations of his deals while in government to the global media. These are yet to be investigated 
and confirmed by the Nigerian government but if we judge from hindsight, there may never be. See 
http://saharareporters.com/report/transcript-photos-documents-atrocities-former-president-obasanjo-confessions-aso-
rock-insider 
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both the local and international community based on the premise that reduced corruption and 
patronage will benefit all in the long run.
756
  
The above views on reform is shared by Ngozi Okonjo-Iwuala who is currently heading 
the taskforce saddled with meeting the 2015 millennium goals for the current administration in 
Nigeria.  To her credit, she made giant strides in her capacity as finance minister in Obasanjo’s 
regime (1999-2227) by spearheading the paying off of our foreign loans (albeit much 
controversy), and is currently charged with ensuring fiscal discipline in government. It will be 
interesting to see how she will ensure not only that the bloated cost of running government is 
reduced, but that diligent oversight is maintained over the funds her office disburses to the three 
tiers of government and that the different government organs that have evolved a corrupt 
tradition for withholding billions of naira in revenue they generate pay their dues to the State. 
She outlines some of her efforts in the last regime (supported by Obasanjo during his 
presidency) to institute fiscal discipline and ensure proper management of oil funds. Such efforts 
includes setting up the oil price-based fiscal rule (OPFR) that enables the government to 
conserve funds and offset the high volatility of an economy wholly based oil price and exports 
(96 percent of Nigerian GDP depends on oil revenue and its related products or services). She 
helped establish for the first time in Nigerian history the Excess Crude Account (ECA) that made 
it possible to save about $46 billion dollars in foreign reserve by 2006 even after paying 
$12billion to cancel its foreign debts. Some have accused the present government to which she is 
an important part (particularly Obiageli Ezekwesili, a minister charged with “due process” in 
Obasanjo’s administration) of serious mismanagement worthy of an independent investigation to 
                                               
756 Ackerman, Corruption and Government, p. 222 
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uncover why seven years after (2006-2013) our foreign reserve still remains a paltry $48billion 
compared to its peak of $60billion in 2008 as claimed by Okonjo-Iwula.
757
  
She however must be credited with the major shift in fiscal policy since her participation 
in governance. She was responsible for incorporating the Policy Support Initiative (PSI) program 
of IMF as part of the mechanism to institutionalize both the OPFR in the long run and broader 
range of fiscal and monetary policies aimed at stability in the medium term. To her credit, she 
helped craft the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) that was signed into law in 2007 that helped 
cement some of the macro economic reforms she initiated. A commission was set up to ensure its 
stipulations are monitored and effectively implemented.
758
 She introduced similar fiscal 
discipline in the Budget office, publishing for the first time budgetary allocations to the three 
tiers of government, and oversaw the liberalization of important sectors of the economy 
(privatizing of public assets).   
                                               
757 http://premiumtimesng.com/news/123672-nigerian-government-distorting-facts-on-foreign-reserves-to-confuse-
citizens-says-ezekwesili.html See also Okonjo-Iwuala, Reforming the Unreformable, Op. Cit. Kindle edition (Kindle 
Location 2365) 
758 She explains this Fiscal Responsibility Act further: “The framework commits all tiers of government to a set of 
rules for efficient economic management and set standards for the planning and control of public revenue and 
expenditure. By providing a debt-management framework and conditions for borrowing, including aiming for 
concessionality of borrowed funds, it seeks to ensure that government will not borrow and spend money without 
ensuring that it has the necessary funds to service debt. It sets general targets and limits for selected fiscal indicators 
for the country, with specific sanctions for noncompliance, such as sanctioning the finance minister. The framework 
provides the basis for the annual budget and allocates resources to strategic priorities among and within sectors. It 
aims to ensure that annual revenue and expenditure estimates are consistent with its provisions through rules on cost 
and its control, budget execution and achievement of targets, and evaluation of program results. The Act also aims at 
promoting transparency and reporting standards by facilitating parliamentary and public scrutiny of economic and 
monetary information and plans. It establishes the Fiscal Responsibility Commission to ensure that the provisions of 
the Act are properly followed through. The Commission is designed with the authority to compel any person and 
government institution to disclose information related to public revenues and expenditure. It can also initiate 
investigations on violations of the provisions of the Act and forward the investigation report to the appropriate 
authorities for possible prosecution. See Ngozi Okonjo-Iwuala, Reforming the Unreformable, Op. Cit, Kindle 
edition (Kindle Location, 552-557) 
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There is no doubt that her actions as finance minister brought significant relief and 
credibility to Nigerian economy. The question that looms large is how sustainable are the 
measures she introduced? Given that she has been given a second chance by the present 
government to continue with her economic development and reform agenda, how could one 
assess the effectiveness or sustainability of same in the face of systemic corruption? Time will 
determine this. Okonjo-Iwuala remains a controversial figure primarily because she stirred the 
hornet’s nest and both patrons and rent-seekers having been fighting back. She constituted part 
of the “enclave” arrangement of the last regime that ensured that her salary was equivalent to her 
salary as Vice president of the world-bank, a job she relinquished to serve the country. She 
claimed that her salary was paid from a consolidated fund abroad and not necessarily by the 
country. In the present dispensation, she was at the center of fuel subsidy removal (recent 
investigation uncovered a massive scam we noted earlier in this chapter), that spurred mass 
discontent and increased the suffering of the average Nigerian as a consequence of over 200%  
increase in cost of transportation with an attendant jump in the general cost of living.  
The Minister is yet to explain to Nigerians why our refineries continue to represent a 
national symbol of corruption. Nigeria’s four refineries are unable to produce 25% of its 
functional capacity so as to enable importation of “fuel” at a huge cost that provides equally huge 
profit that its patrons (often heads of government and their cronies) collect as rent.
759
 This 
situation remains an embarrassment for a finance minister of the caliber of Okonjo-Iwuala. 
                                               
759 Obasanjo held the Oil portfolio (minister of State for oil) for some years during his tenure and it is alleged that 
his family were in charge of fuel importation.  See, Rotimi T. Suberu, “The Travails of Nigeria Anti-Corruption 
Crusade,” in Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, R.I Rotberg, ed. Kindle edition; See also the interview 
revelations of Odunsanya and Seriki, http://saharareporters.com/report/transcript-photos-documents-atrocities-
former-president-obasanjo-confessions-aso-rock-insider 
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Recent investigation into Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) indicates it remains 
the supreme symbol of corruption.
760
 Another is Ajaokuta Steel Mill where over $5 billion has 
been sunk without any steel to show for it. It was then privatized to an Indian company in 2007 
at a paltry sum who then stripped its pricey components, shipped it overseas and returned it to 
the government after 5,000 employees have been lost. In the meantime the same company was 
given 80% share of Delta Steel valued at $1.5billion at $30 million. The bigger problem is not 
merely the corruption in the privatization process that is well documented, but the fact that many 
of these privatized companies are no longer functioning creating serious job problems.
761
          
Rotimi T. Suberu considers targeting the political institutionalization of corruption as the 
proximate measure to curb corruption in Nigeria. He however did not propose any solutions 
apart from that offered by The Anti-corruption Reforms Committee (2005) which report 
recommended among other things:  
[T]he  publication of public officer’s declaration of assets, the removal of the constitutional 
immunity for political chief executives, the nomination of members of anti-corruption agencies 
by civil society groups (Nigeria Labor Congress, Nigerian Bar Association, Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Academic Staff Union of Universities, etc.), the coordination and harmonization of 
the activities of the anti-corruption agencies as well as provisions for their adequate funding, and 
the streamlining and facilitation of current processes for the litigation and adjudication of 
corruption offences. Along with electoral reforms, through the political insulation of the electoral 
administration, which should be modeled after the country’s relatively independent judiciary,  
these institutional reform measures can help to restrain and reverse the malaise of political 
corruption that plagues Nigeria.
762
 
                                               
760 See the Draft Report of Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force (PRSTF) of August, 2012, that shows incredible 
loopholes in production and management services, gross inefficiency, poor oversight, and irreconcilable 
discrepancies in production and sales data of oil and related products. 
http://saharareporters.com/sites/default/files/ribadu-report.pdf 
761 See Mercy A Odey, “Privatization of Public Enterprises and Productivity: Nigeria’s Dilemma,” in Journal of 
Emerging Trends in Economic and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(6):490-496 
762 Rotimi T. Suberu, “The Travails of Nigeria Anti-Corruption Crusade,” in Corruption, Global Security, and 
World Order, R.I Rotberg, ed. Kindle edition (Kindle Locations 3845-3847)  
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We acknowledge the importance of the foregoing proposals for fighting systemic 
corruption either globally or specifically in the Nigeria. However, there is overwhelming 
evidence that the Nigerian situation is so endemic that it cannot be done with quick fixes. The rot 
is so deep that so many who currently feed fat on rent that corruption provides will ensure that 
any effort to institutionalize “due process” fails. Nevertheless, the reform efforts of the last two 
administrations (Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Yar’dua) and the present one (Jonathan 
Goodluck) have, above all else, brought the issue of corruption to national consciousness. The 
signing of the “freedom of information” into law is a critical contribution of the present 
administration to that “process” that leads to the national transformation Nigeria needs.  
Investigative journalism and constant media attention to “facts” of corruption in the 
system are critical factors in fighting the monster of corruption. There are few serious journalists 
that are beginning to do this. The media engages the public in a debate regarding their 
responsibility to hold their leaders accountable. There are anti-corruption agencies springing up 
in the country. These activists are building social networks and coalitions that Nigerian political 
elites are not used to seeing. Gradually the masses are being “mobilized” to do something about 
corruption instead of complete passivity towards this problem. Ultimately, it is going to be the 
people that will compel accountability from the leadership.  
However, knowing the complexity of the Nigerian situation as described from the last 
chapter, we know that a more holistic approach to corruption should include ground networks for 
basic reorientation of pathological mental attitudes. We have noted how tribalism feeds nepotism 
and cronyism that we have argued as the fulcrum upon which corruption revolves in Nigeria. 
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There will hardly be any dent on the mental attitude that spurs corruption in Nigeria without a 
systematic dismantling of tribal sentiments. This will take time to achieve but it ought to 
constitute a core component of a long-term strategy towards eradicating corruption in Nigeria. At 
the core of this strategy is a recovery of conscience. It is our view that a recovery of conscience, 
synonymous with reawakening a people’s “moral consciousness” would involve a degree of 
reconstruction of certain traditional views of morality that present contexts have deformed. This 
will be part of our specific recommendations in our final chapter.  
4.7. MORAL ATMOSTPHERE, CONSCIENCE AND SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
In Chapter One we highlighted the insight of Aristotle who considers “self-indulgence” as 
identical with “wickedness” in those instances where one’s choices affect others. In his view, 
incontinence is better than self-indulgence because while it is possible for the incontinent to 
repent and change, the self-indulgent is obstinate and hardly will change.
763
 We are not so much 
concerned here with the self-indulgent politicians and corrupt public servants who are highly 
improbable candidates for change except compelled to do so by force of external sanctions (legal 
remedies). Rather, we are concerned with the greater majority of Nigerians who are exposed to 
the influence of a corrosive moral atmosphere that the actions of these venal and self-indulgent 
leadership leave behind with serious consequences for the overall moral development of the 
                                               
763 According to him, “Every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and 
it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad; but the term ‘involuntary’ tend to be 
used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage – for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary 
action (it leads to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed), but ignorance of 
particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that 
both pity and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily” See Aristotle, NE, 
Book III Chapter 1, 1110b:25-30 
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different peoples of Nigeria. We are concerned above all with young Nigerians and generation 
yet unborn who stand the greater risk of being negatively influenced by the trajectory of our 
moral evolution.  
We have argued that tribalism, through a manipulative or unhealthy use of kin solidarity, in 
the specific form of covert or overt approval of “corrupt practices,”764 pollutes the moral 
atmosphere such that individuals perceive corruption as “normal’ and a “rewarding” conduct that 
reinforces not just corruption but the quest to make money by all means given the uncritical 
reward and accolade it receives in the community. Aluko’s analysis on the “socialization of 
corruption” is insightful yet fails to provide sufficient depth and clarity to the problematic.765 We 
have tried in this research to provide the background to understand the impact of this 
“socialization” in the moral orientation of those exposed to it. Its impact is not only an ongoing 
moral desensitization or “de-moralization” but essentially a de-formation of moral consciences 
that will impact both present and future generations of Nigerians (and Africans) similar to what 
happened in the deep south of United States regarding slavery and segregation. After many 
years, some still believe in the moral rightness of slavery and segregation precisely because of 
progressive deformation of conscience that effectively beclouds reason and became the platform 
for justifying all forms of atrocities against blacks.   
                                               
764 It is common knowledge that chiefs of local communities give titles to manifestly corrupt personages in society 
to curry favor; local musicians sing their praises, and their kinsmen defend them against other clans or tribes in local 
communities. This point is implied by U. J. Njoku in “Colonial Political Re-engineering and the Genesis of Modern 
Corruption in African Public Service,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 14 (1):99-116 (2005): 107; Affirmed by 
Emeka G. Ekwuru, The Pangs of an African Culture in Travail (Owerri, Totan Publishers, 1999), p.77.  
765 M.A.O Aluko, “The Institutionalization of Corruption and Its Impact on Political Culture and Behavior in 
Nigeria,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 11(3):393-402 (2002).  
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We have specifically identified tribalism
766
 (a localized form of institutionalized self-
interest) from among a host of “cultural pathologies” (like cronyism, xenophobia, superstitious 
mentality or fetishism, chronic materialism, among others), as not only feeding these ancillary 
pathologies or vices, but as a primary mental mode that allows a tacit approval of immoral 
conduct that then impacts negatively on conscience and character development over time. 
Tribalism, by creating a “system of distrust” instills a moral dysfunction into the very 
mechanism of social relationships that eventually impacts every aspect of socio-political and 
economic life. We have consistently argued that constant “distrust” that tribalism engenders 
constitutes the primary feeder for corrupt practices in Nigeria but even more fundamentally 
facilitates the progressive erosion of the traditional system of moral formation (a system of 
shame and guilt) that further reinforces corruption.
767
  
One of the most troubling aspects of seeking remedies for corruption in Nigeria is a 
growing lack of a sense of shame or guilt among the political elite. This signals a deeper 
problem. If they destroy the psycho-social reality we call “the sense of shame” they would 
effectively destroy the very fabric of moral decency. This they have already begun by recent 
events like “celebrating” their “colleagues” that were released from prison for stealing public 
funds; by granting presidential “pardon” to another “colleague” that just served time, in order to 
                                               
766 Kin solidarity is an instinctual behavior adapted for the survival of each species (“strength in numbers”). As such, 
it has a basic positive element. However, “tribalism” is a specific aspect of kin solidarity that is not morally 
indifferent. We characterize “tribalism” here in its negative aspect (when it rationalizes bad conduct). 
767 Jerome Kagan and other behavioral scientists inform us that two independent processes contribute to the 
construction of ideals in child development:  “First, children note which characteristics are praised by their 
community and infer the more perfect forms of those characteristics as well as the perfect forms of features that are 
the opposite of those criticized.” Second is an appreciation of the difficulty involved in attaining that desirable 
quality such that those who attain them become idealized. Imagine then what happens when corruption is tacitly 
“idealized”. See “Morality and its Development,” p. 302.  
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“rehabilitate” his political ambition; a sitting president (Obasanjo) ensured that a criminal in jail 
(Omisore) “won” a senatorial election from jail!. They are either deliberately or inadvertently 
rewriting the moral codes that held our society (or any society for that matter) together, but 
instead of healthy moral pills they are “capsuling” moral poison. A society should never allow its 
sense of shame to be eroded. It explains why our leaders seem unashamed that Africa remains 
“beggarly and miserable” continent in the 21st century. We reaffirm that it is precisely by a 
covert or overt approval of immoral conduct that a community gradually loses not only its sense 
of shame but also its moral voice.
768
 Accommodating this mindset is a recipe for a state of 
anomie; but even more disturbing is that there is no way to adequately measure its future social 
and moral consequences.  
If, as we argued in Chapter three, that conscience is the original memory of the “good” 
and “true” linking each individual to the ideal community, in a globalizing world where all 
borders are crumbling, a communal memory of what constitutes the essentials of our humanness 
underscores our common destiny such that delineating common values for the global community 
becomes less cumbersome. We do not need to further complexify what constitutes a universal or 
global “good”. Building a corruption-free-governmental-system is a “common good” that all 
Nigerians and rational humans everywhere will consider a self-evident truth. While Nigerians 
must spearhead this effort, we cannot do this alone. Therefore, Nigerians (and Africans) need 
                                               
768 The loss of “moral voice” describes the inability of a given cultural collectivity to regulate basic standards of 
“moral conduct” given the specific variables of that culture (e.g. ethnic and linguistic differences, ideological 
divides, tribal sentiments, and religious pluralism). The most recent instance of a direct result of this loss of the 
“voice” of a given moral community was the global economic meltdown that started with sub-prime mortgage crises 
in the United States – the root cause of which was “unregulated” individual and corporate greed on a grand scale. 
While the loss of moral voice in African communities could be attributable to a persistent lack of an adequate, 
indigenous, coherent and consistent system of moral valuation or philosophy, Europe and North America are 
arguably losing theirs as a result of the corruption of an existing system of moral valuation and/or ideology reducible 
to the insidious but powerful influence of one: moral relativism. In both cases however, the problem is internal. 
348 
 
external help to combat its very corrupt political elite that seem bent on destroying all possibility 
of building a decent society and thereby threatening global security. Nigeria needs to be rescued 
from those who must do it harm for the sake of global peace and security.  
Furthermore, in a fast globalizing world, nationhood is already being redefined as more 
people buy-into the idea of “global commons.”  It is not merely the fact that many people are 
now having dual citizenship, but that a good number of people are beginning to lose their sense 
of national imagery to a global one. So, it is a matter of time when it will no longer be sacrosanct 
to reconsider the idea of “sovereignty” in a world with collapsing borders. While this seems to 
pose a real danger to weaker countries, especially in the third world, a more positive and 
proactive approach to such a possibility is to begin now to access the privileges that a globalizing 
world already offers. For instance, a global institution like the UN could be more proactive in its 
approach in assisting weak, poor, and broken nations to stabilize. Its millennium goal of “poverty 
eradication by 2015 is a laudable proactive effort if diligently implemented. It was long overdue 
and it could do more. The “Marshall plan” put in place to rebuild Germany after the WWII put it 
on a sound footing to rise to become the second largest economy in the world today. We wonder 
if the reality of suffering in African has not deserved a similar proactive measure –especially 
considering the historical context of the African dilemma.  
So instead of the gory images of starving faces of African children that has only numbed 
peoples’ sensibilities due to repetitive effects, is it not possible for the global North to be more 
proactive and put together a plan that targets one nation of Africa for a massive reconstruction as 
a model that could challenge the latent potentialities for achieving greatness in many African 
countries and leaders (including Nigeria)? At the very least, we think that a more robust effort at 
349 
 
building capacities for good governance is an area the global North could play a major role in 
rebuilding Africa after the pillage.  
Given the preponderance of venal leadership as the bane of African problems, we argue 
that a stringent international policy that is capable of “forcing” proven corrupt leaders to not only 
restitute but pay for their crimes (that includes psychological, socio-political and economic rape) 
once their case is proven. In other words, we recommend making extraordinary looting of a 
nation’s treasury an international crime equivalent to “crimes against humanity” that should be 
handled at the World court. This will have three major values: First, it will force these venal 
leaders to stop their impunity knowing that they could be held to account one day. Secondly, it 
will create a new mentality in those countries that its masses are paralyzed into inaction to have 
recourse to a higher authority for redress. These leaders act with impunity because they have 
devised a “political culture” that ensures they are never held accountable in their own country for 
their atrocities. They subtly protect themselves from prosecution in and out of office. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most important of all, it helps uphold and maintain a vestige of “objective 
standards” that saves both the annihilation of local moral codes and the formation of conscience.  
It is in the same light of the symbiotic relationship between all nations that globalization only 
makes self-evident, that we have identified a robust effort towards asset recovery as a critical 
element in any serious reform effort. We argue that it could have a “big bang” effects that could 
not only propel serious changes in Nigeria (and Africa) but is capable of redefining mental 
attitudes towards not only corruption but towards the West as inexorably complicit in the African 
plight. In addition to the above recommendations (including the five point recommendations of 
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Ackerman we outlined earlier), we particularly request a tactically enforced
769
 “elevated degree” 
of pressure against corruption on Nigerian leadership from countries that have considerable 
influence and interest in Nigeria particularly United States and Britain. We think that given the 
historical socio-political and economic affinities that these nations share, and the dangers 
inherent in a stateless Nigeria, constitutes a moral obligation that these two in particular, and the 
larger international community in general, should have towards Nigeria (and Africa) in assisting 
with internal reform aimed at overcoming a very serious problematic.
770
 It is wise to spend some 
political capital now as a proactive measure than billions of dollars later in a reactionary effort.  
CONCLUSION 
We have examined the notion and nature of corruption and differentiated systemic from 
incidental corruption. We provided a working definition of corruption and adopted a functional 
description of systemic corruption. We insisted on a definition that is not morally neutral but one 
that engages the individual as a moral person (agent), one whose actions define his/her character. 
Our analysis of corruption in Nigeria indicates that it fits squarely any rational understanding of 
a country plagued by systemic corruption.  
                                               
769 There are leverages these two countries have (particularly the United States) in the affairs of Nigeria that could 
be brought to bear on this issue. We are inclined to think that once these countries consider overcoming massive 
corruption as a priority agenda of their foreign policy with Nigeria and Africa, the leadership of Nigeria (and Africa) 
will feel the heat because these nations will be ready (to invest political capital in it) to use all the “tools” in their 
disposal to achieve these ends similar to what they do in protecting their “national interests” in foreign countries.  
770 Bishop Desmond Tutu words call attention to the need to be for “cosmic embrace” to lend ourselves to forces of 
renewal and recreation everywhere: “There is a movement, not easily discernible, at the heart of things to reverse the 
awful centrifugal force of alienation, brokenness, division, hostility, and disharmony. God has set in motion a 
centripetal process, a moving toward the center, toward unity, harmony, goodness, peace and justice, a process that 
removes barriers. Jesus says, 'And when I am lifted up from the earth I shall draw everyone to myself' as he hangs 
from His cross with out-flung arms, thrown out to clasp all, everyone, and everything, in a cosmic embrace, so that 
all, everyone, everything, belongs.” Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness, p. 265.  
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Our effort to understand the roots of corruption in Nigeria extends beyond identifying 
merely a venal political class to underscore how tribalism has enabled “a structure of sin” that 
both feeds and sustains a “system of corruption”. We argued that it does this by instilling a 
culture of distrust that disrupts not just the entire foundation of socio-political relationships but 
ensures the inability to articulate a unifying national philosophy that makes a sense of the 
“common good” possible. Above all, by fostering distrust, it disables a critical element in the 
social content of conscience formation which we have argued is a natural mechanism for self-
transcendence. Therefore it is in our estimation indirectly responsible for fostering the excessive 
greed we find in our leadership. Their actions reflect a deep moral vacuum due to the absence of 
any “shared” sense of the “common good”. This absence then activates a stampede of self-
interest we see in looting of the treasury. This absence is a function of distrust that tribalism 
fosters.. It becomes obvious how conscience, as the original memory of the “good” and the 
“true”, is distorted by a culture that promotes tribalism in any of its forms.  
We underscored how international “tribalism” is a correlate (in intention), of local 
tribalism for both are forms of “institutionalized self-interest” that have the same objectives and 
goals – private gains without regard for objective ethical standards. We noted how local 
corruption in Nigeria (and Africa) is enabled by tribalism and reinforced by its correlative vice. 
Multinationals and other foreign interests that are complicit in the looting of Nigerian treasury 
have also become complicit in its effects which include not just hunger and disease that 
characterize nation states in stasis, but the emergent trends of international crimes like Nigerian 
e-mail scams, piracy in Somalia, Boko Harm in Nigeria, and other possible terror networks. We 
argue that any effort to reform must begin with sincere effort in the West to come clean with 
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their past and adopt a new policy of engagement with the Nations of Africa in particular and the 
third world in general.   
The solutions we propose come partly from the insights gleamed from analysis of three 
mainline theories of systemic corruption (big bang, gradualism, targeted gradualism).
771
 Our real 
proposal is a more holistic approach that accommodates the insights of the above theories and in 
addition would invest in a robust reorientation effort at the grassroots. The details of this will be 
elaborated in our concluding chapter (Chapter five). We also underscored the need to prioritize 
asset recovery and making it a predicate offense to money laundering. We also recommend a 
new international policy that makes “extraordinary” looting of national treasury (like we have 
witnessed in Nigeria and other African States) a “crime against humanity” that should be tried at 
the world court.  The value of this has been explained in the preceding section.  
Finally, we recommend the appointment of an Ombudsman (internationally and locally). 
Locally by either the legislature or a group of professional bodies that have not lost all credibility 
(like the Labor Union, ASU, NUJ, the Bar Association, Association of Chartered Accountants). 
The ombudsman will have oversight on the executive and administrative organs of government. 
His task will be to protect the interest of the citizens. He will be independent from the executive 
but given all the powers to investigate any wrongdoing by the executive and other organs of 
government. 
                                               
771 These are broad categorizations of mainline theories that take cognizance of “principal-agent theory” and 
“economics of crime” only in their broader aspects.  
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Illustration 3: The Moral “core” drivers of Systemic Corruption772 
  
                                               
772 The system of corruption is enabled when self-interest becomes institutionalized at the local level by virtue of 
endemic tribalism, and further reinforced by external forces coming from interest-driven international organs 
(international tribalism) as they act on the local community to fulfill their profit-driven agenda (only when acting 
without adhering to objective standards of moral conduct), they further pollute the moral atmosphere at the local 
level  that in turn deepens the corrosion of the fabric of moral formation (by destroying the basic mechanisms for the 
formation of conscience) thus  spinning endlessly and out of control the wheel of moral decadence we call systemic 
corruption. That this driver is primary does not discount the significance of other ancillary drivers (like in the case 
of Africa, you many add “endemic poverty” that instills a dependency culture; lack of a coherent system of 
philosophy that would have enabled critical thinking on a larger scale; lack of strong socio-political institutions that 
could have provided the necessary tools for accountability; lack of good education and exposure for a critical mass 
of people that could have provided a counter weight to the political elite that exploit the ignorance of the masses to 
act with impunity; an acceptable national language that could have forged the spirit of the different tribes into a 
unity; and a less sentimental approach to religion that could have purified the mentality of masses of people from the 
deadly poison of superstition (like a cobweb that entangles its victims) leaving masses of people in the delusion that 
“God” would solve every problem for them including corruption. The Catholic Church has been praying the “prayer 
of Nigeria in distress” for years without evident practical steps to fight or remedy it (bishops could have organized a 
sit-out before the general assembly). Even worse is the belief system that positions of privilege like public office is 
“God given” and like “divine right of kings,” it comes with “rights” that some interpretive systems would include 
acting as one pleases in office such that what ordinarily should be considered an “abuse of office” evokes no public 
outrage (See B. Bujo on the extreme “rights” of kings in Africa, African Theology in its Social Context, Loc. Cit., p. 
36). The Igbos say: “obu chi ya nyere ya” or “onye chi ya nyere, ya rie oo!” (It is god that gave him, whoever his 
god gave, he should eat!). Note that “chi” is interpreted as lower personal deity, and not necessarily God (Chi-
ukwu). It is possible that an inherently flawed interpretive system could explain in part the phenomenon of extreme 
passivity of Nigerian masses in the face of corruption of such monumental proportions as we have witnessed over 
the years  
Systemic  
corruption 
Tribalism 
Local & 
International  
Malformation 
of conscience  
354 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CRITICAL SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION  
5.0  INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
This final chapter presents a critical summary of the different chapters (chapters 1-4), a 
general appraisal delineates the critical elements of our research, and our recommendations 
expose some specific aspects of Nigerian traditions (and could be applicable to other African 
nations in broader categorization) that need critical review.  
Part of our recommendations is grass-root conscientization, which we identify as 
synonymous with, and integral to conscience re-education and updating. We specifically propose 
a “three-stage-process” as a methodological tool for this process. We noted that it is refreshing to 
see that African philosophers and theologians have left behind the stale argument of whether an 
African philosophy or theology exists or not and are philosophizing and theologizing in their 
own right. However, we still insist that a systematized philosophy will enhance not just the 
conceptual tools for African theological reflection but also will improve the overall spectrum of 
African conceptual differentiation that continue to hamper both a deeper appreciation of African 
contribution to thought but also its ability to critically evaluate its practices and assumptions. We 
therefore stress the need for a logical transition from compactly held beliefs and practices largely 
in oral traditions to a more differentiated categorization.   
Finally, we present a synthesis of the more critical aspects of the conclusions of this 
research that does not overlook the more detailed “recommendations” and/or the specific 
“conclusions” we reached in the previous chapters.   
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5.1 PART ONE: CRITICAL SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 1-4 
5.1.1. CHAPTER ONE: EXPLORING THE ROOTS OF MORAL [IR] RESPONSIBILITY 
This chapter provides the background for the entire research. It seeks to understand the 
roots of moral responsibility and its relation to conscience by exploring different aspects of the 
problem of “irresponsibility”. It first explores the notion of moral responsibility, follows R.H. 
Niebuhr in defining it along the lines of moral accountability and/or integrity. The essential 
nature of moral responsibility is that it “is a response to what is done to us,” and therefore has a 
natural bearing (or “solidarity”) to the community of moral agents. Our interpretation or 
perception of what is done to us influences our response as it anticipates other “responses” and 
therefore shapes our orientation towards moral responsibility or irresponsibility. It implies we are 
indeed “our brother’s keeper” for we influence who others become by what we do. Another 
critical aspect of moral integrity is that it is not about mathematical consistency but about taking 
our moral values seriously such that wholeness results – a discernible harmonious relationship 
between our acts is evident in the same Self. Our analysis of personhood establishes what this 
“self” represents and its relationship to the moral community.   
Though classical philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) did not solve the problem of 
irresponsibility, their insight s are still valid today: While admitting ignorance and weakness of 
the will as the problem, Aristotle in particular insists on moral agency and that wickedness  
(achieved by the self-indulgent) is a choice. He argues that it is “senseless” (or irrational) to 
knowingly, and consistently make bad choices and expect a different result in life or in one’s 
character. He insists that even if we are inclined to choose the “apparent good” we are still 
responsible for our actions and the subsequent bad character it engenders since the “end appears 
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to each person according to his character,” and we are “responsible for our state of mind.” So, 
instead of admitting to the assumption that we are “determined” he recommends practice or 
habit of virtue as the answer to moral irresponsibility, and an important part of this is “moral 
education” (in agreement with Plato) to impart “knowledge” of specific virtues that needed to be 
acquired as a necessary step to its practice.  
An overview of the philosophical debate on responsibility hinges on human culpability in 
the face of internal or external constraints. These deterministic arguments (fatalism; causal, 
scientific, and theological determinism) underscore the value of human freedom without which 
there cannot be moral responsibility.  We agree more with P.F. Strawson that internal conditions 
rather than external ones provide justification for holding others morally accountable or 
responsible. We are “wired” to hold those in relationship with us accountable for their actions. 
Our “reactive attitudes” (based on “feelings”) are responses to what others have done (he 
stressed the “great importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions of others”) and how they 
significantly shape our beliefs, our intentions, and our actions.  Through our relationships we 
influence what others do or who they become – either morally responsible or irresponsible. We 
create the kind of community we live in by shaping individual “character”.  
We explored the notion of person, adopting Pope John Paul II’s viewpoint, to underscore 
the importance of “morally good action” (the loving act) in conceptualizing personhood. This is 
significant because it resonates with the essential nature of African view of “person” formulated 
around social responsibility or fulfilling one’s duty to the primary community.  It however also 
underscores how this complicates the problem of moral responsibility in Africa given the moral 
ambivalence that current immoral practices obviously instills and fosters. We argue that while 
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there is an obvious social advantage in African socio-morally based conceptualization of 
“person” (encapsulated in the phrase, “Because we are therefore I am”), there is however an ever 
abiding danger for Africans to subsume the individual in the collective just as there is the danger 
in the West of treating the person as an “object” or even a worse scenario of exaggerated 
‘individualism’ that pretends to claim absolute autonomy from the community.  The 
inadequacies of either approach have serious consequences for morality and social development. 
However, for the African, there is the additional danger of conceptual incoherence that tends to 
confuse simply by blurring distinctions. Therefore the need for conceptual clarity regarding our 
beliefs, values, norms and practices cannot be overemphasized.  
Nevertheless, the significance of John Paul’s view as a point of convergence between 
Western and African thought in conceptualizing personhood is not lost to us for it captures the 
essence of what needs retrieving in both traditions. To underscore this point, we reflected on the 
relationship between personhood, moral and social responsibility. Revisiting the “I-thou” 
relationship enables us to retrieve the insight that the “self” comes to know itself only in the 
presence of another self and therefore implies the primacy of “relationships” or “community” 
over the “individual”. Hence, a true sense of “self” is formed from developing “other-regarding-
attitudes”. The African view of “selfhood” is again in sync with this Western view because the 
basis of its morality is about building social relationships that promotes or sustains life (or the 
“life force”). We highlighted the concept of “ubuntu” as not only encapsulating this view, but 
represents, perhaps the first African intra-ethnic synonym for “moral responsibility”. It 
establishes further that the “relationship” factor in community is essential in the development of 
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moral responsibility precisely because it is through such “relationships” that the processes of 
formation of consciences begin and are sustained.   
We examined the debate on the origins of moral responsibility to update our research 
with more recent arguments in neural psychology and biological sciences. Neuroscientists’ 
profile for psychopaths indicates they are persons deficient in “feelings” of empathy and “act 
without conscience.” We wondered if a hormone therapy (using oxytocin), as new research 
suggests, could bridge the irresponsibility gap? And what does this imply for moral theory – 
including our argument on the role of conscience for moral responsibility? We do not think this 
changes anything but if their argument holds true that inability to respond to oxytocin or similar 
“empathy hormone” indicate brain damage, it could provide insight to understand better the 
primary role of conscience as a natural trigger for empathy even if it achieves this through 
activating certain chemical components of the brain. This could be a significant development for 
science and morals. We maintain that altruism beyond kin and reciprocation remains a hallmark 
of the human genus. It is therefore not selfishness but selflessness that morally distinguishes us 
from our evolutionary cousins.  
We concluded that even if we are predisposed to selfishness, as many have argued, we 
have the freedom and the rational impetus to seek its opposite. Evidence is there that we have an 
aboriginal instinct for social sympathy which is perhaps the basis for all moral sense and for the 
formation of community. At the core of the human psyche is a yearning for the ideal community. 
We are equipped with a natural mechanism to build and live that community. That natural 
mechanism is what we call conscience. It is a deep instinct for the good and true, a capacity to 
feel for the other and deny oneself to build an abiding community for all. We therefore conclude 
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this chapter by affirming that a well formed and informed conscience is the key to moral 
responsibility. The emphasis on being well formed and informed is obvious given the reality that 
a poorly formed or uninformed conscience has disastrous consequences.  
 
5.1.2.  CHAPTER TWO: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF CONSCIENCE 
In this chapter we first examined representative psychological notions of moral 
development to help us understand the popular notion of conscience. We find in Freud’s theory 
of repression within which he postulates his theory of conscience as having a significant 
influence on the decline of conscience or the present negative view of conscience at a time 
popular culture takes psychological views perhaps more seriously than philosophical and/or 
theological ones. He argues that the id, a primordial instinct of a sexual nature, represents a 
libidinal energy that “pressures” for expression but restrained by social norms or law. The 
restraints imposed on it by social norms causes “pain” and its expression is pleasurable. Hence, 
this “pleasure principle” seeks avoidance of pain at all cost but learns to discipline its appetites 
through socialization that results in the development of other structures within the psyche: the 
ego and the superego. Both are simply “modifications” of the id in its encounter with the world. 
They are therefore partly conscious and unconscious. The ego, as conscious (“reality principle”), 
in ideal situations, is synonymous with reason that puts a check on the id (the pleasure 
principle). The superego is more specifically a “modification” of the ego. As a regulator of the 
actions of the ego, it is synonymous with conscience. He does distinguish conscience and ego 
ideal as within the ego where the former represents the “don’ts” of the societal norms, and the 
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later represents the acceptable parts of social behavior. In the end, both become internalized and 
speak in their own voice – either reprimanding or praising as cases may be respectively.   
Therefore Freud sees conscience as nothing but the product of repressed social angst 
(soziale Angst) – the “fear of society” arising from the conflict between the desire of the id to 
express itself freely and the social demand to discipline it – ensuring it acts in an acceptable way. 
It is then a neurotic manifestation than a healthy development. As an internalized fear of parental 
and social mechanisms of control, it needs to be expunged, outgrown, or healed. This is the basic 
reason behind his development of psychotherapy – to rid one of myriads of internalized fears 
stemming from parental and social inhibitions. He however does admit that following the 
demands of conscience (or social regulations) could be an expression of “civilized self-interest,” 
since social ordering depends on them.  
We have argued that by forcing a distinction between the “conscience” and the “ego-
ideal” Freud was unable to articulate a holistic and more positive view of conscience that not 
only reproves but also approves. We think that viewing the “ego-ideal” as the positive aspect of 
the same reality (of conscience) not only edges it closer to the theological notion of conscience 
but liberates it and even transforms the negative connotation associated with “repression” given 
that the contents of “ego-ideal” are as “internalized” as the contents of “conscience” in Freud.  
This reconstructs his wholly negative view of conscience in a way that allows reading the social 
angst (the reproofs that gives rise to conscience) not as “repression” as such but rather obverts to 
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“elevation” because they are primary lessons in self-transcendence and therefore represent a 
symbolic moment in the growth of the individual.
773
  
So, we prefer “symbolic elevation” as properly more descriptive of what Freud calls 
“repression” given that it captures the experience of “growth” at all levels during this time: 
physiologically, we singled out bipedalism as a powerful symbolic gesture at this time for the 
child learns to stand erect and look heaven wards. Similar growth is experienced at the cognitive, 
emotional, moral, and spiritual dimensions such that the child could only reach full stature not by 
a fixation on self-gratifications but by struggling to de-center from itself and reach for the stars 
as it learns to “reach out” in loving relationship to others.  Hence the real “repression” would be 
the stifling of the capacity for selflessness and empathy (that would result should the id be given 
an unrestricted expression). We affirm that stifling the potentialities for selflessness and/or 
empathy implies raising persons with a disabled conscience – those who cannot “feel” bad about 
hurting others – a generation of psychopaths. Those who have no active conscience can cause so 
much pain to others in the community, and in the world.    
Other psychological theorists we examined agree on the need to wean the child from an 
infantile self-fixation towards an interests in others (Adler calls it “social interests”). This early 
self-transcending effort is the essence of conscience formation and indeed the formation of the 
moral sense. It will continue to be the very core of morality. Erikson refers to it as the “capacity” 
to find oneself as one loses oneself in others or to redefine oneself by including others. We 
affirm with Adler that the degree we are capable of including others in our interests – or making 
                                               
773 The foregoing is taken from the conclusions we had in chapter two. 
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the interest of the larger whole our interests, to that degree does the individual or culture 
experience development. The role of conscience is to help us develop this capacity.   
Piaget and Kohlberg helped consolidate the foregoing by highlighting the integral 
relationship between cognitive and moral development. We highlighted how these two cognitive 
structuralists underscored the role of feelings in the notion and development of conscience. 
While Piaget affirms it originates from “feeling” of respect and/or social sympathy, Kohlberg 
considers “feelings” in form of “perception of moral atmosphere” at the heart of conscience 
formation. While we noted in our general critique the problem with claims to a universally 
applicable invariant structure of moral development, nevertheless, we admit a progression in 
moral development as a fact of our experience. Kohlberg claims that those at lower levels of 
moral development act out of fear of punishment while those at higher levels act out of self-
condemnation. Most of the Western authors reviewed in this study seem to share this view.  
However, social learning theorists like Bandura made a sweeping critique of all 
psychological development theorists for reductionism and for manipulating experiments to 
predetermined goals. Their insight highlights the significance of other aspects of human 
experience like “affects” and “environment” in moral development that are rather neglected by 
psychological theorists in favor of the cognitive apparatus.   
We argue that internal and external factors all play a part in the development of 
conscience and morals. We singled out the role “affect” or “emotions” play as a vital part of the 
human moral formation (particularly the formation of conscience) that has been overlooked. We 
explored the significance of emotions/affect as “drivers” of human behavior. Providing a link 
between affect and conscience underscores the latter’s significance for shaping behavior at 
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deeper levels than incidental decisions. Most of contemporary theologians we reviewed show an 
increasing interest in admitting the role of feelings (affect or emotions) in the understanding of 
conscience. This is a clear departure from traditional and classical views of conscience that is 
solely cognitive (the intellect without due regard for the role of emotions).       
The theological analysis of the notion and nature of conscience found in Vatican II 
document, and the New Catechism shows evident inadequacies and ambiguities. We did not 
address ourselves to finding a solution to these ambiguities since our concern is neither with 
“objectivity” of norms (as found in the relationship of law to conscience) nor with the possible 
“errors” of conscience. We are rather concerned with searching for the influence that conscience 
has on behavior. Research indicates that cognitive maturity neither guarantees moral maturity 
nor behavior change. We prefer to argue that cognitive maturity and emotional intelligence 
(maturity) harness the powers of conscience for transformative behavior.  
Obviously Aquinas’ notion of conscience we examined does not lead us to this 
conclusion. He however admits with Aristotle the power of “emotions” to determine our choices 
and actions. He however insists on the need to subject the passions to reason. Other theologians 
(Callahan, Curran, Spohn, Gula, Conn), philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, provide 
insight for retrieving the role of emotions in the conceptualization of conscience. We 
acknowledge the problems associated with the notion of “emotion” in morality. We however 
insist that an accurate (not necessarily adequate) notion of conscience should give a central place 
to “feeling” because that is precisely what is at the very core of this phenomenon (conscience). If 
you remove “feeling” (feeling good or bad) from it, the notion becomes meaningless. And “how 
we feel” does often determine what we do. So, conscience influences us deeper than we admit.  
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Given that conscience is often identified with pathological guilt, we examined the notion 
of guilt as an “emotion” and differentiated “neurotic” guilt from “existential guilt”.774 We affirm 
that we need to feel “existential guilt” to be truly human and to live in society with others. Our 
analysis of “shame” distinguishes it from “guilt” to underscore the uniqueness of African moral 
tradition built on “shame” rather than “guilt.” Given the close affinity between individuals and 
community in Africa, the notion of conscience finds its full expression in the community 
conscience. Therefore, it is not internal sanctions (“individual conscience”) but external 
sanctions (“community conscience” or its “moral voice”) that operate through the mechanism of 
“shame” that are at the heart of African moral formation. This is a significant input of our 
research and one that has serious implications. We insist at the end of this chapter that a retrieval 
of some form of a traditional system of shame in Africa is an imperative for moral development 
even if this means leaving it vulnerable to an obvious critique.   
5.1.3  CHAPTER THREE: CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY  
In this chapter we first explored the notion of community. Given the phenomenon of 
double citizenship (there are many “diaspora” Nigerians), we affirmed with Selznick that in a 
globalizing world, “community” should neither be limited to location or territoriality (where 
members need to “spend their whole lives in it”)” nor include all of one’s social relationships, 
but that the range of common interests and activities shared be broad enough rather than merely 
segmental; encompasses “whole persons,” rather than their passing interests.  Therefore shared 
“beliefs and commitments” are essential to our notion of community in a world with increasing 
                                               
774 A good example is the “guilt” of someone who was abused as a child (neurotic guilt); and the “guilt” felt by 
someone who ran over a 10 year old boy with his truck because he was drunk and driving (existential guilt). While 
the first guilt should be discouraged, the second must not. If the second does not exist, it should be induced! 
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“members” living in two different locations but fulfilling the requirements for membership of 
each of them.  While exploring the nature of community we highlighted the insight in Selznick’s 
seven integral elements characterizing an ideal community: “historicity, identity, mutuality, 
plurality, autonomy, participation, and integration.”775 The last (integration) holds in tension the 
other six elements ensuring the balance needed for a consistent effort at building and sustaining a 
wholesome community.   
 We pointed out the danger of losing our “sense of community” by either an exaggerated 
sense of individual autonomy (or individualism as in western culture) or a false sense of 
communalism (in African culture). On one hand we argued that the contractual model 
(gesellschaft) that supplanted the more primary/traditional model (gemeinschaft) in the West has 
enriched purses but ruined homes. It isolates people from one another, elevates individualism, 
and celebrates self-interest. As a consequence, it thrives on destroying a deeper appreciation of 
what we share in common as human beings: our sense of “community” without which a shared 
sense of right and wrong cannot emerge for lack of consensus.  
On the other hand, our examination of African communalism and practices does reveal a 
disturbing paradox: why does a culture that boasts of incredible virtues of sharing and caring 
generate such unprecedented litany of greedy leaders? How does a communalistic culture that 
thrives on elevating community interest over that of the individual (encapsulated in the phrase 
“because we are, therefore I am”) reproduce generations of individuals with such incredible 
appetites for greed? How could we have such greed and insensitivity to the need of the larger 
                                               
775 Philip Selznick, Moral Commonwealth, p. 361 
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communities in a system that holds greed as a central vice?  Our answer is that these realities 
point to a rupture in the system. Our further research attempts to identify part of this rupture.  
We noted that Africans believe in the synergistic relationship of all life. Therefore 
promoting life is at the core of African culture. Morality is defined along these lines as well: 
whatever promotes the life and development of the community and its individuals is “good” and 
otherwise is “bad”.  A deeper exploration shows how this worldview, colored by tribal 
sentiments, has resulted in socio-moral pathology where thieving public servants gain the 
accolades of home communities (just because they are “sons and daughters of the soil”) and 
thereby destroying the basic fabric for both moral formation (as it deforms conscience) and 
socio-political and economic engineering. We therefore argue that African communalism is a 
model idea hampered by tribal instincts and rivalries. Unless old tribal insecurities give way to 
trust its potentials for nation building cannot be harnessed but rather would constitute a major 
hindrance to both statecraft and moral evolution.  
Furthermore, we argue that true communities have an active moral voice. When each 
individual member of it plays his/her part in upholding moral discipline within the community, 
they create and sustain the community’s moral voice that acts as a non-coercive form of external 
sanction. This significantly influences the development and sustenance of individual conscience 
(internal sanction). We argue that conscience formation depends on an active moral voice of the 
community. Therefore a community that loses its moral voice by a disinclination to “lay moral 
claims” on its members gradually destroys the moral glue that binds it together. The consequence 
will be that government will find it increasingly tempting to develop a police state and introduce 
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more aggressive legislations and enforcement to check increasing amoral lifestyle. We insist that 
maintaining internal sanctions are far more effective for social order than its alternative.   
Given that values that are intrinsic to conscience are essentially forged in community, we 
further argue, borrowing the words of Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict X1) that conscience is 
an “anamnesis” (“a memory of origins”) or a divine imprint – an original idea of the good and 
true inhering in the very nature of the human person and recollected or called forth in the 
encounter with the “other” or more precisely in dialogue with the relevant moral community. 
Though it inheres in the individual’s ontological nature, he/she recognizes this inner voice only 
as he opens up to hear that other voice of its authentic moral community regarding the “good” 
and “true.” This is integral to the self-transcending process in the formation of conscience. It 
implies a mutual relation - a creative dialogue between the within and without – between the 
individual and community in collaborative search for an ever purer notion of the “good” and 
“true”.  
Therefore a well formed conscience (ideal conscience) is the product of a functionally 
active moral community (the ideal moral community). They complement each other. When 
individuals unite for a common purpose in the direction of a defined common good, the resulting 
unity (“fusion of existences”) is what constitutes the essence of an ideally active moral 
community as found both in the Church and in the secular society. It is in such a basic moral 
community the “voice” of individual conscience is both formed and heard as the echo of the 
“voice” of that community. It is implicit then that this community primarily mediates God’s 
voice to the individual through its own recollection of the original good and true that affirms its 
own authentic moral voice. The individual also mediates God’s voice to the community as it 
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participates in this creative dialogue. This dialogue is the medium for constantly purifying a 
blurred vision of the good and true for both parties. But the unity essential for a shared vision of 
the true and good is only possible where there is trust and openness. We argue that perhaps the 
greatest problem with most African societies today is this lack of trust due to tribal rivalries. 
Nigeria provides the historical context for our research. We tried to understand the deeper 
roots for the failure of African model of communalism in generating altruistic individuals (as 
proven by extremely venal Nigerian [African] leaders. We identified TRIBALISM as the 
primary culprit. It is the single socio-moral “pathology” (or vice) that feeds other ancillary 
pathologies or social vices (poverty, witchcraft mania, cronyism, nepotism, among others). We 
argue that tribalism as unwarranted prejudice (based solely on tribal differences) constitutes the 
core socio-moral pathology that drives conscience deformation in Nigeria. This is because by 
spreading the poison of distrust and inter-and-intra-tribal rivalry it disrupts the natural process of 
self-transcendence (the proper development of selflessness) which is at the core of proper 
conscience formation. The effect is the destruction of the native capacity for nation building and 
functionally serves as the primary feeder of systemic corruption
776
at least in Nigeria.  
Tribalism is also exploited at the religious level by Northern oligarchs and elites for 
political interests. Insights from the social and behavioral sciences help illumine the role of 
primary groups in “mediating” cultural problems. Different factors possibly contribute to the 
reality of tribalism in Nigeria. However, Gordon Allport’s insight on the nature of prejudice (in 
                                               
776 Tribalism is the crudest form of native self-interest at the group level. We argue that it etches the idea of self-
interest deeper within the psyche of its victims by emphasizing how people are different rather than how they are 
similar to others. It feeds on “distrust” of others outside of one’s kin or ethnicity. In so doing, it activates more 
readily the basic insecurity and fear in all humans that drive them toward self-preservation. The result is the inability 
to forge a deep unity necessary for nation building and a deep sense of insecurity regarding the common purse 
triggers a looting frenzy that is at the heart of systemic corruption as we have witnessed in Nigeria for decades. 
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six theories)
777
 provides the background for our argument that tribalism is a socialized behavior 
(largely learned by miming significant others) and can therefore be unlearned through a reverse 
socialization process.  
In addition we argued that if “insecurity” is a primary driver of prejudice (frustration 
theory of prejudice), and that “highly prejudiced people lacked secure and affectionate 
relationships with their parents,” then there is a need for a critical re-evaluation of our child-
rearing practices given the high incidence of child abuse that prove to leave victims with deep 
psychical scars (often low self-esteem issues symptomatic of insecurity). We then posed a 
question on the possibility that our leaders’ irresponsible actions could be traceable to childhood 
formative dysfunction than merely assuming them to be deliberative stances or choices.  
We made three recommendations towards solving the problem of tribalism: First is 
reverse socialization or re-education process aimed at reforming or updating our consciousness 
(and conscience) and change the mindset that profiles how we see others and/or how we relate to 
those different from our tribe. It will be mandatory to teach this at every level of formal 
education process. Secondly is legislating and vigorously implementing a comprehensive law 
against all forms of tribal discrimination. Thirdly is a national dialogue on tribalism that aims at 
bringing this monster out of the closet to national consciousness with intent to eradicate it.   
Finally, we examined the link between conscience formation and globalization. Apart 
from defining globalization, we identified “international tribalism” as a socio-moral pathology 
whereby local tribalists, plagued by native self-interest find kindred spirits in international 
                                               
777 Gordon Allport provided six theories of prejudice based on areas of emphasis: the historical, socio-cultural, 
situational, psychodynamic, phenomenological, and earned reputation perspectives respectively.  
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players due to the phenomenon of globalization. We defined international tribalism as 
“institutionalized self-interest” at the global level; it refers to an orientation to international 
relations (involving individuals, nations, institutions, or corporate organs) that is based solely on 
self-interest (economic profit) and intended to be achieved at a significant detriment to, or 
without concern for the wellbeing of the opposing party. It is the idealization of self-interest by 
projecting it unto the international space. We argue that given that globalization enables the 
interpenetration of the local in the global, there has emerged a group of international players (or 
tribalists) whose orientation and actions are driven by the same pathology found in local 
tribalism. An apt illustration is the increasing influence of “lobby groups” (in United States) in 
shaping government policy (local and foreign) even at the detriment of the common interests of 
the people as a trend that should cause deep concern in modern statecraft. The virtual 
“international community” populated by this group of international actors influence the local 
community in a way analogous to the influence of the moral community on [mal-]formation of 
individual conscience. 
We argue that their actions not only corrupt new or old local actors but also pollute the 
local moral atmosphere thereby influencing the moral ambience or consciousness of the local 
community. This is precisely how they influence the moral deformation of individual 
consciences. We assert that the foreign policy agenda of some governments (in the West and a 
few emerging economic powers like China
778
) and the profit agenda of some Multinationals they 
protect have been shown to be driven by a “pathological” mindset. Some of their actions have 
                                               
778 Recent developments in Ghana is of particular concern because of the brazen way some Chinese entrepreneurs 
bulldoze their way into mining activities without license, with little care for the people and grossly insensitive to the 
environmental havoc they leave behind in their search for gold. See,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/world/africa/ghana-arrests-chinese-in-gold-mining-regions.html?_r=0 
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proven they have little or no considerations for the wellbeing of the locals. We argue that such 
insensitivity sows discontent and bitterness that becomes the seedbed that groom the ills that now 
(or would in the future) plagues both the local and international community.  
Our final recommendation is a paradigm shift in foreign policy agenda to reflect 
compassion towards the vulnerable people of the local communities involved in all foreign 
relationships. In the words of Anodea Judith, “Each of our hearts is a cell in the global heart, 
giving and receiving love. Each time we create an act of love, we inspire others to do the 
same.”779 Giving priority to the wellbeing of the local communities (different from the practice 
of “settling” their leaders) is an invaluable investment in foreign relationships that yields 
dividends of peace in a globalizing world precisely because responsible actions have generative 
effects. As “responders,” irresponsibility begets irresponsibility and vice versa. The seed of hate 
is sown when we act without conscience or insensitive to the feelings of others. We contend that 
major world players significantly impact the character of people in their playing field. Since 
what we sow is what we reap,
780
 it does not matter then how long it takes, “the chickens do come 
home to roust” someday. We think it is prudent statecraft to invest in long term profitable 
ventures. A foreign policy agenda built on sincere concern for the “others” parties wellbeing is 
good investment in the long run.  
5.1.4 CHAPTER FOUR: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY AND SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of systemic corruption in Nigeria with attention 
to its link to conscience. In an effort to understand the notion and nature of corruption we 
                                               
779 Judith Anodea, The Global Heart, Op Cit, p. 288. The stress is ours.  
780 See Galatians 6.7-9 
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provided a working definition of “corruption” and adopted a functional description of “systemic” 
corruption. We insisted on a definition that is not morally neutral but one that engages the 
individual as a moral person (agent), one whose actions define his/her character. Our preference 
was to differentiate systemic from incidental corruption. Our examination of the Nigerian 
situation does indicate it is a nation plagued by “systemic” rather than “incidental” corruption.   
Our effort to understand the roots of corruption in Nigeria extends beyond identifying merely a 
venal political class to underscore how tribalism has enabled a “structure of sin” that both feeds 
and sustains a “system of corruption”. In our view, by enabling a pervasive culture of distrust, 
tribalism ruptures the very foundations for building a network of healthy socio-political 
relationships and ensures the impossibility of articulating a unified notion of the “common-good” 
that is indispensable for a true sense of nationhood.  
More critical for our research, the distrust that tribalism fosters disables a vital element in the 
social content (or nurture component) of conscience formation. Given that we consider 
conscience to be a natural mechanism for self-transcendence (selflessness), it is fair to argue that 
its distortion, based on “distrust,” is more likely to trigger a stampede of self-interest. Given the 
reality of such a stampede in form of excessive greed among our leaders, we identify the real 
culprit as “tribalism”. But its effectiveness is by distorting the proper formation of consciences.  
“Trust” is a foundational quality that we need to imbibe in relation to “others” in early 
development as a critical key to unlocking an original memory of the “good” and “true” inhering 
in “others”. Therefore, its integral relation to the proper development of conscience and its 
subsequent exercise cannot be overemphasized.  
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Our claim is that international “tribalism” is a correlate (in intention), of local tribalism 
for both are forms of “institutionalized self-interest” that have the same objectives and goals – 
private gains without regard for objective ethical standards. We argue that local corruption in 
Nigeria (and Africa) is enabled by tribalism and reinforced by its correlative vice. It is our view 
that multinationals and other foreign interests that are complicit in the looting of Nigerian 
treasury have also become complicit in its effects which include not just hunger and disease that 
characterize nation states in stasis, but the emergent trends of international crimes like Nigerian 
e-mail scams, piracy in Somalia, and emergent terror networks. We conclude that any effort to 
reform must begin with sincere effort in the West to come clean with their past and adopt a new 
policy of engagement with the Nations of Africa in particular and the third world in general.
781
   
Some of the solutions we propose are partly based on the insights we gleamed from the 
analysis of three mainline theories of systemic corruption (big bang, gradualism, targeted 
gradualism).
782
 Firstly, we propose a more holistic approach that accommodates the insights of 
the above theories and in addition would invest in a robust reorientation effort at the grassroots 
the framework of which is developed in this chapter (five). Secondly we consider prioritizing 
asset recovery and making it a predicate offense to money laundering as a critical part of that 
holistic approach. Thirdly, we recommend a new international policy that makes “extraordinary” 
looting of national treasury (like we have witnessed in Nigeria and other African States) a “crime 
against humanity” that should be tried at the world court.  The value of this has been explained in 
the preceding section. The “context” of corruption in developing countries makes it too 
                                               
781 This paragraph is adapted from our conclusion in Chapter 4. 
782 These are broad categorizations of mainline theories that take cognizance of “principal-agent theory” and 
“economics of crime” only in their broader aspects.  
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vulnerable for any possible internal redress to be effective in good time. External sanctions could 
provide temporary but necessary balance till the countries are able to build viable institutions for 
accountability themselves.  In addition we recommend that the West should appoint independent 
Ombudsmen in each country that has multinationals working in the third world
783
, but 
particularly in Nigeria and Africa where the sourcing of natural resources have long become a 
source of pain to many of the local people. They will ensure that international standards are 
maintained at all times. We recommend a “glocalized”784moral reform as a necessary sequel to 
the foregoing.  
                                               
783 We witnessed recently the tragedy in Bangladesh where a building collapsed and killed over a thousand factory 
workers who produce cloths for Western industries. Priority was given to profit but no attention paid to safety.  
784 This term has been explained earlier (see footnote no. 20), but it refers to the “interpenetration of the global in the 
local” not merely socio-culturally, through the agency of social networks enabled by the internet and news media, 
but also economically and politically, by the direct action of international organs and nation states that help shape 
world events. This phenomenon implies that the global significantly impacts the local communities even though it is 
not necessarily vice versa at the present for those in the developing world except for those places like Nigeria where 
“oil” disruption could impact significantly the global oil market. We are recommending a “glocalized” moral reform 
given the important part foreign governments and MNCs (Multinationals) play in the problem of Nigeria and Africa. 
Our analysis so far indicates the extent they are involved in our problem even without a litany of their past “colonial 
sins” being our focus. Achebe already did a great job of that and as he says, there is need to be consistently 
revisiting the inherent superiority complex factor that negatively impact or “colors” any African contact with the 
West. Achebe’s work in this direction has been well synthesized by Christopher S. Nwodo in Philosophical 
Perspectives on Chinua Achebe, Loc. Cit., p. 277-306. If “relationality” is the essence of our be-ing in the world, as 
Uzukwu has forcefully argued, and as highlighted in this research, we have to keep looking for ways to relate at 
more positive levels. There is nothing too wonderful in isolationism. However, what is necessary is due vigilance. 
There should always be due vigilance in the kind of contracts we sign with the rest of the world. Often this is done 
too quickly; and only when it favors the West. The Japanese root of this “glocalization” is interpreted “global-local” 
and it encapsulates the original idea of the co-mingling of everything in everything. We need each other for better or 
worse. What we should strive for is to try to always improve our relationships in any encounter with another 
(individual, group, or nation). This is at the heart of “Ubuntu”, and at the heart of African communalism and 
hospitality. At one side of that relationship is giving, and its flip side is taking whatever is positive from the other. 
Japan took from the West some seeds of insight and used it to add to theirs and make a giant leap in growth and 
development without losing what they value as a distinct culture (they lost some over time anyway). We need to do 
the same, but we must also be smarter each time than naïve about the West’s wholesale “good intentions” (like our 
ancestors).  
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Finally, at the local level, we propose a critical deconstruction
785
 (reassessment) of our 
traditional moral formation process, some uncritically “received” practices with the aim to 
retrieve what is useful and trash whatever we find detrimental to a wholesome moral 
development. Our analysis underscores inherent ambivalence in our socio-cultural practices like 
the adulation paid to known “looters” who are public servants, politicians, or “socialites” based 
solely on kinship solidarity. We stressed the dangers of such practices on the moral and political 
formation of present and future generations. Other ambivalences are in the form of conceptual 
blurriness that requires a critical shift from compactness to differentiation. A few is addressed in 
this chapter.  
 
5.2.0   PART TWO: RECOMMENDATIONS AND GENERAL CONCLUSION 
5.2.1.    CRITICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.2.1.1 MORAL REFORM AND THE THREE-STAGE-PROCESS 
We recommend a deliberate “glocalized” moral reform as a central proposal of this 
research. Our foregoing analyses underscore the critical role of reverse-socialization in such a 
reform effort. We stress that the direct goal of reverse-socialization is the reformation or 
updating of conscience. It is our view that a social malady like tribalism or racism arises as the 
direct consequence of malformation of conscience in the socialization process from early 
childhood to adulthood. It is a socialized behavior or attitude in relation to others “not like us.” 
                                               
785 The term “deconstruction” in this research refers to the critical re-evaluation of whatever we hold to be valuable 
in the light of how it has helped shape our life for the better or worse. The goal is to keep and promote whatever is 
of true value and discard whatever we find to be unhealthy.  
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Of course the correlation between “racism” and “tribalism” is its prejudice for the “other not like 
us.” The former is based on “color,” the latter on “blood” kinship. Ultimately, both are actually 
about “blood kinship.” It is a socialized behavior that treats “others not like us” differently.  
An example helps illustrate how this formation often starts early. Two white toddlers, 
accompanied by their parents, are approached by a black person on the sidewalk. The black 
person smiled and waved to the kids. One smiled and waved back. The other ran back to the 
safety of its parents. In a related incident, John, an Igbo-man, had an encounter. He lives in the 
same apartment building with a family from a Yoruba tribe. They were good neighbors, and 
friendly with the son of this other family. He came home from work one day and gave this boy a 
cone of ice-cream. The boy was delighted. He took it inside to show his parents, but when they 
saw him with it, he was given a beating, and the ice-cream was thrown into the trash. Since then, 
this kid avoided talking to John. What happened here? Without reading much into this episode, is 
it possible that the parenting protocol for relating to “strangers” is different for the kids in the 
two accounts? We do not know the internal details, but can we judge the outward behavior?  
 Obviously, most parents warn their children about “strangers,” and for good reasons! It 
is also true that some parents warn their children about “blacks” in Western cultures, and about 
“Ọmọ-Igbo,” “nyamiri” or “ofé nmanụ” or “aboki” (for the Igbo or Yoruba or Hausa person 
respectively in popular terminology) in Nigeria. Without prejudice to the “wisdom” of a healthy 
“caution” with “unknown persons” in a world like ours, we argue that a deliberate effort to 
instigate fear of the “other” who is not “one of us” is the beginning of how “nurture” corrupts 
conscience. It is not arguable that the “reasons” adduced for this fear (as an expression of truth or 
irrational prejudice) has any real relevance except to confirm an existing insecurity. As such, 
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children formed in insecurity will grow up with a stranger-phobia, a distrust of any black person 
or a person of a different tribe respectively. It will therefore take reverse socialization aimed at 
reforming the mindset based on prejudice and distrust to one of trust and acceptance to achieve a 
change of attitude. This change of attitude is the goal of “reverse-socialization.  
The implication is that our conceptualization of “reverse-socialization” or 
“conscientization” is essentially a process we consider synonymous with, and integral to 
“conscience reform.”  It primarily refers in this research to a re-education or updating of 
conscience and the sharpening of moral consciousness. We have argued that tribalism, racism, or 
xenophobia, are all learnt behaviors. Therefore, they could be “reversed” through painstaking 
process aimed at reforming the distorted moral “mind-set” that formed it giving birth what we 
consider a “malformed conscience”. We have indicated in chapter four how “tribalism” is an 
“institutionalization of self-interest” that overtime evolved as a primary driver for systemic 
corruption in Nigeria. We indicated in our global analysis how this “institutionalized self-
interest” at the international level is not just driving local corruption but impacting moral 
formation as well. The goal of “reverse-socialization” is bringing to fuller consciousness the 
moral bankruptcy of an attitude that promotes “tribalism” as the gateway to recover proper 
conscience formation in traditional societies like Nigeria. In other words, we consider it obvious 
at this point that wakening the moral consciousness of whomever practices tribalism (or racism) 
is synonymous to activating, educating, and updating or reforming his/her conscience.   
Our central recommendation as to how to achieve this process of updating or reformation 
starts with sowing mental seeds – implanting ideas that counter the poison of the specified social 
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malady. This is what we consider as “targeted” reform process.786 This implies the need to 
identify and focus on certain primary ideas (mental “seeds”) that are relevant to specific goals 
and contexts. From our example, in social contexts where “tribalism” or “racism” is identified as 
a factor, themes like “trust” and “acceptance” will represent primary seeds to be “targeted” as the 
remedy to the problem in the reform process.  
We are living at a time when technology is turning attention to nature – relearning the 
wisdom of how nature does things. Scientists in this domain of research have discovered that 
nature adopts very simple ways to solving seemingly complex problems.
787
 At the beginning of 
this research, we hoped to find a key for grass-root critical education (that could awaken the 
critical consciousness of masses of local people), virtually natural, and simple enough to be 
grasped by the largely illiterate masses of people in agrarian communities of Nigeria (and 
Africa). We think we found this in the concepts that are common to all farming communities: 
planting, weeding, and harvesting. We adapted this familiar language for educational purposes 
hoping that their native symbolism will be powerful enough to captivate their imagination.  
The “three-stage-process” is therefore a theoretical model proposed as a teaching tool 
for raising social consciousness in any given area of particular moral concern. Though it is 
modeled for more traditional societies, like Nigeria, yet it could be adapted for more 
sophisticated societies as well. The idea is to evoke the power of symbolism in capturing the 
imagination of the people to engage in, and commit to the re-education process necessary for a 
                                               
786 The physical sciences employ this method of “targeting” for greater effectiveness in focused research. The 
medical sciences in particular employ “targeted” treatment as a way to deal with aggressive pathogens. We employ 
“targeted” reform as a method to deal with socio-moral maladies for the reasons of greater effectiveness.   
787 See Jeffrey O. Kephart, “Computer Science: Learning from Nature,” Science, Volume 331: 6018 (2:2011): pp. 
682-683; http://www.nature.com/scitable 
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desired outcome – the reformation of conscience that would change behavior leading to social 
transformation. Planting, Weeding, and Harvesting are primary conceptual symbols (or 
categories) in the life cycles of most agrarian communities of Nigeria and Africa. Each 
represents an important moment in their daily lives – each stage is critical to a “good harvest” 
(the goal of every farmer). Given their familiarity with, and the deep meaning they evoke in the 
mind of the average person in most traditional agrarian societies like Nigeria, we chose them to 
constitute the primary conceptual symbols instrumental for updating moral consciousness in 
these or similar societies. 
 Planting: As already noted above, the planting season is often preceded by careful 
deliberation. The “seed” that will be planted in the local farm is a decision the farmer makes 
yearly with his family or partners [kinsmen]. He considers the short and long term benefits of 
whatever choice of crop he decides to seed next farming cycle. He weighs the possible impact on 
personal, family and communal needs; evaluates economic factors like market trends, and 
possible impact of weather and environmental conditions (like disease control resources). He 
might even deliberate on the political situation, government policies and subsidies, among 
others. In the end, his choice is never born out of whim but the product of a deliberative process.  
 Analogously, the “planting” season in our model signals a time for creative dialogue788 
with the specific aim of identifying, at a communal level, the conceptual “seed[s]” that needs to 
be “planted” in the course of moral education cycle. This cycle does not however mean a year 
but maybe set at between 2-10 year period for functional and practical reasons. Once there is a 
                                               
788 Paulo Freire has argued forcefully on the value of dialogue as an indispensable tool in developing “critical 
consciousness” and has social transformation as its goal. See his Education in Critical Consciousness, Bloomsbury 
Academic, reprint edition, 2013, pp. 4-6; 34 
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consensus as to the choice of “seed” (an idea, often a “virtue”), the actual “planting” proceeds as 
(or ought to be) a communal effort. The reason for the “creative dialogue” session is to ensure 
that everyone engages in the first step of the process and serves as possible insurance for 
participating in the second step – the actual planting. As noted earlier, the model is a pedagogical 
tool tailored for adult conscientization process. This model does not discard but builds upon an 
existing dialogical model of dialogue (or “palaver”) that is common to any African community. 
789
Even where possible consensus was not reached as soon as expected, the very possibility of 
that primary dialogue already serves as preparatory similar to how “tilling” (plow or harrow) the 
soil is preparatory for planting. Unless the ground is ready, the actual planting of the seed has to 
wait. Every session in the dialogical process is analogous to “tilling” the soil – the soil of the 
human heart, the biblical seat of conscience. In fact, every critical dialogue is an effort to awaken 
the conscience – or moral consciousness.  
 Each moral community has a peculiar moral deficiency. Therefore, the deliberative 
process is meant to identify the moral “seed” best suited to address their need. Eventually, the 
“seed[s]” chosen for “planting” will become the target of family discussions, the focus for 
preaching in churches, mosques, and other religious and secular outlets. It will form a central 
part of the school curriculum in all tiers of learning in that community, region/country.
790
 Above 
                                               
789 Most African communities have a tradition of dialogue (a “town hall” meeting) where most issues are brought to 
the attention of the community by the leaders (or Chiefs) if the issue is of great moment. There is effort to engage 
“everyone,” except that often this implies “men” in prevalently patriarchal societies of Africa. The dialogical 
process we propose will be truly all inclusive even as it builds on traditional forms of solving problems.   
790 The creative dialogue we propose happens at different levels: family, clan, village, town, local government, state, 
region, and national. Paulo Freire speaks of “generative themes” that could be revealed in each “limit-situation” that 
range from particular units to broader aspects (moving from small communities to regional, national, and continental 
levels) such that it acquires a universal character depending on its extensions. We quote him: “In sum, limit-situation 
imply the existence of persons who are directly or indirectly served by these situations, and of those who are negated 
and curbed by them. Once the latter come to perceive these situations as the frontier between being and nothingness, 
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all, it will provide the direction for the process of reverse socialization. Critical dialogue is a 
constant source of generating new stream of questions as to how to achieve the goals of “reverse-
socialization,” which, as noted above has as goal the reformation of conscience.    
 Paulo Freire, whose work on pedagogy provides an inspiration to this segment, argues 
that domination is the “fundamental theme” of our time.791 Therefore, the process of critical 
education would aim at its opposite – “liberation.” While liberation remains the ultimate 
objective of the dialogical process suggested here, however, each historical context has unique 
“sub-themes” directed to achieve goals particular to that context. In the Nigerian context, while 
liberation ought to remain the ultimate goal, themes that build “trust” and promote 
“selflessness” (as a counter measure to “tribalism” and “corruption”) will be the particular goal 
of creative dialogue sessions at national, regional, and community levels. In additions, regions, 
states, and communities may have other “sub-themes” aimed at addressing other social-moral 
problems peculiar to their contexts. In the United States, for instance, attention should be 
directed to “generative themes” that aim to counter the scourge of unique social ills like 
consumerism, racism, militarism, and individualism. While these themes have a national import, 
each of them has more relevance in some regions of that country than in others.  
 Though our global analysis stresses the influence of world powers on weaker nations of 
the third world, it fails to strictly identify that influence as a form of “domination,” which it 
                                                                                                                                                       
they begin to direct their increasingly critical actions towards achieving the untested feasibility implicit in that 
perception. On the other hand, those who are served by the present limit-situation regard the untested feasibility as a 
threatening limit-situation which must not be allowed to materialize, and act to maintain the status quo. 
Consequently, liberating actions upon an historical milieu must correspond not only to the generative themes but to 
the way in which these themes are perceived. This requirement in turn implies another: the investigation of 
meaningful thematic.” See Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum 2000), pp. 102-103 
791 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Ibid. p. 103.  
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obviously is. Therefore, while this “three stage process” is more relevant to third world nations, 
like Nigeria, but its full effect depends on similar creative dialogue happening on the opposite 
side of the Atlantic – among the “dominators” who try to shape world events. Hence, when 
powerful nations like United States engages in a creative dialogue aimed at overcoming some of 
the “pathologies” of its own culture: consumerism, racism, militarism, or individualism, it is 
inevitable that it will have to confront the reality of being in a position of “oppressor”.  
Therefore, the theme of “domination” illumines the different aspects of the “pathologies” 
above. If the dialogue is sincere, its effect will be the amelioration of the inclination or need to 
dominate both outside and inside its borders. This will provide a boost not only to the 
“liberation” process for those impacted by their dominance (especially in the third world) but 
also in its own “liberation.” This is an important point given that those who dominate others are 
in a sense, in a deeper state of bondage.
792
 And from the insights of our global analysis, we all 
are impacted by one another. We cannot save ourselves alone. We need to collaborate with 
others to achieve our fullest potential. This “fullest potential” does not necessarily mean more 
material wealth or power, but a deeper sense of happiness. Being in a state of dominance does 
not guarantee the later but could actually diminish that possibility.  
It is however the desire and action of the oppressed themselves towards liberation that is 
critical to its actualization. Breaking the shackles of dependency is incomplete without 
                                               
792 Jean Jacques Rousseau writes in his Social Contract, “Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Those 
who think themselves the masters of others are indeed greater slaves than they.” Cited in Tom Butler-Bowdon, 50 
Philosophy Classics: Thinking, Being, Acting, Seeing, Profound Insights and Powerful Thinking from 50 Key Books 
(Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2013, Kindle Edition), Kindle Locations 4465-4466. 
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psychological liberation.
793
 As Paulo Freire would argue, a “dominated consciousness” often 
perceives only a fragmented view of his “limit-situation” (perceives it as an “epiphenomena”), 
and therefore fails to know or comprehend his true situation.
794
 They then fail to realize how this 
ignorance of their true situation constitutes a critical part of their continued subjugation, an 
important part of the strategy of dominance is to achieve and maintain a “culture of silence” or 
passivity in the face of monstrous abuse and oppression. This is an inglorious state Nigerians 
have attained due largely to the coercive approach to governance of many years of despotic 
military leadership. To reverse this passivity, the masses have to be gradually conscientized, or 
more appropriately, gradually led to achieve a deeper level of critical consciousness.  
The temptation however is for leaders of this movement towards conscientization and 
social transformation to foist their ideas on this largely passive people. This will impede the 
goals of the process because such approach underscores a presumption that the people do not 
know what is good for them. This treats them as “objects” instead of as “subjects”. According to 
Freire, the leaders and the led are “equally Subjects of revolutionary action,” and their reality is 
the “medium” for achieving transformation through critical dialogue where both parties (the 
leaders and the led) are “actors in intercommunication.”795  
                                               
793 This is evident in the fact that political independence that all nations of Africa experienced did not materialize in 
real liberation. Imperialist forces used different strategies to ensure the shackles of dependency are maintained and 
therefore perpetuating domination in a new form of colonialism.     
794 P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 104 
795 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Op. Cit., p. 129. Hanna Arendt argues forcefully how our “word and 
deed” constitute a composite of human “action” and through it we “insert ourselves” into the world revealing 
ourselves to it like a “second birth…” By taking initiative expressed in “work, deed and action” we take back our 
original form or dignity. Therefore we are truly human when we engage in deliberative action (that includes voicing 
our view in a community of being) as real subjects. See Hanna Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 175-247  
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WEEDING: This concept is enriched by experience among farmers in traditional societies. It 
identifies the conceptual “weeds” that needs to be “uprooted” to make room for the new plants to 
survive. While weeding is a major stage after planting, it has minor segments throughout the 
process. It is an integral part of every dialogical process. However, given the fact that “weeding” 
is given particular attention after planting in traditional farming, we accord it due significance in 
the dialogical process.  
Methodologically, it represents that stage when particular attention is paid to particular 
concepts (words, stories, or lore), mental attitudes or beliefs, behavior or practices, and persons 
(or institutions) that endanger the fruitfulness or objectives of the entire process. This stage is 
analogously critical to the effectiveness of the next stage as weeding is critical to the “harvest 
season” by ensuring the healthy growth of the plant. As in weeding, it uproots everything that is 
not part of the “plant”.  We can only speak in broad outlines here given limitations of space. It is 
our hope that this method would be given full elaboration in a post-doctoral project. But this 
stage focuses on identifying and eliminating specific cultural baggage that hinder the full 
flowering of the process. It has different dimensions: conceptual, personal, and institutional 
dimensions that we now elaborate as follows:  
The conceptual dimension will include beliefs, lore, proverbs, and idioms that are 
potentially destructive. We will identify a few of them in this chapter. This is perhaps the most 
important aspect of “weeding” as a methodological process. It is a critical assessment of all 
“traditions” we have received from our “elders” since the beginning of our existence as a people. 
Though it is has comprehensive extensions, it does not mean it must be done all at once. Focus 
should be placed on more urgent areas of community or national life. We place greater emphasis 
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on moral and religious practices of our culture even before political “practices”. The reason is 
that even though the moral, religious, and political culture seems to be integral to the life of the 
people, we consider the first two as having deeper roots than the last. Hence, when the former is 
properly addressed, it would impact positively upon the later.    
The personal dimension will identify “typologies” of personalities whose words and 
actions inject toxicity into the “soil” or “moral sphere” of the community. The goal is to ensure 
such personality types are never allowed public office, and any public servant whom they 
sponsor directly or indirectly has the same fate. The political drama that led to the literal 
kidnapping of a sitting governor (Chris Ngige) by his political godfather (Chris Uba) in Anambra 
State of Nigeria is a case in point. The refusal to sign away billions of Naira of public fund 
(meant for Anambra state people) to the godfather resulted in a political drama that shocked the 
State and the world. Personalities like that “godfather” should be “ostracized” from ever 
meddling in public life. Without critical dialogue about what is wrong with this kind of act, the 
younger generation begins to see people with such pedigree as “models” to emulate.796  
Conversely, the character “type” represented in Ngige should be promoted as a model for 
the young. He exhibited courage and integrity in a critical context where most give in to fear or 
greed. His example will remain an important “personality type” for modeling proper “conscience 
formation” for young Nigerians. He stood firm on the inviolability of the principles that regulate 
public office. He fought the adversaries of the “state” (those whose ultimate goal is to harm the 
                                               
796 Most scholarly views affirm that young people’s moral adjustment depends largely on the “local consensus” than 
anything else. William C. Spohn points out the impact of “contrary values” on the moral development of young city 
dwellers that are often open to media influence. He argues that their consciences are “dulled” when they are not 
adequate moral vocabulary or when for political convenience important moral issues are “dumbs down” for some 
selfish or utilitarian goals. See W. C. Spohn, “Conscience and Moral Development,” p. 135; Sissela Bok, Mayhem: 
Violence as Public Entertainment (Reading, Mass,: Adison Wesley, 1998).  
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community) and won. Integrity and honesty should be seen as capable of winning the day if there 
is the will to fight for it. The courage comes largely from the support of well-meaning people 
whose interests are actually at stake. His stance on principles was reinforced by the moral voice 
of his primary community – his constituency that stood behind him through his ordeal.  
The institutional dimension identifies all forms of “organized wrongdoing” (in politics, 
the three tiers of government, educational institutions, organized religion, NGOs, financial 
institutions, business enterprises, and organized crimes like 419). The idea is to arrive at a deeper 
understanding of how these “organized wrongdoing” hinder our collective growth and stultify 
our individual and common destiny.
797
 Therefore, the “weeding” process directed at institutions 
and organizations (priority attention is given to public institutions), aims at seeing them as the 
fountain from which “the quality of life” flows unto the people. These “institutions” of 
governance, like the seed, if they are defective, will mean the family will go hungry and become 
needy and poor. Even when they are healthy seeds, without due attention to the planting and 
weeding and other conditions that the farmer carefully contributes to its proper growth and 
development, they will fail to deliver the dividends expected of good harvest. So, they should be 
made to guard jealously these institutions or else they will fail. If they fail, it affects not just their 
life and happiness but that of their children and generations yet unborn.  
                                               
797 We exposed the “corruption” of the system in chapter four and described the rot in public office. Though there is 
hardly sufficient clarity as to the depth of corruption in all cases, but it is hardly disputed to claim that no institution 
is unaffected by corruption in Nigeria. We however argued in the same chapter that apart from the recommendations 
proposed therein, we should pursue a more holistic approach to the problem. A more robust approach includes all 
those recommendations and in addition seeks a deeper solution through a long term investment in grass-root 
conscientization process reforms conscience. This is a “down-up” approach to the problem as complementary rather 
than opposed to those other “top-down” solutions. We insist that until a critical mass of people are awakened to their 
role in good governance, the gains of any solutions to the problem of systemic corruption will disappear with time as 
the “system” gradually recalibrates and transforms reformers into the “reformed” who maintain the status quo. 
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 During weeding, the farmer usually tills the soil around the “plant” to allow for moisture 
and proper air circulation and prevent toxicity among the plants. Analogously, during weeding, 
attention is paid to how the passivity of the masses provides the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the “weeds” to grow and thrive. We have the choice to provide the proper 
conditions for the “plants” to grow instead by ensuring the weeds are eliminated. The process of 
“eliminating” the “weeds” in the system cannot be accommodated in this study because of space, 
but suffice to say that it is to be integrated into the political democratic process as the engine of 
power that resides in the people.  
The real reason behind the impunity of our venal leadership is the very poor development 
of the democratic process in place. They have virtually perfected the art of “buying” the 
electorate during the elections as part of a broader plan for “rigging” the election. Constituencies 
and towns are often “settled” with specific sums of money so that they can vote “en bloc” for a 
particular candidate. It does not only make it impossible for poorer candidates to get elected, but 
it forms part of the deeper rupture in the moral orientation of the community. It describes in part 
how whole communities “sell” their consciences and barter away their only chance to a better 
government. At the political realm, “weeding” will aim at addressing the problems of the 
political process from the prism of the dynamics of power.  
HARVEST: Obviously, a good harvest is the end or goal of every farmer. Analogously, 
“harvest,” the third stage in our model, represents the end or goal of the dialogical process. It 
describes the cumulative results or “fruits” of the preceding stages. As the hope of a bumper 
harvest provides hope and impetus to the farmer, so the end result of the dialogical process 
provides the impetus for persistency in the difficult task of socio-moral re-engineering. Just as 
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the farmer does not give up farming due to a poor harvest in a particular season, so also those 
charged with implementing the reverse socialization process do not surrender due to initial poor 
results. Persistency has its adequate rewards in due time.  
 The specific character of this stage of the process is not merely observing outcomes but 
more essentially assessing such outcomes in the light of the primary ideals envisioned at the 
beginning of the process. Therefore, a proper assessment of results should be able to delineate 
specific areas that need closer attention. Given that this dialogical process is the continuous or 
cyclic application of theory/reflection to practice and vice versa, we adopt the concept of 
“praxis” as an amalgam of that reality.798 The notion of “praxis” (see footnote) we reference 
here does not admit of too sharp a bifurcation between reflection and action but as one fluid 
reality. So, the stages of “planting,” “weeding,” and “harvesting,” are better understood as a 
synthesis of critical dialogue and action as one unbroken activity or event. The “planting” for 
instance happens right in the heat of dialogue as the community struggles to wrestle with words 
aimed at building a better community. As they proceed to further implement the consensus view, 
they are ever open to new insight arising from reflection upon their choice. This could lead to 
new dialogue. The importance here is a constant openness to new voices to be heard but this does 
not mean that there is no discernible distinction between critical dialogue and specific external 
action (“praxis”). This is where we perhaps differ from Paulo Freire who rejects any such 
                                               
798 The term “praxis” here refers to reflection and action as a composite act aimed at socio-moral transformation. 
Though it has a long tradition dating back to the Greeks (Plato and Aristotle), and adapted by philosophers of 
different stripes including Hanna Arendt (The Human Condition, 1958). We are adopting it here with the belief that 
it represents the proper mode for human learning – the encounter between idea and practice. An idea that claims to 
have a bearing on human life is meaningless unless tested and proven to be relevant to it. And an action that 
proceeds “thoughtlessly” is not truly human until it is backed up by reflection or deliberation. Praxis here is the 
interaction of reflection and action with an aim to transform its subjects to an ever better pattern of thought and 
action. It is a concept that already finds a home in every African community “palaver” but needs formalization.  
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bifurcation. Traditionally, there is a distinction between the planting, weeding, and harvesting 
times, even though they are but distinct moments in one and integral farming cycle. So also this 
model will maintain an internal consistency with this traditional model by ensuring a distinction 
between the three stages of the process while stressing their integral relationship.  
 The proper “harvest” of this model is a deeper level of moral probity for a greater number 
of the population. This is foundational to the realization of other anticipated “fruits” of the 
process. These other fruits include, but not limited to “psychological”  and “religious” freedom, 
which describes the unshackling of the different forms of inner inhibitions and insecurities that 
together constitute the deepest forms of mental enslavement that still afflicts our people.  For 
example, we identified “tribalism” as prejudice based on native insecurities. We also pointed out 
the need for a deeper investigation into the “pathologies” associated with religious practices (like 
witchcraft, sorcery, cultism, spiritism, among others).
799
 While efforts to counter the negative 
assertions regarding Africa have their value, but most end up as mere apologetics unless we 
really disprove these assertions by way of positive results in the continent. That means the need 
to concentrate on building for effectiveness in all our institutions. Results-oriented strategy 
speaks louder than rhetoric – for results speak for themselves – good or bad results. For example, 
one can argue convincingly that Africa has a set of different parameters for judging the 
effectiveness of her institutions. Whatever those parameters are, its value will be based on its 
capacity to deliver better quality of life to the majority of African people. If it is proven to 
                                               
799 We noted earlier that Elochukwu E. Uzukwu’s recent book on the subject of “spirits” is an invaluable 
contribution to this need for greater clarity about our beliefs and practices. While arguing for a “creative, 
pneumatological synthesis,” he does hold a caveat on “romanticizing” all of our history (and we interpret that to 
include all our beliefs and practices). See, God, Spirit, and Human Wholeness (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2012)p. 
60 
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promote why we have a laundry list of bad leaders or poor administration of our resources, then 
common sense would consider such parameter part of the problem. A result-oriented strategy is a 
pragmatic orientation to problem solving that is not only a common sense approach but one that 
has deep roots in the African psyche (plurality of gods) and so needs to be retrieved.   
 The “harvest” we seek is a condition that reverses of the all the negatives we see in 
Nigeria today. We insist that this is possible through a pain-staking deconstruction of some of 
our old assumptions, beliefs, and practices. It is like rebuilding a city after a devastating war. 
Some of the buildings have to come down to create space for a new and better one. The analogy 
Jesus used for “new wine in new wine skin”800 is perhaps an appropriate metaphor here. We need 
to be wise enough to know when the old wine is no longer appropriate for new wineskin. The 
“harvest” is reaped at three discernible levels: moral (or empowerment), psychological and 
spiritual freedom, and material manifestations in form of a functional social system that flows 
directly from good leadership.  
So, the “harvest” is the cumulative effect of building more effective social institutions 
using as pillars the primary agency of active moral communities, “one village at a time”.801 It is a 
community where people are not merely well informed of the benefits of building such a 
community, but are properly motivated to build it, and so participate actively in its realization. 
The process takes time but the fruits of that effort are predictable. They know the consequences 
of actions we have condemned in this study and they hold the members of their community 
                                               
800 Matthew 9:17, Luke 5:37 
801 Goerge B. N. Ayittey made this suggestion in a presentation on “Ted Talks,” for an African renaissance that takes 
Africa back from the “hippos” and “cheetahs,” terms he used to describe the kleptomaniacs in political leadership in 
the continent.  
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accountable for their actions. They ask relevant questions and demand accountability from their 
leaders. Accountable leadership invests in building and maintaining credible institutions. 
Ultimately the harvest is social transformation. It cannot be otherwise if diligently implemented.  
Obviously, the “three-stage-process” as explained above implies skill-sets that cut across 
different disciplines and practices. Therefore, the role of theologians, philosophers, journalists, 
and social scientists are not more important than that of local activists, pastors, imams, and other 
town folks involved in the process at the local level but rather each role is equal and 
complementary to the others. This point cannot be overemphasized particularly in the Nigerian 
setting where utmost value is placed on “positions” of authority. It is part of the goals of the 
process to deconstruct the mindset that thrives on acquiring a laundry list of irrelevant “titles” 
just to “feel” or “seem” more important than the average person.802 Therefore, as noted above, 
even a hint of physical or intellectual hierarchy or superiority within the process will defeat its 
primary objectives. Those who lead the dialogue are not “directors” who dictate their ideas and 
‘force” it through to the masses. As Freire argues, such approach would turn the leaders into 
oppressors themselves and any change that results from such is inauthentic and objectionable.
803
  
Perhaps, it is right to point out that eventually all human communities, irrespective of 
context, will need to pay close attention to “generative themes” that promote “selflessness” given 
that “self-interest” is at the core of all domination (practiced by the oppressor and oppressed 
                                               
802 It is a common practice to see people pile-up ridiculous titles like “Chief, Dr, Barr, Sir, “X” OND, B.Sc. M.Sc., 
and OFR. KSJ, JP. Woe to the person who will introduce this person in public without mentioning all those titles! Is 
it difficult to see this as a self-image problem on a national scale? See a funny article by Ebele Orakpo, “Nigerians 
and the Craze for Titles,” Vanguard Newspapers (online edition),  http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/09/nigerians-
and-the-craze-for-titles/ 
803 See Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Ibid. pp. 125-135 
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alike), all tribal or racial prejudices (present in developing and developed worlds), and all socio-
moral pathologies identifiable in any given culture. We have argued that conscience is the 
natural mechanism in our nature that enables self-transcending growth towards selflessness. 
Therefore, whatever helps discourage excessive self-interest promotes selflessness; and whatever 
promotes selflessness promotes the formation of authentic conscience and vice versa. Hence, the 
ultimate goal of this dialogical process is to reform conscience and promote selflessness.  We 
provide simple illustrations of the process below in figures 4 through 7: 
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FIGURES 4-7: ILLUSTRATING THE “THREE-STAGE-PROCESS”804 
 
 
 
 
HARVEST 
                                               
804 These illustrations are similar to the one in chapter 3 where local and international tribalism defined more simply 
as “institutionalized self-interest” are primary drivers of systemic corruption (in Nigeria). Our response to this (and 
other) socio-moral disease[s] is reformation of conscience through the dialectics of the three-stage-process: 
“planting-weeding-harvesting”. They are conceptual models that serve as vehicles that drive critical dialogue in the 
process of reverse socialization aimed at reforming conscience and achieving social transformation. The illustration 
differentiates the segments of the process to underscore the integral relationships they share. A funnel is used for the 
“planting” process given that it is a about sieving out the proper “seed” through an information flow (education of 
conscience) enabled by critical dialogue or “palaver”. The “weeding” process is of greater critical importance and 
perhaps with wider extensions for Nigerian and African societies.  
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5.2.1.2  DEVELOPING AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY  
 
Philosophy is said to be the “handmaid” of theology for obvious reasons. We are 
convinced that Africa needs to gradually, but systematically, develop a coherent system of 
philosophy that represents a necessary logical transition that replaces “oral philosophy” or “sage 
wisdom” as a body of knowledge that guides its life and practices. It is refreshing to know that 
African scholars are now philosophizing in their own rights rather than spending time debating 
whether there is an African philosophy/philosopher or not. Though it is possible to leap-frog to 
systematized theology at this time, but it will be grossly inadequate given that such a project will 
have to depend mainly on borrowed philosophical categories developed for a different historical 
context and therefore would be to that extent estranged from African realities.   
The value of a coherent system of philosophy is that it provides the logical framework for 
articulating an adequate political philosophy or ideology and formulating a coherent ethic and 
theology. Part of the reason for the unstable nature of political institutions in Africa today is 
rooted in the lack of a coherent and/or consistent political philosophy or ideology. There is 
democracy but some call it “democrazy” because most political parties represent a plethora of 
ideologies with no real discernible core values that differentiate one from the other.  The lack of 
a core value implies a visionless political posturing that overtime proves itself incapable of 
delivering any visible dividends of democratic governance. Without a core value there is no 
commitment to the people. Yes, “ideas build a nation”.  
Moreover, part of the role of a coherent system of philosophy is to purify the content of 
intellectual consciousness. It enables a transition from compactness to differentiation such that 
the content of beliefs and practices are regularly sieved to purify them of their unhealthy and 
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stultifying qualities or categories. There are many traditional beliefs and practices that Nigerians 
and Africans have been able to discard as a result of Christian evangelization efforts (keeping of 
slaves, the ostracism of the “Osu,” someone dedicated to a deity, and killing of twins among the 
Igbos are but few instances).  But there are many more beliefs and practices that refuse to be 
dislodged from our individual and collective psyche except through a coherent and consistent 
reflective effort that formal philosophy enables. For example, there are many stories (lore) and 
proverbs that encapsulate deep rooted albeit unhealthy beliefs that define practices. We shall 
examine a few (stories and proverbs) in the next segment to underscore this point and also 
expose their implication for moral formation and practices.     
5.2.1.3  REVIVING MORAL COMMUNITIES: RETRIEVING MORAL VOICES 
There is a hidden treasure in African communalism. It is a concept that captures a 
fundamental truth about life. It affirms that “relationality”805 is at the very heart of creation and 
the core element of socio-cultural evolution. There is deep insight (albeit undeveloped) in the 
African belief that personhood cannot be defined apart from the community or social 
relationships. In other words, our subjectivity is community bound. Therefore, while 
acknowledging our critique of a possible exaggeration in the claim: “We are, therefore, I am,” 
we still identify it as capturing an original insight of the essential constitutive principle of 
subjectivity, personhood and community. However, what has happened is that African 
communalism, stifled by tragic historical constraints (inter-tribal wars and slave trade; 
                                               
805 E. E. Uzukwu affirms that “relationality” is the conceptual paradigm for a deeper understanding of the African 
Universe of meaning. He argues, “The principle of relationship or the idea of relationality is converted into the 
measure of all things. The fundamental assumption that reality is plural – dual or twinned, multiple or a combination 
of twinned components – structures the human access to the universe.” See E. E. Uzukwu, God, Spirit, and Human 
Wholeness, Loc. Cit., p. 10.   
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colonialism and dictatorships; poverty and disease) has evolved a paradoxical individualism at 
the core of communalism instead of a self-transcending altruism that an authentic 
“communalism” would have actualized.806 In other words, constantly pushed to the brinks of 
survival, they were forced by their circumstances to strive for survival, and take refuge only 
within the limits of each defined circle of trust – the family, clan, and tribe. It becomes obvious 
why tribalism still holds strong in all African nations. The culprit then is historical isolationism.  
Just as personhood (as subjectivity) is destroyed by isolationism or individualism, community (as 
“nationhood”) is destroyed by tribalism; but both could be healed by a more extensive sense of 
“communion” in true communalism. This implies that the walls of tribalism that promotes 
isolationism must fall if a holistic psychosocial emancipation will be realized.  
There is need to identify and then retrieve, revive, or “reincarnate” some essential 
traditional values we have lost or losing in most Nigerian (and African communities). For 
instance, among the Igbos, traditional title holders were known to be men of highest moral 
integrity. The recipients of the Ọzọ title (called Ndị Nze) were traditionally believed to be 
incapable of telling lies or acting unjustly.
807
 This might sound naïve, as it seems to exaggerate 
the human capacity for moral uprightness. However, given that it had functioned well in the past 
in upholding both personal and social integrity, it underscores the essential role, if not the 
“capacity”, of the moral community in instilling and sustaining socio-moral values. This research 
has affirmed that a community without a moral voice will destroy the moral compass of its 
                                               
806 This assertion is worthy of deeper investigation in post-doctoral research.  
807 Unfortunately, this is no longer case. The proof of this is affirmed at a Jubilee celebration recently where the 
presiding chairman of the occasion, in a rare act of courage asked the people if the claim “Onye Nze anaghị eghe asị 
(the Nze person does not lie) still holds true? There was a roaring “Noooooo!” from the audience.  
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constituents. The inherent values in traditional socio-moral institutions like these needs to be 
retrieved or new ones reinvented.   
5.2.1.4 ` Grace and Human Initiative 
 Africa as a whole believes in the spiritual dimension of all life. Africans generally believe by 
default that “divine help’ is needed for every success. We have noted the Igbo aspect of this 
reality (only in passing) in our analysis of personhood. An Igbo proverb captures an aspect of 
this as belief in “divine favor”: Ọkụbalụ ma’chi ekwehe (He that works hard but his chi refuses 
[him success]).
808
 We admit the need for divine help in all human efforts towards transformation. 
We acquiesce to the imperative of grace as Augustine and Aquinas have argued forcefully in the 
Christian tradition.
809
 We however maintain that what is lacking in the African situation is not 
necessarily the divine dimension but the human cooperation. We are inclined to argue here of the 
importance of context. The historical context of the Nigerian (and African) narrative 
complexifies their inner response to both grace and natural endowments. The “value confusion” 
we see in the continent confirms this. As it is, there is rather too much religiosity than its lack, 
too much orientation to “spirits” than its lack, too much prayer than its lack.810 There is a 
                                               
808 This echoes Psalm 127:1 “Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labor in vain.” Uzukwu, Achebe, 
and Nwodo (all are cited in our analysis of Personhood) argue forcefully in their analysis of Chi (the personal deity 
charged with individual destiny) on the necessity of divine favor for any success in life. See particularly Nwodo, 
Philosophical Perspectives, Loc. Cit., pp. 265-269  
809 Stephen J. Duffy provides a historical analysis of Augustine and Aquinas teaching on grace in The Dynamics of 
Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993), pp. 75-120 
810 We commend E.E. Uzukwu’s recent contribution to the ongoing effort at clarifying these “ambiguities” (in God, 
Spirits, and Human Wholeness, Op. Cit.). While admitting the complexity involved, he suggests a “patient 
pedagogy” as Africans gradually evolve their God-human experience (see Uzukwu, ibid, pp. 58-59, 221-222). He is 
right. The God-experience cannot be forced if it must be real and wholesome. Nevertheless, we think there is need to 
ask if it is not proper to acknowledge the other aspect of this “duality,” in that we are inclined to view his 
endorsement of “plurality” of gods and spirits, (see p. 54, 59), and subsequent effort at clarifying how we view these 
myriad of “spirits” in African religion as one that will generate debate in years to come. It is a beautiful piece of 
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debilitating compactness that suffocates any effort at clarity in critical domains of life. Without 
sufficient clarity, even simple problems could easily transform into monstrosities.  
For example, it is believed that the African cannot be separated from his religion. He is 
suffused with the “spirit” of religion. It is our view that there is need for clarity about the many 
“spirits” that are operative in communities in Africa, and perhaps “exorcising” some of these 
“spirits” from the African psyche and communities would do us a lot of good. At the beginning 
of this research we noted the deep sense of fear that exists in the African mind evoked by a deep 
seated belief in “witchcraft,” and other “dark forces”. Many nations in the West have in the past 
systematically purged themselves of these “fears” even through some unorthodox methods, like 
the “witch hunting” episodes in Europe.  
Nigeria [and Africa] needs to find a way to liberate itself from their native fears of the 
“unknown”. To reduce this phobia to merely “superstitious mentality” is a simplistic approach to 
the problem that we cannot advocate because we recognize the existence of forces of evil that are 
active in our world. What needs to be investigated is whether the evident preponderance of 
“spirits” activity in Africa is an “infestation” or a blessing. If an “infestation,” does it feed on 
ignorance, exaggerated religiosity, or both? What conditions make “spirits” infestation possible? 
                                                                                                                                                       
research. We are at the same time convinced of the need for continuous effort at greater clarity in the direction of 
“discernment of spirits.” There is a greater need than ever to distinguish ever more clearly “good spirits” from “evil 
spirits”. As it is, there seems to be at the moment too much of the activities of the latter in the Nigerian experience. 
O. Kalu have noted the “precariousness” of human life in Africa due to the activities of “evil spirits,” “angry gods,” 
and “vengeful ancestors,” that cause “all forms of misfortune, illness, death, [business] failure.” See O. Kalu, 
African Cultural Development (Enugu: Fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1978), p. 30, J. Obi Oguejiofor categorizes 
“evil spirits” as “far more numerous, more dangerous and fearful than any other group of Supernatural beings”. See 
The Influence of Igbo Traditional Religion on the Socio-political Character of the Igbo (Nsukka: Fulladu Publishing 
Company), p. 85. Scholarly efforts towards clarity should not only aim at identifying inherent values in our 
traditional practices but also a critical reassessment of these “values” in the light of how it empowers or stultifies our 
growth and development as a people. That will imply identifying or developing some standards or criteria for such 
an assessment if what is obtainable outside of Africa (Western views) is considered tainted.   
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Any practical solutions to the problem should include vigorous education, legislation, an 
indigenous but systematized investigation and subsequent prosecution of death-dealing 
“sorcerers,” “shamans” and “witchdoctors” and their cohorts in crime. That their activities still 
constitute a daily experience in countries like Nigeria is worrisome in the 21
st
 century. We are 
however convinced that the greatest priority is a differential imperative that enables greater 
masses of people make clearer distinctions about the role of “spirits” and ‘religion” in their 
overall development. It matters what you believe in. Part of the goal of Christianity is to purify 
the content of faith. The transition from faith in “spirits” to an absolute faith in God is one that 
Nigerians need to purify and liberate their psyche from its “origins” but this may take time.   
5.2.1.5  IMPLICATION OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS: A SHIFT TO A NEW ETHIC 
The lesson of globalization is to highlight the essential unity of the human family. It 
makes visible the hidden reality of an organic relationship between all peoples and all nations. It 
is perhaps a movement towards the unification of the human family and of all creation. It should 
generate an ever increasing sense of expectancy that erupts in joy when its goals are realized. 
Therefore the collapsing borders ought not to generate a new phobia leading towards new forms 
of individualistic isolationism but to a new freedom towards global communion, the goal of true 
communalism that Africa models even if so poorly. It liberates us from our stultifying parochial 
self-interests to a new sense of “sharing” of our gifts, talents, resources, and blessings. The 
fullness of the earth and of ourselves is there to be discovered, appreciated, and shared.  
Proper “sharing” happens among friends. Aristotle thinks that the goal of the state is to 
make “friends” of its citizens because that is only when the State is safe. Extrapolate that to the 
global commonwealth.  The collapsing borders calls attention to what we have neglected in our 
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relationships – the need to promote intra and inter racial or tribal “friendships” as against mere 
political “alliances” across local and international borders. The former is relationship developed 
by promoting equality, fairness, and justice; the other is a marriage of convenience brokered to 
protect strategic interests of the parties sometimes at the detriment of equality, fairness, and 
justice. It is therefore not globalization that generates the present phobia but rather the coming to 
consciousness of this neglected dimension of our relationships. It is the affirmation that our 
collective “conscience” still speaks deep within us (in the depth of our hearts, and in the midst of 
our community) sometimes accusing, judging, condemning, counseling, directing or prescribing. 
We need to listen to this voice from our depths, and following its guidance would help us loose 
nothing in the end except our fear.  
We have recommended a paradigm shift towards a new ethic that guides international 
relations and the crafting of foreign policies in a globalizing world. This ethic believes in a 
fundamental equality and fraternity of all peoples and therefore eschews any framework or 
method characterized by domination or subordination of one group over and against the other.  It 
acknowledges the interpenetration and integration of all life, especially human life, such that the 
action of one affects all; the action or inaction of one nation (or government) in some ways 
affects or influences events and/or behaviors in others – even those far away. While we 
recognize the inherent pull towards self-interest in inter-personal and corporate relationships as a 
critical factor of our nature that often define these relationships, we at the same time point to the 
rational exigency that requires a deliberate shift towards a more disinterested approach for the 
sake of our common heritage.   
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We recognize the inherent difficulty (if not the naivety) of reversing a long tradition of 
statecraft often based solely on “strategic self-interest,” but given its tragic history of disastrous  
effects (the root cause of all wars, revolutions, rebellions, and recent global economic 
meltdown), and the need to proactively harness the inherent positive elements in ongoing 
globalization, it will be foolhardy not to reverse course or at least engage in a holistic re-
evaluation of our policy of engagement. The United States for instance, in the light of its 
experience, needs to re-evaluate the “wisdom” of a foreign policy that leads it to squander 
trillions of dollars of tax payers’ money and the precious lives of thousands of its citizens in a 
war of attrition that it can only pretend to win. The only “winners” are those who “lobby” for it – 
the very few individuals and/or owners of corporations who benefit from providing the weapons 
or enjoy the spoils of war (in reconstruction contracts).  
It might sound naïve, but the other real “winners” are the pioneers of Al Quarda whose 
real goal is perhaps to bankrupt America and the West by drawing them out to an endless war. 
They seem to have already succeeded (even if only partly) by subtle manipulation of the 
psychological “insecurities” or “phobias” of America and its allies as evident in their insatiable 
need for “ego massage” that often leads them to a false sense of “military might” that then easily 
ensnares them. In all their wisdom, they do not seem to see the same script played out in the 
disintegration of USSR. Currently the United States is tethering at the brink of economic 
collapse with burgeoning debt-problems that threaten the very future of its citizens. European 
Union is held together by a slender thread that could snap any day due to serious economic 
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difficulties.
811
 We insist that the future of these nations and the world as not in war but in 
rebuilding a network of true friendships.  
Therefore, the paradigm shift that we propose recognizes the benefits of promoting 
authentic friendship across national and ethnic boundaries that is primarily “other” related. When 
the foundational ethic of engagement is “self-oriented” or refractive, it manipulates or distorts all 
relationships to benefit the self/nation; but in the end, this strategy does prove to be (or will 
ultimately prove to be) defeatist or self-destructive precisely because it thrives on generating 
discontent and creating enemies.  
Conversely, an ethic of engagement that is “other” related is not in real terms a “strategy” 
but a “relationship”. It establishes a normal human relationship with another entity that brackets 
all preconceived bias and “open” to encounter the “other” in the fullness of being and 
accommodate growth and development within the parameters of a normal human relationship. It 
is therefore supportive of whatever it considers “ethically healthy” in the ongoing relationship 
and firmly opposes whatever it understands as an unhealthy ethical practice. This is the basis of a 
love relationship in personal encounters that forms the basis for intra and inter-national and 
cooperate relationships. Though this approach is open to the setbacks of normal interpersonal 
relationships but it is also inherently less prone to generating antagonism over time. Canada 
seems to stand out as a nation that has built a reputation for itself (as friend of many nations) 
even though it adopts only a rudimentary model of this kind of relationship in its foreign policy. 
                                               
811 We quickly note that the economic problems of EU states cannot be traced to war expenses as against the 
situation of the United States that have spent over a trillion dollars in the last decade on War alone.  
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She therefore has very few antagonisms because she has generated few enemies in its 
relationships.
812
  
This paradigm shift in relationship would therefore resist the attempt to support (directly 
or indirectly) unethical practices where its perceived interests are involved knowing that it 
tarnishes one’s credibility in the short term and not cost effective in the long term given the 
astronomical cost of damage control measures.   
5.2.1.6  The Contribution of Our Research to Scholarship 
The contribution of this research to scholarship may be summarized under five points: 
 
Firstly, it retrieves the idea that we are responders to what is done to us. This insight is 
particularly poignant in a world that is increasingly aggressive. Aggression is often a reaction to 
one’s life situations and frustrations. If we increasingly treat others well in our relationships, 
beyond the face-to-face encounters to relationships between nations, there is a high probability 
that we will have less aggression at local and international levels. This research calls us to pay 
                                               
812 It is arguable that Canada’s foreign policy approach is determined by its position in the world – a medium power. 
By the same logic, it implies that United States’ foreign policy approach is based on its position as the sole super 
power in the world today. That seems to be a fair argument. However, such a view presumes that a “super power” 
position necessarily generates “super enemies” by default. We do not accept this myth. Rather, we assert that the 
attitude one adopts while “in power” makes all the difference as to the response one gets in return. It is similar to the 
attitude of great emperors or monarchs of history, even if they were rare. They were either loved or hated to the 
degree their attitude or approach to leadership inspires or spites respectively. Moreover, if humans today have an 
improved sense of morality, as history suggests, then our leadership ethic ought to catch-up with our times. 
Communication technology (particularly the Media) has changed the way we live in significant ways, including the 
way great leaders lead. Media “images” shape not just public opinion globally, but significantly impact people’s 
perception of a “super power” like United States. By constantly projecting an image of a “powerful war machine” (a 
super strong nation) that punishes ruthlessly its enemies, a “war monger” or “oppressor” image is created that leaves 
it more and more vulnerable in a globalizing world. It gives easy tools to its enemies.  It needs to rediscover or 
project more of its “soft-power tools” against a global enemy: not more drones or any of its war “toys,” but more of 
its “benevolent” leadership. Unfortunately, the war of attrition has drained away most of the juice at a time it needs 
it for image laundering. The wars has rendered the nation too broke to care as a super power should. It is the hope of 
this research that United States goes back to the drawing board to rediscover what makes it truly great. In our 
opinion, it is not military might, but its ability to inspire hope to the hopeless, to provide help to the needy, and to 
give voice to the voiceless. This is possible when it “listens” to that inner voice we call conscience. And we have 
argued that this voice is activated in a moral community that has not lost its own voice.     
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attention to how we treat others. This insight is particularly important to powerful nations of the 
global North that often take their relationship with the weaker countries of the South for granted.  
Secondly, we were able to indicate how conscience influences our lives beyond what we 
admit – it brings meaning and direction to our lives through the values it helps us promote. We 
identified how an emphasis on the cognitive aspect of conscience has obfuscated the deeper 
aspect of feeling in motivating behavior. We forged a link between our feelings and conscience 
both in its formation and its influence on our behavior such that we are what our conscience is. 
We argue that even when we do not listen attentively to our consciences it still shapes who we 
are, and even when we do not admit to its relevance, it still shapes who we become. We therefore 
retrieved its role as the doorkeeper of personal probity and socio-moral responsibility.  
Thirdly, this research apart from distinguishing shame and guilt identified the need to 
retrieve the sense of shame in African Communities. The reason is that “shame” acts as a 
powerful external mechanism for moral sanctions that complements the role of conscience as an 
internal sanction. However, given the influence of Western moral standards on African moral 
orientation, the value of traditional taboos have lost their power to sanction behavior. The result 
is that we have now evolved a political class that has lost a sense of shame for committing 
atrocities. Hence we affirm the need to retrieve critical elements in the traditional system of 
shame in Africa if we are to recover or retain our fast vanishing deepest values. African ethical 
system is communalistic and without a system of shame in place the entire edifice crumbles 
precisely because individual conscience has little meaning or force apart from the mechanism of 
community shame or sanctions. If active, they complement and reinforce each other; if passive, 
both fail.  
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Fourthly, while we recognize the inherent value in kinship solidarity as a socio-cultural 
institution that helps to protect and safeguard the values and privileges of different ethnic 
communities, we warn that when this kinship solidarity by undue prejudice, perverts the very 
reason for its existence, it becomes self-destructive. Therefore we brought attention to the 
pathology we call “tribalism” and exposed how this is destroying the fabric of moral formation 
and constituting the primary driver of systemic corruption in Nigeria (and other African 
countries).  
Fifthly, we identified a new form of tribalism – “international tribalism” as a form of 
kinship of interest that is gradually disrupting good governance in developed countries like the 
United States, and impacting the moral orientation of local communities by virtue of their wider 
reach that globalization enabled.  When cooperate groups or governments pursue their “strategic 
interests” at a significant detriment to the well-being of ordinary people, they activate a form of 
tribalism that is even more dangerous to our world (because of the extensive harm they can cause 
by virtue of their reach and power, like the global recession) than what is obtainable at the local 
level. Moreover, history proves that imperialist forces have influenced tribal genocide by their 
actions in the past (Rwanda/Burundi genocide and the slave trade are two serious instances). 
Sixthly, we argue that African view of personhood favor holism rather than 
individualism. We identified relationship as the critical window for understanding African 
orientation to moral probity. The concept of Ubuntu provides us the link between personhood, 
communalism as “relationship,” and socio-moral responsibility. We argue that while African 
communalism as the matrix for the protection and realization of the ends of community, 
however, tribalism injects toxicity into that context such that prejudice and distrust not only 
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erases the dividends of communalism but disrupts the formal mechanism of conscience 
formation to the degree it (tribalism) becomes a core driver for systemic corruption.   
Finally, we provided a methodology that will enhance mass mobilization in traditional 
agrarian communities like Nigeria. It is an original construct that is yet to be given full 
articulation which when fully developed will become a critical too for social emancipation and a 
buffer against systemic corruption.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
As we come to the end of our research, we wish to delineate the critical conclusions of 
this study keeping in mind that there are specific recommendations and conclusions that we 
expressed in the different chapters that cannot be accommodated here due to scope limitations:  
1.  Our search for the “roots” of moral [ir-] responsibility underscores the fact that we are 
primarily neither “builders,” nor “inventors” but “responders”. We respond to others based on 
how we “interpret” their actions towards us. We have noted that this interpretation is not merely 
“cognitive,” but involves how we “feel” about that action. In normal human relationships, 
actions that show concern, care, fairness, affection, trust, respect, honesty, acceptance, 
friendship, among others, are considered “responsible” actions and often elicit similar responses. 
In other words, a responsible action evokes a reciprocal response and vice versa. Therefore, 
responsibility or irresponsibility would ordinarily replicate itself in a community of moral agents 
based on our actions or attitude towards others. In this way, we shape “who” people become – 
either responsible or irresponsible people. It will be naïve to expect otherwise.  
2.  We affirm that the influence of conscience on our moral behavior is significant but 
grossly underestimated.  The reason we adduced for this is a historical scholarly fixation on the 
cognitive aspect of conscience in particular, and human judgment in general that consistently 
overlooks the significant influence of feelings not just in our everyday practical judgments but 
even more importantly in the processes of conscience. Our analysis on psychopathy (chapter 
one) reveals that “lack of feelings of conscience” as a central part of the psychopath’s profile or 
identity. Our emotional intelligence enables us to have moral “feelings” of a social nature (as 
expressed in empathy, compassion, or concern for others) that this research associates with the 
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reality of conscience such that its lack implies the disabling of our natural capacity to “feel”  with 
and for “others”. In other words, our ability to be “sensitive” to how others “feel” about our 
attitudes or actions towards them puts a moral check on us and enables us to act responsibly 
towards them. The lack of this “feeling” implies a disabled or deactivated conscience and a 
symptom of a serious psycho-moral disease or pathology. Hence, the inability to feel “existential 
guilt” (rightly ascribed to conscience, distinct from “neurotic guilt”) for our misconduct is not a 
sign we have “outgrown” conscience but rather a sign of serious psycho-moral ill-health.  
3.  We stress that conscience is a naturalized “mechanism” in us that enables us to self-
transcend our native impulses to selfishness, which is a central defect in our nature leading to 
irresponsibility. It is “naturalized” in the sense that it is a capacity that is developed in us through 
the interaction of “nature” (our natural endowments) and “nurture” (socio-cultural environment). 
We have shown in our analysis of the relationship between conscience and the moral community 
that this capacity develops properly in an ideal community: one with an “active moral voice”. 
This ideal community is one that still maintains a degree of “solidarity” or “kin feelings” with its 
members such that each member participates in moral formation of its constituents by 
demanding mutual accountability. It implies that “critical dialogue” is a necessary feature of an 
ideal moral community. A community without an active moral voice, where people are afraid to 
criticize the wrongdoings of its members, gradually experiences moral stagnation expressive in a 
spike in “self-interest” that is often sort at the detriment of the “common-interest” of all.   
4.  We affirm with Ratzinger that conscience is “an anamnesis of origins,” an “original 
memory” of the good and true. However, we argue that while this “original memory” is innate, it 
is only “in relationship” with “others” in an active moral community that it becomes activated 
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and elicited
813. In other words, it takes an “openness” to the “within” and “without” (a 
willingness to listen to our deeper selves and to “others” through reflection and “creative 
dialogue”) that we both form and hear the authentic voice of our consciences. It is in “creative 
dialogue” (in our “interaction” or “relationship” with others) that God’s voice is ever mediated to 
us such that we hear it both deep in ourselves and in the “voice” of others within the ideal moral 
community. However, this “voice” is ever in need of purification since it is only a “mediated” 
voice of God. As such, it is an “absolute” voice of God only to its subject. While it is indeed the 
final moral arbiter for practical judgment for the individual moral subject, it is ever in need of 
formative education in creative dialogue with its relevant moral community. We mediate God’s 
“voice” to one another in an ideal moral community. The aim of that “voice” of conscience is to 
ever urge us to care about how we treat others, to make sacrifices for one another, to live 
responsibly - that is, to ever make effort to self-transcend.  
Of course this self-transcending process finds its ultimate expression in a deeper relation 
with God that is the proper orientation to living a responsible and righteous life, a life in accord 
with God’s will. So, when that voice of conscience is stifled, care for others and obeying God’s 
commands becomes a burden rather than a moral imperative. It then happens that without an 
active conscience, we lose both our “feelings” for others and a proper respect for God’s 
commands.  Paradoxically, we become “naturalized” psychopaths.814 In other words, as William 
                                               
813 Though this is best realized in an ecclesial community but an authentic conscience can still be formed outside of 
it so long as there is openness to the true and good in dialogue with others in a morally sensitive community.  
814 We use this term “naturalized psychopath” to express a reverse situation of what happens when conscience is not 
allowed to play its normal role in our life. It not only captures the reality of what it means “to act without 
conscience” but also underscores the fact that so long as we are “sensitive” to our moral obligations towards others, 
and we care about their wellbeing, we are actually being influenced by our conscience even though we do not admit 
its influence explicitly or even deny such influence explicitly. It means conscience is not just about “guilt feeling” 
but even more so about our “good feelings” towards others. It is the seat of our moral sensibility.   
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Spohn observed above, conscience is more than involved in our decisions because it is so 
integral to our life that we become what our conscience is. We “become what we do” since our 
character is shaped by the quality of our consciences even when we do not admit its influence in 
our lives. To deny conscience is to deny our real self.  
5.  We assert that “communalism” represents a theoretical African conceptualization of the 
ideals of community that ironically is yet to find a home or authentic expression in the lived 
experience of most African communities. We questioned the authenticity of the claims of 
“communalism” (as encapsulated in the phrase, “because we are, therefore I am”) suggesting a 
deep bond with the community and concern for its wellbeing as a present practice in African 
communities (and nations) given the preponderance of venal leadership across the landscape. We 
wondered why an ethical framework that is designed to counter self-interest or views greed as a 
central vice generate such class of leaders that exhibit an insatiable appetite for greed even to 
ridiculously insane proportions (as in the Nigerian situation). The reason we adduced for this 
aberration is the “virus” of “tribalism” that distorts the value inherent in true communalism.  
6.  We hold strongly to the conviction that “tribalism” is the primary socio-moral 
“pathology” of most traditional societies but with particular emphasis on Nigeria. We argue that 
tribalism as primarily a native prejudice in relation to “others” outside the tribe practically 
disrupts the traditional process of moral formation, and at the core of this is the malformation of 
conscience. The functional category is its ability to generate distrust across tribal lines such that a 
healthy social integration becomes impossible. Given that “trust” is an essential quality in all 
human relationships, a moral formation process that excludes it in relation to others distorts not 
merely the “thinking” process towards prejudice, but even more pertinent is how it impacts how 
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we “feel” towards each other. When our thinking and feeling is skewed towards the negative 
about someone or a group of people, a profound “disconnect” is achieved that paves way to all 
conceivable atrocity towards them (the Biafran experience is a typical example).
815
 We argue 
that the role of conscience as a “natural mechanism for self-transcendence” is to bridge this 
disconnect through its formation process that begins at childhood through adulthood. It involves 
finding one’s authentic “self” by losing oneself in others-“selves,” and the wider the extension, 
the better. It is a formation in selflessness and self-sacrifice. This can neither be achieved 
without “trust” nor in a climate of prejudice. Native “prejudice” that tribalism fosters ensure 
both. This is how tribalism that irrationally memes bias towards others significantly impacts the 
quality of conscience development in tribal societies. The same is the case in modern societies 
where “racism” is a fact of life. The result is a stampede of self-interest that we see in an array of 
venal leaders that have insatiable appetites for greed and insensitive to the suffering of the 
community (or nation) including their own kin.  
7.  We further affirm from the above that “tribalism” serves as a primary driver and 
reinforcement for systemic corruption in Nigeria. It is possible the same is the case in other 
African countries, and other tribal societies. We argue that given the climate of mutual distrust 
among different ethnic communities that tribalism fosters, forging a coherent ethic of service 
(based on merit and integrity) for the greater common good becomes a virtual impossibility. We 
argue that tribalism is not merely prejudice but a form of “institutionalized self-interest” at the 
local level. Therefore the privilege of public service becomes an “opportunity for looting” the 
national treasury since commitment is to the tribal periphery at the detriment of the center (state 
                                               
815 We have noted in this research how Chinua Achebe affirmed recently in his one of his last writings, There was a 
Country, that the Biafran-Nigerian war is a genocide perpetrated against the Igbos based on tribal prejudice.  
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or nation). This is how the promotion of local “self-interest” at the detriment of the larger whole 
plays a significant part in the malformation of conscience at the political arena for adult moral 
agents. It explains how such adults will remain fixated at the lower levels of Kohlberg’s model 
of moral development.  
8.  Furthermore, we assert that given the fact that local tribal communities support and 
reward with “titles” their “sons” and “daughters” who stole public funds merely on the pretext 
that they are “one of us” inadvertently destroy the very foundation of traditional moral formation 
(that forms conscience) by “modeling” irresponsibility. This reverse “modeling” not only 
deactivates the community’s moral voice but actively corrodes the moral atmosphere that impact 
upon the character and behavior of its constituents. This, in our opinion, is the greatest harm 
tribalism does to the formation of the present and next generation of Nigerians (and Africans).  
9.  We hold strongly to the view that “international tribalism,” as a form of “institutionalized 
self-interest” projected to the global space, is a socio-moral “pathology” similar to local 
“tribalism” above. We conclude from our global analysis that just as local tribalism impacts 
negatively on the formation of individual consciences, international tribalism not only actively 
influences the moral orientation of local communities but also by injecting toxicity in the moral 
sphere impact upon the moral choices and behavior of its constituents. We provided ample 
examples to illustrate how international actors (consists of individuals, institutions, 
multinationals, and organizations representing nation-states) propelled by native or “strategic 
self-interest” often achieved at significant costs detrimental to the local community, influence 
outcomes in the local community (or other nation-states). Apart from enabling corruption 
(assisting in the looting of treasury in Nigeria), we noted the growing influence of “lobby 
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groups” in governmental policy decisions as a socio-political phenomenon that has serious moral 
implications if unchecked. We argue that this flowering of a new form of “tribe” that defend 
vested interests at all costs, often against the interests of the common good has proven its 
capacity to negatively impact our world through the sub-prime mortgage crisis that resulted in 
the global recession.  
 We highlighted how the collusion of international and local tribalism, sharing “kinship 
of interests” are directly and indirectly responsible for the emergence of a new breed of 
international actors like terrorists and scam artists. The logic is simple: irresponsibility begets 
irresponsibility in the long run. We therefore recommend a paradigm shift in foreign policy 
agenda away from solely “strategic-interests” towards compassionate engagement given the 
reality of reciprocity of conduct that globalization has enabled.  
10.  Our recommendations include, but not limited to a “glocalized”816 moral reform that 
stresses the internal content of that reform.
817
 We propose a unique method (the “three-stage-
process”) that is tailored to meet the needs of largely uneducated agrarian societies of Nigeria 
(and perhaps Africa) but adaptable to the educated class. We hope that this method be part of a 
robust long-term strategy for moral reform in Nigeria (and perhaps Africa) that aims at updating 
conscience formation and raising moral consciousness by building active moral communities, 
one village at a time. Part of that reform agenda includes the critical re-evaluation of our 
received traditions in the light of their relevance to meet present needs.  
                                               
816 As noted earlier we use this term to describe the interpenetration of the global in the local such that powerful 
nations and multinationals that have significant influence in other nations (like Nigeria) where they have interests 
can participate in a significant way in a reform agenda through their policies and actions.  
817 Part of that internal reform effort is the critical re-evaluation of received values encoded in behavior, practices, 
and symbols such that unhealthy aspects could be expunged and healthy practices retrieved or reinvented.  
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